Sagit Yehoshua

Insurgency & Terrorism Series
VOLUME 13



TERRORIST MINDS

From Social-Psychological Profiling to Assessing the Risk

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TERRORIST MINDS

From Social-Psychological
Profiling to Assessing the Risk

Insurgency and Terrorism Series

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TERRORIST MINDS

From Social-Psychological Profiling to Assessing the Risk

Sagit Yehoshua

Hebrew University in Jerusalem,
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To Michaela, my love

— Sagit Yehoshua

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Preface

The aim of this book is to explore the process of terrorist behavioural analysis, from the social-psychological profiling of terrorists to the development of risk assessment tools. Most of the research for this book was conducted with the cooperation of the Intelligence Department of the Israeli Prison Service (IPS), which enabled me to conduct qualitative, in-depth interviews with subjects in several prisons around Israel. There were a total of 18 participants, all of whom were leaders of the three major terrorist organisations in Israel and Palestine: Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The resultant social-psychological profiles are based on five main themes:

1. *Social influence factors*: Adolescence, family, social surroundings, the organisation, and their combined influence on the leaders' adjustment to imprisonment.
2. *Personality profile* of the leaders and whether they have symptoms of a psychopathic personality based on the Hare psychopathy checklist (PCL-SV).
3. *Mindset*: General perspectives such as rationalisations for committing terrorist acts, perceptions of the victims, Israeli society, and their actions in relation to the conflict.
4. *Leadership profile*: What kind of leaders are they? How do they perceive this position? How do they see their conduct and achievements

as leaders? Would they want to continue their leadership position outside of prison?

5. *Imprisonment*: The effect of the prison experience and their radicalisation or de-radicalisation process.

The main findings of this social-psychological profile suggest that the leaders of terrorist groups in Israeli prisons go through a unique process while incarcerated, that psychopathic personality profile was not found among them, and that their rationalisations for carrying out the terrorist acts are quite varied. Furthermore, this profile highlights the importance of the aspects of social surroundings and culture on the prisoners' mindsets and conduct, as well as on their adjustment to imprisonment and their radicalisation or de-radicalisation process.

More than a decade after establishing a social-psychological profile, it was possible for me to commence the next stage of the process — developing terrorist risk assessment tools, which would allow for better observation and practical management of the problem. This book explores this development in the field of terrorism, as well as within my own professional career.

About the Author

Sagit Yehoshua is a criminologist specialising in psychological profiling and risk assessment of terrorists. She completed her PhD thesis, titled 'The Social-Psychological Profile of Terrorist Leaders in Israeli Prisons' at King's College London University, in 2013. Her work involves years of researching and teaching the mindset and conduct of individuals and groups involved in terrorism and political violence. Sagit is a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (I.C.T.), Inter-Disciplinary Centre, Herzliya, Israel, and also joined The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King's College London as an Atkin Research Fellow in 2009. Currently, Sagit works as a lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, as well as the Interdisciplinary Centre (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel. She also works as a consultant for intelligence, commercial, and private security companies as well as a profiler and extremist risk assessor in Israel and internationally.

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I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Israeli Prison Service (IPS) and its intelligence department for their valuable cooperation, as well as two main funders of this longstanding project, entrepreneurs and philanthropists, Mr. Newt Becker, RIP, who believed in the importance of this work and its necessity but unfortunately died before its completion, and Miss Celia and Mr. Edward Atkin who believed in me and supported my efforts to finalise this work. I would also like to thank Professor John Gearson for his perceptive guidance. Finally, my dear cherished family, who never ceased to push me forward.

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Introduction

From Social-Psychological Profiling of Terrorist Leaders in Israeli Prisons to Assessing the Risks in Managing Them

What is it that truly motivates a terrorist? And how can we predict his or her future behaviour? The answers to these vital questions are many and varied, and each individual carries their own specifics. Yet, recent years have seen tremendous advances in the research and techniques used to answer such questions. This book explores the processes associated with terrorist behavioural analysis, from the social-psychological profiling of terrorists, through to the development of risk assessment tools.

Most of the research for this book was carried out between the years 2004 and 2006 with the cooperation of the Intelligence Department of the Israeli Prison System. The author conducted qualitative, in-depth interviews with 18 Palestinian leaders of terrorist organisations in prisons around Israel. The participants, who all freely agreed to take part in the research, were leaders of major terrorist organisations that operate in Israel and Palestine: Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Once the social-psychological profiles were established, the next stage was to devise terrorist risk assessment tools, ones that allow for better observation and practical management of the threat posed by such terrorists.

This book is a product of the author's accumulated research and professional experience, starting with her experience as a criminologist completing a Master's degree focusing on the personality profiles of the leaders of terrorist groups in Israeli prisons (Chapter 2), through her PhD thesis, and her work as a profiler, establishing the wider social-psychological profiles of these leaders. She then used her wide experience as a risk assessor of terrorists and extremists in prisons, as well as in other security, commercial, and governmental institutions. In these instances, she assessed the risk posed by individuals and advised on the measures required to minimise that risk.

This book explores the process and development of terrorists' behaviour in the last two decades from a social-psychological perspective. It starts by profiling the individual terrorist, as well as organisations and groups, in order to better understand the phenomenon from a social-psychological aspect. The book then proceeds to detail the practical method for assessing the risk they pose, which in turn allows for better management of the threat. This is elucidated through a discussion of the author's own experience during a period of extensive research. Namely, the author started with the aim of forming a better understanding of the conduct and mindsets of terrorists held in prisons by establishing individual, as well as group, social-psychological profiles. Over time, she also began assessing the effects of the prison experience on them, and conducted practical risk assessments of terrorists held in prisons, as well as in other security-related facilities around the world. The insights and skills the author gleaned in this one, very specific area thus yielded valuable and universal lessons that can benefit other disciplines in various relevant capacities, such as criminology, intelligence, or even politics and human resources.

Furthermore, this book fills gaps in the existing literature[1] relating to the psychology of terrorist group leaders in prisons by exposing the main

[1] Silke, A. (2001). The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13(4), 1–14; Silke, A. (2008). Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalisation. *European Journal of Criminology*, 5(1), 99–123; for more information regarding the insufficient research on terrorism, see Schmid, A. P. and Jongman, A. J. (1988). *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature*. Transaction Publisher, Chapter 3, pp. 137–139 and Chapter 4, pp. 177–185; Horgan (2004). The case of first-hand research. In: Andrew Silke (ed.), *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements & Failures*.

aspects of their social, professional, and personal lives, as well as their attitudes and perceptions. It will also expose the practical aspects of conducting risk assessments based on social-psychological profiling, and discuss relevant tools that have been developed in recent years. This information was gathered by first-hand interviews through repeated encounters with terrorist leaders, and hence makes an original contribution to the literature, as well as to the practice of counter-terrorism initiatives and policy-making by, hopefully, improving methods of communication, counter-terrorism, and conflict resolution.

The research for this book was conducted mainly in Israeli prisons and will present unique, first-hand information gathered during more than a year of interviewing leaders of the most active terrorist groups operating in Israel and Palestine — Hamas, Fatah, and Islamic Jihad. The data includes the leaders' life histories, thoughts, mindsets, attitudes, and social surroundings.

The data in this study are divided into five main categories, which ultimately form the foundation of the social-psychological profiles of the leaders:

1. Sociological influencing factors within the leaders' lives, comprising: adolescence, family, social surroundings, and the organisation, as well as the effect of these aspects on the leaders' adjustment to imprisonment.
2. Personality profiles of the leaders and assessment of whether they display symptoms of psychopathic personality based on the Hare psychopathy checklist (PCL-SV).
3. General perspectives, such as rationalisations for carrying out the terrorist acts, their perceptions towards these acts and the victims involved, as well as the Israeli society in general.
4. Leadership profile, including their perceptions of leadership, their decision-making process, difficulties, and ambitions.
5. The effect of the prison experience in general, and on their radicalisation or de-radicalisation process in particular.

Taylor & Francis, Chapter 2, pp. 30–56; as well as more updated edition of Schmid, A. P. (2011). *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research.* Taylor and Francis, Chapter 8, pp. 459–460.

The Focus of the Book and Main Foundation

This book focuses on terrorist leaders within Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as there is a particular need for knowledge and information about this group of leaders; they have major responsibilities and involvement in their respective terrorist organisations and their activities, and yet the literature related to these individuals is very limited. Worthy leaders are considered to possess extraordinary sets of qualities and, whether through charisma or extensive use of managerial skills, influence the organisation they are in charge of by encouraging development and progress. Furthermore, the literature regarding the psychological and sociological aspects of terrorism concentrates mainly on the individual terrorist or the group, and much less on the leaders,[2] while most available data relating to terrorist leaders consist largely of specific reports or profiles of certain leaders, with minimal examination of the broad social and psychological components of this group.[3] Furthermore, the leaders' social-psychological profile will serve as the initial step towards the development of a risk assessment method, which is a more practical tool for behaviour analysis, as well as counter-terrorism.

[2] Research on the social and psychological aspects of terrorism in general: Silke, A. (2003). *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences*. Wiley; Victoroff, J. I. (2006). *Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism*. IOS Press; Miller, L. (2006a). The Terrorist Mind. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 50(2), 121–138; Victoroff, J. and Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). *Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights*. 1st edition, Psychology Press.

[3] Examples of information on specific leaders can be found in: Bergen, P. L. (2006). *The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda's Leader*. Simon and Schuster; Show E. D. (2003). Saddam Hussein: Political Psychological Profiling Results Relevant to His Possession, Use, and Possible Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to Terrorist Groups. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 26(5), 347–364.

Literature Review

Definitions of Relevant Terms

Terrorism has always been a very complicated term to define, and even now, there is still no universal agreement on the definition of the concept. The lack of consensus is to some extent inescapable, given the heterogeneity of terrorist behaviours and conduct, and the variety of declared or assumed motivations, i.e. religious, ethno-nationalist, social, ideological, etc.[1] Malik details the factors that must be taken into consideration when attempting a definition of terrorism: the viewpoints of the actors, the nature of the act, whether it's a state or non-state activity, the objectives, the targets, the victims, the political and historical context, and the time or action, whether during a time of war, or during a period of peace. Accordingly, it seems that a universal definition of terrorism is mostly unmanageable[2]; or, as Laqueur expressed it in the late 1970s, simply impossible.[3]

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[1] Schmid, A. P. (1992). The Response Problem as a Definition Problem. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(4), 7–13; Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press, Chapter 1, pp. 13–44; Crenshaw, M. (2000). The Psychology of Terrorism: New Agenda for the 21st Century. *Political Psychology*, 21(2), 405–420; Cooper, H. H. A. (2001). Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited. *American Behavioural Scientist*, 44(6), 881–893; Ruby, C. L. (2002b). The Definition of Terrorism. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 2(1), 9–14.

[2] Malik, O. (2000). *Enough of the Definition of Terrorism*. Royal Institute of International Affair, pp. 1–2.

[3] Laqueur, W. (1977b). *Terrorism*. Boston: Little, Brown, p. 5.

Though the phenomenon of terrorism has occurred frequently throughout history, the term itself appeared relatively recently, in 1798, as a French term for abuse and wrongdoing inspired by the French revolution.[4] It reappeared in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s and, despite its definition being the subject of constant debate, the term has been used — and misused — by political actors and propaganda, often in conjunction with other concepts in order to extend its meaning or to condemn related phenomenon, e.g. 'cyber' or 'narco-terrorism'.[5] Hoffman even argues that the meaning of the term was further extended, mainly by the media, to describe any misconduct — for example, assassinations or poisoned supermarket products — even when such incidents have no relation to the actual parameters of the term, such as political aims or the use of actual violence.[6] In a famous study, Schmid and Jongman tried to establish a foundation for a broad definition for terrorism based on 109 definitions they found in the existing literature. They identified 22 main categories of definitions, including violence, political aims and fear, but the definition they eventually formed was itself complicated and regarded as inadequate.[7] It has also been argued that there is no need for a definition of terrorism, which is nothing but a violent crime.[8] However, especially following the terrorist attacks of September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) against the United States, there has been a growing number of attempts to define the concept of terrorism in order to allow governments and law enforcement agencies to collaborate effectively in handling the threat. Various states, such as Australia, Canada, the US, the UK, and South Africa, as well as

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[4] Laqueur, W. (1977a). *The History of Terrorism*. Transaction Publishers, p. 6.

[5] Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., *et al.* (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), 777–794.

[6] Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press, p. 1; Schmid, A. P. (1992). The Response Problem as a Definition Problem. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(4), 9–10.

[7] Schmid, A. P. and Jongman, A. J. (1988). *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature*. Transaction Publishers, Chapter 1, pp. 1–29; Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., *et al.* (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), 777–794.

[8] Malik, O. (2000). *Enough of the Definition of Terrorism*. Royal Institute of International Affair, p. 46.

international institutions such as the United Nations, have found it necessary to define terrorism according to their own perceptions. Most of these countries approached the definition in more general terms that cover broader aspects of terrorism, while some added more specific parameters in order to address violent acts occurring in certain regions, such as kidnapping or hijacking for ransom in South Africa.[9]

Since 1983, the US State Department has defined terrorism as: 'politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience'.[10] The three main elements of this definition are the political motivation, the target as non-combatant, and the perpetrators as non-state actors, which accordingly mean that nation states cannot be defined as terrorists when they commit political violence. Furthermore, Ruby has stressed that there are other important aspects such as the psychological, moral, legal, and behavioural elements of an act that need to be considered when defining acts as terrorism. Following the terrorist events of 9/11, other measures were taken by the US Congress and President George W. Bush to widen the definition of international and domestic terrorism in order to tackle the threat in light of the new events and needs.[11] The definition used by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation relates to these aspects

[9]All these varied definitions are detailed in Golder, B. and Williams, G. (2004) What is Terrorism? Problems of Legal Definition. *SSRN eLibrary*, pp. 270–295. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1351612; Malik, O. (2000). *Enough of the Definition of Terrorism*. Royal Institute of International Affair, p. 46; Ruby, C. L. (2002b). The Definition of Terrorism. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 2(1), 9–14; Saul, B. (2005). Definition of 'Terrorism' in the UN Security Council: 1985–2004. *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 4(1), 141–166.

[10]U.S. Department of State. (2000). Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf.

[11]Ruby, C. L. (2002b). The Definition of Terrorism. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 2(1), 9–14; Golder, B. and Williams, G. (2004). What is Terrorism? Problems of Legal Definition. *SSRN eLibrary*, pp. 277–278. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1351612; Crimm, N. J. (2004). High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its Implication for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy. *William and Mary Law Review*, 45(4), 1341–1451; as well as US Public Law (2001). 107th Congress Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, 18

of domestic and international terrorism, while taking into consideration the origin, base, and objectives of terrorist organisations.[12]

The UN general assembly, as part of its response to the events of 9/11, drafted a general definition of terrorism that principally referred to any person who commits an offence that causes death or seriously injures others or damages private or public property as a result, or means to cause economic loss, when the purpose of these acts are intimidation of others or influencing governments or international institutions to do an act or to refrain from doing an act. This definition is still in draft form and no consensus has been reached on this proposal yet. This lack of definition is to a certain extent deliberate as the UN advocates countries establishing their own definitions to address their specific needs without limitations from international authorities. Similarly, when initiating resolution 1737 to tackle terrorism financing, no precise definition of terrorism was provided, and hence any country could address the issue according to its own interpretations.[13]

Ganor argues that an objective definition of terrorism is crucial to any serious attempt to combat the phenomenon. He suggests that an objective definition should be based upon accepted international laws and principles regarding what behaviours are permitted in conventional wars between nations. Ganor's definition of terrorism seeks to overcome the notion that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter', introduced by Trotsky[14] in 1920 to highlight the problematic aspect of a terrorist's

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USC. Available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf.

[12]FBI — Federal Bureau of Investigation, C. division (2006). *Terrorism 2002–2005*.

[13]Saul, B. (2005). Definition of 'Terrorism' in the UN Security Council: 1985–2004. *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 4(1), 157–161; Golder, B. and Williams, G. (2004). What is Terrorism? Problems of Legal Definition. *SSRN eLibrary*, pp. 273–275. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1351612; United Nation Department of Public Information, DPI/2375E — January 2005; as well as Kassa, W. (2015). Rethinking the No Definition Consensus and the Would Have Been Binding Assumption Pertaining to the Security Council Resolution 1373. Flinders L.J., 17, pp. 127–128.

[14]Trotsky, L. (1920). *Terrorism and Communism* (*Dictatorship vs. Democracy*). Vol. 1, Chapter 4. New York: Worker Party of America. Available at: www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky; See also Laqueur, W. (1987). *The Age of Terrorism.* Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, p. 302.

identity. Ganor instead defines terrorism as 'the deliberate use or the threat to use violence against civilians in order to attain political, ideological, and religious aims'.[15]

This work was conducted in Israeli prisons, where the participants are prisoners who were charged with terrorism offences under Israeli law and sentenced accordingly. Israel lacks a written constitution; however, due to constant terrorism threats since its creation, specific legislation was initiated upon the state's founding in 1948 in order to deal with these challenges. Under the Israeli Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (PTO),[16] the definitions of a terrorist organisation, a member, and a leader are as follows:

- *Terrorist organisation* — A group of people who use violent activities or the threat of violent activities that can cause death to another person or an injury to that person.
- *A member of a terrorist organisation* — A person who is counted in a terrorist organisation, participates in its activities, publishes propaganda of the organisation, its activities and goals, or collects money or other material objects for the favour of a terrorist organisation and its activities.
- *Terrorist organisation's leading activist* — A person who plays a role in the leadership or the training team of a terrorist organisation, or participates in its committees or its decision-making process, or has a role in the terrorist organisation's court of law, or gives propaganda speeches in public assemblies or on the radio in the name of a terrorist organisation.

These definitions have not changed since 1948; however, over the years, amendments have been made to the legislation, such as the definition of

[15] Ganor, B. (2002). Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter? *Police Practice and Research*, 3(4), 287–304.

[16] See Appendix 5: Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance from 1948 (In Hebrew); See also Buhler, E. G. (2010). The Israeli Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance and Its Impact on the Quality of Democracy. *Stanford Journal of International Relations*, XI(2), 58–63.

people who support terrorism through actions,[17] including donating money or other instrumental needs, and speaking in favour of the terrorist organisation. Furthermore, Section 8 of the PTO[18] deals with the governmental declaration of what constitutes a terrorist organisation from a legal perspective, and who is considered to be an active member. Accordingly, the Israeli government published a list of terrorist organisations, which includes the three organisations discussed in this book: Fatah is number 8 on the list, Islamic Jihad is number 30, and Hamas is number 28.[19] Furthermore, Islamic Jihad and Hamas also appear on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) recognised by the US Department of State,[20] though Fatah does not due to its renunciation of terrorism during the peace process with Israel in 1993. However, as will be detailed further, Fatah continues with its militant activities, mostly through its military wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which does appear on the US Department of State's list. A short introduction to each of the three organisations will follow.

Fatah — Palestinian National Liberation Movement (in Arabic: *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini*)

Fatah is the largest and most established of the three Palestinian organisations detailed in this book and the only one that is secular, based mainly on national principals and goals rather than religious values. Fatah was established in 1959 by lower-middle class Palestinian refugees in Kuwait as a result of disappointment in the attitudes of other Arab countries to the Palestinian cause. These countries did not imbed the Palestinians' interests in their effort to deal with immense changes in the Middle East.

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[17] These amendments are from 1980 and later on in 2002, see Appendix 5: Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance from 1948.

[18] *Ibid*.

[19] The Israeli Ministry of Defence website from July 2019: https://english.mod.gov.il/About/Innovative_Strength/Pages/Fighting_Terror_in_the_Legal_Arena.aspx.

[20] The US Foreign Terrorist Organizations list from July 2019: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm; Hamas is number 5, Islamic Jihad is number 13 and the military wing of the Fatah, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, is number 24.

Another factor that triggered its inception was the failure of any formal Palestinian leadership to emerge after the founding of Israel in 1948. Fatah promotes ideas related to Palestinian identity and nationalism, which it considers to be essential for the liberation of Palestine through an armed struggle.[21] Nonetheless, Fatah was only acknowledged as an independent Palestinian political force after the 1967 'Six-Day' War with Israel, free from the external pressure of the defeated Arab countries. Fatah was led by Yasser Arafat,[22] who was one of the main founders and activists of the organisation, and its main leader until his death in 2004. Around this time, Fatah also established its first base in the West Bank, gaining strong support and cooperation from the Palestinian population from all over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as in the Palestinian diaspora.[23]

By the end of 1969, having taken over the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and become the most prestigious, dominant and institutionalised Palestinian national organisation recognised by the Arab states,[24] Fatah established its position as the umbrella for all Palestinian national organisations. By doing so, Fatah enhanced the group's political and social validity, and furthered its institutionalisation process, as well as the legitimisation of the Palestinian resistance.[25] Furthermore, in 1968, Fatah adopted the PLO's charter, created in 1964, and amended it to

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[21] Sayigh, Y. (1997). *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993*. Oxford University Press, pp. 80–92; Kurz, A. N. (2005). *Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle.* Sussex Academic Press, pp. 23–26; Baumgarten, H. (2005). The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948–2005. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 34(4), 25–48.

[22] For information on Yasser Arafat, see: Rubin, B. and Rubin, J. C. (2005). *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography.* Oxford University Press; Stefoff, R. (1988). *Yasir Arafat*. Chelsea House, Broomall, PA.

[23] Sayigh, Y. (1997). *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993*. Oxford University Press, pp. 155–158.

[24] For information about the PLO and its history: Hamid, R. (1975). What Is the PLO? *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 4(4), 90–109; Hilal, J. M. (1995). The PLO Crisis in Legitimacy. *Race & Class*, 37(2), 1–18.

[25] Kurz, A. N. (2005). *Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle.* Sussex Academic Press, pp. 57–59; Hamid, R. (1975). What Is the PLO? *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 4(4), 99–101.

account for its perception of armed struggle — and the destruction of Israel — as the only way to 'liberate' Palestine, assume full sovereignty and self-determination; whereupon the Jews who live in Palestine would be considered Palestinians and would live under Palestinian authority.[26]

Since the early 1970s, Fatah has gone through several different processes of mobilisation. It has moved its headquarters around various Arab countries and Palestinian territories, continued its armed struggle and also enhanced its legitimacy and political recognition. The constant struggle with Israel forced Fatah to consider the use of diplomacy in order to uphold its activism and sustainability. The outbreak of the first *intifada* (the Palestinian uprising) in 1987, however, was partially triggered by Fatah's failure to end the occupation, as well as the troubled political situation between Fatah and various Arab countries at that time. Additionally, other international circumstances challenged the organisation to take control over the uprising and to lead the way for the establishment of the peace process with Israel in 1993.[27]

Nevertheless, the peace process with Israel did not proceed as anticipated. Although in an April 1996 meeting, Fatah announced that it would change its charter, which calls for the destruction of Israel and supports the armed struggle, and the Palestinian National Council (PNC) voted in favour of the change,[28] it seems that these amendments have never been implemented. The proposed changes in the charter were alleged not to have been fulfilled by Palestinian and Israeli officials, since Fatah never

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[26] Cobban, H. (1984). *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics*. Cambridge University Press, p. 43; See also The Palestinian charter from 1968 (English version), online: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22573.htm.

[27] Kurz, A. N. (2005). *Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle.* Sussex Academic Press, pp. 18–22; Usher, G. (1995). *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence.* Pluto Press, pp. 1–3.

[28] Rubin, B. (1999). *The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building*. Harvard University Press, p. 96; Khalidi, A. S. (1996). *The Palestinians' First Excursion into Democracy*. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 25(4), 20–28; Schmemann, S. (1996). P.L.O. Ends Call for Destruction of Jewish State. *New York Times,* April 25. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/25/world/plo-ends-call-for-destruction-of-jewish-state.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.

disengaged completely from the armed struggle.[29] The Palestinians viewed the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) — now the 'Palestinian National Authority' within the Oslo accord[30] — as futile, as it would not lead to any security or prosperity.[31] By 2000, due to the failure of the peace process, as well as the formidable efforts of Fatah to attain a peace agreement with Israel, the second *intifada,* another Palestinian uprising, occurred. Fatah, which was now part of the PA, aspired to gain back its patronage within the Palestinian population by supporting the armed struggle and establishing the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, the military wing of the organisation, thus ending the peace process completely.[32] However, this did not lead to an increase in its popularity, due, according to Israel and US analysts, to the faction's apparent corruption and bad leadership; however, other factors thought to be responsible include deterioration as a result of Israeli actions against the Palestinian populations, as well as a decline in the socioeconomic situation.

By 2006, Hamas, another dominant Palestinian organisation, won democratic elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, thus changing the dynamics of the conflict completely and leaving Fatah badly damaged.[33] Following these elections, violence escalated between the two parties, leading to the separation of Hamas from the new coalition, thus

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[29]Clubb, G. (2009). *Re-evaluating the Disengagement Process: The Case of Fatah*. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 3(3), 25–34; Shragai, N. (1996). An Internal Fatah Publication: The Palestinian Charter Did Not Go Through Any Change. *Ha'aretz*, 22 April (in Hebrew).

[30]An agreement negotiated and initialled in August 1993 and finally signed in Washington in September the same year. It forms a declaration of principles for Palestinian self-governing arrangements in Gaza and Jericho. See Shlaim, A. (1994). The Oslo Accord. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23(3), 24–40.

[31]Turner, M. (2006). Building Democracy in Palestine: Liberal Peace Theory and the Election of Hamas. *Democratization*, 13(5), 739–755.

[32]Kurz, A. N. (2005). *Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle.* Sussex Academic Press, pp. 21–22; Frisch, H. (2005). Has the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Become Islamic? Fatah, Islam, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 17(3), 391–406.

[33]Mishal, S. and Sela, A. (2006). *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence.* Columbia University Press, p. xiii, preface to 2006 edition; Turner, M. (2006). Building Democracy in Palestine: Liberal Peace Theory and the Election of Hamas. *Democratization*, 13(5), 740–746.

creating two separate Palestinian autonomies, with Hamas controlling Gaza and the PA controlling the West Bank. Years after the split, attempts at reconciliation were made in 2011 and 2012 to no avail. Further reconciliation attempts were initiated in 2014 and 2017; the agreement established in 2014 led to the formation of a unity government, and in 2017 further efforts allowed the PA to gain back some government function in the Gaza Strip. However, these efforts failed miserably, and by early 2019 the unity government officially ended.[34] An introduction to the organisation, Hamas, now follows.

Hamas, Islamic Resistance Movement (In Arabic: *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamia*)

The second biggest Palestinian organisation, established in late 1987 at the outbreak of the first *intifada,* the Palestinian uprising, is a religious alternative to Fatah, and hence it represented a dramatic challenge to Fatah hegemony within the Palestinian arena. Unlike Fatah, which was initiated by, and operated for many years within, the Palestinian diaspora, Hamas emerged within the Palestinian Territories. Hamas was deeply involved socially with Palestinian society from 1945 as part of the Muslim Brotherhood, long before Hamas's formal creation.[35] The Muslim Brotherhood is a very dominant Islamic movement, which emerged in the late 1920s in Egypt, later spread to other Arab countries and Palestine, and was involved mainly in social and cultural activities within civil society.[36]

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[34]Rasgon, A. (2019). Abbas to appoint PM to lead new government 'within days,' Fatah official says, *The Times of Israel,* February 28, available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/abbas-to-appoint-pm-to-lead-new-government-within-days-fatah-official-says/; Tariq, D. (2019). The prolonged decay of the Palestinian National Movement. *National Identities*, 21(1), 39–55.

[35]For more information on the Muslim Brotherhood, see: Abu-Amr, Z. (1994). *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad.* Indiana University Press; Zahid, M. (2012). *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis: The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East.* I.B. Tauris, Chapter 4.

[36]Abu-Amr, Z. (1993). Hamas: A Historical and Political Background. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22(4), 5–19; Mishal, S. and Sela, A. (2006). *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision,*

Thus, the foundation of Hamas as the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood by Ahmed Yassin, then a dominant preacher of the Muslim Brotherhood,[37] and his colleagues required an organisational adjustment and justification to its initiation. Hence, Hamas was created originally as an independent organisation; arguably, had Hamas not enjoyed success fighting for the Palestinian cause via the uprising, the organisation would not have been recognised by the Muslim Brotherhood and may have been overlooked. Therefore, due to its massive support and operational successes, Hamas declared itself the military branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in its charter, which was written in 1988.[38]

Hamas's strength is based mainly in its roots in society — it participates in various charitable activities and builds religious and educational facilities;[39] but its political stance, described in its charter as resistant to the Israeli occupation, also gained Hamas much popularity and support while Fatah was trying to facilitate peace with Israel. Accordingly, Hamas was seen by Palestinian society as honest, uncorrupted, and a relatively moderate organisation that was fighting for a righteous cause.[40] Numerous, mostly Western scholars detail Hamas' strict perception of Palestine as an Arab/Muslim land and Zionism as an 'alien entity',

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Violence, and Coexistence. Columbia University Press, p. 16; Baumgarten, H. (2005). The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948–2005. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 34(4), 37–38.

[37] For more information on Yassin and his activism, see Mishal, S. and Sela, A. (2006). *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence.* Columbia University Press, pp. 19–20; Levitt, M. (2007). *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad.* Yale University Press, pp. 34–37.

[38] Abu-Amr, Z. (1993). Hamas: A Historical and Political Background. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22(4), 10–12; see also the Hamas charter, translated into English: https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/880818.htm.

[39] Zuhur, S. (2008). *Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics*. Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 6–7; Turner, M. (2006). Building Democracy in Palestine: Liberal Peace Theory and the Election of Hamas. *Democratization*, 13(5), 747; Malka, H. (2005). Forcing Choices: Testing the Transformation of Hamas. *The Washington Quarterly*, 28(4), 37–53.

[40] Milton-Edwards, B. (2007). Hamas: Victory with Ballots and Bullets. *Global Change, Peace & Security* (Online), 19(3), 301–316.

supported by Western countries.[41] It also advocated for Palestinians to have total sovereignty of the area based on the Islamic principles of the *Sharia*, the traditional Muslim law. Accordingly, based on this analysis, Hamas views the conflict with Israel as a conflict of faith and religion, rather than of nationalism and land, and believes that only by devotion to Islam will victory be achieved.[42] However, other scholars also stress the immense moderation process Hamas has gone through since its initiation, resulting in its eventual participation in democratic elections in 2006, as well as the de-escalation of violence and the negotiation of a *Hudna*, a temporary truce, with Israel. In view of this, national aspects are also being highlighted and dealt with pragmatically, suggesting a broadening of the primary focus of the organisation — religion and the Muslim faith.[43] Tamimi, a British Palestinian academic, claims that the image of Hamas in the West is unbalanced and tendentious, disregarding its social philanthropy and dedication to charity, as well as its struggle against an unjust oppressor.[44]

From 1994, Hamas expanded its operations and started using suicide bombing as a tactic, which increased its popularity among much of the Palestinian population and caused major panic within Israeli society. Nevertheless, this method was also found to cause damage to the image of the Palestinian struggle internationally, and hence required re-evaluation.[45] Hamas appears to have been going through a continual process of pragmatic change, realising that the current situation with Israel, a militarily strong and developed country, necessitates the use of pragmatic solutions.

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[41] Litvak, M. (1998). The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34(1), 148–163; Hroub, K. (2004). Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 33(4), 21–38; Levitt, M. (2004). Hamas from Cradle to Grave. *Middle East Quarterly*, XI(1), 3–15; Schanzer, J. (2003). The Challenge of Hamas to Fatah. *Middle East Quarterly*, X(2), 29–38.

[42] *Ibid*.

[43] Dolnik, A. and Bhattacharjee, A. (2002). Hamas: Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD? *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14(3), 109–128; Brown, N. J. (2006). In his report titled: *Aftermath of the Hamas Tsunami*. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/BrownHamasWebCommentary.pdf; Hovdenak, A. (2009). Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions. *Democratization*, 16(1), 59–80.

[44] Tamimi, A. (2007). *Hamas: Unwritten Chapters*. C. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd., pp. 1–3.

[45] Dolnik, A. and Bhattacharjee, A. (2002). Hamas: Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD? *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14(3), 114–115.

Hamas also keeps a constant balance between nationalism and religion in order to maintain its support base within the Palestinian population. These factors contributed to Hamas' decision to gain more legitimacy by becoming more overtly political and entering the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006, which culminated in a dramatic electoral victory for the organisation.[46]

Hamas' triumph and subsequent control over the PA emasculated the peace process with Israel due to the organisation's refusal to accept the requirements set out by the quartet of the US, EU, UN, and Russia — to recognise Israel, to acknowledge previous agreements between the PA and Israel and to stop terrorist activities completely, denouncing the use of violence. As a result, its electoral success was not acknowledged by the international community, and it was isolated diplomatically.[47] Furthermore, since Hamas gained control in Gaza, Palestinian society has stood on the edge of civil war, facing severe economic and social sanctions, though Hamas has found ways to adjust to the difficult situation and to overcome the challenges facing it. As was mentioned in the introduction to Fatah, quite a few reconciliation attempts were made to settle the rift with Fatah, but none were successful. Currently, Hamas is still in control of the Gaza Strip, employing advanced military capabilities, while constantly launching rockets towards the southern area of Israel and building offensive and defensive tunnels that run underground from Gaza into Israel and other influential places. These actions led Israel to conduct a few military operations in Gaza in 2008, 2012, and most recently in 2014, which resulted in major destruction of Hamas infrastructure and military capabilities. In spite of this retaliation, there has been no attempt to end Hamas' control over

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[46] Hroub, K. (2010). *Hamas — A Beginners Guide*. Second. Pluto Press, pp. 40–57; Hovdenak, A. (2009). Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions. *Democratization*, 16(1), 66–67; Gunning, J. (2004). Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation. *International Affairs*, 80(2), 233–255; Milton-Edwards, B. (1999). *Islamic Politics in Palestine.* I.B. Tauris, pp. 193–194.

[47] Brown, N. J. (2008). *The Road Out of Gaza.* Available at: https://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/brown_gaza_final.pdf; Hovdenak, A. (2009). Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions. *Democratization*, 16(1), 60–61; Turner, M. (2006). Building Democracy in Palestine: Liberal Peace Theory and the Election of Hamas. *Democratization*, 13(5), 249–251.

Gaza, and the organisation seems to maintain its ideological stand against Israel.[48] The third and last organisation that will be elaborated on further will be the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad — PIJ (In Arabic: *Harakat Al-Jihad Al-Islami fi Filistin*)

The smallest but most radical organisation among the three groups under consideration, and even among all other Palestinian terrorist organisations in general, PIJ was established by two Muslim Brotherhood activists from the Gaza Strip in 1981, Dr. Fathi Àbd al-Àziz Shiqaqi and Shaykh Àbd al-Àziz Àwda. Both objected to the common views of the Brotherhood towards the Arab–Israeli conflict that advocated primarily Islamic education and Muslim unity as the only elements that would enable the defeat of Zionism or any other enemy. They have been arrested and imprisoned by Israel several times for committing militant acts against the state of Israel. Both leaders were inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the militant Islamic movements in Egypt, which is where they obtained their education.[49] In an interview in 1999, Ramadan Àbdallah Shallah, the secretary general of the PIJ, who later became the leader of the organisation, argued that the conflict between Israel and the Arab world is a matter of right and wrong, and can never be changed. Accordingly, Israel will always aspire for an empire and total control over the Palestinians, and the only way to deter

[48]Yehoshua, S. (2019). Hamas. In: Silke, A. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. Routledge, UK; Abu Amer, A. (2018). Hamas: Between Unity with Fatah and a Deal with Israel. *Aljazeera,* August 28th. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/hamas-unity-fatah-deal-israel-180827144942247.html.

[49]Hatina, M. (2001). *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement*. The Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, pp. 23–28; Litvak, M. (2002). *The Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Background Information*, Tel-Aviv Notes, No. 56. November 28, The Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies and The Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel-Aviv University, pp. 1–2. Available at: http://www.dayan.org/sites/default/files/taunotes56.pdf%3B; https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/56.pdf; Abu-Amr, Z. (1994). *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad*. Indiana University Press, pp. 91–94; Milton-Edwards, B. (1999). *Islamic Politics in Palestine*. I.B. Tauris, pp. 198–208.

it is by armed struggle. Shallah claimed that his organisation realised this and therefore took the active military initiative in order to fight the occupation forces. Furthermore, this approach led to massive operations against the organisation and its leaders and activists by Israel and its allies, which forced PIJ to reorganise. In spite of that, Shallah insists that the PIJ is the third biggest Palestinian organisation and has strong support from Palestinian society, even though it focuses on the military aspects of the conflict and less on social involvement. He believes that the balance of power in the world is changeable and the conservation of the 'three noes' — no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel — will grow to be a dominant concept in the future.[50]

The PIJ started its armed operations in 1984 but, soon afterwards, in 1986 and later on in 1988, both leaders were arrested and exiled to Lebanon. For this reason, the organisation's attempts to lead the armed struggle during the first *intifada* failed. Nonetheless, Shiqaqi remained active in the leadership of the organisation until his assassination by Israel in 1995, disabling the organisation temporarily though new leadership was appointed under the name of Dr. Ramadan Àbdallah Shallah. The organisation never reached its initial aim of being centrally involved in the conflict.[51]

Due to its main leadership being situated in Lebanon, the PIJ established close ties with Hizballah — literally 'Party of God' — a Shiite militia group that also serves as a social and political party in Lebanon, initiated in the early 1980s as a resistance group to the Israeli invasion to Lebanon.[52] Hizballah supplied PIJ with training facilities and logistical needs. This enabled the organisation's infiltration into the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon to gain supporters and followers. It also

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[50]Shallah, R. Àbdallah and al-Àyid, K. (1999). The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 28(4), 61–73.

[51]Litvak, M. (2002). *The Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Background Information*. Tel-Aviv Notes, No. 56. November 28, The Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies and The Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel-Aviv University, p. 2; Alexander, Y. (2002). *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad*. Transnational Publishers, pp. 29–30.

[52]Addis, C. L. (2011). *Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress*. DIANE Publishing, pp. 1–9; for more information, see: Harik, J. P. (2005). *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*. I.B. Tauris.

facilitated close connections with Iran, which eventually became its main sponsor. Nevertheless, it remains a small organisation, comprising around several hundred activists, and seems to lack the support of the majority of the Palestinian population, mainly due to its lack of social activism within Palestinian society. However, the PIJ is responsible for the killing and injuring of numerous Israelis, mostly civilians, by attacks and suicide bombings. It completely rejected the peace process with Israel and, since 2000, it has been cooperating with Hamas and Fatah in order to commit more terrorist acts and damage Israel's security.[53]

Further, in recent years, Iran, PIJ's main patron, has been under severe economic stress due to American sanctions. Hence, it uses the PIJ to destabilise the region by firing rockets into Israel and destroying Egypt's efforts to calm Hamas, which seems to be unable to control the PIJ and thus is being dragged into conflict escalation.[54]

It seems that the three organisations detailed above are all driven by a national motivation to liberate Palestine. Nonetheless, they are different in their ideologies and perceptions. While Fatah is a secular organisation that focuses mainly on nationalism and the need for a Palestinian state, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are religious organisations that base their philosophy and activism on Islam and its doctrines. The relationships between the organisations, mainly Fatah and Hamas, have been quite tense since Hamas's initiation in the late 1980s, and the rivalry between them caused casualties on both sides. Nevertheless, since the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004 and the electoral victory of Hamas in 2006, these fraught relations escalated massively, resulting in Hamas taking over Gaza, separating the PA's control over the Palestinian territories.[55]

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[53] Hatina, M. (2001). *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement*. The Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African studies, Tel Aviv University, pp. 107–115; Alexander, Y. (2002). *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad*. Transnational Publishers, pp. 31–34; Shallah, R. 'Abdallah and al-'Ayid, K. (1999). The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 28(4), 62.

[54] Lappin, Y. (2019). Palestinian Islamic Jihad starts a fire in Gaza. *JNS Jewish News Syndicate*, May 4.

[55] See report of the Congressional Research Service, the Library of US Congress: Pina, A. D. (2006). *Fatah and Hamas: The New Palestinian Factional Reality*. CRS Report for

In 2012, an Israeli military operation named 'Pillar of Defence', the second one since operation 'Cast Lead' in 2008,[56] was undertaken to undermine Hamas's control over Gaza, targeting Hamas leadership and institutions.[57] In 2014, due to constant firing of rockets to the southern border, Israel launched another operation named 'Protective Edge' to eliminate the threat posed by the rockets, as well as the destructive tunnels created by Hamas to allow smuggling of weapons and lancing attacks on Israel.[58] Five years since that last IDF operation in Gaza, things seem to have deteriorated, as Hamas has managed to restore its rocket arsenal and uses it constantly against the southern border of Israel, where there are weekly protests along the fence, and burning of hectares of land.[59]

This book explores the social-psychological profile of the imprisoned leaders of these three terrorist groups by focusing on two main elements. The first element derives from the discipline of profiling, whereby the identification of similarities and differences between the terrorist leaders allows for certain inferences to be drawn regarding their present, or even future, behaviour and conduct. The second element comes from the discipline of criminology, which deals intensively with the effects of

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Congress, Order Code RS22395, 3 March, pp. 1–7. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22395.pdf; Klein, M. (1996, pp. 115–119) Competing Brothers: The Web of Hamas-PLO Relations. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 8(2), 111–132; Schanzer (2003, pp. 29–38).

[56]Information regarding 'Cast Lead' operation: Farquhar, S. C. (2009). *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*. Government Printing Office, Chapter 3, pp. 83–102.

[57]For full coverage of operation 'Pillar of Defence' in the Israeli media: *Ynet news* (2012). *News from Israel, Ynetnews — Operation Pillar of Defence* (online). Available at: http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-10544,00.html. For other resources: al-Mughrabi, N. (2012). Israel Hammers Hamas in Gaza Offensive, *Reuters*, 14 November. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/14/us-palestinians-israel-hamas-idUSBRE8AD0WP20121114.

[58]ICT, Database desk (2014). Operation 'Protective Edge': A Detailed Summary of Events, 7 December.

[59]Ahronheim, A. (2019). Five years after operation 'Protective Edge' deterrence has been lost, The situation on the southern front is anything but peaceful, *The Jerusalem Post*, 8 July.

prison on people and with their adaptation to imprisonment, and lastly with the development of risk assessment tools that allow for better practical management of these outcomes. Each element will be detailed further in the following sections.

Profiling

The first element at the heart of the theoretical framework of this book comes from the discipline of profiling, which is an interdisciplinary science that enables one to make assumptions about offenders based on their persistent behaviour traits. Another aspect of profiling explores the psychological similarities between certain types of offenders that can affect non-criminal aspects of the person as well, and relate to his general conduct.[60]

Turvey argues that the history of criminal profiling is somewhat malevolent and goes back to the 9th century, to ancient Roman times, when it was used to demonise Jews through the spreading of anti-Semitic claims, e.g. that Jews kill and eat Christians during their holidays. Later, in the 15th and 16th centuries, criminal profiling was used during the medieval inquisition to identify witches in order to persecute and punish them for their activities, and until the 18th century it was used by the Spanish inquisition to identify Jews and Muslims who falsely claimed to have converted to Christianity.[61] Others trace the history of profiling to fictional literature in the 18th and 19th centuries. Authors like

[60] Jackson, J. L. and Bekerian, D. A. (1997). Does offender profiling have a role to play? In: J. L Jackson and D. A Bekerian (eds.), *Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice*. England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, pp. 2–3; Holmes, R. M. and Holmes, S. T. (1996). *Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool*. Second Edition. Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 1–2; Petherick, W. A. and Turvey, B. E. (2011). Criminal profiling: Science, logic and cognition. In: *Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioural Evidence Analysis*. Academic Press, pp. 42–65; Shone, R. and Spender, N. (2008). *Solving Crimes Through Criminal Profiling*. Rosen Classroom, pp. 6–7; Grubin, D. (1995). Offender Profiling. *The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry*, 6(2), 259–263.

[61] Turvey, B. E. (2011). *Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioural Evidence Analysis*. Academic Press, Chapter 1, pp. 4–18.

Edgar Allan Poe,[62] Wilkie Collins,[63] and the famous example from the late 19th and early 20th, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle[64] with his creation of Sherlock Holmes, a brilliant yet peculiar scientist who solved murder cases by using criminal profiling.[65]

Criminal profiling emerged in real investigations around the same time in London, in the year 1888, by a forensic medical examiner named Thomas Bond who contributed to the case of the serial killer known as 'Jack the Ripper'.[66] Although this case was never solved, it raised awareness of profiling, and in World War II the US military asked Walter Langer, a psychoanalyst, to profile Adolf Hitler in order to understand his mindset and behaviour.[67] Since then, profiling has been used in a variety of cases — one famous, successful case was the story of the 'Mad Bomber' who terrorised the city of New York from 1940 for 17 years, and was caught after being profiled by a psychiatrist named James Brussel.[68]

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[62]Poe, E. A. (1887). *The Murders in the Rue Morgue: And Other Tales*. Worthington Company. An American Author who was known as the first author to publish a detective novel. The book was first published in 1841.

[63]Collins, W. W. (1860). *The Woman in White*. Bernhard Tauchwitz; as well as Collins, W. W. (1868). *The Moonstone.* Wordsworth Editions Ltd. A British author who was well known to be one of the first to create a fiction based on a detective who is also a psychologist specialising in human behaviour.

[64]Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan. (2012). *The Complete Sherlock Holmes: All 4 Novels and 56 Short Stories*. Create Space Independent Publishing Platform. The first novel was published in 1892, the second in 1894, and the other three were published in 1905, 1917 and 1927.

[65]Hicks, S. J. and Sales, B. D. (2006). *Criminal Profiling: Developing an Effective Science and Practice.* American Psychological Association, pp. 3–5.

[66]Shone, R. and Spender, N. (2008). *Solving Crimes Through Criminal Profiling*. Rosen Classroom, p. 44; Canter, D. (2004). Offender Profiling and Investigative Psychology. *Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling*, 1(1), 1–15.

[67]Hicks, S. J. and Sales, B. D. (2006). *Criminal Profiling: Developing an Effective Science and Practice.* American Psychological Association, p. 7; A similar project was completed in the United Kingdom by Professor Martyn Housden, at the University of Bradford, see: Housden, M. (2005). An Early Example of Personality Profiling: Henry A. Murray's Study of Adolf Hitler Written for the OSS. *Rutgers Journal of Law & Religion*, 2–17.

[68]Grubin, D. (1995). Offender Profiling. *The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry*, 6(2), 259–260; Brussel, J. A. (1968). *Casebook of a Crime Psychiatrist*. Bernard Geis Associates. Distributed by Grove Press.

In spite of its charm and popularity among investigators and law enforcement agencies, criminal profiling has often been criticized for a lack of scientific grounding, and hence, for not being reliable. Many scholars, as well as professionals, are quite sceptical as to its effectiveness, and therefore it is yet to be used universally.[69] Kocsis and Palermo detailed numerous weaknesses of this method, including its validity due to scarcity of information, the objectivity of the profiler and the use of intuition, as well as the actual utility of the method — what is labelled as 'profiling' is often simple common sense, and in many cases a profile can be irrelevant or over-generalised. They also stress the lack of homogeneity in the results of different methods and terminologies in the same field, and furthermore the absence of any regulation.[70] These criticisms highlight the need for further intensive research and development of the field of profiling; nevertheless, there is already better use being made of the various approaches of profiling according to the needs of different agencies or unique cases, such as diagnostic evaluation,[71] crime scene analysis,[72] and investigative psychology,[73] as well as geographic profiling,[74] among others.[75]

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[69]Bartol, C. R. (1996). Police Psychology Then, Now, and Beyond. *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, 23(1), 70–89; Muller, D. A. (2000b). Criminal Profiling: Real Science or Just Wishful Thinking. *Homicide Studies*, 4(3), 234–264.

[70]Kocsis, R. N. and Palermo, G. B. (2005). Ten Major Problems with Criminal Profiling. *American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry*, 26(2), 45–67.

[71]More scientific and relies mainly on clinical judgment. For more information: Copson, G. *et al.* (1997). Articulating a Systematic Approach to Clinical Crime Profiling. *Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health*, 7(1), 13–17.

[72]Developed by the behavioural science unit of the FBI, it is the popular method of profiling, which inspired numerous novels and movies. For more information: Muller (2000b, pp. 237–240).

[73]Developed by David Canter an academic psychologist who focused more on environmental profiling, Canter, D. (2004). Offender Profiling and Investigative Psychology. *Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling*, 1(1), 1–5.

[74]The analysis is based on the characteristics of the locations of the crimes and mobility of the offender. See: Holmes, R. M. and Holmes, S. T. (1996). *Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool*. Second Edition. Sage Publications, Inc., Chapter 10, pp. 148–165.

[75]Muller, D. A. (2000a). Criminal Profiling. *Homicide Studies*, 4(3), 234–264; Wilson, P. *et al.* (1997). Validity, Utility and Ethics of Profiling for Serial Violent and Sexual

Furthermore, criminal profiling is defined as 'a technique for identifying the major personality and behavioural characteristics of an individual based upon an analysis of the crimes he or she has committed.'[76] This aspect is essential in aiding the investigation of serious criminals, such as serial killers, sex offenders, and serial arsonists. These crimes tend to cause social panic and police can have difficulty comprehending the complexities of such offenders' motives and natures. By using the method of profiling, authorities might be able to understand the intricacies of these crimes.[77]

Holmes and Holmes describe the main output of profiling as three pieces of information that can be used by the criminal justice system: a social and psychological assessment of the perpetrator; the material possessions the perpetrator might have, which can link him to the specific crime; and recommended strategies for interviewing, in addition to investigation techniques that can be used by law enforcement officials.[78] Additionally, profiling is a dynamic method; it does not have to contain all these aspects and it does not apply to all kinds of crimes. The profiler usually works according to the needs of the law enforcement officials he/she is working with. While profiling was mainly initiated and used within crime divisions on cases involving murderers, sex offenders or arsonists, in recent years it has also been applied to terrorism, due to the extreme developments and the severity of the acts committed by terrorist organisations around the world, as will be elaborated further.

Offenders. *Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law*, 412; Holmes, R. M. and Holmes, S. T. (1996). *Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool*. Second Edition. Sage Publications, Inc., Chapter 10, pp. 7–8.

[76] Bennell, C. *et al*. (2008). What Skills are required for Effective Offender Profiling? An Examination of the Relationship between Critical Thinking Ability and Profile Accuracy. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, 14(2), 143.

[77] Holmes, R. M. and Holmes, S. T. (1996). *Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool*. Second Edition. Sage Publications, Inc., p. 2; Ainsworth, P. B. (2001). *Offender Profiling and Crime Analysis.* Illustrated edition. Willan Publishing, pp. 5–9.

[78] Holmes, R. M. and Holmes, S. T. (1996). *Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool*. Second Edition. Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 3–6.

Terrorists Profiling

In recent decades, profiling has also been used in studies conducted on terrorism and political violence. In the context of terrorism, investigative profiling seeks to examine the physical and behavioural features of an act of terrorism, and draws inferences about the potential characteristics of the person who committed the act.[79] One example of such research is the detailed sociological study conducted in the late 1970s by Russell and Miller, in which the sociological profile of a terrorist was developed based on terrorists from 18 different terrorist organisations between the years 1966 and 1976. They came up with some interesting findings relating to the social aspects of terrorism, such as gender, educational achievements, socioeconomic status (SES), marital status, etc.[80] Another example is Merari, a psychologist who established a profile of a suicide bomber. He gathered information from interviews of families of suicide terrorists and others who failed in their missions, as well as from newspapers and other resources. His profile reveals information about the demographic characteristics of suicide bombers, as well as personality aspects, mental illness, religion, and group dynamics.[81] This information assists in better understanding the phenomenon and further acquiring sufficient tools in order to deal with it.[82]

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[79] Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Become a Terrorist and Why?* Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf; Borum, R. (2004). *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida, p. 36; Dean, G. (2007). Criminal profiling in a terrorism context. In: Richard N. Kocsis (ed.), *Criminal Profiling*. Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, pp. 169–188; Horgan, J. (2008a). From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into Terrorism. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 618(1), 80–94.

[80] Russell, C. A. and Miller, B. H. (1977). Profile of a Terrorist. *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 1(1), 17–34.

[81] Merari, A. (2005). Suicide terrorism. In: David Lester (ed.), *Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Suicidal Behaviour*. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 431–454.

[82] Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. *Science*, 299(5612), 1534–1539.

Borum[83] emphasised that the difference between criminal profiling and terrorist profiling is that the information used in criminal profiling is from crimes that have already been committed, and that information helps to build a profile that will assist in catching the offender. However, in profiling in relation to terrorism, there is usually no need to identify the perpetrator, due to the fact that individuals behind most terrorist acts, as well as the terrorist organisations which send them, are quite keen to reveal their identity and, most importantly, their aims, by way of a statement. In cases like these, building a profile helps to further enrich the knowledge and understanding of the phenomena, which could even allow for predictions of future behaviour and manoeuvres of the profile subject — be it an individual or an organisation. Borum was sceptical of these wider applications of profiling and suggested that there is no place for such methods in relation to terrorism. Other researchers who attempted to develop a unique profile of terrorists have also had mixed success due to the variety of characters involved and lack of pathologies or criminal features among terrorists.[84]

This book will attempt to challenge this assumption and will also argue that profiling in relation to terrorist groups and individuals is a method that deserves far greater scholarly, as well as practical, emphasis. This reflects the belief that 'knowledge is power' and, particularly in cases dealing with data that could assist in the prevention of future acts of terrorism, it is crucial to consider such investigations as high priority. Understanding the mindset and conduct of individuals and groups involved in violent acts will enable us to make assumptions about their behaviour and future acts. Investigating the concept of leadership is also a key priority since, as Alderdice argues, the leader of any group is a strong and influential figure; therefore, it is as necessary to understand the psychological profile of terrorist leaders as it is any form of leader. Most

[83] Borum, R. (2004). *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida, pp. 36–38.

[84] *Ibid*.; For more information: Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf; Dean, G. (2007). Criminal profiling in a terrorism context. In: Richard N. Kocsis (ed.), *Criminal Profiling*. Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, pp. 172–176.

leaders share similar personality characteristics, which allows for an understanding of the social aspects and the psychology of the group involved, as well as its quality and conduct.[85]

Terrorists Social-Psychological Profiling

Social psychology is described as the 'scientific study of social human behaviour'[86]; it focuses on the psychology of human behaviour within social contexts. However, this definition is found to be too vague as it does not include important aspects of human behaviour, such as values, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions.[87] Allport's more specific definition may be applied more appropriately in the current query, and describes social psychology as: 'An attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling, and behaviour of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others'.[88] Furthermore, it has been argued that the study of human mindset and behaviour cannot be comprehensive without being linked to social science and human interactions.[89] The limitation of social psychology is its focus on the individual's interaction with the group, and hence makes the study of the phenomenon of wider groups difficult. However, it seems that there has been immense progress in the practice of social psychology and a change towards exploring wider

[85] Alderdice, L. (2007). The Individual, the Group and the Psychology of Terrorism. *International Review of Psychiatry*, 19(3), 201–209; An example of the major effects of the leaders' characteristics in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict by a psychoanalytic biography of the Israeli leader, Ariel Sharon, and the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat: Falk, A. (2004). *Fratricide in the Holy Land: A Psychoanalytic View of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, Chapters 3 and 4, pp. 36–86.

[86] Abrams, D. and Hogg, M. A. (1998). *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes*. Psychology Press, p. 8.

[87] *Ibid.* (p. 10).

[88] Allport, G. W. (1968). The historical background of modern psychology. In: Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology.* 2nd edition. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., pp. 1–80.

[89] McDougall, W. (2003). *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. Courier Dover Publications, p. 1.

groups in recent years.[90] This method is also criticised for not being scientific enough and for the major difficulties in conducting experiments in relation to this field of study due to a lack of objectivity and means to explore it. In response to this claim, the study of social psychology in relation to individuals and groups can be investigated scientifically by a variety of experiments that will reinforce each other. Additionally, as was expressed previously in this introduction, transparency in the research allows a clear understanding of all the aspects involved in the study of any phenomenon and also helps to avoid ethical barriers.[91] Hence, it was found to be the most suitable method to enrich the knowledge of the social and psychological aspects of terrorist leaders' lives.

The social-psychological profile of terrorist leaders in Israeli prisons will be assessed in this book through the evaluation of four distinct areas: (1) social influence factors; (2) personality characteristics; (3) mindset; and (4) the leadership role. This analysis is based on information obtained from primary sources and scholarly work, and each element will be elaborated further.

Social Influence Factors

The first element of the social-psychological profile refers to the effect of the leaders' social surroundings on their life circumstances and their decision-making processes. Different kinds of studies have investigated and emphasised the significant role of social factors, such as the family, peer groups, and educational institutions, from early childhood until adolescence, and in fact throughout adulthood, on individual development.[92]

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[90] Abrams, D. and Hogg, M. A. (1998). *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes*. Psychology Press, p. 3.

[91] *Ibid*. (p. 9); Lewin, K. (1939). Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology: Concepts and Methods. *American Journal of Sociology*, 44, 868–896.

[92] Examples of such research: Kahan, D. M. (1997). Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence. *Virginia Law Review*, 83(2), 349–395; with a focus on the social influence factors and criminal attitude: Graham, J. W. *et al.* (1991). Social Influence Processes Affecting Adolescent Substance Use. *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, 76(2), 291–298; Brooks-Gunn, J. *et al.* (1993). Do Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Development? *The American Journal of Sociology*, 99(2), 353–395; on educational

Hayward and Gorman point out that the social conditions of a child will play a vital role in determining much of his or her future circumstances, such as lifestyle preferences and exposure to unpleasant work conditions, as well as income and wealth aspects.[93] Furthermore, socioeconomic conditions and educational achievements heavily affect lifestyle behaviours such as smoking, drinking, diet, and physical activity.[94] Other social factors, such as family and peers, have a major impact on an individual's life choices relating to criminal activities, violence, drugs, and the use of alcohol. Consequently, criminologists have stressed the fact that social factors are the primary determinants of crime.[95]

It appears that terrorism is also highly affected by social factors; as Post, Sprinzak, and Danny emphasised during their research interviewing 35 terrorists in Israeli prisons, it was quite obvious that the most influential determinant for participating in terrorism was the social environment of their youth. Massive family support for and involvement in terrorism was common, and the peer group was even more important, as recruitment was most likely to be through an acquaintance or a friend.[96] More recent research on foreign fighter terrorists also emphasises the importance of the

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achievements: Israel, G. D. *et al.* (2001). The Influence of Family and Community Social Capital on Educational Achievement. *Rural Sociology*, 66(1), 43–68; with a focus on the effect on the person's well-being: Link, B. G. and Phelan, J. (1995). Social Conditions as Fundamental Causes of Disease. *Journal of Health and Social Behaviour*, 35, 80–94; Montgomery, M. R. and Casterline, J. B. (1996). Social Learning, Social Influence, and New Models of Fertility. *Population and Development Review*, 22, 151–175.

[93]Hayward, M. D. and Gorman, B. K. (2004). The long arm of childhood: The influence of early-life social conditions on men's mortality. *Demography*, 41, 87–107.

[94]Lynch, J. W. *et al*. (1997). Why Do Poor People Behave Poorly? Variation in Adult Health Behaviours and Psychosocial Characteristics by Stages of the Socioeconomic Life course. *Social Science & Medicine*, 44(6), 809–819.

[95]Farrington, D. P. and Welsh, B. (2007). *Saving Children from a Life of Crime: Early Risk Factors and Effective Interventions.* Oxford University Press, Chapters 3, 4 and 5; Loeber, R. and Stouthamer-Loeber, M. (1986). Family Factors as Correlates and Predictors of Juvenile Conduct Problems and Delinquency. *Crime and Justice*, 29–149; Brooks-Gunn, J. *et al*. (1993). Do Neighbourhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Development? *The American Journal of Sociology*, 99(2), 358–362.

[96]Post, J. M., Sprinzak, E. and Denny, L. (2003). The Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 15(1), 171–184.

social aspect on vulnerability to recruitment, and suggests that a person's behaviour largely depends on the society he or she grew up in, since it influences aspects such as ethics and values, as well as the person's attitude to life in general.[97] Thus, investigation of the social aspects of terrorists' lives is an indispensable task that will enable an understanding of the motivations and causes that lead these people towards committing violent acts.

Social aspects that will be discussed include: (1) details of the social and economic status of leaders' families, (2) leaders' marital and family status, (3) their experiences of adolescence, (4) their relationships with their families, and (5) the families' relationships to terrorism, as well as (6) their perceptions of terrorist organisations.

Socioeconomic status

A significant social factor that influences a person's development and future, and that is considered by social scientists to be one of the main foundations for opportunities in life, is his or her socioeconomic status (SES). There are difficulties in determining its exact definition; whether it refers to economic position or social status.[98] However, it seems that SES is best defined as a coalescing of family income, parental education, and occupational status and it keeps spreading as a universal pattern, despite the influences of other intervening social variables such as culture or immigration.[99]

Most people from low socioeconomic areas suffer from disadvantages in opportunities, education, and well-being.[100] Socioeconomic status is

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[97]Reganti, N. A. *et al.* (2017). *Understanding Psycho-Sociological Vulnerability of ISIS Patronisers in Twitter,* the 2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference.

[98]Entwisle, D. R. and Astone, N. M. (1994). Some Practical Guidelines for Measuring Youth's Race/Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status. *Child Development*, 65(6), 1521–1524; Brooks-Gunn, J. and Duncan, G. J. (1997). The Effects of Poverty on Children. *The Future of Children*, 7(2), 55–71; Bradley, R. H. and Corwyn, R. F. (2002). Socioeconomic Status and Child Development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 53(1), 371–399.

[99]White, K. R. (1982). The Relation Between Socioeconomic Status and Academic Achievement. *Psychological Bulletin*, 91(3), 461–481; Bradley, R. H. & Corwyn, R. F. (2002). Socioeconomic Status and Child Development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 53(1), 371–399.

[100]Lynch, J. W. *et al*. (1997). Why Do Poor People Behave Poorly? Variation in Adult Health Behaviours and Psychosocial Characteristics by Stages of the Socioeconomic Life

found to be the basis for other intervening factors such as collective socialisation, peer-group influence, and institutional capacity, which together determine the prospects available to a person. In many cases, low SES can lead to criminal behaviour, juvenile delinquency, or other kinds of antisocial behaviour.[101]

Johnstone[102] detailed the '*relative deprivation*' model, which deals with the impact of social surroundings on a person's life, referring to a high social status community in a mixed area as a hindrance for those who do not share the same privileged status. In these areas, the less fortunate in the community suffer from a low socioeconomic status, feel provoked by their affluent neighbours, and develop the need to create a deviant and criminal subculture in order to resist this injustice and provocation.

Furthermore, since the 'birth of international terrorism', as Hoffman[103] termed it, in 1968, when Palestinian terrorist groups began to hijack aeroplanes in Europe in order to promote their goals, and even more intensively after the terrorist attack on the US in September 2001, other researchers have tried to investigate whether there is a direct causal link between low SES and participation in terrorism; while both concepts are

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course. *Social Science & Medicine*, 44(6), 809–819; Brooks-Gunn, J. & Duncan, G. J. (1997). The Effects of Poverty on Children. *The Future of Children*, 7(2), 55–71; Walpole, M. (2003). Socioeconomic Status and College: How SES Affects College Experiences and Outcomes. *The Review of Higher Education*, 27(1), 45–73.

[101] Farrington, D. P. (1987). Early precursors of frequent offending: families, schools, and delinquency prevention. In: Glenn C. Loury and James Q. Wilson (eds.), *From Children to Citizens: Families, Schools, and Delinquency Prevention*. 1st edition. Springer, pp. 27–50; Jencks, C. and Mayer, S. E. (1990). The social consequences of growing up in a poor neighbourhood. In: L. E. Lynn Jr. and M. G. H. MeGeary (eds.), *Inner-City Poverty in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, pp. 111–185; Heimer, K. (1997). Socioeconomic Status, Subcultural Definitions, and Violent Delinquency. *Social Forces*, 75(3), 799–833; Brooks-Gunn, J. & Duncan, G. J. (1997). The Effects of Poverty on Children. *The Future of Children*, 7(2), 190–191; Bradley, R. H. & Corwyn, R. F. (2002). Socioeconomic Status and Child Development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 53(1), 377–378.

[102] Johnstone, J. W. C. (1978). Social Class, Social Areas and Delinquency. *Sociology and Social Research*, 63, 49–77.

[103] Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press, p. 178.

strongly related to participation in crime in general.[104] In addition, Berrebi[105] argues that it is reasonable to correlate varied research into economic theories related to crime[106] or to suicide[107] and, even more reasonable, participation in religious sects[108] with involvement in terrorism. This correlation emphasises the assumption that terrorism, like crime, committing suicide, and joining a religious sect, attracts the less fortunate and those who have much less to lose. Nonetheless, the results also point to a minimal connection between poverty, low education, and participation in terrorism.[109]

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[104] Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. *Science*, 299(5612), pp. 1534–1539. Maleckova, J. (2005). Impoverish terrorists: Stereotype or reality? In: Tore Bjørgo (ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*. Routledge, pp. 33–43; Newman, E. (2006). Exploring the 'Root Causes' of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29, 749–772; Pilat, J. F. (2009). The causes of terrorism. *Organisational Transformation and Social Change*, 6(2), 171–182; Taspinar, O. (2009). Fighting Radicalism, not 'Terrorism': Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined. *SAIS Review*, 29(2), 75–86; for more information about crime and its relation to terrorism: Shelley, L. I. and Picarelli, J. T. (2002). Methods not Motives: Implications of the Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism. *Police Practice and Research*, 3(4), 305–318; Makarenko, T. (2004). The Crime–Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism. *Global Crime*, 6(1), 129–145; Bovenkerk, F. and Abou Chakra, B. (2006). Terrorism and organised crime. In: Alex P. Schmid (ed.), *Forum on Crime and Society*. United Nations Publications, pp. 3–16.

[105] Berrebi, C. (2007). Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 13(1), 1.

[106] Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 76(2), 169–217; Witte, A. D. and Witt, R. (2000). Crime Causation: Economic Theories. *Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice*, 1–17.

[107] Hamermesh, D. S. and Soss, N. M. (1974). An Economic Theory of Suicide. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 82(1), 83–98; Yang, B. *et al.* (1992). Sociological and Economic Theories of Suicide: A Comparison of the U.S.A. and Taiwan. *Social Science & Medicine*, 34(3), 333–334.

[108] Iannaccone, L. R. (1997). Toward an Economic Theory of 'Fundamentalism'. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 153, 100–116; James III, R. N. and Sharpe, D. L. (2007). The 'Sect Effect' in Charitable Giving: Distinctive Realities of Exclusively Religious Charitable Givers. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 66(4), 697–726.

[109] Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. *Science*, 299(5612), 1534–1539; Krueger, A. B. and Maleckova, J. (2003). Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(4), 119–144; Maleckova, J. (2005). Impoverish terrorists: Stereotype or reality? In: Tore Bjørgo (ed.), *Root Causes*

Moreover, Krueger and Maleckova[110] claim that over-emphasising this connection only causes a disregard for the real roots of terrorism.

Examples of such an attempt to connect social as well as economic factors with terrorism can be found in the study of Russell and Miller[111] from the late 1970s, which sought to establish a demographic profile of a typical terrorist from a sample of more than 350 people engaged in terrorism. The information was gathered from newspapers and the terrorists researched were active in the period 1966–1976. They were from different parts of the world, including Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and from different types of organisations, such as the IRA, the Baader-Meinhof, and the Japanese Red Army. According to this research, the majority of the terrorists investigated came from middle- or upper-class families and had some university education, either as undergraduate or post-graduate students.

Nasra Hassan[112] also found that of almost 250 members of the most militant Palestinian groups she interviewed, the vast majority were well educated, from middle-class families, and held a profitable job. Furthermore, Krueger and Maleckova[113] concluded that well-educated and affluent people will probably be more interested and will have the means and expertise to get involved in politics, and therefore, with the right circumstances and opportunities, might decide to get involved in terrorism. Moreover, it seems that terrorist organisations prefer to recruit these types of people, as they

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of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. Routledge, pp. 33–43; Newman, E. (2006). Exploring the 'Root Causes' of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29, 769–770; Berrebi, C. (2007). Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 13(1), 3–4.

[110] Krueger, A. B. and Maleckova, J. (2009). Does poverty cause terrorism? In: Jeff Victoroff and Arie W. Kruglanski (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights*. 1st edition. New York and Hove: Psychology Press, pp. 201–210.

[111] Russell, C. A. & Miller, B. H. (1977). Profile of a Terrorist. *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 1(1), 17–34.

[112] Hassan, N. (2001). An Arsenal of Believers — Talking to the 'Human Bombs'. *The New Yorker*, 19 November, p. 2.

[113] Krueger, A. B. and Maleckova, J. (2009). Does poverty cause terrorism? In: Jeff Victoroff and Arie W. Kruglanski (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights*. 1st edition. New York and Hove: Psychology Press, pp. 209–210.

have more expertise and the capabilities to implement the acts needed. On the other hand, the development and conduct of Daesh (The Islamic State) in recent years marks a dramatic change in the social profile of terrorists due to their new recruitment tactics of addressing the deprived and more challenged people in society, and those who lack a sense of identity or belonging and are looking for self-empowerment and rewards.[114]

Adolescence

The period of adolescence is the stage between childhood and adulthood, and is a very complex and dramatic phase in a person's life[115]; a period of developmental transition, where there is a significant change within both the individual and his social environment.[116] Hall is recognised as the first commentator to acknowledge this unique phase as worthy of further scientific research. He described it as a very conflicted period involving confusion between dichotomist aspects, as well as physical and psychological turmoil — the 'storm and stress' period.[117] Moreover, Hall[118]

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[114]Drăgoi, A.-E. (2018). Dabiq: The Role of Daesh's Jihadist Manifesto in the Violent Radicalisation Process. *Romanian Journal of Society & Politics*, 13(2), 52–64.

[115]Lerner, R. M. (1993). Early adolescence: toward an agenda for the integration of research, policy, and intervention. In: *Early Adolescence: Perspectives on Research, Policy, and Intervention*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 1–13; Lerner, R. M. and Galambos, N. L. (1998). Adolescent Development: Challenges and Opportunities for Research, Programs, and Policies. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49, 413–446; Dubas, J. S. *et al*. (2003). The study of adolescence during the 20th century. *The History of the Family*, 8(3), 375–397; Gowers, S. (2005). Development in Adolescence. *Psychiatry*, 4(6), 6–9.

[116]Petersen, A. C. (1988). Adolescent Development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 39, 583–607; Kimmel, D. C. and Weiner, I. B. (1994). *Adolescence: A Developmental Transition*. Second Edition. Wiley, p. 24; Lerner, R. M. & Galambos, N. L. (1998). Adolescent Development: Challenges and Opportunities for Research, Programs, and Policies. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49, 414.

[117]Hall, G. S. (1904). *Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education*. New York: D. Appleton & Company, vol. 1, pp. 555–589. Available at: http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/2004-20104-000/; for more information: Arnett, J. J. (1999). Adolescent Storm and Stress, Reconsidered. *American Psychologist*, 54(5), 317–326.

[118]Arnett, J. J. (1999). Adolescent Storm and Stress, Reconsidered. *American Psychologist*, 54(5), 338–388; Hall, G. S. (1904). *Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to*

distinguished the importance of environmental factors during this period; elements such as peer group and family issues play a major role in affecting and shaping an adolescent's conduct and behaviour. However, the study of adolescence has gone through a remarkable change since Hall's seminal work.[119] By mid-century, the pattern had altered with researchers noticing more positive aspects of adolescence. Anna Freud[120] elaborated on Hall's theory by explaining that complexity and turmoil are necessary and influential aspects in the adolescent's normal healthy development. Furthermore, Erikson[121] emphasises the crucial development of the person's identity during this period, particularly with regard to the development of self-determination and personal goals. Accordingly, an important developmental aspect of adolescence is the aspiration towards occupational goals for the future, which are found to be strong predictors for their professional attainments as adults.[122] Nevertheless, Mead[123] asserts that it is not altogether necessary to go through turmoil and complication during adolescence; notwithstanding some inevitable difficulties, most adolescents manage to go through this transition period relatively smoothly.[124]

Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology Sex, Crime, Religion and Education. New York: D. Appleton & Company, vol. 2, Chapter XV, pp. 363–448.

[119]Hall, G. S. (1904). *Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education*. Vols. 1 and 2. New York: D. Appleton & Company.

[120]Freud, A. (1958). Adolescence. *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*. 13, 255–278.

[121]Erikson, E. H. (1968). *Identity: Youth and Crisis [Chapter 3]*. Norton. New York, pp. 91–135.

[122]Schoon, I. and Parsons, S. (2002). Teenage Aspirations for Future Careers and Occupational Outcomes. *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, 60(2), 262–288; Hirschi, A. and Vondracek, F. W. (2009). Adaptation of Career Goals to Self and Opportunities in Early Adolescence. *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, 75(2), 120–128.

[123]Two researches relating to adolescence in Samoa and New Guinea: Mead, M. (1950). *Coming of Age in Samoa*. New American Library. New York; and (1953) *Growing Up in New Guinea.* New American Library, New York.

[124]For more information: Douvan, E. A. M. and Adelson, J. (1966). *The Adolescent Experience.* New York: Wiley, pp. 80–85; Offer and Schonert-Reichl (1992). Debunking the Myths of Adolescence: Findings from Recent Research. *Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry*, 31(6), 1003–1014; Lerner, R. M. and Steinberg, L. D. (2004). *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*. John Wiley and Sons, mainly part one, pp. 15–155 and part two, pp. 299–487.

Since the mid-1970s, there has been a dramatic increase in the interest of scholars and researchers in the field of adolescence. The wave of new investigations and research focused on external processes such as social development, the importance of the family and the peer group, as well as the effect of the person's social surroundings in general.[125] These studies have established that the basic process of development in adolescence comprises both negative and positive outcomes of the transition from childhood to adulthood.[126] One of the negative aspects of this emotionally unstable period is its reinforcement of the probability of involvement in different criminal activities and juvenile delinquency, such as theft, violence, vandalism, and drug abuse.[127] Learner and Steinberg[128] listed risk factors that are found to influence the potential for aggression and antisocial behaviour during adolescence, such as personality, low IQ, and low educational achievement, disputed or large families, as well as problematic parents, socioeconomic factors, peer groups, school, and community influence. According to these researchers, those risk factors affect the immediate situation depending on situational factors as well as the presence of opportunity and victims.[129]

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[125]Petersen, A. C. (1988). Adolescent Development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 39, 583–607; Offer and Schonert-Reichl (1992). Debunking the Myths of Adolescence: Findings from Recent Research. *Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry*, 31(6), 1003–1014; Lerner, R. M. and Galambos, N. L. (1998). Adolescent Development: Challenges and Opportunities for Research, Programs, and Policies. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49, 413–446.

[126]Eccles, J. *et al.* (1997). The association of school transitions in early adolescence with developmental trajectories through high school. In: J. Schulenberg *et al*. (eds.), *Health Risks and Developmental Transitions during Adolescence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 283–320; Lerner, R. M. and Galambos, N. L. (1998). Adolescent Development: Challenges and Opportunities for Research, Programs, and Policies. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49, 416.

[127]Hirschi, T. (1969). *Causes of Delinquency*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Lerner, R. M. and Steinberg, L. D. (2004). *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*. John Wiley & Sons, p. 632.

[128]Lerner, R. M. and Steinberg, L. D. (2004). *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*. John Wiley and Sons, pp. 636–646.

[129]For more information, see also: Farrington, D. P. (1987). Early Precursors of Frequent Offending: Families, Schools, and Delinquency Prevention. In: Glenn C. Loury and James Q. Wilson (eds.), *From Children to Citizens: Families, Schools, and Delinquency*

Marital and family status

Socioeconomic disadvantage can also be linked to overcrowded and large families.[130] Previously, lack of awareness and knowledge of contraception and the inability to acquire it were considered the main reasons for this correlation. However, Freedman[131] suggests that the arrival of urbanisation and industrialisation allowed more people to become involved in the global world, to acquire education and general knowledge, and therefore to become more aware of this issue. Yet, in more traditional and patriarchal societies, where males are dominant and women have less autonomy in terms of freedom of movement and finance, it is probable that there will be more desire for children and less awareness of the means to prevent pregnancy.[132] Caldwell[133] argues that among all religions, Islam is the most patriarchal, founded on principles of male domination in the family; accordingly, there is an extremely high birth rate among Muslims.

Furthermore, there is a cultural and religious debate within Muslim society over how to define family planning within the five human action categories in Islamic legislation: obligatory, recommended, permitted,

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Prevention. 1st edition. Springer, pp. 27–50; Agnew, R. (2009). *Juvenile Delinquency — Causes and Control*. Third. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, Parts 2 and 3.

[130]Rutter, M. (1980). *Changing Youth in a Changing Society: Patterns of Adolescent Development and Disorder*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, Chapter 4, pp. 201–202; Lanjouw, P. and Ravallion, M. (1995). *Poverty and Household Size*. *The Economic Journal*, 105(433), 1415–1434; Iacovou, M. and Berthoud, R. (2006). *The Economic Position of Large Families*. Research report, Department for Work and Pensions, no. 358, Leeds: Great Britain.

[131]Freedman, D. S. (1963). The Relation of Economic Status to Fertility. *The American Economic Review*, 53(3), 414–426.

[132]Morgan, S. P. *et al.* (2002). Muslim and Non-Muslim Differences in Female Autonomy and Fertility: Evidence from Four Asian Countries. *Population and Development Review*, 29(3), 515–537.

[133]Caldwell, J. C. (1986). Routes to Low Mortality in Poor Countries. *Population and Development Review*, 12(2), 171–220.

disapproved but not forbidden, or absolutely forbidden.[134] Omran explains[135] that, apart from worship, Islam serves as a cultural, civil, and social system, and therefore Islamic legislation deals with all human needs and concerns. Family planning is considered one of these basic needs and thus is dealt with sensitively and with care; therefore, it is not approved of but is also not forbidden.[136] However, radical Islamic people contest this perception, claiming that Islam's strength is in its numbers, and having children is a religious duty. Extremists even assert that contraception is a conspiracy of the West to reduce Muslim populations.[137] In addition, according to Hasna's[138] research, Muslim men collectively feel that family planning programmes are a threat to the progeny and thus to the patriarchal system they grew up and believe in. Moreover, Hasna[139] also discovered that, among Palestinian refugees, fertility serves as means to reclaim lost honour.

In regard to marital status and terrorism, most research indicates that the majority of terrorists are single due to the difficulties of combining caring for a family with involvement in activities that require unusual working hours and a huge risk to life.[140] Hoffman's interesting case study

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[134] Sachedina, Z. (1990). Islam, Procreation and the Law. *International Family Planning Perspectives*, 16(3), 111–137; Hasna, F. (2003). Islam, Social Traditions and Family Planning. *Social Policy and Administration*, 37(2), 181–197.

[135] Omran, A. R. (1992). *Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam*. 1st edition. Routledge; A book, which is a result of a massive research project, gathering fourteen centuries (the seventh to the twentieth) of views on family formation and planning, as expressed by leading Islamic theologians and jurists.

[136] See also Sachedina, Z. (1990). Islam, Procreation and the Law. *International Family Planning Perspectives*, 16(3), 182–184.

[137] Omran, A. R. (1992). *Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam*. 1st edition. Routledge, p. 31.

[138] Hasna, F. (2003). Islam, Social Traditions and Family Planning. *Social Policy and Administration*, 37(2), 183.

[139] *Ibid*.

[140] Russell, C. A. and Miller, B. H. (1977). Profile of a Terrorist. *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 1(1), 31; Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Become a Terrorist and Why?* pp. 55–59. Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf; Reinares, F. (2009). Who are the terrorists? Analysing

examining these elements[141] details the efforts made by Yasser Arafat, the former chairman of the PLO — 'Fatah', the Palestine Liberation Organization — to eliminate one of their military branches called the 'Black September Organisation', during the 1970s, when they were no longer needed. Arafat decided to give them a good reason not to be involved in terrorism any more. He arranged for all of them to get married and receive financial benefits; he even promised them a reward if they had a baby within a year. The project succeeded beyond expectations. The former terrorists fell in love, settled down and raised families, and later refused to go abroad, even for non-violent missions. Nevertheless, it seems that such factors may have different impacts in other circumstances, as Bekker[142] details in his extensive report about 'jihadi' networks in Europe. He found no pattern in family status among his subjects, with married, single, and divorced people spread equally among the 28 'jihadi' networks he investigated. The exception was one particular network that contained only very young people who were all single at the time of their arrest. Later research that explores leaked documents of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF), who went and joined the conflict in Syria, found that among the 759 Saudi Arabian FTF, 73% of them declared their status as single and only 18% as married. That can be explained by the relatively young age of these FTF, 65% of whom were younger than 24.[143]

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changes in sociological profile among members of ETA. In: Jeff Victoroff and Arie W. Kruglanski (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism — Classic and Contemporary Insights*. New York and Hove: Psychology Press, pp. 227–246.

[141] Hoffman, B. (2001). All You Need is Love — How the Terrorists Stopped Terrorism. *Atlantic Magazine*, 288(5), 34–37.

[142] Bekker, E. (2006). *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe — Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study*, p. 32. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20061200_cscp_csp_bakker.pdf.

[143] Al Saud, A.b.K. (2019). *Saudi Foreign Fighters: Analysis of Leaked Islamic State Entry Documents*, ICSR, King's College London, p. 11. Available at: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ICSR-Report-Saudi-Foreign-Fighters-Analysis-of-Leaked-Islamic-State-Entry-Documents.pdf.

Relations with the family

In the past, the concept of family was defined mainly as the individual's biological and legal ties.[144] However, today, family is a broader notion perceived as the 'key socioeconomic unit in society' and can apply to a group of people sharing a home and identity while experiencing their history, as well as their future, together.[145] Furthermore, in addition to the neighbourhood and social surroundings, which were detailed in the beginning of this chapter as one of the key aspects determining a person's quality of life and opportunities, the family is the first and closest entity he encounters and thus has a vital effect on his existence.[146] Over time, it is also likely to determine his general behaviour and the choices he will make regarding every aspect of his life, such as education, occupation, social behaviour, and well-being.

Hence, relations within the family and the dynamics between family members play a major role in shaping the personality and attitude of a person towards life in general and his coping abilities in particular.[147] Within Arab society, which is distinguished as a traditional and hierarchical culture, family also plays a dominant role in a person's life by determining the person's religious, class, and cultural associations, along with

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[144] Murdock, G. P. (1949). *Social Structure*. New York and Hove: Macmillan, pp. 1–22; Fitzpatrick, M. A. and Vangelisti, A. L. (1995). *Explaining Family Interactions.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

[145] Alesina, A. F. and Giuliano, P. (2009). Family Ties and Political Participation. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series*. No. 15415. Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15415.

[146] Burgess, E. W. and Locke, H. J. (1945). *The Family: From Institution to Companionship*. New York: American Book, part 2, pp. 209–239.

[147] McCord, J. (1991). Family Relationships, Juvenile Delinquency and Adult Criminality. *Criminology*, 29(3), 397–417; Examples for other general outcomes of family relationships, such as coping abilities, attachments and self-identity, can be found in: Bernard, M. L. and Bernard, J. L. (1983). Violent Intimacy: The Family as a Model for Love Relationships. *Family Relations*, 32(2), 283–286; Grotevant, H. D. and Cooper, C. R. (1985). Patterns of Interaction in Family Relationships and the Development of Identity Exploration in Adolescence. *Child Development*, 56(2), 415–428; Arditti, J. A. (1999). Rethinking Relationships between Divorced Mothers and Their Children: Capitalizing on Family Strengths. *Family Relations*, 48(2), 109–119.

providing security and support in times of need.[148] Barakat[149] explains that the roots of the word 'family' in Arabic (*alia* or *usra*) means 'to support' while the very concept of it reflects the shared commitment and responsibility of the family members towards the family as a whole. Evidence of this can be seen in the concept of 'crimes of honour,'[150] which emphasises the impact of an act committed by one family member on the whole family. The hierarchical structure of Arab families is based on sex and age; the oldest members are respected and considered superior to the youngsters, and men are considered superior to women. The father is positioned at the top of the pyramid in the role of breadwinner or provider. Thus, fathers have the authority in the family and expect respect and total obedience from all other members in the family. The mothers function as housewives, subordinated to their husbands and to the maintenance of the house. They also have total responsibility for the children who, accordingly, are much closer to their mothers than to their fathers. Furthermore, there are strong family and kinship ties with solid bonds going back generations.[151]

Significantly, as described above, Arab society leans on traditional and hierarchical values that in most cases are intensively enforced; nonetheless, it seems that Arab society is going through a process of

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[148] Al-Haj, M. (1987). *Social Change and Family Processes: Arab Communities in Shefar-a'm*. 1st Edition. Westview Press Inc., p. 4; Haj-Yahia, M. M. (1995). Toward Culturally Sensitive Intervention with Arab Families in Israel. *Contemporary Family Therapy*, 17(4), 429–447; Moghadam, V. M. (2004). Patriarchy in Transition: Women and the Changing Family in the Middle East. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 35, 137–162.

[149] Barakat, H. (1993). *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State*. University of California Press, p. 98.

[150] Crimes of honour, defined as sexual indiscretion by a female, dishonour her family and need to be punished by death, see Nesheiwat, F. K. (2004). Honour Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal Laws. *Penn State International Law Review*, 23(2), 253; Baxi, P. *et al*. (2006). Legacies of Common Law: 'Crimes of Honour' in India and Pakistan. *Third World Quarterly*, 27(7), 1239–1253.

[151] Barakat, H. (1993). *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State*. University of California Press, p. 102; Haj-Yahia, M. M. (1995). Toward Culturally Sensitive Intervention with Arab Families in Israel. *Contemporary Family Therapy*, 17(4), 431; Moghadam, V. M. (2004). Patriarchy in Transition: Women and the Changing Family in the Middle East. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 35, 137–138.

transformation — a result of economic, educational, social, and cultural changes in the world.[152] Traditional practices, such as arranged marriages, are being replaced by imported ones, and cultural values of the status and role of the family are losing their importance.

Apart from modern social influences on the Arab-Palestinian society mentioned above, another influential aspect of the Palestinian family is the ongoing conflict with Israel since 1947.[153] Most studies dealing with the effects of stress, trauma, or violence experienced by children suggest that the consequences of these aspects on the development and conduct of these children, as well as on the quality of their family relations, are largely negative.[154] However, in the case of experiencing stress and trauma as an outcome of political violence, it seems that there is no definite opinion on the impact. Some researchers have argued that, due to the brutal events that children are exposed to during political conflicts, and their severity and frequency, most children are diagnosed with various physical or mental nuisances, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, antisocial behaviour, and other psychological and behavioural disturbances.[155]

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[152] Al-Haj, M. (1989). Social Research on Family Lifestyles among Arabs in Israel. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 20, 175–195; Laqueur, W. (1958). *The Middle East in Transition*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 196–197; Haj-Yahia, M. M. (1995). Toward Culturally Sensitive Intervention with Arab Families in Israel. *Contemporary Family Therapy*, 17(4), 429; Moghadam, V. M. (2004). Patriarchy in Transition: Women and the Changing Family in the Middle East. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 35, 152.

[153] For information about the Arab Israeli conflict: Bregman, A. (2000, 2002) *Israel's Wars, 1947–93*. Routledge; and *Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947*. Routledge; Bregman, A. and El-Tahri, J. (1999, 2000) *50 Years' War.* TV Books; and *Israel and the Arabs: An Eyewitness Account of War and Peace in the Middle East.* TV Books.

[154] Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial Resilience and Protective Mechanisms. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 57(3), 316–331; Weingarten, K. (2004). Witnessing the Effects of Political Violence in Families: Mechanisms of Intergenerational Transmission and Clinical Interventions. *Journal of Marital and Family Therapy*, 30(1), 45–59; Matsakis, A. (2004). Trauma and its impact on families. In: Donald Roy Catherall (ed.), *Handbook of Stress, Trauma, and the Family*. Routledge, pp. 12–27.

[155] Baker, A. M. (1991). Psychological Response of Palestinian Children to Environmental Stress Associated with Military Occupation. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 4(3), 237–247;

On the other hand, other studies suggest that the influence of political violence on the conduct and well-being of children and families can be less severe than anticipated, with children developing resilience to the harsh events and circumstances.[156] This resilience is best explained by drawing attention to the effect of ideological commitment to the cause, social, cultural, and family support, as well as the deep psychological meaning of the conflict.[157] In addition, in the case of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Punamäki, Qouta, and El-Sarraj[158] detail that Palestinian children gain support and admiration from their families, especially from their mothers, due to their participation in the political conflict. They also experience mutual understanding of the importance and meaning of the conflict, which cause the families to be united in the face of the struggle. These positive aspects related to the families are also a positive defence for these children against the trauma caused by exposure to violence. Furthermore, parents and family relations are crucial to a child's adjustment and development after conflict or traumatic events; harmonic relations in the family and loving parents will allow the child to develop positively with fewer negative symptoms. In contrast, negative parental relations and family dynamics can make the child vulnerable to post-traumatic stress symptoms.[159]

Qouta, S. *et al.* (2008). Child Development and Family Mental Health in War and Military Violence: The Palestinian Experience. *International Journal of Behavioural Development*, 32(4), 310–321.

[156]Cairns, E. and Dawes, A. (1996). Children: Ethnic and Political Violence — A Commentary. *Child Development*, 67(1), 129–139.

[157]Barber, B. K. (1999). Political Violence, Family Relations, and Palestinian Youth Functioning. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 14(2), 206–230; Punamäki, R. L. *et al.* (2001). Resiliency Factors Predicting Psychological Adjustment After Political Violence among Palestinian Children. *International Journal of Behavioural Development*, 25(3), 256–267.

[158]*Ibid*.

[159]For more information: Garbarino, J. and Kostelny, K. (1996). The Effects of Political Violence on Palestinian Children's Behaviour Problems: A Risk Accumulation Model. *Child Development*, 67(1), 33–45; Qouta, S. *et al*. (2005). Mother-Child Expression of Psychological Distress in War Trauma. *Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 10(2), 135–156; Qouta, S. *et al*. (2007). Predictors of Psychological Distress and Positive

Social environment relations to terrorism

Social environment is considered the composite of a person's basic survival needs, including all human interactions and circumstances as well as actual physical context such as accommodation, workplace, SES, laws and regulations in the society.[160] The nature and characteristics of a person's social environment, especially during childhood and adolescence, has a major role in contouring and shaping his life.[161] This can relate to the people who encircle the person, whether his own family,[162] his friends or others at school, or in the area he lives in.[163] It may also refer to the type and quality of the area and the institutions surrounding him, such as his school, youth movements, or neighbourhood.[164] Moreover, social environment influences and changes people throughout their lives via daily experiences, whether through home, school, or the neighbourhood.

Resources among Palestinian Adolescents: Trauma, Child, and Mothering Characteristics. *Child Abuse & Neglect*, 31(7), 699–717.

[160]Zastrow, C. H. and Kirst-Ashman, K. K. (2004). *Understanding Human Behaviour and the Social Environment.* Sixth Edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson- Brooks/Cole, p. 7.

[161]Roosa, M. W. *et al*. (2003). Prevention Science and Neighbourhood Influences on Low-Income Children's Development: Theoretical and Methodological Issues. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 31(1–2), 55–72; Roosa, M. W. *et al*. (2010). Neighbourhood Disadvantage, Stressful Life Events, and Adjustment among Mexican American Early Adolescents. *The Journal of Early Adolescence*, 30(4), 567–592.

[162]Kagitcibasi, C. (1996). *Family and Human Development across Cultures: A View from the Other Side.* Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Available at: https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED410004; Katz, Lynn Fainsilber and Woodin, E. M. (2002). Hostility, Hostile Detachment, and Conflict Engagement in Marriages: Effects on Child and Family Functioning. *Child Development*, 73(2), 636–652.

[163]Duncan, G. J. *et al*. (2001). Sibling, Peer, Neighbour, and Schoolmate Correlations as Indicators of the Importance of Context for Adolescent Development. *Demography*, 38(3), 437–447; Kling, J. R. *et al*. (2007). Experimental Analysis of Neighbourhood Effects. *Econometrica*, 75(1), 83–119.

[164]Brooks-Gunn, J. *et al*. (1993). Do Neighbourhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Development? *The American Journal of Sociology*, 99(2), 353–395; Roosa, M. W. *et al*. (2003). Prevention Science and Neighbourhood Influences on Low-Income Children's Development: Theoretical and Methodological Issues. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 31(1–2), 55–72.

This process is defined as 'social influence' and is considered the main currency of all aspects related to social life.[165]

An important example of social influence is mutual communication between people, which eventually creates cultural norms of beliefs and behaviour.[166] According to Bar-Tal, the validation of a belief, as well as an increase in confidence in that belief, occurs when the person knows that he shares this belief with others. In addition, the common belief causes a sense of resemblance among the group members and affects the group assurance and homogeneity, thus enhancing its efficiency in carrying out activities and in decision-making.[167] Furthermore, social norms and beliefs can most strongly serve as behavioural incentives when the person identifies with the society and hence is interested in complying with its norms and distinctive social beliefs.[168]

Another aspect of social influence added by Mayer and Jencks[169] is the 'Contagion model'. According to this concept, a person will emulate the common behaviour that surrounds him. In that sense, in rough areas containing a large number of criminals, alcoholics, or drug addicts, it is likely that children in these areas will emulate that behaviour. The same thing can be said of areas where the majority respect the law and obey it. Furthermore, similar processes can occur in relation to participation in politics; the characteristics of a social environment and the opportunities it provides can encourage or discourage a person to become involved in politics, and to take an active part in policymaking while trying to make a difference.[170]

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[165] Forgas, J. P. and Williams, K. D. (2001). *Social Influence: Direct and Indirect Processes*. Psychology Press, pp. 3–22.

[166] Schaller, M. (2001). Unintended influence, social evolutionary processes in the construction and change of culturally-shared beliefs. In: Joseph P. Forgas and Kipling D. Williams (eds.), *Social Influence: Direct and Indirect Processes*. Psychology Press, pp. 77–95.

[167] Bar-Tal, D. (2000). *Shared Beliefs in a Society: Social Psychological Analysis*. Sage, pp. 2–14.

[168] Christensen, P. N. *et al*. (2004). Social Norms and Identity Relevance: A Motivational Approach to Normative Behaviour. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30(10), 1295–1309.

[169] Mayer, S. E. and Jencks, C. (1989). Growing Up in Poor Neighbourhoods: How Much Does It Matter? *Science*, 243(4897), 1441–1445.

[170] Huckfeldt, R. R. (1979). Political Participation and the Neighbourhood Social Context. *American Journal of Political Science*, 23(3), 579–592; Kenny, C. B. (1992). Political

Moreover, the likelihood of an individual participating or disengaging in terrorism, as well as most aspects detailed above, is also found to be influenced immensely by the social environment.[171] In areas where there is strong support for extreme political acts and terrorism, it is likely that more people from that area will feel the need to join the political efforts and will have the opportunities to do so. Joining a terrorist organisation, claims della Porta,[172] is a social process, possibly engaged in by an individual who is well-entrenched in society. Accordingly, della Porta adds that most recruitment of members to terrorist organisations occurs through personal relationships and ties, such as neighbours, friends from school, cousins, or even closer relatives such as siblings or partners.

Tosini[173] emphasises the importance of the social environment by explaining the community's essential involvement in providing help, such as encouraging recruitment of members from society to terrorist organisations, providing support by way of money, weapons, rewards, and economic aid, as well as upholding their families' status and prestige. Furthermore, the culture, along with its values and principles, allows an understanding of the phenomena of taking part in extreme and violent acts, hence cultural attitudes based on legitimising and supporting this kind of behaviour and beliefs cause members of the society to share these views as well.[174]

Since the beginning of the conflict with Israel in 1947, Palestinian society is a good example of the development of a culture based

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Participation and Effects from the Social Environment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(1), 259–267.

[171] Victoroff, J. and Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). *Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights*. 1st edition. Psychology Press, Sections 4 and 5; Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Network.* University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 125–135; Post, J. M. Sprinzak, E and Denny, L. (2003). The Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 15(1), 172–174.

[172] della Porta, D. (2009). Recruitment processes in Clandestine political organisations: Italian left-wing terrorism. In: Jeff Victoroff and Arie W. Kruglanski (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights*. 1st edition. New York and Hove: Psychology Press, pp. 307–316.

[173] Tosini, D. (2007). Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat. *Sociology Compass*, 1(2), 664–681.

[174] Pedahzur, A. (2005). *Suicide Terrorism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 158–165.

on resistance and on a daily struggle — Israel is perceived as the main cause of the damage to their social and political existence.[175] Kuttab explains in his article about 'the profile of the stone thrower' that Palestinian children are born to a reality of refugee camps and an overriding sense of deprivation. These aspects, along with cultural encouragement and support, cause them to obtain a high level of political awareness and to become actively involved in the struggle.[176] Furthermore, the Palestinian social environment seems to offer strong support for joining terrorist organisations and becoming involved in violent acts. Whether it is a secular or religious movement, people are strongly encouraged to join.[177] Crucially, it is also acknowledged that there is similar support and reinforcement for suicide terrorism in this Palestinian culture; in these social surroundings, it is a normal and acceptable form of resistance.[178]

Perceptions related to the terrorist organisations

In their research from the 1970s, Russell and Miller[179] assert universities to be the main places for recruitment by terrorist organisations. They also found the average age of recruits to be from early to late 20s, though

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[175] Haj-Yahia, M. M. (1995). Toward Culturally Sensitive Intervention with Arab Families in Israel. *Contemporary Family Therapy*, 17(4), 430.

[176] Kuttab, D. (1988). A Profile of the Stone Throwers. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 17(3), 14–23; see also Barber, B. K. (1999). Political Violence, Family Relations, and Palestinian Youth Functioning. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 14(2), 207–208.

[177] Post, J. M., Sprinzak, E. and Denny, L. (2003). The Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 15(1), 173–174; as well as Piazza, J. A. (2019). Democratic skepticism and support for terrorism in the Palestinian Territories. *Public Choice*, 178(3–4), 417–443.

[178] Soibelman, M. (2004). Palestinian Suicide Bombers. *Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling*, 1(3), 175–190; Pedahzur, A. (2005). *Suicide Terrorism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 162–164); Moghadam, A. (2009). Palestinian suicide terrorism in the second intifada: Motivations and organisational aspects. In: Jeff Victoroff and Arie W. Kruglanski (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights*. 1st edition. New York and Hove: Psychology Press, pp. 129–130.

[179] Russell, C. A. and Miller, B. H. (1977). Profile of a Terrorist. *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 1(1), 29.

with some differences among the organisations. However, more contemporary studies argue that prisons are the primary locations for terrorist organisation recruitment.[180] Also, according to Sageman's research on jihadi international terrorism,[181] most recruits to jihadi organisations were in the diaspora and not in an individual's home country, while the average age of these recruits is around 25.[182] Different findings in relation to the location of recruitment were found in Bakker's study on European jihadist groups,[183] in which he found that most of the recruits joined in their home countries, close to the individuals' families and social surroundings; this phenomenon is defined as 'home-grown terrorism', while the age range in this research was also early adulthood to age 27. However, Silke argued for a younger age; he says that most join terrorist organisations in their early 20s.[184] A recent European study explores the phenomenon of FTFs that join Daesh. It suggests an average age of 30 years — relatively older young males — and identified an underlying long-term radicalisation process, which incorporates prisons, as well as family and peer relations, as the dominant methods of recruitment.[185]

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[180]Cuthbertson, I. M. (2004). Prisons and the Education of Terrorists. *World Policy Journal*, 21(3), 15–22; Cilluffo, F. J. *et al*. (2007). Radicalization: Behind Bars and Beyond Borders. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 13(2), 113–122; Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalisation Programs. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(2), 267–291; Silke, A. (2011). The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism. Taylor & Francis, chapter 9; Neumann, P. (2010). *Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries*. ICSR in partnership with START. Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Prisons-and-terrorism-15-countries.pdf; Gunaratna, R. (2011). Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 6(1), 65–82.

[181]Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 92–93.

[182]Though the age gap between the participants was fairly big, see Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 92.

[183]Bakker, E. (2006). *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*. The Hague: Clingendael.

[184]Silke, A. (2008). Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalisation. *European Journal of Criminology*, 5(1), 99–123.

[185]Rekawek, K., *et al*. (2018). Who Are the European Jihadis? From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Midterm Report. *GLOBSEC, Ideas Shaping the World*.

However, a different study on FTFs from Saudi Arabia, who went to Syria, shows a younger average age of 23.9.[186]

Personality Profile

The second element constructing the social-psychological profile focuses on the personality characteristics of the leaders through examination of common traits among them, and an assessment of whether they possess symptoms of psychopathic personality. Allport[187] was the first to identify the concept of 'personality', which he described as a developed system of unique cognitive, spiritual, and emotional characteristics revealed by the person throughout his life. Later, McCrae and Costa[188] added that personality also reveals differences between individuals by illustrating consistent patterns in people's thoughts and behaviour. Personality theorists attempt to understand behaviour as a reflection of the individual's personality; however, not all human behaviour can be explained solely by personality traits.[189] In relation to terrorism, Martens argues that terrorists have some characteristics in common with individuals who are diagnosed with psychopathic personality.[190] The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) defines people with psychopathic personality

[186]Al Saud, A.b.K. (2019). Saudi Foreign Fighters: Analysis of Leaked Islamic State Entry Documents, ICSR, King's College London, p. 10. Available at: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ICSR-Report-Saudi-Foreign-Fighters-Analysis-of-Leaked-Islamic-State-Entry-Documents.pdf.

[187]Allport, G. W. (1931). What Is a Trait of Personality? *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 25, 368–372.

[188]McCrae, R. R. and Costa Jr, P. T. (1990). *Personality in Adulthood.* Guilford Publications, p. 25.

[189]Ozer, Daniel, J. and Benet-Martínez, V. (2006). Personality and the Prediction of Consequential Outcomes. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 57, 401–421; Cervone, D. and Pervin, L. A. (2009). *Personality: Theory and Research,* 11th edition, Wiley.

[190]Martens, W. H. J. (2004). The Terrorist with Antisocial Personality Disorder. *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice*, 4(1), 45–56; McCauley, C. (2004). Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the response to terrorism. In: Chris E. Stout (ed.), *Psychology of Terrorism: Coping with the Continued Threat*. Greenwood Publishing Group, pp. 33–67; Borgeson, K. and Valeri, R. (2009). *Terrorism in America*. Jones & Bartlett Learning, p. 35.

characteristics as exhibiting a pattern that regularly disregards and violates the rights of others. These behaviours are often present from a very young age. People with psychopathic personality characteristics are often aggressive and impulsive, and recklessly disregard social norms, laws, and the safety of themselves and others. They also lack remorse and are indifferent towards or rationalise having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from others.[191]

What is personality?

Personality derives from the Latin word 'persona', meaning 'mask', and refers to the exterior characteristics of a person: his public self. Other aspects of personality refer to a person's social abilities, behaviour, and common human nature.[192] Psychology ascribes personality to the individual as a whole, and emphasises the differences that exist within him, and between him and other people. Furthermore, the study of personality investigates individual behaviour as seen through the many aspects of a person's functioning, and the interaction between these different psychological processes. Although personality does not include all human behaviour, there are only a few aspects related to individual conduct that do not reflect an individual's personality.[193]

Gordon Allport, a pioneer in the field of personality psychology, argued that personality is in fact what the person really is. Personality is a developed system of unique cognitive, spiritual, and emotional features that is revealed from the behaviour of the person, at any time in his life.

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[191] American Psychiatric Association (2000). *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV*. 4th edition. American Psychiatric Pub, p. 701.

[192] Kluckhohn, C. and Murray, H. A. (1953). Personality formation: The determinants. In: Clyde Kluckhohn *et al*. (eds.), *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*. 2nd edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 53–67; Hergenhahn, B. R. and Olson, M. (1999). *An Introduction to Theories of Personality.* 5th edition. Prentice Hall, pp. 1–2; p. 193.

[193] Pervin, L. A. (1975). *Personality — Theory, Assessment and Research*. 2nd edition. Wiley, pp. 2–3; Buss, D. M. (1999). Human nature and individual differences: The evolution of human personality. In: Lawrence A. Pervin and Oliver P. John (eds.), *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*. 2nd edition. New York and London: Guilford Press, pp. 31–56.

Allport also referred to personality traits as variables or as the basic unit of personality.[194] Respectively, other personality psychologists defined personality primarily in terms of features, which are consistent, observable behaviours, or as a dimension of individual differences that tend to mirror the consistent pattern of thoughts, feelings, and actions.[195] Furthermore, Allport added that there are additional dimensions, such as cognitive structures, motives, self-perception, values, and philosophies of life, which are also required for an adequate description of the person and his personality.[196]

Nonetheless, while there is no clear and acceptable definition of personality, there are some common interpretations that relate to the internal conduct of a person. This also consists of the way he interacts with his social environment, his individual significant characteristics, and how these can be similar to or different from other people.[197] Pervin suggested a broad definition of personality that he found to be suitable, and accordingly stated: 'Personality represents those structural and dynamic properties of individual or individuals as they reflect themselves in characteristic responses to situations, and in other words — personality represents the enduring properties of individuals that tend to separate them from other individuals'.[198] However, it seems that over the decades the number of personality traits, and the scales that have been devised to measure them, have grown exponentially, causing confusion and difficulty in the study of this field, and a need arose for a more general and universally accepted classification system. The five-dimensional theory of personality (the 'Big Five') was developed to meet this need. It does not represent a

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[194] Allport, G. W. (1931). What is a Trait of Personality? *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 25, 368–372.

[195] McCrae, R. R. and Costa Jr, P. T. (1990). *Personality in Adulthood*. Guilford Publications, pp. 22–32; Winter, D. G. (2005). Things I've Learned about Personality from Studying Political Leaders at a Distance. *Journal of Personality*, 73(3), 557–584.

[196] Allport, G. W. (1937). *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*. Vol. xiv. Oxford, England: Holt, pp. 552–558.

[197] Pervin, L. A. (1975). *Personality — Theory, Assessment and Research*. 2nd edition. Wiley, pp. 2–3; Buss, D. M. (1999). Human nature and individual differences: The evolution of human personality. In: Lawrence A. Pervin and Oliver P. John (eds.), *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*. 2nd edition. New York and London: Guilford Press, p. 31.

[198] Pervin, L. A. (1975). *Personality — Theory, Assessment and Research*. 2nd edition. Wiley, p. 3.

specific theory but is gleaned from the analysis of the ways in which people describe themselves and others.[199]

The 'Big Five' — The five-factor model of personality

The five-factor theory of personality is based on the assumption that there are five individual characteristics that are highly significant in interactions between people. The five dimensions are:

1. *Extraversion* — The ability to engage in socialisation, demonstrating activism, being talkative, energetic, and assertive.
2. *Agreeableness* — Collaboration capability, demonstrating flexibility, good nature, and kindness.
3. *Conscientiousness* — Demonstrating total reliability, responsibility, and being orderly.
4. *Emotional stability* — Total relaxation, demonstrated lack of neuroticism, and an ability not to become easily upset.
5. *Openness or intellect* — Vivid imagination, originality, and an open and independent mind.

The name of the theory — the 'Big Five' — is not intended to show how big each dimension is in its importance, but how wide it is. Furthermore, the theory does not attempt to argue that the differences between people can be reduced to five personality traits alone, but rather that the five personality dimensions represent a high level of abstraction, and that each dimension summarizes a wide number of personality traits very clearly and specifically.[200] However, other researchers criticized this theory by

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[199]Goldberg, L. R. (1971). A historical survey of personality scales and inventories. In: P. McReynolds (ed.), *Advances in Psychological Assessment*. Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behaviour Books, pp. 293–336; John, Oliver P. and Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: history, measurement and theoretical perspectives. In: Lawrence A. Pervin and Oliver P John (eds.), *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*, 2nd edition. Guilford Press, pp. 102–103.

[200]Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 41(1), 417–440; John, Oliver P. (1990). The 'Big Five' factor taxonomy: Dimensions of personality in the natural language and in questionnaires. In: Lawrence A. Pervin (ed.), *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*. New York

arguing that it suffers from a lack of accuracy within the dimensions, as well as a lack of consistency among the scholars who advocate it.[201] Some even suggested expanding the model by adding other categories or traits; Hogan and Hogan, for example, proposed splitting the aspect of extraversion into ambition and sociability.[202]

Pervin[203] noticed in the early 1990s that many studies on personality traits focused on differences between people and not on the people themselves. He therefore established that there were fewer references in the literature to personality profile and to different typologies of individuals. The 'five-factor model of personality' has raised interest in the research field of personality typologies or profiles and has led to personality traits being gathered together in a consistent and diagnostic pattern with different types of people sharing the same basic personality profile.

Personality typologies and profiles

There exists a broad general consensus among psychologists who research the structure of the human personality that an individual's core personality

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and London: The Guilford Press, pp. 66–100; Costa Jr, P. T. and McCrae, R. R. (1992). Four Ways Five Factors are Basic. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 13(6), 653–665; Barrick, M. R. and Mount, M. K. (1991). The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job Performance: A Meta-Analysis. *Personnel Psychology*, 44(1), 1–26; John, Oliver P. and Srivastava, S. (1999). The big five trait taxonomy: history, measurement and theoretical perspectives. In: Lawrence A. Pervin and Oliver P John (eds.), *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*. 2nd edition. Guilford Press, pp. 102–103.

[201] Waller, N. G. and Ben Porath, Y. S. (1987). Is It Time for Clinical Psychology to Embrace the Five-Factor Model of Personality? *American Psychologist*, 42(9), 887–889; Livneh, H. and Livneh, C. (1989). The Five-Factor Model of Personality: Is Evidence of Its Cross-Measure Validity Premature? *Personality and Individual Differences*, 10(1), 75–80; Briggs, S. R. (1989). The optimal level of measurement for personality construct. In: David M. Buss and Nancy Cantor (eds.), *Personality Psychology: Recent Trends and Emerging Directions*. Springer-Verlag, pp. 246–260; Pervin, L. A. (1994). A Critical Analysis of Current Trait Theory. *Psychological Inquiry*, 5(2), 103–113.

[202] Hogan, J. and Hogan, R. (1989). How to Measure Employee Reliability. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 74(2), 273–279.

[203] Pervin, L. A. (1994). A Critical Analysis of Current Trait Theory. *Psychological Inquiry*, 5(2), 110.

does not undergo significant changes over time. Although certain aspects of personality may change, its central features remain more or less stable.[204] This implies that delinquents, for example, are not likely to change their basic personality profiles, which means that they will probably repeat the same crimes in a similar manner.[205] This assumption led researchers to isolate specific personality traits in different groups. The research sought to create a theory of personality typologies based on diagnostic categories identified within individuals who share the same attributes and personality, allowing for the categorization of human nature.[206] A very well-known study of personality typology was conducted by Block and is entitled *Lives Through Time*. It examined the types of personalities exhibited from adolescence to adulthood. Block referred to this as 'personality development' and claimed that a limited number of different typologies of personality are likely to develop due to the individual personality traits and environmental conditions of people. Indeed, he found five typical personality types of men and six types of women.[207] Another example of this theory can be found in a study conducted by Kimhi and Even, which deals with suicide bombers and further explores

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[204] Buss, A. H. (1988). *Personality: Evolutionary Heritage and Human Distinctiveness*. L. Erlbaum Associates, p. 40; Costa Jr, P. T. and McCrae, R. R. (1986). Personality Stability and Its Implications for Clinical Psychology. *Clinical Psychology Review*, 6(5), 407–423; Funder, D. C. (1991). Global Traits: A Neo-Allportian Approach to Personality. *Psychological Science*, 2(1), 31–39.

[205] Block, J. (1971). *Lives through Time*. Berkeley, CA: Bancroft Books, pp. 267–268; Pinizzotto, A. and Finkel, N. (1990). Criminal Personality Profiling. Criminal Personality Profiling. *Law and Human Behaviour*, 14(3), 215–233; Holmes, R. M. and Holmes, S. T. (1996). *Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool*. 2nd Edition. Sage Publications, Inc., p. 43.

[206] One of the famous type indicators who classify people into 16 personality types: Myers, I. B. and McCaulley, M. H. (1985). *A Guide to the Development and the Use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press; Other classifications: Ozer, Daniel J. and Gjerde, P. F. (1989). Patterns of Personality Consistency and Change from Childhood through Adolescence. *Journal of Personality*, 57(2), 483–507; Robins, R. W. *et al*. (1996). Resilient, Over Controlled, and Under Controlled Boys: Three Replicable Personality Types. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(1), 157–171.

[207] Block, J. (1971). *Lives Through Time*. Berkeley, CA: Bancroft Books.

four types of bombers: the religious-fanatical, the exploited, the psychological-avenger, and the fanatic-national. Each has a central characteristic motive and usually a unique course that brings him to the suicide mission.[208]

Typology can also be based on one personality trait that is common in a specific group of people.[209] However, building a profile is a different and more complex task that requires a greater number of characteristics and features, or in many cases, even different typologies. Law enforcement authorities are heavily reliant on building comprehensive psychological profiles of offenders in order to trace the perpetrators of various crimes, including sex offenders, serial killers, and other major criminals.[210]

Criminal personality

Criminal personality or, as it is also termed, 'antisocial personality', is defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) as a type of a person with a strong tendency for negative and destructive actions from an early age, including actions against the law, which consequently lead to prison. Another criterion of criminal personality is a lack of responsibility, expressed in repeated failures to keep a steady job or meet various financial obligations. Psychopathic personality, however, is characterized by a lack of empathy, delinquency and low self-esteem from an early age and throughout adulthood, in addition to aggressiveness, impulsiveness, and lack of remorse for actions.[211]

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[208] Kimhi, S. and Even, S. (2004). Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers? *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), 815–840.

[209] Robins, R. W. *et al*. (1996). Resilient, Over-Controlled, and Under-Controlled Boys: Three Replicable Personality Types. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(1), 157.

[210] Holmes, R. M. and Holmes, S. T. (1996). *Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool*. 2nd Edition. Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 1–7; Jackson, J. L. and Bekerian, D. A. (1997). Does offender profiling have a role to play? In: J. L. Jackson and D. A. Bekerian (eds.), *Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice*. England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., pp. 2–3.

[211] American Psychiatric Association (2000). *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV.* Fourth. American Psychiatric Pub, pp. 701–705.

In their study on crime and personality, Eysenck and Gudjonsson[212] state that antisocial individuals and/or criminals share a certain behaviour that can be characterized as standing at the other end of pro-social, altruistic behaviour. They argue for this model while acknowledging the broad diversity of types of criminals that exist, mainly due to the varying natures of the crimes committed. Furthermore, criminal personality is related to several dimensions of personality, such as extraversion, neuroticism, nonconformity, impulsiveness, and risk-taking. Yochelson and Samenow[213] also identified other traits of criminals, such as low self-esteem, feeling worthless, stupid, and a total failure, as well as deceitfulness, seeing lying as a natural and essential aspect of their daily lives.[214]

However, there is some confusion between the concept of criminal or antisocial personality and two terms related to it — psychopathic and sociopathic personality. Some scholars view all three as different names for the same phenomenon. They argue that all three are a reflection of an antisocial behaviour that is the result of some abnormality or deficiency.[215] Others distinguish each one as a distinct disorder, arguing that though all three share the same patterns of deviant personality, their origins and formation are not the same. In this sense, a sociopathic personality is the result of a social defect, while a psychopathic personality is the result of biological/genetic neurological defects. Hare, for example, argued that the difference between psychopathic personality and antisocial personality disorders is that psychopaths possess certain traits that

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[212]Eysenck, H. J. and Gudjonsson, G. H. (1989). *The Cause and Cures of Criminality.* Springer, Chapter 3, pp. 43–88.

[213]Yochelson, S. and Samenow, S. E. (1976). *The Criminal Personality: A Profile for Change*. Vol. 1. New York: Jason Aronson, pp. 21–25.

[214]For more information on crime and personality: Caspi *et al*. (1994). Are Some People Crime Prone? Replications of the Personality–Crime Relationship across Countries, Genders, Races and Methods. *Criminology*, 32(2), 163–196.

[215]In his preface to the fifth edition of his book: Cleckley, H. (1976). *The Mask of Sanity*. 5th revised edition. Mosby, p. viii. Cleckley explains that he is familiar with the term changes over the years but sees it as synonymous with the disorder that he prefers to term as psychopathy; as well as Blackburn, R. (1988). On Moral Judgements and Personality Disorders — The Myth of Psychopathic Personality Revisited. *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 153, 505–512.

can potentially — but not necessarily — lead them to criminal behaviour; while people diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder are in fact characterised by their criminal behaviour.[216]

Hare created a diagnostic tool to diagnose psychopathy entitled 'Hare Psychopathy Checklist — Revised' (PCL-R), which was first described by him in 1980,[217] revised in 1985 and published in 1991.[218] The PCL-R contains 20 clinical rating scale items that can be applied to information gathered from interviews, as well as personal files and other relevant resources. This tool provides an estimation of whether an individual matches the profile of a psychopath. It has been applied to offenders as well as forensic patients in different health and correction institutions.[219] Opponents of this tool argued that it merged two distinct concepts of personality disorder and criminal behaviour, in that it puts criminal behaviour as the centre of psychopathy and causes confusion in thinking of criminals and psychopathy as necessarily linked.[220]

In 1994, Hart and his colleagues developed a shorter version of the PCL-R, consisting of 12 items and intended to be used as a predictor of violence among individuals with mental disorders. It was called the Hare Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL-SV). It correlates highly with the PCL-R and is used both in forensic institutions and

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[216]Hare, R. D. (1993). *Without Conscience — the Disturbing World of the Psychopaths among Us*. Pocket Books, pp. 99–104; as well as Hare, R. D. (1996). Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Case of Diagnostic Confusion. *Psychiatric Times*, 13(2), 1–6; See also in the introduction to his book: Lykken, D. T. (1995). *The Antisocial Personalities*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, p. vii. Available at: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=26032642 (accessed 29 May 2012).

[217]Hare, R. D. (1980). A Research Scale for the Assessment of Psychopathy in Criminal Populations. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 1(2), 111–119.

[218]Hare, R. D. (1991). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)*. Toronto, Ontario: Multi-Health Systems.

[219]Hare (1996a, p. 30); See also Johansson, P. *et al*. (2002). On the Operationalization of Psychopathy: Further Support for a Three-Faceted Personality Oriented Model. *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica*, 106(s412), 81–85.

[220]Cooke, D. J. *et al*. (2007). Understanding the Structure of the Psychopathy Checklist — Revised: an Exploration of Methodological Confusion. *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, 190(49), 39–50; Lilienfeld, S. O. (1994). Conceptual Problems in the Assessment of Psychopathy. *Clinical Psychology Review*, 14(1), 17–38.

independently as an assessment tool for psychopathy in non-criminal populations.[221] Due to the fact that it focuses on violence, which is particularly relevant to terrorists, as well as non-criminal and other diverse populations, the PCL-SV was found to be more relevant to this research, and its results will be detailed later in this book.

Another important link between Hare's research and this study is Hare's acknowledgement that

> It is not uncommon for psychopaths to emerge as 'patriots' and 'saviours' in a society experiencing social, economic, and political upheaval … Wrapped in the flag, they enrich themselves by callously exploiting ethnic, cultural, or racial tension and grievances.[222]

Accordingly, studies relating to the personality and characteristics of terrorists might have some interesting implications regarding the understanding of societies that face this phenomenon and confront it. Consequently, the group of interviewees who participated in this study see themselves as idealists and patriots, who are involved in violent activities due to the circumstances their society is facing, as well as national and social grievances. Therefore, there might be a strong link between this group and Hare's last statements that should be further explored.

Terrorist personality

In relation to terrorism, the isolation of personality traits shared by terrorists was found to be a difficult task, and the attempts to create a terrorist personality profile were generally unsuccessful. Furthermore, there is no

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[221] Hart, S. *et al*. (1994). Psychopathy as a risk marker for violence: Development of a screening version of the revised psychopathy checklist. In: John Monahan and Henry J. Steadman (eds.), *Violence and Mental Disorder: Developments in Risk Assessment*. University of Chicago Press, pp. 81–98; Hart, S. *et al*. (1995). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version*. Toronto: Multi-Health Systems; Hare, R. D. (1996b). Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Case of Diagnostic Confusion. *Psychiatric Times*, 13(2), 1–6.

[222] Hare, R. D. (1996a). Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct Whose Time Has Come. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 23(1), 25–54.

proof of the claim that such a profile exists, and no indication was found of a 'typical terrorist personality' as the terrorists' personalities and traits were found to be as varied as those of ordinary individuals.[223] Since the mid-1970s, studies that related to the psychology of terrorism developed immensely and further investigated the motives and behaviour of individuals who engaged in terrorist activities. Different researchers tried to isolate specific personality disorders and even tried to find a correlation between them and terrorists.[224] While primary studies associated terrorist personality with psychopathic characteristics,[225] others have found fewer relations between the two and further discovered more similarities with the general 'normal' personality types.[226] The present study was aided by some of these studies with regard to their reference to certain personality traits that are part and parcel of personality disorders. However, the characteristics projected by the interviewees in some cases led to similar results, while in other cases they led to different results, as will be detailed later.

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[223] Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Become a Terrorist and Why?* p. 37. Federal Research Division Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf; Borum, R. (2004). *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida, pp. 35–36; Horgan, J. (2008b). The search for the terrorist personality. In: Andrew Silke (ed.), *Terrorists, Victims and Society*. John Wiley & Sons Ltd., pp. 1–27.

[224] Post, J. M. (1984). Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behaviour. *Terrorism*, 7(2), 241–256; as well as Post, J. M. (1990). Terrorist psychologic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces. In: Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 25–40; Taylor, M. (1988). *The Terrorist*. Brassey's Defence Publishers; Horgan, J. (2005). *The Psychology of Terrorism*. Routledge; Miller, L. (2006b). The Terrorist Mind II — Typologies, Psychopathologies, and Practical Guidelines for Investigation. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 50(3), 255–268.

[225] Cooper, H. H. A. (1977). What Is a Terrorist: A Psychological Perspective, *Legal Medical Quarterly*, 1, 16–32; Cooper, H. H. A. (1978). Psychopath as Terrorist. *Legal Medical Quarterly*, 2, 253–262; Kellen, K. (1979). *Terrorists — What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe their World and Action.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

[226] Ruby, C. L. (2002a). Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged? *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 2(1), 15–26; Silke, A. (1998). Cheshire-cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, 4(1), 51–69.

Martens found a correspondence between several personality traits that were shared between terrorists and individuals with antisocial personalities. He detailed characteristics such as manipulativeness, irresponsibility, and deficient behavioural inhibitions, which he found to be characteristics common to both individuals with antisocial personality disorder and to terrorists.[227]

As mentioned above, information is scarce about the leaders of terrorist organisations. A question that arises from time to time is whether they are criminals in disguise, meaning that they have delinquent personalities but choose to engage in a more glorified criminal activity; for example, smuggling weapons and ammunition instead of drugs or other goods, or killing for a sacred political purpose rather than as part of criminal activity. It is easy to demonstrate the similarities and differences between criminal activities and terrorism. Thus, the question of whether terrorist leaders have psychopathic personalities is a very relevant one. Further to general understanding of the leaders' personalities, this research addresses the query related to the aspect of psychopathic personality and its relation to the terrorist leaders, by using PCL-SV, which is a 12-item clinical rating scale for diagnosis of psychopathic personality.[228]

Mindset

The third element of the leaders' social-psychological profile refers to the leaders' beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions towards general issues, which allows insight into their minds. No person is neutral towards what surrounds him, whether it is his family, his job, the place in which he lives, or the food he eats. As a human being, one always evaluates one's environment.[229] Fishbein claimed that a person holds a range of beliefs,

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[227]Martens, W. H. J. (2004). The Terrorist with Antisocial Personality Disorder. *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice*, 4(1), 45–56.

[228]Hare, R. D. (1991). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)*. Toronto, Ontario: Multi-Health Systems; Hare, R. D. (1996). Psychopathy. *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, 23(1), 25 –54. See Appendix 6: PCL-SV item description.

[229]Wilson, T. D. *et al*. (2000). A Model of Dual Attitudes. *Psychological Review*, 107(1), 101–126.

whether negative or positive, towards any given object. These beliefs can be interpreted as different characteristics, attributes, values, and goals associated with that object. In addition, the stronger these beliefs are, the greater effect they have on the attitude shown towards the object.[230] Furthermore, these beliefs and the perspectives of the individual lead to a certain attitude, which was defined by Allport as a 'mental state of readiness'.[231] Accordingly, another aspect of the relationship between beliefs and attitudes is its effect on the individual's behaviour. A person will engage in any given behaviour due to an ordered delineation of beliefs, attitudes, and behavioural intentions.[232]

Mindset/general perceptions

Why is it essential to know the mindsets of others and the way that they think? Philosophers have always been intrigued by the human mindset and the ways in which people contemplate the world. Various theories have been developed to try and explain how people interpret different aspects of reality in order to deepen the knowledge related to human learning abilities and development.[233] Edmund Husserl, one of the significant philosophers of the 20th century, was a leading founder of the research of *Phenomenology,* which is the study of the impression an object leaves as it goes through the human mind. According to Husserl, the individual defines and limits the objective world through his own mind

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[230]Fishbein, M. (1965). A consideration of beliefs, attitudes, and their relationships. In: I. D. Steiner and M. Fishbein (eds.), *Current Studies in Social Psychology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, pp. 107–120; for more information on beliefs and attitudes, see: Eiser, J. R. (1997). Attitudes and beliefs. In: Andrew Baum *et al*. (eds.), *Cambridge Handbook of Psychology, Health, and Medicine*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–6.

[231]Allport, G. W. (1935). Attitudes. In: C. Murchison (ed.), *A Handbook of Social Psychology*. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, pp. 798–844.

[232]Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975). *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 387–389.

[233]Husserl, E. (1931). *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. J. H Muirhead (ed.), New York: The Macmillan Company; Schütz, A. (1967). *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. North-Western University Press.

and perceptions, which are based on his life experiences.[234] Another field of research that relates to people's perceptions is the field of *phenomenography,* which was initiated by Marton[235] during the late 20th century, and aimed to describe and compare peoples' perceptions of general social surroundings in order to gain more knowledge about the way people learn. According to Merton, 'A careful account of the different ways people think about phenomena may help uncover conditions that facilitate the transition from one way of thinking to a qualitatively "better" perception of reality'.[236]

Moreover, understanding the human mindset is also one of the main aspects in the theory of criminal profiling that contributes significantly to the analysis of a wider social-psychological profile. Correspondingly, this profile can lead to the understanding of the conduct and behaviour of an offender and, to go even further, the information available might even allow for predictions of his, her, or, in the case of a group, their behaviour.[237]

In his book, *From the Terrorists' Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy*, Moghaddam[238] advocates the importance of listening to and understanding the viewpoints of terrorists, as doing so can allow us to develop more efficient ways of dealing with the

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[234]Husserl, E. (1999). *The Idea of Phenomenology*, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl — Collected Works*, Netherlands: Springer; Moran, D. (2005). *Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology*. Polity, pp. 1–2.

[235]Marton, F. (1981, 1986). In his two articles: Phenomenography? Describing Conceptions of the World Around Us. *Instructional Science*, 10(2), 177–200; and Phenomenography: A Research Approach to Investigating Different Understanding of Reality. *Journal of Thought*, 21(3), 28–49; for more information: Bruner, J. (1991). The Narrative Construction of Reality. *Critical Inquiry*, 18(1), 1–21; Svensson, L. (1997). Theoretical Foundations of Phenomenography. *Higher Education Research & Development*, 16(2), 159–171; Säljö, R. (1997). Talk as Data and Practice — A Critical Look at Phenomenographic Inquiry and the Appeal to Experience. *Higher Education Research & Development*, 16(2), 173–190.

[236]Marton, F. (1986). Phenomenography: A Research Approach to Investigating Different Understanding of Reality. *Journal of Thought*, 21(3), 28–49.

[237]Holmes, R. M. and Holmes, S. T. (1996). *Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool*. Second Edition. Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 3–7.

[238]Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). *From the Terrorists' Point of View: What they Experience and Why They Come to Destroy*. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 2.

terrorist threat. Furthermore, the broad field of the social psychology of terrorism that was exposed by various researchers — most are mentioned widely in this book[239] — strongly endorses the importance of a study of the mindset, potentially leading to the prediction of behaviour, and in that sense could allow for the prevention of violent events. As Victoroff and Kruglanski clearly assert, "Terrorism is applied psychology. It is literally the application of the knowledge about others' minds — knowing what others are likely to dread — to guide the behaviour of some aggressors in a conflict."[240] One of the important viewpoints of terrorists, which allows a deep understanding of their mindsets and motives, is their rationalisations for carrying out violent acts. This aspect will be detailed further.

Criminals' neutralisation techniques

In order to understand deviant behaviour, researchers have invested in studying and analysing offenders' attitudes, motives, and conduct while theorising on these aspects and their possible influence on predicting criminal behaviour and hence reducing it. Such studies have found that one factor most offenders found unbearable is a sense of guilt, and therefore offenders must have well-prepared rationalisations and justifications for their acts in order to avoid this pain.[241] One of the preliminary

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[239] Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf; Crenshaw, M. (2000). The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century. *Political Psychology*, 21(2), 405–420; Horgan, J. (2005). *The Psychology of Terrorism*. Routledge; Post, J. M. (2006). The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism, in Louise Richardson (ed.), *The Roots of Terrorism*. CRC Press, pp. 17–28; Borum, R. (2004). *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida; Victoroff, J. and Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). *Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights*. 1st edition. Psychology Press.

[240] Victoroff, J. and Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). *Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights*. 1st edition. Psychology Press, p. 1.

[241] Armstrong, J. (2007). Getting the Best and Reducing the Worst in How Humans Act — Myth Busting and Momentum Building. In: *CRU Conference*, February 2007, p. 2.

researchers to explain criminal behaviour is Sutherland,[242] who suggested that criminality is a technique that can be learned. Furthermore, he argued that criminals must learn not only how to commit crimes but also how to justify their actions by using motives, attitudes, and rationalisations in their favour. Sykes and Matza elaborated on this theory, which, according to them, was too limited as it generalised all criminals as lacking any sense of indignity and regret towards their criminal acts. Thus, they went on to argue that criminals use varied justifications, which are better known as 'rationalisations', to protect themselves from this guilt and shame. They named this theory the *neutralization theory* due to the neutralising of guilt stemming from the criminal act, allowing criminals to commit crimes without the nuisance of feeling responsible for them.[243]

Accordingly, Sykes and Matza have suggested five main techniques of neutralisation — the first one is the *denial of responsibility* towards the deviant acts, where the offender blames other people or occurrences, which have had a negative impact on his life. The second technique is *denial of injury* and relates to the offender's interpretation of whether an injury actually occurred. By denying injury, the offender does not acknowledge the consequences of their actions; for example, stealing from rich people or vandalizing public property. The third technique is *the denial of the victim*, in which the offender takes responsibility for both the committing of the criminal act and the harm caused to the victim, but renounces the victim's innocence, and thus delegates fault to the victim's actions or conduct. Examples of this could be racist or homophobic crimes. The fourth technique is *the condemnation of the condemner*,

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[242] Sutherland, E. H. (1947). *Principles in Criminology*. Philadelphia: Lippincott; as well as his more recent book: (1973) *On Analysing crime*. Karl F. Schuessler (ed.), University of Chicago Press, pp. 8–10; For more information regarding Sutherland theory: Sutherland, E. H. *et al*. (1995). The theory of differential association. In: Nancy J. Herman (ed.), *Deviance: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach*. Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 64–71; Reed, M. D. and Rountree, P. W. (1997). Peer Pressure and Adolescent Substance Use. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 13(2), 143–180.

[243] Sykes, G. M. and Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency. *American Sociological Review*, 22(6), 664–670; See also Cromwell, P. and Thurman, Q. (2003). The Devil Made Me Do It: Use of Neutralizations by Shoplifters. *Deviant Behaviour*, 24(6), 535–550.

where the offender directs attention to the wrong and immoral conduct of those who are against his actions, such as the police, parents, or education system. The last technique, *the appeal to higher loyalties*, involves the offender accepting social norms in general, but claiming that occasionally his association group demands a different kind of behaviour or conduct, such as helping or covering up for a friend, even if it involves actions that are against the law.[244]

Hirschi[245] elaborated on this theory by adding that in most cases the deviant behaviour comes before the need to neutralise it, but because this behaviour usually occurs occasionally over a certain period of time, these techniques probably influence the behaviour, from one act to another. Subsequent studies have identified five more techniques of neutralisation. The *metaphor of the ledger* allows an individual to justify an immoral act by suggesting it may be balanced out by the good deeds he has committed in the past.[246] *Defence of necessity* describes occasions when a person perceives a criminal act as being absolutely necessary and therefore feels less guilty about committing it.[247] The other three techniques were defined by Coleman and detailed in his book regarding white-collar crimes.[248] The first one is *the denial of the necessity of the law*, which suggests the law is not useful or applicable, does not serve its purpose, and therefore should be ignored; *the claim that everybody else is doing it* and hence it is so widespread that it seems less important and relevant; and the *claim of entitlement,* which refers to people who feel that they have some right to commit certain acts due to their life circumstances or needs.

Hence, it seems that there are 10 neutralisation techniques defined in the literature so far: (1) denial of responsibility; (2) denial of injury;

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[244] *Ibid*. (pp. 667–669).

[245] Hirschi, T. (1969). *Causes of Delinquency*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 208.

[246] Klockars, C. B. (1974). *The Professional Fence*. New York: Free Press, p. 151.

[247] Minor, W. W. (1981). Techniques of Neutralization: A Reconceptualization and Empirical Examination. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 18(2), 295–318.

[248] Coleman, J. W. (1994). *The Criminal Elite: The Sociology of White-Collar Crime.* New York: St. Martin's Press; Coleman, J. W. (2005). *The Criminal Elite: Understanding White-Collar Crime*. 6th edition. Worth Publishers, pp. 204–209.

(3) denial of the victim; (4) condemnation of the condemner; (5) appeal to higher loyalties; (6) metaphor of the ledger; (7) defence of necessity; (8) denial of the necessity of the law; (9) the claim that everybody else is doing it; and, (10) claim of entitlement.[249]

Terrorists' neutralisation techniques

Similarly, terrorists also use varied techniques to rationalise their violent acts in order to avoid complexes of guilt and blame, as Rapoport asserts:

> All terrorists must deny the relevance of guilt and innocence, but in doing so, they create an unbearable tension in their own souls, for they are in effect saying that a person is not a person. It is no accident that left-wing terrorists constantly speak of a 'pig-society', by convincing themselves that they are confronting animals, they hope to stay the remorse which the slaughter of the innocent necessarily generates.[250]

Canter[251] found correlations between justification techniques of violent men and terrorist groups, which were summarised from wider research done by Canter and Barrett[252] that deals with violent men. The main four linked justifications they raise are:

(1) The strength and importance of honour, which validate extreme responses in cases of disrespect or insult;
(2) The act of revenge or retribution for injustices caused by others;

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[249]Eliason, S. L. and Dodder, R. A. (1999). Techniques of Neutralization Used by Deer Poachers in the Western United States: A Research Note. *Deviant Behaviour*, 20(3), 233–252.

[250]Rapoport, D. C. (1971). *Assassination and Terrorism*. Toronto: CBC Merchandising, p. 42; see also Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* p. 35, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf.

[251]Canter, D. (2006). The Samson Syndrome: Is There a Kamikaze Psychology? *Twenty-First Century Society*, 1(2), p. 120.

[252]Canter, D. and Barrett, E. (2006). *Narratives of Violence*. Liverpool: Centre for Investigative Psychology.

(3) The need to defend oneself, hence the violent acts; and finally,
(4) Diminish responsibility by arguing that bad things happen and that it is collateral damage.

Bandura also details four techniques terrorists might use in order to morally disengage from their violent acts and hence avoid the consequences of guilt and human pain:

(1) Consider themselves the saviours of their people from an evil entity;
(2) Belittle their role and transfer responsibility to the leader or the group;
(3) Ignore the victims' pain or minimise it; and,
(4) Dehumanise the victims and make them irrelevant.[253]

More on the rationalisation related to victims can be found in Baumeister's book regarding evil, human violence, and cruelty, which argues that offenders must despise their victims in order to avoid guilt. Furthermore, they need to believe that what they are doing is good, and therefore their opponents are necessarily bad and thus evil.[254] Similarly, in order to avoid any sense of guilt, terrorists 'depersonalise' the victims of their terrorist acts, and by so doing they are able to kill them, whether they are women or children, without feeling any culpability. They perceive these victims as representing an evil system or cooperating with it and therefore as a righteous target.[255]

Another aspect related to the rationalisations that terrorists use in relation to their victims is target selection. The basic principles of the ideology of the group dictate who their enemy is, and therefore define that

[253] Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanism of moral disengagement. In: Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and Cambridge University Press, pp. 161–191.
[254] Baumeister, R. F. (1996). *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty.* W. H. Freeman & Co, pp. 180–181.
[255] Kellen, K. (1979). *Terrorists — What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Action*, p. 3. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

enemy as a genuine target that deserves to be attacked and injured.[256] Nevertheless, these victims have a very passive role in the dynamics of the actual terrorist acts, and they serve the terrorists only as tools for achieving their main goal of causing a dramatic event with significant consequences for the political and social reality of the targeted place.[257]

However, Drake[258] argues that in the case of terrorism, rationalisations for committing violent acts are a result of the group's ideology, based on its political concerns and identity, and hence provides the structure and motivation for action. Indeed, an ideology can be religious, social, or nationalist, and is defined by Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, and Victoroff[259] as the 'agent' motivating force. By raising certain grievances, pointing the blame for these grievances towards a third actor, a government or an institution, nurturing violence as a morally justified method of action, and promising rewards for activists, a charismatic leader can eloquently draw a socially, economically, or morally deprived audience towards alienation of the 'others' and the absorption of a violent doctrine.[260]

Examples of militant organisations with a solid nationalist but anti-religious ideology are the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has

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[256]Drake, C. J. M. (1998). The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10(2), 53–85.

[257]Hacker, F. J. (1980). Terror and Terrorism: Modern Growth Industry and Mass Entertainment. *Terrorism*, 4(1–4), 143–159; Schmid, A. P. and Jongman, A. J. (1988). *Political Terrorism: a New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature.* Transaction Publishers, p. 17.

[258]Drake, C. J. M. (1998). The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10(2), 54–55; Wilkinson, P. (1988). Support mechanisms in international terrorism. In: Robert Owen Slater and Michael Stohl (eds.), *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. New York: St. Martin Press, p. 95; Gentry, C. (2004). The Relationship between New Social Movement Theory and Terrorism Studies: The Role of Leadership, Membership, Ideology and Gender. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(2), 274–293.

[259]Kruglanski, A. W. *et al*. (2007). What Should This Fight Be Called? Metaphors of Counterterrorism and Their Implications. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*. 8(3), 97–133.

[260]*Ibid*.; As well as Oberschall, A. (2004). Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory. *Sociological Theory*, 22(1), 26–37.

committed various suicide attacks in Turkey, and the 'Tamil Tigers' who carried out many suicide bombings in Sri Lanka and India.[261] Nonetheless, the Islamist militant doctrine, which is based on a strong religious ideology, has been characterised as having two main streams. The first is a worldwide Salafist/Jihadist doctrine, as embraced by Islamic organisations such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh, which divides the whole world into two camps: the faithful and the unbelievers, while aiming to spread the 'word of God' as superior and, not subject to borders.[262] The other stream is the nationalist/insurgent Islamist militant doctrine as embraced by groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Israel/Palestine, who are more limited in their ambitions, aiming to tackle more local grievances such as the creation of an independent state or defending an existing one.[263]

Although most of its members consider themselves Muslim, Fatah is an example of a national militant organisation, which has an ideology based on national interests evolving from mainly social grievances related to the need for an independent state. However, according to Frisch,[264] Fatah has gone through some changes in its ideology, including the

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[261] Canter, D. (2009) in his extensive report on *Pathways to the Radicalization of Islamic Terrorists in India*. International Research Centre for Investigative Psychology: University of Huddersfield; Ramasubramanian, R. (2004). *Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka.* IPCS Research paper, New Delhi, India, p. 6; Van de Voorde, C. (2005). Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). *Police Practice and Research*, 6(2), 181–199.

[262] Bakker, E. (2006). *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe — Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study*. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, pp. 1–2.

[263] Stares, P. B. and Yacoubian, M. (2006). Unconventional approaches to an unconventional threat: A counter-epidemic strategy. In: K. M. Campbell and W. Darsie (eds.), *Mapping the Jihadist Threat: The War on Terror Since 9/11. A Report of the Aspen Strategy Group*. Queenstown, MD: The Aspen Institute, pp. 85–95. Available at: http://www.usip.org/files/stares_yacoubian_threat.pdf; Feldstein, S. P. (ed.), (2009). *Terrorists Ideology and the Implications of Radicalisation*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., p. 103; A hearing before the selected committee on intelligence of the United States senate on the topic of Terrorist Ideology; See also: Ayoob, M. (2005). The Future of Political Islam: The Importance of External Variables. *International Affairs*, 81(5), 951–961.

[264] Frisch, H. (2005). Has the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Become Islamic? Fatah, Islam, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 17(3), p. 392.

adoption of more religious themes such as establishing its major fighting arm, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (Kata'ib Shuhada Al-Aqsa), whose name evokes the most religious place in Jerusalem for the Palestinians, the Al-Aqsa mosque, which has been under Israeli control since 1967.[265] The aim of the initiative was to challenge the wider success and progress of other Islamic movements in the area mentioned previously, such as Hamas and Hizballah.

Smelser[266] highlights the fact that not all ideologies address a social agent as being responsible for their grievances; most religions advocate the existence of a cosmic power beyond human reach that is accountable for all good or bad occurrences, hence prompting more passive responses and self-observation. However, this is evidently not the case within terrorist organisations and among activists, where their actions express active hostility towards and negation of their targets. In that sense, terrorist organisations practice the criminal techniques of neutralisation, such as the denial of the victim, the condemnation of the condemner, the appeal to higher loyalties, as well as the defence of necessity, the denial of the necessity of the law, and the claim of entitlement. These techniques mostly correlate with Bandura's and Canter's suggestions of justification techniques terrorists might use in order to deal with the consequences of their actions with regards to their perceptions of their victims, delegating responsibility, and the sense of their essential participation in these acts.[267]

The thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes of the terrorist leaders towards different issues — such as their rationalisations for carrying out terrorist acts, their long-term objectives, the Arab–Israeli conflict, or Israeli society — are detailed in this book in order to determine whether there is a strong connection between their thoughts and beliefs, and their final acts.

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[265] *Ibid*. (p. 393).

[266] Smelser, N. J. (2007). *The Faces of Terrorism — Social and Psychological Dimensions*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p. 65.

[267] For more information on these techniques and their relation to terrorism, see: Schmid, A. P. and Jongman, A. J. (1988, p. 226, note 119). *Political Terrorism*: *A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases*, *Theories*, *& Literature*. Transaction Publishers.

Leadership Profile

The fourth element contributing to the leaders' social-psychological profile is the leadership role itself. This aspect deals with the leaders' perceptions of leadership, their decision-making processes, their ambitions, and leadership conduct. Leadership is defined in the literature as the feature that constitutes the brain of the organisation, and the part that plans, leads, and manages its activity. The organisation cannot function without the leader; however, the leader serves as a means to an end as far as the organisation's goals are concerned, and in most organisations, following leadership is not supposed to be the goal itself.[268] There is a differentiation in the literature between two types of leadership: 'transformational' and 'transactional' leaders. 'Transformational' leadership is charismatic, and involves a leader who leads the organisation and its followers to fulfilment of a noble cause. This leader is endowed with the talent to enable cooperation between all the people involved in order to achieve the group vision and to facilitate change. According to Bass, these leaders provide meaning, challenge, a sense of mission, and higher vision; they gain respect and trust, and act as role models for their subordinates, and they foster a climate of trust and motivate other colleagues to transcend self-interest for the sake of the organisation.[269]

Conversely, the 'transactional' leader operates in a stricter and more business-like way. Standards and expectations are specified and those who do not comply may be punished. In addition, a transactional leader can build a base level of trust by clarifying expectations and rewards, and then reliably executing what has been agreed upon.[270] Most leaders of

[268] Druker, P. (1992). *From Yesterday's Management to Tomorrows Leadership*. Tel Aviv: Trivax Matar (in Hebrew); Bass, B. M. (1985). *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*. Illustrated edition. New York: The Free Press, p. 11; Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Free Press, p. 23; Kahai, S. S. *et al*. (2003). Effects of Leadership Style, Anonymity, and Rewards on Creativity-Relevant Processes and Outcomes in an Electronic Meeting System Context. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 14(4–5), 499–524.

[269] Bass, B. M. (1985). *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*. Illustrated edition. New York: The Free Press, pp. 16–19.

[270] *Ibid.* (p. 14); Kahai, S. S. *et al*. (2003). Effects of Leadership Style, Anonymity, and Rewards on Creativity-Relevant Processes and Outcomes in an Electronic Meeting System Context. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 14(4–5), p. 503.

terrorist groups are better seen as transformational leaders and are gifted with charisma and the power to spread a message or ideology, or to persuade others to follow them.[271] Additionally, Fortune suggests that leadership in a prison environment is very different to leadership outside of prison due to the obvious difficulties, restrictions, and scarcity of resources that characterise the place; therefore, the techniques an individual needs to use in order to reach the leadership position differ from those used elsewhere. The leader has to comply with the prison code of silence and to earn the fellow prisoners' trust and respect.[272] Leaders of terrorist groups in Israeli prisons are responsible for every aspect of their members' daily lives, as well as managing communication with the organisations outside of prison. They operate within the limitations of their incarceration while negotiating the prisoners' needs and issues with the prisons' authorities, handling communication with their organisation by every means they have, such as through their family visits, lawyers, and released prisoners.[273]

Significantly, Bass says of leaders:

> Leaders are agents of change — persons whose acts affect other people more than other people's acts affect them.[274]

Leaders, in different shapes and forms, have existed since the early days of humanity, and they have played significant roles in people's lives throughout history.[275] Though leadership is a universal phenomenon,[276]

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[271] Bass, B. M. and Riggio, R. E. (2006). *Transformational Leadership*. Routledge, p. 5; Price, B. C. (2009). *Removing the Devil You Know: Unravelling the Puzzle Behind Decapitation Effectiveness and Terrorist Group Duration*. PhD thesis. USA: Stanford, p. 106.

[272] Fortune, S. H. (2003). *Inmate and Prison Gang Leadership*. PhD thesis. East Tennessee State: East Tennessee State University, p. 29.

[273] Bornstein, A. (2001). Ethnography and the Politics of Prisoners in Palestine-Israel. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 30(5), 546–574.

[274] Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Free Press, pp. 19–20.

[275] *Ibid.* (1990, p. 3); Burns, J. M. (1978). *Leadership*. 1st edition. Harper and Row, p. 2.

[276] Bass, B. M. and Bass, R. R. (2008). *The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Simon and Schuster, p. 7.

and, according to Burns, one of the most observed on earth,[277] it seems that like the concept of terrorism,[278] the notion of leadership has various definitions and coinciding meanings, which often lead to confusion.[279] In his 1978 work on leadership, Burns[280] argued that the concept of leadership was not well understood and this was evident through his exploration of 130 definitions of this concept. Later, during the 1990s, Bass argued, "there are almost as many different definitions to the concept of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept".[281] Rost verified this statement by identifying 221 definitions of leadership within 587 publications he examined around that time.[282]

The 'Trait Theory' of Leadership

Early theories perceived leadership as the tenure of a 'great man', whose extraordinary qualities shaped history by their existence and

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[277] Burns, J. M. (1978). *Leadership*. 1st edition. Harper and Row, p. 2.

[278] Schmid, A. P. (1992). The Response Problem as a Definition Problem. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(4), 7–13; Ganor, B. (2002). Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter? *Police Practice and Research*, 3(4), 287–304; Ruby, C. L. (2002b). The Definition of Terrorism. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 2(1), 9–14; Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., *et al*. (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), 777–794; All discussed the difficulties and attempts to define the concept and phenomenon of terrorism.

[279] Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Free Press, p. 11; Burns, J. S. (1996). Defining Leadership: Can We See the Forest for the Trees? *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies*, 3(2), 148–149; Bass, B. M. and Bass, R. R. (2008). *The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Simon and Schuster, p. 15; Eddy, P. L. and VanDerLinden, K. E. (2006). Emerging Definitions of Leadership in Higher Education New Visions of Leadership or Same Old "Hero" Leader? *Community College Review*, 34(1), 5–26; Winston, B. E. and Patterson, K. (2006). An Integrative Definition of Leadership. *International Journal of Leadership Studies*, 1(2), 6–66.

[280] Burns, J. M. (1978). *Leadership*. 1st edition. Harper and Row, p. 2.

[281] Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Free Press, p. 11.

[282] Rost, J. C. (1993). *Leadership for the Twenty-First Century*. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 44.

actions.[283] These theories were the basis of the 'trait theory' that was first introduced in the 1920s, growing in popularity between the 1930s and the 1950s. The trait theory classifies leadership as a certain personality type, consisting of a significant arsenal of traits, which contributes to a leader's ability to become an authority that others accept and follow, and influencing the leader's effectiveness.[284] Later on, this theory was somewhat undermined and criticized, starting with Stogdill, a prominent scholar in the field of leadership, who contended that personality itself is not enough, and even though it has been found that leaders share unique traits compared to non-leaders (such as intelligence, persistence, high self-esteem, as well as responsibility), there is a need to take into consideration the contexts or situations in which the leader operates.[285]

Consequently, since these ideas were originally presented, personality traits came to be considered a factor of leadership, along with situational factors and environmental ones.[286] In the early 1970s, the trait theory enjoyed a revival, based on the argument that traits were a good way of predicting behaviour,[287] and further evidence was found to suggest that certain traits such as intelligence, dominance, masculinity, self-confidence, and even adjustment have a strong relationship with leadership and effectiveness.[288]

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[283]Carlyle, T. and Adams, J. C. (1907). *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History.* Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, p. 18.

[284]Cowley, W. H. (1931). The Traits of Face-to-Face Leaders. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 26(3), 304–313; Mann, R. D. (1959). A Review of the Relationships between Personality and Performance in Small Groups. *Psychological Bulletin*, 56(4), 241–270; Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Free Press, p. 12; Hogan, R. *et al*. (1994). What We Know about Leadership. Effectiveness and Personality. *The American Psychologist*, 49(6), 493–504.

[285]Stogdill, Ralph M. (1948). Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature. *The Journal of Psychology*, 25(1), 35–71.

[286]Judge, T. A. *et al*. (2002). Personality and Leadership: A Qualitative and Quantitative Review. *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87(4), 765–780.

[287]Bem, D. J. and Allen, A. (1974). On Predicting some of the People some of the Time: The Search for Cross-Situational Consistencies in Behaviour. *Psychological Review*, 81(6), 506–520.

[288]Stogdill, R. M. (1974). *Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research*. Free Press, p. 72; Lord, R. G. *et al*. (1986). A Meta-Analysis of the Relation between

Stogdill revised his theory, and in a new study highlighted the fact that personality traits are a significant factor in leadership; in particular, characteristics such as creativity and originality in finding solutions, ambitiousness, responsibility, consistency, the ability to make hard decisions and to cooperate with others, and to accept failure when needed are all primary aspects of being an effective leader.[289]

Another attempt to link leadership and personality was made through the theory of the five-factor model of personality, or as it is often called, the 'Big Five', as discussed earlier.[290] This attempt revealed a strong relationship between five structured traits and effective leadership.[291] The first trait explicated in this theory is *neuroticism*, or more accurately, the absence of neuroticism, as this feature was found to be adversely related to the emergence of leadership and its effective conduct.[292] In his review, Bass[293] indicated the significance of low neuroticism among leaders. This led to the observation that self-esteem is another quality that, when found to be very low, serves as an indicator of neuroticism.[294] Consequently, it has been established that leaders have medium to high self-esteem and

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Personality Traits and Leadership Perceptions: An Application of Validity Generalization Procedures. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 71(3), 402–410; House, R. J. and Aditya, R. N. (1997). The Social Scientific Study of Leadership: Quo Vadis? *Journal of Management*, 23(3), 409–473.

[289] Stogdill, R. M. (1974). *Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research*. Free Press, p. 72.

[290] See this introduction, p. 53.

[291] Judge, T. A. and Bono, J. E. (2000). Five-Factor Model of Personality and Transformational Leadership. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 85(5), 751–765; Judge, T. A. *et al*. (2002). Personality and Leadership: A Qualitative and Quantitative Review. *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87(4), 767–768; Shao, L. and Webber, S. (2006). A Cross-Cultural Test of the 'Five-Factor Model of Personality and Transformational Leadership'. *Journal of Business Research*, 59(8), 936–944.

[292] Hogan, R *et al*. (1994). What We Know about Leadership Effectiveness and Personality. *The American Psychologist*, 49(6), 497.

[293] Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Free Press, p. 69.

[294] Eysenck, H. J. (1990). Biological dimensions of personality. In: Lawrence A. Pervin (ed.), *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*. 1st edition. New York: Guilford Press, pp. 244–276.

hence these findings contradict the notion that leaders have high levels of neuroticism.[295] The findings presented in this book reinforce this theory, which is discussed in Chapter 2, and deals with the personality profile of the interviewees who are all leaders in prisons.

The second trait listed in the 'Big Five' theory is *extraversion*, which is the opposite of introversion and is characterised as having the quality of being an energetic and lively person.[296] This might be linked to the emergence and social aspects of leadership where the leader is active, assertive, and full of energy to take on the leading role in a group or society.[297] *Openness* is the third trait of the 'Big Five' theory, and it refers to original thinking, intellect, and creativity;[298] all important skills that have great influence on effective leadership[299] and, according to Bass,[300] are highly correlated with leadership. *Agreeableness* is the fourth and most controversial trait in relation to leadership, due to the fact that being sensitive to others and possessing thoughtful interpersonal communication skills can be an important quality of a leader. However, agreeableness was also

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[295] Hill, N. C. and Ritchie, J. B. (1977). The Effect of Self-Esteem on Leadership and Achievement: A Paradigm and a Review. *Group & Organization Management*, 2(4), 491–503; Hogan, R *et al*. (1994). What We Know about Leadership Effectiveness and Personality. *The American Psychologist*, 49(6), 496.

[296] Eysenck, H. J. (1990). Biological dimensions of personality. In: Lawrence A. Pervin (ed.), *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*. 1st edition. New York: Guilford Press, p. 244; Judge, T. A. *et al*. (2002). Personality and Leadership: A Qualitative and Quantitative Review. *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87(4), 768.

[297] Costa Jr, P. T. and McCrae, R. R. (1988). From Catalogue to Classification: Murray's Needs and the Five-Factor Model. *Journal of Personality*, 55(2), 259; Shao, L. and Webber, S. (2006). A Cross-Cultural Test of the 'Five-Factor Model of Personality and Transformational Leadership'. *Journal of Business Research*, 59(8), 936–944.

[298] Digman, J. M. (1990) Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model. *Annual Review of Psychology*. 41(1), 424; Costa Jr, P. T. and McCrae, R. R. (1992). Four Ways Five Factors are Basic. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 13(6), 653–665.

[299] Kahai, S. S. *et al*. (2003). Effects of Leadership Style, Anonymity, and Rewards on Creativity-Relevant Processes and Outcomes in an Electronic Meeting System Context. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 14(4–5), 500–501; Mumford, M. D. *et al*. (2002). Leading Creative People: Orchestrating Expertise and Relationships. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 13(6), 705–750.

[300] Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Free Press, p. 66.

found to be associated with modesty and a need for affiliation, which does not characterise leadership.[301] The last trait is *conscientiousness,* which defines the person as fully motivated, ambitious, efficient, organised, and responsible,[302] qualities that are quite essential for effectiveness in any job and serve as a significant predictor of an effective charismatic leader.[303]

Charisma

Another quality that is linked extensively with leadership is charisma. Weber was the first to associate leadership with the word 'charisma,' which means 'a gift of grace,' taken from a study related to the Christian church. Weber argues that charisma is one of three aspects of legitimacy of power, the other two being the traditional and legal aspects of leadership. A charismatic leader, according to Weber, may be perceived as supernatural; an 'ideal' type of person who magically possesses spiritual power and paranormal abilities in relation to speech and mind as well as immense motivation to bring about change.[304] Furthermore, charismatic

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[301] Judge, T. A. *et al*. (2002). Personality and Leadership: A Qualitative and Quantitative Review. *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87(4), 768; Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 41(1), 422–424.

[302] McCrae, R. R. and Costa Jr, P. T. (1990). *Personality in Adulthood*. Guilford Publications, p. 47; Bass, B. M. and Bass, R. R. (2008). *The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Simon and Schuster, p. 121.

[303] Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. Free Press, p. 109; Barrick, M. R. and Mount, M. K. (1991). The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job Performance: A Meta-Analysis. *Personnel Psychology*, 44(1), 5; Judge, T. A. *et al*. (2002). Personality and Leadership: A Qualitative and Quantitative Review. *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87(4), 765–780.

[304] Weber, M. (1978). In the second part of his book: *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. University of California Press, pp. 1111–1156; for more information on Weber's theory of Charisma, see also: Breuilly, J. (2011). Max Weber, Charisma and Nationalist Leadership. *Nations and Nationalism*, 17(3), 477–499; Ensari, N. and Murphy, S. E. (2003). Cross-Cultural Variations in Leadership Perceptions and Attribution of Charisma to the Leader. *Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes*, 92(1–2), 52–66; Weber, M. and Whimster, S. (2004). *The Essential Weber: A Reader*. Routledge, Chapter 7, pp. 133–145.

leaders are also known to be very effective leaders. They use their unique 'gift' to influence their followers and motivate them to devote themselves to a collective cause, contributing more than expected of them, and making personal sacrifices for the greater good and as a part of collective duty.[305]

In modern times, Weber defines leaders slightly differently. The leader still possesses an extraordinary virtue and striking personality, yet is not supernatural.[306] Accordingly, a charismatic leader rules the actions of the present and thus controls the events of the future. Such charisma can be implemented by four types of figures: sages, such as scientists and philosophers, who change human perceptions of the world; generals, who maintain security and conquer enemies; political authorities, who control aspects of an entire community's everyday life; and, revolutionary leaders, who aim to improve the conditions and way of life for people within their societies. The revolutionary leader, in contrast with the other three types of leaders, needs to rely on his charisma and persuasive skills in order to convince others of his vision of a better future; therefore, he cannot simply depend on the practical qualities other types of leaders may use to maintain a status quo.[307]

Furthermore, though studies on the exact personality characteristics of charismatic leaders are not comprehensive,[308] Javidan and Waldman[309] found four main factors that seem to be common in most charismatic leaders:

(1) Self-confidence;
(2) Eloquence;

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[305] Shamir, B. *et al*. (1993). The Motivational Effect of Charismatic Leadership: A Self-Concept Based Theory. *Organisation Science*, 4(4), 577–594.

[306] Spencer, M. E. (1973). What Is Charisma? *The British Journal of Sociology*, 24(3), 341–354.

[307] *Ibid.* (pp. 345–347).

[308] House, R. J. (1992). Charismatic Leadership in Service-Producing Organisations. *International Journal of Service Industry Management*, 3(2), 5–16; Yukl, G. (1999). An Evaluation of Conceptual Weaknesses in Transformational and Charismatic Leadership Theories. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 10(2), 285–305.

[309] Javidan, M. and Waldman, D. A. (2003). Exploring Charismatic Leadership in the Public Sector: Measurement and Consequences. *Public Administration Review*, 63(2), 229–242.

(3) High energy and determination; and
(4) Desire for change and risk-taking.

Other studies have explored a different side of charismatic leadership, a negative one, in which charisma is used to exploit eager followers and deceive them in order to gain personal and mostly pathological aims. Accordingly, these leaders might be narcissistic, politically manipulative, and egocentric, as well as possessed with damaged and unethical or immoral visions and beliefs.[310] Bass and Steidlmeier named these leaders as inauthentic or pseudo-transformational leaders. The concept of transformational leadership, the incarnation of charismatic leadership, will be explored here further.[311]

Transformational vs. transactional leadership

More than two decades ago, researchers expanded the theory related to charismatic leadership by applying it to organisational leadership, with a focus on senior influential leaders in companies or other relevant institutes. During this period, the term 'charismatic leadership' has also been expanded upon in order to describe a transformational, visionary, or even revolutionary leadership, which consequently was better suited to modification.[312] Accordingly, transformational leadership is an influential, charismatic, and ideological kind of leadership, characterising leaders who lead people to achieve a higher purpose and have the vision and morality to do so while working towards achieving a common goal together with their subordinates. By pursuing change, the transformational

[310]Conger, J. A. and Kanungo, R. N. (1998). *Charismatic Leadership in Organisations*. SAGE, Chapter 7, pp. 211–241; Fogarty, S. G. (2010). The Dark Side of Leadership. *Australasian Pentecostal Studies*, 137–141; See also Post, J. M. (2004). *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behaviour*. Cornell University Press, Chapter 9, pp. 187–199.

[311]Bass, B. M. and Steidlmeier, P. (1999). Ethics, Character, and Authentic Transformational Leadership Behaviour. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 10(2), 181–217.

[312]Conger, J. A. (1999). Charismatic and Transformational Leadership in Organisations: An Insider's Perspective on These Developing Streams of Research. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 10(2), 145–179.

leader creates an atmosphere of cooperation to establish a shared vision and a better future.[313]

The opposite of the transformational leadership is the transactional leadership, which is largely more characteristic of business and administrative leadership. The transactional leader achieves cooperation among subordinates by controlling trade, as well as by offering a reward in exchange for the completion of a proposed task or the imposition of sanctions when a task is not performed properly. The transactional leader's role is to monitor conduct and to punish or reward accordingly in order to achieve desired results.[314]

According to Bass, "The transactional leader works within the organisational culture as it exists; the transformational leader changes the organisational culture",[315] yet there might be symptoms of both types of leadership within the same leader, though to different extents and intensities, due to the necessity of both aspects for leadership efficiency.[316] According to Hoffman, an example of such a leader would have been Osama Bin Laden, who until quite recently was the undisputed leader of Al-Qaeda before he was targeted and killed by American forces. Hoffman argues that Bin Laden transformed Al-Qaeda into a transnational terrorist organisation with a business-oriented administration through his modern management capabilities, his education, and managerial experience gained through the family business. Bin Laden had essentially applied to Al-Qaeda effective management methods that are used in other cooperative entities around the world. In addition to this, he was also a charismatic

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[313] Burns, J. M. (1978). *Leadership*. 1st edition. Harper and Row, p. 4; Bass, B. M. (1985). *Leadership and Performance beyond Expectations*. Illustrated edition. New York: The Free Press, pp. 14–32; Kahai, S. S. *et al*. (2003). Effects of Leadership Style, Anonymity, and Rewards on Creativity-Relevant Processes and Outcomes in an Electronic Meeting System Context. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 14(4–5), 500–501.

[314] Burns, J. M. (1978). *Leadership*. 1st edition. Harper and Row, p. 4; Bass, B. M. and Avolio, B. J. (1993, p. 52). Transformational leadership: A response to critiques. In M. M. Chemers & R. Ayman (eds.), *Leadership Theory and Research*: *Perspectives and Directions.* San Diego, CA: Academic Press, pp. 49–80.

[315] Bass, B. M. (1985). *Leadership and Performance beyond Expectations*. Illustrated edition. New York: The Free Press, p. 24.

[316] *Ibid*. (p. 26).

leader who encouraged new ideas and creative thinking in order to push the organisation and its goals forward.[317]

Commenting on leadership in terrorist organisations, Price notes:

> Terrorist groups are violent, clandestine organisations that are primarily value-driven in pursuit of their goals. As a result, terrorist group leaders have different incentive structures and fewer constraints than leaders in other organisations.[318]

Though extensive studies have been conducted regarding the personality and background of dominant terrorist leaders such as Bin Laden[319] and Yasser Arafat,[320] only limited research has been conducted regarding the internal conduct of these leaders within their organisations, their decision-making processes, and their general managerial attitudes.[321] Post stresses the importance of the role of terrorist leaders in contributing to group members' justification for committing violent acts, noting a lack of psychopathology among group members, as well as the major influence social surroundings have on them.[322]

Ranstorp detailed the emergence since the 1960s of religious terror groups, which are motivated mainly by religion, but also by the general politics in their area. The leadership within these groups emerges from

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[317]Hoffman, B. (2004). *Redefining Counterterrorism — the Terrorist Leader as CEO*. RAND Corporation. 28, 14–15.

[318]Price, B. C. (2009). *Removing the Devil You Know: Unravelling the Puzzle behind Decapitation Effectiveness and Terrorist Group Duration*. PhD thesis. USA: Stanford, p. 110.

[319]Post, J. M. (2002). *Killing in the Name of God: Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda*. The Counter Proliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 18, USAF Counter Proliferation Centre, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Available at: https://fas.org/irp/world/para/post.pdf.

[320]Kimhi, S. and Even, S. (2003). Yassir Arafat: Behavioural and Strategic Analysis. *Social Behaviour and Personality: An International Journal*, 31(4), 363–373; as well as Brexel, B. (2003). *Yasser Arafat*. The Rosen Publishing Group.

[321]Oots, K. L. (1990). Bargaining with Terrorists: Organizational Considerations. *Terrorism*, 13(2), 145–158.

[322]Post, J. M. (2005b). When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism. *Political Psychology*, 26(4), 615–636.

radical clerics who attract others with their charisma and violent ideology. These leaders control the military aspects, as well as the political activities in the organisation, while providing a religious justification for them.[323]

Terrorist leaders may be elected by group members for their general abilities like any other political leader. However, the leaders of such groups do not fit any common profile, as it seems that there are various types of leaders of different ages, genders, education levels, and mental capabilities. Furthermore, they are generally not under the authority of another, more superior actor in the area and so have no legal obligations or restrictions. Consequently, they gain significant power and control from these aspects of organisational structure and characteristics.[324] Most terrorist leaders tend to depend more on charisma and lean more towards the transformational type of leadership, basing their leadership strategy on their capability to move and inspire their followers, as well as their ability to steer the organisation forward and make necessary changes. They tend to lean less towards the transactional type of leadership, which is more business-oriented and focused on the attitudes of management towards the organisation's followers and its goals.[325] Mannes gives two examples of charismatic terrorist leaders: Fathi Shkaki, founder of PIJ, and Abimael Guzman, founder of the Peruvian terrorist organisation Sendero Luminoso. In both cases, the leaders' absence from their respective organisations resulted in the groups' severe dysfunction.[326]

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[323]Ranstorp, M. (1996). Terrorism in the Name of Religion. *Journal of International Affairs*, 50(1), 41–63; for more information: Fine, J. (2008). Contrasting Secular and Religious Terrorism. *Journal of International Affairs*, 50(1), 41–63.

[324]Price, B. C. (2012). Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism. *International Security*, 36(4), 9–46.

[325]Bahnsen, J. C. (2001). Charisma. In: Christopher D. K. *et al*. (eds.), *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*. Stackpole Books, pp. 259–276; Price, B. C. (2009). *Removing the Devil You Know: Unravelling the Puzzle behind Decapitation Effectiveness and Terrorist Group Duration*. PhD thesis. USA: Stanford, pp. 112–113.

[326]Mannes, A. (2008). Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity? *The Journal of International Policy Solutions*, 940–949.

Indeed, due to their importance to their organisations and the organisations' activities, as well as the immense influence they have on the followers, counter-terrorism strategists have found it effective to 'decapitate' these organisations by targeting their leaders in order to reduce the organisations' efficiency or even to demolish them totally. Numerous scholars have argued that this strategy, which has much support within the agencies in charge of counter-terrorism activities, mostly in America and Israel but also in other countries around the world, is counterproductive and in some cases even harmful, as it attracts more young volunteers to join terrorist groups and commit violent and suicidal acts.[327] Nevertheless, when leaders are captured rather than assassinated, they are usually imprisoned for long periods of time, and they normally continue leading their groups from prison, as will be elaborated further.

Leadership in prisons

Prisons are penal institutions that are characterized by a unique culture,[328] where leadership and status serve certain goals that are different from other institutions outside of prison. The prison atmosphere, due to its limited human resources, sees the development of various techniques that enable the achievement of the status of leadership. In order to become a leader, the prisoner must thoroughly understand the prison culture, such as codes of silence, while also being respected, honoured and perceived as trustworthy by their fellow prisoners. Prisoners understand the issue of leadership in a variety of unique ways, but they generally interpret it as the ability to

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[327] Jordan, J. (2004). *Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organisations.* Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec; Jordan, J. (2009). When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation. *Security Studies*, 18(4), 719–755; see also Price (2009 and 2012); Hafez, M. M. and Hatfield, J. M. (2006). Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29(4), 359–382.

[328] Clemmer, D. (1940). *The Prison Community*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, p. 270; for more information: Peat, B. J. and Winfree, L. T. (1992). Reducing the Intra-Institutional Effects of 'Prisonization'. *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, 19(2), 206–225.

set an example to other inmates regarding how to survive in prison.[329] It has also been found that different types of prisons affect the characteristics of leadership within them, as was detailed in a study from the late 1970s by Akers: minimum security prisons are characterised by a more democratic, open-minded leadership, with the leaders being mostly older, usually white, inmates. In prisons with stricter security, the leaders are commonly defined as dictatorial, tough, and destructive individuals, and they are usually younger and black.[330]

Another research project, also from the late 1970s, conducted by Solsar in two prisons in the US, found that the leaders elected by the group also play a social role in prison in that they are involved in social life, they are selected by other prisoners for various social activities and have many friends in prison. Furthermore, these leaders were divided into two groups: representative leaders, who work with the prison authorities on the one hand; and emerging leaders, who influence and operate within the group of prisoners on the other. It was found that leaders who are cooperative, who are able to represent the prisoners effectively and are likely to be approved of by the prison staff were more likely to be elected to the role of representative leaders. This is contrasted with emerging leaders who are less acceptable to the prison staff, but are favoured by the prisoners themselves. Furthermore, in terms of their characteristics, emerging leaders will often be in prison for longer terms than the other prisoners, compared with representative leaders, whose sentences vary between prisons. In high-security prisons, leaders would not be characterised by a long-term sentence, whereas in less secure prisons, representative leaders will be characterised by a long-term sentence. Furthermore, both types of leaders will generally be older than the prisoners who are not leaders, they are generally more educated and may have a history of more severe crimes and offences.[331]

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[329] Fortune, S. H. (2003). *Inmate and Prison Gang Leadership*. PhD thesis. East Tennessee State: East Tennessee State University, p. 2.

[330] Akers, R. L. (1977). Type of Leadership in Prison: A Structural Approach to Testing the Functional and Importation Models. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 18(3), 378–383.

[331] Solsar, J. A. (1978). *Prisonization, Friendship and Leadership*. Lexington Books, pp. 99–117; See also Shrivastava, R. S. (1974). The Inmate Elite: Social Stratification among Prison Inmates. *The Indian Journal of Social Work*, 34, 387–393.

Leadership of security prisoners in Israeli prisons is also divided into two types of leaders — internal ones who hold leadership positions within the organisations, and spokesmen who moderate between the security prisoners and the prison authorities. Though there is not much literature on the characteristics of these leaders, the only difference in their leadership conduct found in this study was linked to the aspect of religion rather than their leadership role type. The spokesman is described as someone who has good communication and negotiation skills, he speaks good Hebrew and is rather moderate in his conduct and mindset, allowing him to cooperate with prison authorities. The internal leaders, on the other hand, generally have high status in the Palestinian arena since they belong to distinguished and honourable families. Their charges are also an influential factor and they should have a remarkable list of charges of acts against Israel to improve their chances of being elected.[332]

The leaders who were interviewed for this book described their leadership roles and the ways they interpreted the concept of leadership. The points they noted included whether they saw themselves as the *only* authority or whether they believed they were cooperating with other members of the organisation. Other elements relating to the leadership aspect will be explored, such as their preferences regarding the organisations' targets versus the perceived needs of the organisation members, as well as their expression of leadership difficulties and personal ambitions. The final aspect that will be explored in this chapter is whether they were found to be charismatic leaders or not, according to factors highlighted by the literature review and their own perceptions and conduct related to leadership.

As Victoroff has suggested:

> Investigating the terrorist mind may be a necessary first step toward actualizing modern political psychology's potential for uncovering the bases of terrorist aggression and designing an optimum counterterrorism policy.[333]

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[332]Rosenfeld (2011, p. 7); Nashif (2008, p. 9); Shaked (2008, p. 28).

[333]Victoroff, J. (2005). The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(1), 3–42.

Finally, a wide, social-psychological profile of the leaders of terrorist groups held in prisons will be presented by merging the four elements discussed previously with the last element: imprisonment and its influence on the leaders' behaviour, perceptions and on their leadership conduct, which will be elaborated in Chapter 5.

Imprisonment

Clemmer, in the early 1940s, was the first to establish the concept of 'prisonisation', meaning 'the taking on in greater or lesser degree of the folkways, mores, customs, and general culture of the penitentiary'.[334] Accordingly, an exposure to prison, which contains a hostile social system, leads to indoctrination of the prisoner with certain characteristics of prison lifestyle and deviant norms. Furthermore, Clemmer suggested a distinction between two elements determining the effects of prison: the 'deprivation model' relates to how the experience of incarceration affects the creation of a prisoner subculture; while the 'importation model' describes the effects of the inmate's social experience *before* entering prison on his adaptation to his new social system.[335]

Sykes, and later on Goffman, expanded the deprivation model and suggested the concept of 'pains of imprisonment,' which referred to the prisoner's loss of sovereignty and freedom of movement. The prisoner experiences a deprivation of heterosexual or other relationships they used to maintain, and a sudden loss of the possessions and services, as well as personal security and safety, which they had previously enjoyed. These deprivations are combined with substantial damage to the prisoner's self-esteem due to the low social status of being a prisoner.[336]

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[334]Clemmer (1940, p. 270); Peat and Winfree (1992, pp. 206–225).

[335]Clemmer (1940, p. 270).

[336]Sykes, G. M. (1958). *Society of Captives: Study of a Maximum Security Prison*. Princeton University Press, pp. 63–83; Goffman, E. (1961). *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients.* Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican, pp. 12–74; for more information regarding the concept 'pain of imprisonment': Johnson, R. and Toch, H. (1982). *Pains of Imprisonment*. United States: Sage Publications, Inc; Riley, J. (2002). The Pains of Imprisonment: Exploring a Classic Text with Contemporary Authors. *Journal of Criminal Justice Education*, 13(2), 443–461.

Furthermore, Clemmer claims that the inmate has to integrate into a subculture, which operates through a value system defined as the 'inmate's code'. Illustrating the rules and conduct among the prisoners and with the prison personnel, he pointed out, "The inmate code, therefore, summarizes the behavioural expectations of the inmates' social system".[337]

More recent research investigated the applications of the deprivation model and the importation model on prisoners, suggesting that the deprivation model allows for a better prediction of prisonization. Nonetheless, researchers acknowledged the significant impact of some aspects of the importation model as well, such as age, race, socioeconomic status, employment, and education. This has eventually led to the conclusion that both models explain more variables together than separately.[338] For instance, the process a prisoner goes through when entering incarceration for the first time is described as dramatically painful and traumatic. Prisoners lose their self-identity and their freedom of will and action in new social surroundings, which contain people who are not relatives or friends, and furthermore can be either hostile or highly dangerous. The consequences of these circumstances can include strong emotions of hopelessness and distress that may in turn lead to despair and to extreme violence, or even suicidal behaviour.[339] Interestingly, other studies have suggested that prisoners incarcerated for political and ideological reasons are more likely to experience positive development rather than effects of

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[337]Clemmer (1958, pp. 152–155); for more information regarding the 'inmates code': Sykes, G. M. and Messinger, S. L. (1960). The Inmate Social Code and its Functions. *Social Science Research Council*, 15, 401–405; Wellford, C. (1967). Factors Associated with Adoption of the Inmate Code: A Study of Normative Socialization. *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, 58(2), 197–203; Matthews, R. (1999). *Doing Time: An Introduction to the Sociology of Imprisonment.* Palgrave Macmillan, p. 53.

[338]Paterline, B. A. and Petersen, D. M. (1999). Structural and Social Psychological Determinants of Prisonization. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 27(5), 427–441; Reisig, M. D. and Lee, Y. H. (2000). Prisonization in the Republic of Korea. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 28(1), 23–31.

[339]Sykes, G. M. (1958). *Society of Captives: Study of a Maximum Security Prison*. Princeton University Press. pp. 63–83; Goffman, E. (1961). *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients*. Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican, pp. 12–74; Dhami, M. K. *et al*. (2007). Adaptation to Imprisonment. *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, 34(8), 1085–1100.

victimisation or despair.[340] Alderdice demonstrated the findings of a study that compared terrorist prisoners to other criminal prisoners, and found them to be more caring towards their compatriots, possessing stronger survival abilities in stressful situations, and even tending to make better use of the education facilities while in prison.[341]

Adaptation to imprisonment

Apparently, even in these modern times, no suitable alternative to incarceration has been found for dealing with serious criminal offenders. As a result, different studies have focused on the varied aspects affected by imprisonment, such as the family and the general social surroundings, health, occupation, and mental state. Examples include the research of Murray and Farrington,[342] who found that prisoners' children are considerably susceptible to suffering from personality disorders and mental health problems; or studies that focus on imprisonment as a factor that causes the adoption of criminal careers and affects the market place,[343] as well as studies that show the damage incarceration can cause to physical and mental health.[344] Accordingly, incarceration has been found to have a

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[340]Erbes, C. *et al*. (2005). Posttraumatic Growth among American Former Prisoners of War. *Traumatology*, 11(4), 285–295; Feder, A. *et al*. (2008). Posttraumatic Growth in Former Vietnam Prisoners of War. *Psychiatry*, 71(4), 359–370.

[341]Alderdice, Lord. (2007). The Individual, the Group and the Psychology of Terrorism. *International Review of Psychiatry*, 19(3), 202.

[342]Murray, J. and Farrington, D. P. (2005). Parental Imprisonment: Effects on Boys' Antisocial Behaviour and Delinquency through the Life-Course. *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 46(12), 1269–1278; for more information related to this issue, see: Gabel, S. (1992). Behavioural Problems in Sons of Incarcerated or Otherwise Absent Fathers: The Issue of Separation. *Family Process*, 31(3), 303–314; Travis, J. (2003). *Prisoners Once Removed: The Impact of Incarceration and Reentry on Children, Families, and Communities*. The Urban Institute.

[343]Freeman, R. B. (1994). *Crime and the Job Market*. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series*. No. 4910. Available at: https://www.nber.org/papers/w4910.pdf; Western, B. *et al*. (2001). The Labour Market Consequences of Incarceration. *Crime & Delinquency*, 47(3), 410–427.

[344]Walker, N. (1983). Side-Effects of Incarceration. *British Journal of Criminology*, 23(1), 61–71; Schnittker, J. and John, A. (2007). Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term Effects of

significant influence on the offender's life and hence on his attitude and conduct. However, only a minority of offenders will go through different kinds of behavioural and cognitive treatment programmes during their time in prison and there is still an immense lack of evidence as to how and in what way incarceration affects the person.[345]

Moreover, most social studies on the effect of imprisonment highlight the harmful influence of incarceration on the prisoner's social attitude, evidenced by apathy, a lack of initiative or interest in significant contact with the outside world, and loss of responsibility and concern for life beyond the prison walls. Furthermore, long-term incarceration leads prisoners to develop a total dependency on the institution, understanding only the socialisation process inside prison and lacking social skills that will allow them to reintegrate with the outside world.[346]

Most early studies regarding prisoners who are incarcerated for a long period of time or even for life sentences, emphasise that these prisoners are found to be more susceptible to prisonization, along with its severe consequences of loss of social behavioural skills and immense deterioration in personal, mental, or social attributes.[347] In more current studies, other opinions have been expressed, which place less emphasis on the destructive effects of long incarceration by arguing that research did not

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Incarceration on Health. *Journal of Health and Social Behaviour*, 48(2), 115–130; Massoglia, M. (2008). Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health. *Law & Society Review*, 42(2), 275–306.

[345] Wormith, J. S. (1984). Attitude and Behaviour Change of Correctional Clientele. *Criminology*, 22(4), 595–618; Zamble, E. and Porporino, F. (1990). Coping, Imprisonment, and Rehabilitation. *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, 17(1), 53–70; Ditchfield, J. (1990). *Control in Prisons: A Review of the Literature*. London: H.M.S.O, p. 8; Zamble, E. (1992). Behaviour and Adaptation in Long-Term Prison Inmates. *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, 19(4), 409–425.

[346] West, D. J. (1963). *The Habitual Prisoner*. Cambridge Studies of Criminology. London: Macmillan, pp. 106–107; Barton, R. (1966). *Institutional Neurosis*. Wright, p. 14; Flanagan, T. J. (1981). Dealing with Long-Term Confinement. *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, 8(2), 201–222; Liebling, A. and Maruna, S. (2005). *The Effects of Imprisonment*. Cullompton Devon, UK; Portland, OR: Willan, pp. 4–5; Munn, M. (2011). Living in the Aftermath: The Impact of Lengthy Incarceration on Post-Carceral Success. *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, 50(3), 233–246.

[347] *Ibid*.

find strong evidence of large-scale decline in the social and physical abilities of people who were incarcerated for long periods of time.[348]

An example of such research is the study conducted by Leigey, who investigated the mental health of prisoners serving a life sentence without parole, which is the most severe incarceration sentence available in non-capital punishment penal systems, inasmuch as the prisoner is to spend the rest of his life in prison without a chance of early release. Leigey reported that most of the prisoners interviewed claimed to suffer from poor mental health including depression, severe anger, and suicidal attitudes before incarceration, as well as during their first few years in prison. However, these prisoners reported significant changes in their mental health later on in their confinement; they had enhanced their sense of humanity and self as well as their social responsibilities despite ongoing sadness and even apathy due to their difficult situation.[349]

Another unique group that has been investigated in relation to imprisonment and its outcomes is that of prisoners of war (POW). Studies suggest that this group of people is at high risk of suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as other symptoms of depression, mental health problems, and alcoholism due to incarceration, as well as stressful and traumatic conditions.[350] Other studies on POW found that these traumatic experiences can also lead to constructive outcomes defined in literature as 'post-traumatic growth', which is the occurrence of positive changes as an outcome of dealing with demanding and burdensome life circumstances. It can be manifested by personal and social changes, such as an enhanced sense of personal strength and meaningful relationships with others, adoption of different priorities in life, as well as feelings of gratitude for life in

[348]MacKenzie, D. L. and Goodstain, L. (1985). Long-Term Incarceration Impacts and Characteristics of Long-Term Offenders. *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, 12(4), 395–414; Zamble, E. (1992). Behaviour and Adaptation in Long-Term Prison Inmates. *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, 19(4), 410; Flanagan, T. J. (1995). *Long-Term Imprisonment: Policy, Science, and Correctional Practice*. Sage Publications, pp. 3–9.

[349]Leigey, M. E. (2011). For the Longest Time: The Adjustment of Inmates to a Sentence of Life without Parole. *The Prison Journal*, 90(3), 247–268.

[350]Kluznik, J. C. *et al*. (1986). Forty-Year Follow-Up of United States Prisoners of War. *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, 143(11), 1443–1446; Tennant, C. (2000). Prisoners of war. In: George Fink (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Stress*. Academic Press, p. 248.

general.[351] Moreover, according to recent research, it seems that due to the character of their personal and political involvement in an ideological cause, people imprisoned for terrorist offences show relatively high levels of post-traumatic growth as well.[352]

Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons

The group of prisoners investigated in this book have been convicted in Israel for terrorist activities and are part of a wider unique group of prisoners incarcerated in Israeli prisons since the 1967 war between Israel and its neighbouring countries. The social profile of the prisoners has changed considerably during these years: originally, they were young people, in their 20s or 30s, mostly students in higher education who were involved in the '67 war' and thus were arrested during the war or after it. Later, during the 1970s, the dynamic of the prison population altered as more teenagers were incarcerated due to high school educated members becoming active locally. Correspondingly, from the mid-1970s until the *intifada* (the uprising of the Palestinians against Israel) in 1987 and beyond, the social profile changed again with an immense wave of arrests of individuals who belonged to quite a different social spectrum. These included influential people such as political leaders, professionals, and political activists. Furthermore, this wave of prisoners formed the foundation of the security prisoner community and were responsible for its institutionalisation.[353]

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[351] Tedeschi, R. G. and Calhoun, L. G. (1996). The Posttraumatic Growth Inventory: Measuring the Positive Legacy of Trauma. *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, 9(3), 455–471; Tedeschi, R. G. and Calhoun, L. G. (2004). Posttraumatic Growth: Conceptual Foundations and Empirical Evidence. *Psychological Inquiry*, 15(1), 1–18; Weiss, T. (2002). Posttraumatic Growth in Women with Breast Cancer and Their Husbands. *Journal of Psychosocial Oncology*, 20(2), 65–80.

[352] Erbes, C. *et al*. (2005). Posttraumatic Growth among American Former Prisoners of War. *Traumatology*, 11(4), 285–295; Salo, J. A. *et al*. (2005). Adult Attachment, Posttraumatic Growth and Negative Emotions among Former Political Prisoners. *Anxiety, Stress & Coping: An International Journal*, 18(4), 361–378; Feder, A. *et al*. (2008). Posttraumatic Growth in Former Vietnam Prisoners of War. *Psychiatry*, 71(4), 360.

[353] Nashif, E. (2008). *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community*. Taylor & Francis, pp. 12–13.

In Israel, prisoners incarcerated for terrorist offences are defined as 'security prisoners', which is a classification determined by the principles of the prison governor and regulations of the prison authority. Its purpose is to differentiate these prisoners — usually by their identity, political attitude, and offences — from regular criminal prisoners. This classification is an administrative policy and not a legal one, which allows the prison authorities a unique freedom in supervising this group of prisoners and in handling them in such a manner as to avoid a security risk; for example, by restricting visits, phone calls, and early release. Furthermore, these prisoners are handled as a homogenous group posing a dangerous risk, rather than as individuals with unique backgrounds and specific needs.[354]

In addition, detentions and arrests of Palestinians in relation to security offences against the state of Israel were relatively high during the first *intifada* (1987–1992), whereas at the beginning of the last two decades, marked by the Oslo accord in 1994, Israel had released a large number of prisoners and reduced the number of detentions and arrests until the year 2000 when the second *intifada* occurred.[355] Since then, the dynamic has

[354]Rosenfeld, M. (2004). *Confronting the Occupation: Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee camp*. Stanford University Press, p. 245; Ajzenstadt, M. and Ariel, B. (2008). Terrorism and Risk Management. *Punishment & Society*, 10(4), 355–374; Harel, A. (2011). Who is a security prisoner and why? An examination of the legality of prison regulations governing security prisoners. In: Abeer Baker and Anat Matar (eds.), *Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel*. Pluto Press, pp. 37–43; Berda, Y. (2011). The security risk as a security risk: Notes on the classification practices of the Israeli Security Service. In: Abeer Baker and Anat Matar (eds.), *Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel*. Pluto Press, pp. 44–56; Korn, A. (2011). Prison policy and political imprisonment in Northern Ireland and Israel. In: Abeer Baker and Anat Matar (eds.), *Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel*. Pluto Press, pp. 68–82; Baker, A. M. (2011). Palestinian political prisoners. In: Nadim Rouhana N. and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury (eds.), *The Palestinians in Israel — Readings in History, Politics and Society*. Haifa, Israel: Mada al-Carmel-Arab Centre for Applied Social Research, pp. 100–109.

[355]Isaac, J. (1989). A Socio-Economic Study of Administrative Detainees at Ansar 3. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 18(4), 102–109; Rosenfeld, M. (2011). The centrality of the prisoners' movement to the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation: A historical perspective. In: Abeer Baker and Anat Matar (eds.), *Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel*. Pluto Press, pp. 3–24.

changed again, reaching a peak in 2006 with nearly 10,000 prisoners in Israeli prisons, but there has been a steady decline since then to slightly more than 7,000 in 2009 and less than 6,000 in 2011.[356] This took a dramatic turn when Israel released 1,027 security prisoners as a result of a deal with Hamas to release an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who was captured and held by Hamas for more than five years. Finally, after years of attempts at deals and negotiations, and with the mediation of Turkey, Germany, and Egypt, the deal was signed and Shalit was released on October 18th, 2011, reducing the number of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons for terrorist offences to less than 5,000.[357] These numbers have stayed relatively stable since then, yet the exact number of security prisoners in Israeli prisons as of April 2020 is 4,560. It is interesting to note that since 2014 the number of newcomers with an affiliation with Daesh was 8 in 2014 and by 2018 the number had risen to 76. Another change in the profile of these imprisoned terrorists occurred between 2015 and 2017, when a wave of lone wolf terrorists emerged, whose motivations for conducting terrorist attacks included personal dysfunctions and grievances rather than the pure ideology that motivated most terrorists until then.[358]

Nashif described the Israeli prisons as 'One of the major sites of Palestinian national movement'[359] and Hajjar defined it as 'part of the sociocultural bonds that unite Palestinians in the Occupied Territories as a

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[356]Baker, A. M. (2011). Palestinian political prisoners. In: Nadim Rouhana N. and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury (eds.), *The Palestinians in Israel — Readings in History, Politics and Society*. Haifa, Israel: Mada al-Carmel-Arab Centre for Applied Social Research, pp. 101–102.

[357]Information about this deal can be found in Israeli newspapers and websites such as:

Haaretz: http://www.haaretz.com/meta/Tag/Gilad%20Shalit;

Ynet: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4134408,00.html;

As well as in other international websites such as:

BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15339604;

Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/gilad-shalit.

[358]IPS Media and Public Relation (2018). IPS1 — Terrorism and Radicalisation in Prisons. An International High Level Conference, 5 September. Shragai, N. (2018). Study finds surprising reasons behind most terrorist attacks, *Israel Hayom*, 24 August.

[359]Nashif, E. (2008). *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community*. Taylor & Francis, p. 72.

community'.[360] Due to their large numbers, Palestinian prisoners construct a whole new community and social space inside prison through the concepts of shared identity and collectivism, leading to fully formalised institutions.[361] Hajjar describes this as 'a society within society'.[362] Rosenfeld explains that the prisoners institutionalised themselves in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and this unique arrangement gained even further significance in the mid to late 1980s up to the early 1990s. The community handles every aspect of the prisoners' daily lives and needs, including providing materials and basic necessities in the prison, education, as well as supporting the prisoners' involvement in political discussions and activism.[363]

The prison experience described by ex-prisoners, and further explained by scholars and activists dealing with this topic, is a very significant and meaningful one, both in the personal aspects, as well as the social ones. Upon entering prison, the prisoners are asked to declare the organisation to which they belong, and if they do not belong to any specific organisation, they are advised to choose one that aligns with their social and religious views in order to be entitled to the benefits and support that prisoners receive from the different organisations. From this point on, the organisations supply the prisoner with his basic needs, as well as with information about the organisation itself and further education in relation to the conflict, or to general topics. The prisoner learns all aspects relating to the history of the conflict and the organisation's ideology, history, funders, and conduct. Most prisoners report being more politically attuned and having a better understanding of the conflict and the struggle after they have entered prison, while some of them even develop their

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[360]Hajjar, L. (2005). *Courting the Conflict — the Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza*. University of California Press, p. 209.

[361]Nashif, E. (2008). *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community*. Taylor & Francis, p. 9; Shaked (2008). The Security Prisoners in Israeli Prisons. *Roim Shabas*, 26–29 (in Hebrew).

[362]Hajjar, L. (2005). *Courting the Conflict — the Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza*. University of California Press, p. 207.

[363]Rosenfeld, M. (2011). The centrality of the prisoners' movement to the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation: A historical perspective. In: Abeer Baker and Anat Matar (eds.), *Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel*. Pluto Press, pp. 6–7.

leadership skills and abilities, and others have enhanced their solidarity and sense of personal and social identity.[364]

In addition, it seems that education plays a major role in prison, even to a greater extent than outside prison. In prison, they have the time, the guidance, and the motivation. Most prisoners report entering prison uneducated and finding there an opportunity to gain knowledge, from high school up to university level. They also declare that they largely enjoy the political and philosophical discussions they have with their fellow veteran prisoners, which serve to open their minds and expand their horizons.[365] Nonetheless, since 2010, as a means to put political pressure on the terrorist organisations to release the captured soldier, Gilad Shalit, there has been a ban on acquiring any kind of education in prison, which has not been lifted as of today. However, this has not stopped prisoners from continuing to study, including learning Hebrew, by themselves and with the help of other inmates, allowing them to better understand the Israeli society, events that are happening in the region, and the Israeli personnel that they encounter in prison every day.[366]

Prison therefore plays a major role in a person's life, and further suggests that in the case of security prisoners in Israeli prisons, it plays an even more significant role. Prisons are unique communities and institutions, which shape the lives and identities of the prisoners, as well as the Palestinian society. The following findings will emphasise these differences, as well as the unique process this group of prisoners goes

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[364]Hajjar, L. (2005). *Courting the Conflict — the Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza*. University of California Press, pp. 207–210; Bornstein, A. (2001, p. 556), and (2010, p. 465) Palestinian Prison Anthologies. *Dialectical Anthropology*, 34, 459–472.

[365]Rosenfeld, M. (2004). *Confronting the Occupation: Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp*. Stanford University Press, pp. 238–239; Nashif, E. (2008). *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community*. Taylor & Francis, pp. 72–73; Bornstein, A. (2010). Palestinian Prison Anthologies. *Dialectical Anthropology*, 34, 465–466.

[366]Levy, E. (2018). In prison, I understood Israelis want peace, says released Palestinian murderer, *Ynet news*, 10 October. Available at: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5115295,00.html.

through while incarcerated, its outcomes on their conduct in prison and, further, upon their release.

This book will also attempt to illustrate that the group of terrorist leaders in Israeli prisons do not go through the same painful process of adjustment to incarceration as other prisoners; instead, they experience prison as a place to empower themselves. They use the traumatic aspects of prison as a source of strength and exploit the circumstances in order to allow themselves to embark upon a dramatic development in their lives and attitudes. Another aspect that might have an immense influence on this process is the strong support and care these inmates receive from family, friends, the organisation, and from general Palestinian society, who perceive them as the saviours of their people. Furthermore, inmates take advantage of the time during which they are imprisoned to improve their reputation and their chance of being accepted as leaders within Palestinian society, whether in prison or outside. These aspects also relate to the leaders' process of deepening their involvement in the terrorist organisations and activism, and thus influence their radicalisation or possible de-radicalisation process, as will be detailed next.

Radicalisation or de-radicalisation in prisons

Another outcome of imprisonment that has been well researched lately is the radicalisation or de-radicalisation process that terrorists go through while incarcerated.[367] Prisons are often identified as 'breeding grounds' for terrorist radicalisation[368] or even as 'universities for terror'.[369] For reasons such as these, prisons attract great attention from governments, who invest funds and other resources to tackle the matter. A remarkable project conducted by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation

[367] Neumann (2010); Gunaratna (2011); Adam, T. (2019). Approaches to countering radicalisation and dealing with violent extremist and terrorist offenders in prisons and probation, RAN P&P Practitioners working paper.

[368] Cuthbertson (2004, p. 17); Austin, J. (2009). Prisons and Fear of Terrorism. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 8(3), 641–646; The Washington Times (2004). Prisons breeding ground for terror? *The Washington Times*, 5 May.

[369] Cuthbertson (2004, p. 15); Useem, B. and Clayton, O. (2009). Radicalisation of U.S. Prisoners. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 8 (3), 561–592.

(ICSR) investigated the policies and approaches of 15 countries around the world towards extremism and radicalisation in prisons. The report emphasised the potential of prisons for bringing extremists together and allowing them to influence others, as well as continuing their acts of rebellion and religious radicalisation.[370]

Silke illustrates the growing concern around Europe regarding militant jihadi extremists and their ability to influence others while in prison. In his book, he details the strategies of different countries towards extremist prisoners; for example, the question of whether to have them concentrated in a small number of high-security prisons, thus enabling them to exert substantial peer pressure on other prisoners to conform to the ideology of the group, enhancing commitment to the cause, and consequently developing 'universities of terror' inside the prisons. The alternative is to spread these prisoners between prisons with other types of prisoners, which potentially runs the risk of sparking severe security issues, such as riots and congregations of prisoners who plan to commit hostile activities, as well as spreading radicalisation activities to non-terrorist inmates and converts.[371]

Around the world, in most prison systems dealing with terrorist threats, the prisoners organise themselves into very hierarchical and systemised structures for spreading knowledge, ideology, and politics. They also arrange activities against the prison management, such as demonstrations, riots, and attempts to escape.[372] Neumann's report details numerous kinds of de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes, which are taking place in prisons around the world. Countries including Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Yemen initiated programmes at the level of individual prisoners. These mainly consist of

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[370] Neumann (2010, Chapter 3, pp. 23–28).

[371] Silke (2010, p. 123–127). See also: UN (2008, p. 8). *First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes*. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/44297.

[372] Cuthbertson (2004, p. 16); Silke (2010, p. 125); for more examples: Voglis, P. (2002). *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners during the Greek Civil War*. Berghahn Books, p. 42; Warnes, R. and Hannah, G. (2008). Meeting the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners: The Experiences of the United Kingdom and Spain. *Policing* 2(4), 402–411; Bates-Gaston, J. (2003). Terrorism and imprisonment in Northern Ireland: A psychological perspective. In: Andrew Silke (ed.), *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences*. Wiley, pp. 233–255.

religious re-education and professional training, which take care of psychological and sociological needs, as well as strengthening individuals' commitments to their community and state.[373] Other countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, focus on collective de-radicalisation and disengagement processes, while emphasising the importance of charismatic, structured leadership of the prisoners. Together with government facilitation, it has been claimed that this can achieve remarkable outcomes in changing the attitudes of the prisoners towards committing or even just approving of extreme violent acts.[374] In the last decade, European countries have also dealt with an immense growth in extremist prisoners. They found de-radicalisation to be difficult to implement and so shifted away from that and focus now on disengagement, which provides the prisoners with more tools to leave extremism behind.[375]

Different kinds of strategies result in varied outcomes and therefore, in order to understand which approaches will be effective in each country, other factors need to be considered as well. Variables include the type of group that is being imprisoned, whether it is operating against government action or against the very existence of a country, the nature of the conflict and the history involved, as well as the basic roots of the ideology; whether it derives from religious, national, or other motives.[376] This book locates these root factors as they relate to the Israeli case of Palestinian prisoners incarcerated for committing terrorist acts against the Israeli state and determines whether there is a suitable de-radicalisation programme in that case.

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[373] Neumann (2010, p. 47); for more information on de-radicalisation process in these countries see: Gunaratna, R. *et al*. (2011). *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism.* Taylor & Francis.

[374] Neumann (2010, p. 39); for more information on de-radicalisation processes in Egypt, see: Ashour, O. (2007). Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalisation of Armed Islamist Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group. *The Middle East Journal*, 61(4), 596–625; As well as in Algeria see: Ashour, O. (2008). Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures. *The Middle East Institute Policy Brief*. 2, 11–14.

[375] Khalil, J. (2018). *Deradicalisation Programmes in Spanish Prisons: A Flawed Paradigm?*, RUSI, 3 September 2018. Available at: https://rusi.org/commentary/deradicalisation-programmes-spanish-prisons-flawed-paradigm.

[376] Neumann (2010); Gunaratna, R. *et al*. (2011). *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism.* Taylor & Francis, pp. 5–8.

Radicalisation in prisons

Radicalisation as a concept has gained popularity mainly in the last decade and has since influenced the work of a variety of fields, such as political science, sociology, law, and security studies, as well as private and collective institutions.[377] Neumann argues that the concept of radicalisation, taken from the Latin word *radix,* which means 'root', suggests further investigation and research into the 'root causes' of terrorism, which became unpopular after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US, due to its interpretation by some as a justification for the killing of innocent people.[378]

According to the UK Home Office, radicalisation is 'a process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups'.[379] However, other researchers argue that the concept of radicalisation actually has two meanings. The first one relates to adopting extreme ideas, in the sense of promoting radical views that are based on the need for dramatic change to society, while the second meaning relates to the actual committing of political violence. Sageman stresses that most people acknowledge both aspects of radicalisation and by doing so, they expand dramatically the view on terrorism since a large number of people might support extreme views but have never actually carried out violent acts.[380] Sedgwick argues that it is far more

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[377] Dearey, M. (2010). *Radicalisation*. 1st edition. Routledge-Cavendish, pp. 1–5; Sedgwick, M. (2010). The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22, 479–494.

[378] Neumann, P. (2008). Papers from the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence — Introduction. In: 17 January 2008 London: ICSR — International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, pp. 3–4. Available at: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/Perspectives-on-Radicalisation-Political-Violence.pdf.

[379] HM Government (March 2009). *Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism.* Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, CM 7547.

[380] Veldhuis, T. and Staun, J. (2009). *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model.* Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, p. 4. Available at: https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/islamist_radicalisation.veldhuis_and_staun.pdf; Sageman, M. (2008). The turn to political violence in the West. In: R. Coolsaet (ed.), *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., pp. 117–130.

complicated than this. The concept of radicalisation is very confusing due to its different uses in different contexts, such as security, integration, and foreign policy, which all have different agendas; it therefore obtains different meanings in different contexts. Hence, according to Sedgwick, the term radicalisation should not be acknowledged as an absolute concept, but as a comparative one with a wide range of definitions according to the context.[381] As for the nature of radicalisation, the Global Future Forum (GFF), for example, defines radicalisation as 'a process, not an end unto itself and it does not necessarily lead to violence'[382] meaning that radicalisation is not the outcome but the root, which can lead to extreme, sometimes quite horrific acts, but not always, since it can also lead to positive deeds.[383]

In this book, the term 'radicalisation' will be taken to refer to the process that a prisoner goes through while in prison, whereby he adopts extreme views that he did not have before, or else he becomes more extreme in his attitude and conduct than he was before his incarceration. As mentioned previously, prisons are known to be places of recruitment, as well as environments in which extreme political views may be developed and enhanced. In prisons, there are different kinds of involvement in extreme acts and behaviour. Many inmates who were active before incarceration continue to contribute to the extremist movements, and those who had some background of activity in these movements find the opportunity to increase their involvement. Likewise, prisoners who were convicted for criminal acts and were motivated to adopt extreme views can become more radical political activists.[384]

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[381] Sedgwick, M. (2010). The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22, 479; see also: Mandel, D. R. (2010). Radicalisation: What does it mean? In: T. Pick and A. Speckhard (eds.), *Indigenous Terrorism: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe*. Amsterdam: IOS Press, p. 9.

[382] Global Future forum (2006). In their report on: *Radicalisation, Violence and the Power of Network*. Ottawa, p. 3.

[383] Fraihi, T. (2008). (De-) Escalating Radicalisation: The Debate within Muslim and Immigrant Communities. In: Rik Coolsaet (ed.), *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., pp. 131–138; Dearey, M. (2009, p. 3). *Radicalisation*, 1st edition. Routledge-Cavendish.

[384] Rushchenko, J. (2019). Terrorist Recruitment and Prison Radicalization: Assessing the UK Experiment of 'Separation Centres.' *European Journal of Criminology*, 16(3),

Silke notes that recruitment to extreme violent organisations is more prevalent among Islamist prisoners, who are keen to influence non-Muslims, enrolling them in their society and activities. By contrast, nationalist, non-religious organisations such as the IRA are less keen on cooperating with others or recruiting outsiders, unless it is for mutual interests or benefit. Examples of such radicalisation processes can be seen in the case of the Spanish non-Muslim, Trashorras, who was imprisoned for criminal offences, converted to Islam in prison and, along with another criminal, non-observant Muslim who was radicalised in prison, Ahmidan, joined an Al-Qaeda radical terrorist group that later bombed four trains in Madrid, killing 191 people.[385] Other examples of such phenomena are Richard Reid, known as the 'shoe bomber', who was imprisoned in the UK for domestic criminal offences, converted to Islam, became radicalised in prison and later attempted to blow up an aeroplane *en route* from Paris to Miami using explosives hidden in his shoe.[386] Similarly, Muktar Said Ibrahim, who was a British citizen, was radicalised in prison and continued this radicalisation process outside. This led to his involvement in the terrorist acts in London in July 2005, killing 52 people and injuring more than 700.[387] Like most of the countries in the European Union, the UK has recently been suffering from a dramatic increase in incarceration of terrorists due to the rise of Daesh and the return of 'foreign fighters', instigating the spread of radical Islam ideology within prisons. Hence, the government decided to tackle the problem by creating three 'separation centres' in order to hold the most radical inmates, preventing them from radicalising others and increasing terrorism.[388]

295–314; Korteweg, R. *et al*. (2010). Background contributing factors to terrorism. In: Magnus Ranstorp (ed.), *Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*. Taylor & Francis, pp. 21–49.

[385] Silke, A. (2011). *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism*. Taylor & Francis, p. 127.

[386] Warnes, R. and Hannah, G. (2008). Meeting the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners: The Experiences of the United Kingdom and Spain. *Policing*, 2(4), 409; Yehoshua, S. (2011). Terrorist Profiling: Analysing our Adversaries Personalities. *Aviation Security International*, 17(4), 20–23.

[387] Warnes, R. and Hannah, G. (2008). Meeting the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners: The Experiences of the United Kingdom and Spain. *Policing*, 2(4), 409.

[388] Rushchenko, J. (2018). *Prison Management of Terrorism-related Offenders: Is Separation Effective?* London: The Henry Jackson Society.

Similar processes have occurred in the US, which holds the record for the highest confinement rate in the world. With more than two million prisoners, the risk of prisoner radicalisation is a major potential threat to the country. Islamic ideas were not the first to penetrate into prisons and cause extremist attitudes and recruitment to violent groups. History has shown that US prisons have always been a hub for a variety of different types of extremism, including political right-wing groups, neo-Nazis, and racial gangs. Islamist groups have embraced the methods of these other extremist groups in prisons in order to spread their agenda and recruit prisoners to their movements. The strength of these groups lies in the fact that these processes do not end in prison, but continue in full force upon a prisoner's release, providing the prisoner with a structured community outside and a continuation of support in their ideological education that was provided to them in prison. An example of this process can be found in the case of Kevin Lamar James, a prisoner of a state prison in California, who founded a jihadist group called JIS — Assembly of Authentic Islam. James recruited fellow prisoners, as well as those already released on parole to join the group's activities, the main focus of which was the implementation of serious attacks on numerous places in Los Angeles. In this case, they were all caught in advance of their attacks due to a mistake made by one of the members, who lost his mobile phone in a robbery that later exposed the whole movement and its plans.[389]

De-radicalisation Programs in Prisons

Ferguson[390] argues that there are two common methods that counter-terrorism agencies employ to deal with terrorism: killing those who are involved in terrorism or incarcerating them. While the latter can often lead to further radicalisation of the inmates, allowing them to unite with other extremists and improve their methods and techniques of perpetrating violent acts, it is nevertheless conceivable that a reverse process may occur,

[389]Cilluffo, F. J. *et al*. (2007). Radicalisation: Behind Bars and beyond Borders. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 13(2), 114.

[390]Ferguson, N. (2010). Disengaging from terrorism. In: Andrew Silke (ed.), *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism*. Taylor & Francis, pp. 111–122.

in which inmates become de-radicalised in prison or even disengage from the terrorist organisations and beliefs.

Horgan defines de-radicalisation as:

> The social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalisation is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. De-radicalisation may also refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-offending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues.[391]

Rohan Gunaratna, one of the leading figures in the field of de-radicalisation or, as he phrases it, the 'rehabilitation' of terrorists, argues that terrorist supporters and activists believe in a twisted and misinterpreted agenda, which advocates violence as an acceptable tool to bring about political change. Therefore, he argues, it is essential that they undergo a rehabilitation process in order to be brought back into the mainstream.[392] Various countries have elected to investigate different ways to deal with this growing phenomenon of radicalisation among prisoners, whether on an individual or a collective basis. Though it might be complicated to determine levels of success, it seems that most of the initiatives are flawed and many have been subject to criticism; in particular, regarding implementation and outcomes, as will be detailed further.

Examples of de-radicalisation initiatives

Programmes of de-radicalisation are known as the 'soft approach' as opposed to the combative 'hard approach'[393] of counter-terrorism, and

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[391] Horgan, J. (2009). *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*. Taylor & Francis, p. 153.

[392] Gunaratna, R. (2011). Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 6(1), 65–82.

[393] Guru, S. (2010). Social Work and the War on Terror. *British Journal of Social Work*, 40(1), 272–289; Stracke, N. (2010). Arab Prisons: A Place for Dialogue and Reform. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 1(4). Available at: http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/15/html.

these are implemented in various countries. One example is the Saudi Arabian programme called the 'Advisory Committee Counselling Program', which aims to de-radicalise prisoners who have been charged with terrorist offences. The programme, which functions through the Ministry of Interior, operates in several dimensions to cover aspects of Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC). Its main goal is to reintegrate these inmates back into society, while helping them to denounce their extremist beliefs and involvement in violent activities. This initiative approaches inmates as victims and not offenders, and thus there are various units responsible for their treatment, such as a special department concerned with their families' social and financial needs and another accountable for their social or psychological treatment by psychologists, psychiatrists, and other relevant specialists in the field.

Additionally, there are subcommittees that deal with specific aspects of the treatment, such as religion, which has a very significant role, where moderate clerics and scholars engage with the inmates in open discussions about their perceptions and understanding of the Quran. Another subcommittee deals with security aspects. It evaluates the inmates' progress within the programme — whether they still present a risk to society or are eligible for release. Another subcommittee is in charge of media aspects and the influence of anti-terrorism television programs and other means of mass communication to raise greater awareness of the disadvantages of violent behaviour and terrorism.

Furthermore, the inmate undergoes a six-week workshop by clerics and social scientists, which focuses on various social and religious issues. At the end of the programme, the inmate will be evaluated and, if appropriate, will continue to an aftercare programme in which he will be treated individually according to his needs, whether psychological or in terms of basic necessities he lacks; for example, employment, accommodation, and transportation. It seems that this programme of de-radicalisation, which, according to Saudi officials has an 80% success rate with a low recidivism rate, is the most intense and well-funded available and hence probably the most publicised one.[394]

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[394] Al-Hadlaq, A. (2011). Terrorist rehabilitation: the Saudi experience. In: Lawrence Rubin *et al*. (eds.), *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches*

However, there are quite a few opponents to the Advisory Committee and the counselling programme in Saudi Arabia who claim that it is being operated illegitimately, withholding information from the public, and not being productive at all. It is also seen as being incapable of rehabilitating the most radical and hard-line extremists and is criticized for being a very expensive programme that only a relatively wealthy country, such as Saudi Arabia, can implement, with little potential for implementation in the rest of the world. Furthermore, it is criticized on the basis that rehabilitation measures are based on a specific Salafi version of Islam that might be too hard for prisoners to adjust to once released from prison.[395]

Another example of such an initiative comes from Yemen, which has suffered greatly from Islamic terrorism since the 1990s and has sought to improve its counter-terrorism strategies. The programme was initiated in 2003 and, after investigating the profile of Yemen's terrorist inmates and activists, it was decided that religion and dialogue should form the foci of the programme. The name of the committee established especially for that matter is the Religious Dialog Committee (RDC), which comprises five religious scholars and has at its head a judge generally held in high esteem, Hamoud Al-Hitar.[396]

According to this programme, terrorism occurs due to misinterpretation of a country's religion and culture, and therefore there is a need for

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to Counter-terrorism. 1st edition. Routledge, pp. 59–69; Boucek, C. (2011). Extremist disengagement in Saudi Arabia. In: Lawrence Rubin *et al*. (eds.), *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism*. 1st edition. Routledge, pp. 70–90; Gardner, F. (2017). Inside Saudi Arabia's rehab centre for jihadists. *BBC News*. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40061550.

[395] Seifert, K. (2010). Can Jihadis Be Rehabilitated? *Middle East Quarterly*, XVII(2), 21–30; Boucek, C. (2007). Extremist Re-education and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia. *Terrorism Monitor*, 5(16); Rabasa, A. *et al*. (2010). *De-radicalising Islamist Extremists*. National Security Research Division, RAND, pp. 62–65. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf; Casptack, A. (2015). De-radicalisation Programs in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study. *Middle East Institute*.

[396] Al-Hitar, H. A. (2011). Dialogue and its effects on countering terrorism. In: Lawrence Rubin *et al*. (eds.), *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism*. 1st edition. Routledge, pp. 109–121; Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalisation Programs. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(2), 275.

better education and advanced discussions to counter these inaccurate and mistaken beliefs. During these discussions, which take place in small groups, the scholars challenge the inmates on their understanding and knowledge of the Quran, as well as other aspects of Islamic culture, state, and society. At the end of this process, which can involve weeks of debates, inmates are released and are eligible for the government's support in employment and reintegration into society — that is, if they agree to abandon terrorism.[397]

According to Al-Hitar, the programme has achieved the highest rate of renunciation of terrorism and full integration of participants back into society, and hence has led to a reduction in terrorist acts in Yemen since the beginning of the programme.[398] However, the interpretation of terrorism held by Al-Hitar and the Yemenite authority generally is controversial. For example, they have a significantly subjective view regarding what constitutes a legitimate resistance such as the one, they argue, needed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel/Palestine. Moreover, two other factors are worth considering: Firstly, statistics show that the programme in fact only has a 60 percent success rate; secondly, there have been attacks on US embassies in Yemen by at least two of the programme's graduates. This does not help to support the programme administrators' claims of accomplishment[399] and, in spite of its initial success, the programme was terminated in 2005, mainly due to lack of funding and cooperation from the government. Since 2012, there have been a few attempts

[397] Al-Hitar, H.A. (2011). Dialogue and its effects on countering terrorism. In: Lawrence Rubin *et al*. (eds.), *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism*. 1st edition. Routledge, pp. 114–118; Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalisation Programs. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(2), 275.

[398] Al-Hitar, H.A. (2011). Dialogue and its effects on countering terrorism. In: Lawrence Rubin *et al*. (eds.), *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism*. 1st edition. Routledge, pp. 119–120; Seifert, K. (2010). Can Jihadist Be Rehabilitated? *Middle East Quarterly*, XVII(2), p. 22.

[399] Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalisation Programs. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(2), 276; Rabasa, A. *et al*. (2010). *De-radicalising Islamist Extremists*. National Security Research Division, RAND, pp. 52–55. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf.

to revive the rehabilitation programme for terrorists in Yemen and international assistance in this domain; however, due to the complicated and unstable security situation in the country, so far there has been no success.[400]

Another similar approach is utilised in Singapore, where the Ministry of Home Affairs tackles terrorism from two angles — the community and the prisons. A special Community Engagement Program (CEP) was developed in order to get involved with the community and maintain harmony between the various religious and ethnic groups in the country, which were vulnerable to racism as well as to extremist ideas. The CEP cooperates with other communal and private organisations, as well as with academic representatives who play an important role in numerous projects to promote moderation and anti-racism. These include the publication of books and articles containing information about the danger of racism and violent behaviour, the organisation of discussions and meetings between different racial and religious groups, and job fairs and campaigns to enhance awareness and knowledge of the matter.[401]

The other measure taken by the Singaporean authorities relates specifically to prisons and is led by another committee, the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). This committee is founded on the understanding that the perceptions and knowledge of religion and ideology of detainees (mostly individuals from the Islamic extremist group Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah or 'JI') are inaccurate and simplistic, and promote hatred and violence. The RRG comprises members from different educational and occupational backgrounds, as well as nationalities and Islamic associations. Their work includes religious counselling and discussions with the prisoners and their families, publishing books and articles on counter-terrorism and extremist ideas, and cooperation with the CEP on how to integrate these prisoners back into society.[402]

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[400] Embassy of the Republic of Yemen. (July 2017). Yemen Efforts in the Fight Against Terrorism. Washington DC, available at: https://www.yemenembassy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Yemen-Efforts-in-the-Fight-Against-Terrorism.pdf.

[401] Gunaratna, R. and Bin Mohamed Hassan, M. F. (2011). Terrorist rehabilitation: The Singapore experience. In: Lawrence Rubin *et al*. (eds.), *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism*. 1st edition. Routledge, pp. 36–58.

[402] *Ibid.* (pp. 38–44).

Furthermore, as part of its holistic approach, immense social, motivational, and financial support is given to the families of these detainees. Arguably, the strong leadership and significant effort involved in this programme make it a very efficient one, with a relatively low rate of recidivism and wide recognition, even though the threat of terrorism remains severe in the region, largely due to Singapore's location and close ties with the US.[403]

Other de-radicalisation programmes are much less structured than the ones previously mentioned and are mostly the initiatives of the extremist organisations' leaders themselves. Several very similar programmes were developed at approximately the same time, around 1997, in Egypt and in Algeria, where the main active terrorist organisations declared their renunciation of terrorism and political violence, and have since published literature that de-legitimizes violent behaviour and beliefs. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the self-declared armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was one such organisation. Following several failed peace negotiations between the FIS and the Government of Algeria, the AIS leadership decided to act independently and to declare a ceasefire in order to demilitarize and 'join' Algerian civil society. Another such group was the Al-Gama Al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Group (IG) in Egypt, which is considered to be the largest militant group in the country. Both organisations have strong connections with Al-Qaeda and received strong support for their extremist and violent agenda, and thus their total renunciation of terrorism and violence was surprising.[404]

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[403] *Ibid*. (pp. 54–57); D'Souza, S. M. (2019). *Countering Insurgencies and Violent Extremism in South and South East Asia*. Routledge.

[404] Ashour (2007, pp. 612–614); Ashour, O. (2008, p. 1–3); Ashour, O. (2010). De-Radicalisation of Jihad? The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on Al-Qaeda. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 2(5). Available at: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/36/html (accessed 7 December 2011); Gunaratna, R. and Bin Ali, M. (2009). De-Radicalisation Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32(4), pp. 277–291; Lawrence, R. (2011). Non-kinetic approaches to counterterrorism: A case study of Egypt and the Islamic Group. In: Rohan Gunaratna *et al*. (eds.), *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism*. Taylor & Francis, pp. 26–35.

According to Ashour, there are some variables that might be useful in explaining these rather surprising initiatives. He suggests that one such variable might be state repression, which caused insecurity among the leaders of these groups regarding their ability to protect their followers and members, as well as the efficiency of violence as a tool to promote their cause. Inducements from the government also certainly helped. These were very selective and hesitant at the beginning but later improved and gathered more support. Another variable suggested is the social interactions within the groups while in prison and with other groups and individuals. Such interactions opened individuals' minds, allowing them to see 'others' as acceptable and thus enhanced their tolerance. Probably the most important variable of influence on the de-radicalisation process was the strong and charismatic leadership that was able to make this decision, changing the agenda and conduct of the entire group, and causing most members and supporters to follow.[405] Nevertheless, these initiatives of de-radicalisation were not easy to undertake and a large portion of the groups' members and followers found it hard to accept the change; the governments were also suspicious at first. While the process in Algeria was relatively short and lasted only three years, probably due to more pragmatic leadership, in Egypt de-radicalisation is still underway and has not been fully established yet; though it seems as though progress has been made.[406]

Radicalisation or de-radicalisation in Israeli prisons

During the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, thousands of Palestinians have been charged as being members of terrorist organisations, and for committing acts of terror against Israel and its citizens. Those prisoners see themselves as the people who continue the struggle towards achieving the goal of a Palestinian state.[407] Nonetheless, there are no

[405] Ashour (2007, pp. 614–624; 2008, pp. 3–10).

[406] *Ibid*. (2008, p. 10); Gunaratna, R. and Bin Ali, M. (2009). De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32(4), pp. 288–289.

[407] Ganor, B. (1991). Cancer and Its Name Terrorism: The National Resistance Movement — the Hamas. *Matara — the Israeli Monthly for Intelligence, Army and Security*, 19, pp. 24–36 (in Hebrew).

de-radicalisation programmes in Israeli prisons; the prisoners, who are defined by the Israeli officials as 'security prisoners' do not recognize the legitimacy of the country they are incarcerated in, and therefore would not agree to take part in a programme or initiative offered to them by the government of that country. In Israel's prisons, these prisoners organise themselves in what they define as an 'internal order/organisation/regime,' which conform to strict hierarchies, similar to those of the terrorist organisations outside prison, although adjusted to their conditions of incarceration. In so doing, prisoners run an administration in prison, which functions independently of prison management; they organise everyday life in prison via committees for different social aspects, such as education, finance, security, and religion. Each committee has a leader elected by his prisoner peers. In each organisation, elected leaders are in charge of managing the function of the organisation; a different person is elected as the spokesman and is in charge of all the communications between the prison authorities and the prisoners of the organisation. The main criteria for being elected as spokesman are long prison terms, charisma, reputation among Palestinians outside the prison, and experience in leading prisoners in their struggle with the prison authorities. The spokesmen also need to speak fluent Hebrew, and to understand how to negotiate with higher authorities. Other Palestinian prisoners are not allowed to speak with the Israeli prison authorities.[408]

Ferguson further propounds that the prison allows the prisoners to rethink their violent activities and to determine that they were not the best way to handle the situation. At the same time, Ferguson adds that there is ultimately no change in their dedication to the cause and the organisation.[409] In addition, it seems that as a result of attaining

[408]Rosenfeld, M. (2011). The centrality of the prisoners' movement to the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation: A historical perspective. In: Abeer Baker & Anat Matar (eds.), *Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel*. Pluto Press, p. 7; Nashif, E. (2008). *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community.* Taylor & Francis, p. 9; Shaked, R. (2008). The Security Prisoners in Israeli Prisons. *Roim Shabas*, pp. 26–29 (in Hebrew).

[409]Ferguson, N. (2010). Disengaging from terrorism. In: Andrew Silke (ed.), *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism*. Taylor & Francis, pp. 112–117.

education, studying the history and other aspects of Jewish culture, and having relations with Israelis while in prison, the security prisoners' ideological, cultural, and even mental approaches can change. Accordingly, it appears that most terrorist leaders in Israeli prisons go through a gradual process while in prison that enables them to think through the conflict and its conduct. All the while, they are experiencing less stressful conditions, as well as reduced pressure from their organisations or social surroundings. Accordingly, they become more pragmatic and capable of considering matters, such as the problematic side of the armed struggle, and their effects on their lives and their social surroundings.

Terrorist Risk Assessment

Risk assessment is a professional tool that allows for a clear understanding of the level of threat an offender poses to the community, and the means needed in order to mitigate that threat.[410] Correctional agencies have been using risk assessment tools since the beginning of the last century. There has been immense development in the field; from first-generation risk assessment, which relied mainly on 'gut feelings' and professional experience, to second-generation risk assessment in the early 1970s, which used static factors and evidence-based instruments, mainly from the offenders' past behaviour and history. However, while the latter were more accurate, they did not include dynamic factors, which are reversible with the right intervention, and hence the level of risk did not change. Third- and fourth-generation risk assessments include the consideration of static and dynamic factors, and hence allow for better intervention and supervision.[411]

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[410]Edward J. L. and Brian L. (2010). The Role of Offender Risk Assessment: A Policy Maker Guide. *Victims & Offenders*, 5(3), pp. 203–219.

[411]Bonta, J. and Wormith, S. J. (2008). Risk and need assessment. In: G. McIvor and P. Raynor (eds.), *Developments in Social Work with Offenders*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, pp. 131–152.

There are different risk assessment tools that focus on specific tendencies, such as violence,[412] sex offences,[413] or psychopathy.[414] Nevertheless, there has been a recent increase in the need for terrorist and extremist risk assessment tools to allow for a better management of that threat.[415] This increase is largely due to the dramatic events occurring around the world, commencing with the civil war in Syria and the rise of the terrorist entity, Daesh, instigating a severe wave of radicalisation around the world.

In this respect, risk assessment as defined by Kraemer and his associates is 'the process of using risk factors to estimate the likelihood (i.e. probability) of an outcome occurring in a population'.[416] Notably, Kraemer *et al.* define a 'risk factor' as any variable that (a) statistically correlates with the outcome (in this case, terrorism), and also (b) precedes the outcome in time.[417] Monahan argues that unlike other crimes, terrorist incidents are relatively rare and hence it is not appropriate to use statistics in order to learn from them. Therefore, he suggests the most suitable method is Structured Professional Judgment (SPJ), whereby it is possible to construct a risk assessment using optimal professional capabilities.[418]

The first SPJ, specifically designed for terrorist risk assessment, was the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA), established in 2009, by

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[412]Jaber, F. S. and Mahmoud, K. F. (2015). Risk Tools for the Prediction of Violence: 'VRAG, HCR-20, PCL-R'. *Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing*, 22(2), 133–141.

[413]Rettenberger, M., Matthes, A., Boer, D. P. and Eher, R. (2010). Prospective Actuarial Risk Assessment: A Comparison of Five Risk Assessment Instruments in Different Sexual Offender Subtypes. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 54(2), 169–186.

[414]Hart, S. D., Hare, R. D. and Harpur, T. J. (1992). The Psychopathy Checklist — Revised (PCL-R). In: J. C. Rosen & P. McReynolds (eds.), *Advances in Psychological Assessment*, pp. 103–130.

[415]BaMaung, D., McIlhatton, D., MacDonald, M. and Beattie, R. (2018). The Enemy Within? The Connection between Insider Threat and Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 41(2), 133–150.

[416]Kraemer, H., Kazdin, A., Offord, D., Kessler, R., Jensen, P. and Kupfer, D. (1997). Coming to Terms with the Terms of Risk. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 54, 337–343.

[417]*Ibid.*

[418]Monahan, J. (2012). The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, 18(2), 13–28.

Pressman[419] with a new version constructed by Pressman and Flockton in 2012, VERA-2.[420] Its main purpose is to assess the risk posed by extremists and terrorists, or rather 'would-be terrorists' — individuals who hold extremist views and are willing to use violence as a morally justified action in order to promote political, religious, or any other ideological goals. The VERA-2 is based on four main risk indicators: (1) beliefs and attitudes; (2) context and intent; (3) history and capability; and (4) commitment and motivation, while the fifth element is an opposite indicator for risk, defined as 'protective items', which lists indicators that might mitigate the risk. The protocol contains 31 items to assess from low to medium or high risk, where low indicates a low risk and high a high risk, whereas with the protective items, the rating levels are reversed. The VERA-2 can be used with or without the subject's cooperation and is being used widely as a complementary component of comprehensive risk assessment.[421]

Another relevant risk assessment tool is the Extremism Risk Guidelines, ERG+22, established by Lloyd and Dean in 2015.[422] It is different from the VERA-2 in its main purpose since it is being used by the National Offender Management Service in the UK as a correctional tool for individuals who have already been convicted of terrorist offences, and hence was developed in order to better manage the risk these offenders pose, rather than only assess it. However, they are both similar in their approach towards SPJ, as well as sharing some indicators of risk.[423] The ERG+22 looks not only at the individual but also at the influence of

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[419]Pressman, D. E. (2009). Risk assessment decisions for violent political extremism. Available at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2009-02-rdv/2009-02-rdv-eng.pdf.

[420]Pressman, D. E. and Flockton, J. S. (2012). Calibrating Risk for Violent Political Extremists: The VERA-2 Structural Assessment. *British Journal of Forensic Practice*, 14(4), 237–251.

[421]*Ibid*.

[422]Lloyd, M. and Dean, C. (2015). The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, 2(1), 40–52.

[423]Geoff, D. and Graeme, P. (2017). The 3 R's of Risk Assessment for Violent Extremism. *Journal of Forensic Practice*, 19(2), 91–101.

his or her social surroundings, and hence it is based on three main elements: engagement, intent, and capability. Each element consists of several relevant factors: engagement has 13, intent has 6, and capability has 3, giving a total of 22 factors, while the '+' allows for some flexibility through the addition of any other factors that appear relevant. The role and function of each factor to the contribution of risk in each case is dynamic and subject to the assessor's discretion. The ERG+22 is still being informed so access to its guidelines is restricted, and at present it is being used by licensed trainees in the UK only. However, it does allow for other counter-terrorism experts to use it as a structured framework that assists decision-making processes related to such individuals and other relevant cases.[424]

[424]Lloyd, M. and Dean, C. (2015). The development of structured guidelines for assessing risk in extremist offenders. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, 2(1), 40–52.

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Methodology

The main research for this book, while objective and academically independent, was conducted in collaboration with the Israeli Prison Service (IPS), and addresses a specific interest of its intelligence department: the terrorist groups' leaders. The prison authorities have encountered the same problem as researchers in this field in terms of the lack of up-to-date information on the leaders themselves. It is important to note the full cooperation of the prison authorities, which involved allowing the author access to the numerous interviewees, as well as any information needed for conducting the study, such as the interviewees' files and other data established from prison personnel.

Research Characteristics

The study is qualitative, based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews that focus on individuals' life stories. Qualitative research is designed to obtain a detailed, thorough, and comprehensive description of processes and subjective interpretations of phenomena within their natural contexts by focusing on a small sample of people who have experienced them. In addition, a qualitative approach allows for a rich and deep understanding of people and group perceptions of language and meaning, which is essential for the study of these individuals and groups, as well as different phenomena. Certain phenomena can be understood only from the

perspectives of those who experience them, and so these individuals are crucial to understanding and interpreting such phenomena.[1]

Data were gathered from in-depth interviews, personal files, and other resources, such as the media and prison personnel, which were analysed by the researcher. The interviewees were asked mainly open questions regarding their background and personal life. The interview would normally start with the researcher requesting that the interviewee tell her about himself or herself, where they grew up, and their family life history. This included details about their family structure, status, relationships, affiliations and conduct, as well as similar details regarding their social environment. During these conversations, the researcher often asked for the interviewees' thoughts on and feelings towards these raised issues. Furthermore, the interviews also touched upon other relevant topics related to the conflict, the role of the interviewees in the struggle, and their rationalisations for their conduct and activism. The researcher asked questions regarding their leadership roles and their decision-making processes, as well as their perceptions of their imprisonment and the process they had been through since their incarceration.

The personality aspect was dealt with by specific questions related to personal characteristics and prisoners' own perceptions of them. They were asked about their behaviour in different circumstances and other specific characteristics, such as their sense of self-esteem and responsibility, impulsiveness, and their ability to feel remorse. The researcher was guided by Hare's Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL-SV) in identifying relevant characteristics, as well as to gain a better understanding of the link between the interviewees' personalities and their conduct and behaviour. The PCL-SV comprises a 12-item clinical rating scale. The items are as follows: (1) Superficial; (2) Grandiose; (3) Deceitful; (4) Lack of remorse; (5) Lacks empathy; (6) Does not accept responsibility; (7) Impulsive; (8) Poor behavioural control; (9) Lacks goals; (10) Irresponsible; (11) Adolescent antisocial behaviour;

[1] Creswell, J. W. (1998). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Traditions*. Sage Publications, pp. 14–16; Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 3rd edition. Sage Publications, pp. 2–3.

and (12) Adult antisocial behaviour.[2] The interviewees were free to raise other issues if they wanted, and the discussions moved to different topics that eventually formed the base of the social-psychological profile.

The PCL-SV can be used as a screening tool for psychopathy among people imprisoned or otherwise institutionalised, or as a stand-alone instrument for research with non-criminals, including civil psychiatric patients. It was developed by Hare and his colleagues after Hare initially created the first version of the tool, which contains 20 items and relates more to general psychiatric purposes.[3] The PCL-SV is used as a predictor of violence among individuals with mental disorders and was found to have a high internal consistency and validity.[4] The PCL-SV was found to be appropriate for use in this research due to the fact that it focuses on violence, which is more relevant to terrorists, as well as its possible use among non-criminal and other diverse populations.[5]

Furthermore, unlike most other tools, the PCL-SV does not require any particular effort on the part of the participant as it does not involve the filling in of any forms or questionnaires. The researcher established the information needed for the PCL-SV from an analysis of the interviews she conducted and from other sources of information gathered from the prisoners' personal files, the media, and other publicly available data. These factors, as well as the sensitivity of the research and the possible high levels of suspicion that it could engender, made it the most suitable tool to be used in this research. Furthermore, the researcher found the PCL-SV significantly effective in examining the link between political and criminal violence and establishing whether this link

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[2] For the list of PCL-SV's 12 items, see Appendix 6: PCL-SV Item Description.

[3] Hare, R. D. (1991). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)*. Toronto, Ontario: Multi-Health System; Hare, R. D. (1996). Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Case of Diagnostic Confusion. *Psychiatric Times*, 13(2), 1–6.

[4] Hart, S. *et al*. (1994). Psychopathy as a risk marker for violence: Development of a screening version of the revised psychopathy checklist. In: John Monahan and Henry J. Steadman (eds.), *Violence and Mental Disorder: Developments in Risk Assessment*. University of Chicago Press, pp. 81–98; Hart, S. *et al*. (1995). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version*. Toronto: Multi-Health Systems; see also the reference Hare (1996) in footnote 3.

[5] Hare, R. D. (1991). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)*. Toronto, Ontario: Multi-Health System; Hare (1996b).

actually exists. Establishing whether these leaders have a psychopathic personality or not through the use of this tool might shed some light on this phenomenon and assist in better understanding individuals' motivations. No other tools were taken into consideration, largely due to known associated complications, but also due to the researcher's interest in the interviewees' life stories, perceptions, and insights. Though, as detailed in the introduction of this book, opponents of this tool argue that it reinforces the link between criminal behaviour and personality disorder and causes a misinterpretation of the two. Therefore, the examination of criminal behaviour in relation to the interviewees' personality characteristics only accounts for a small aspect of the overall analysis, but was deemed to be relevant due to their current location in prison.

Research Participants

The participants were 18 leaders of the major Palestinian terrorist organisations: Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. Ten of them were elected leaders in the organisations and eight were spokesmen. However, they were all considered dominant leadership figures within their respective organisations, both by their fellow prisoners and the prison authorities. Thus, they were regarded as equal leaders for the purposes of this work with no differentiations between them. The participants were chosen by the IPS intelligence department (which is responsible for intelligence and security issues related to prisoners) according to their seniority and willingness to participate in the study. The IPS intelligence department possesses far more information relating to the seniority of imprisoned leaders than is available in the public domain. Their recommendations were further supported by external sources such as press reports and statements by the organisations themselves. In every prison that the researcher attended, she met with the prison's head of intelligence, who was in charge of the security prisoners and was very familiar with the leadership structure of the different organisations. After a discussion regarding the list of leaders present in the prison, the officer contacted the ones who seemed to be most relevant to the study. The choice was made based on their status among the prisoners, their ability to express their thoughts within their

respective organisation and for being very active, both inside and outside prison. This was done after the researcher had set out the parameters of the project to the IPS intelligence department identifying the research needs and type of participants required. Twenty prisoners were approached by the IPS to participate in the study. On only one occasion did an interviewee arrive to be interviewed, decide that he was not interested in participating, and return to his cell. One other prisoner refused to participate before even arriving at the interview; the other candidates, 18 in total, were willing to be interviewed and cooperated fully with the research process.

Interviewees' demographic details

The 18 interviewees in this research consisted of 94% males; with the exception of one female, the other 17 interviewees were all male. Sixteen were adults and two minors, thus resulting in a total average age of 33. Excluding the two minors, who were both aged 17, the average age of the 16 adults was 35, where the youngest was 28 years old and the oldest was 44.

Eleven out of the 18, or 61%, had been sentenced for life, while the average sentence of the other seven interviewees was 18 years. 85% of the interviewees had already served more than 10 years in prison.

Seven out of 18 of them, or 39%, were married, and 56% of them, 10 out of the 18, came from a medium to high socioeconomic background.

The researcher chose to focus this research on prisoners due to the social and political importance of this group and their influence inside and outside of prisons. As will be described further in this book, many Palestinians view these prisoners as the vanguard of their society, the people who sacrificed the most and are therefore treated with great respect, while the fight for their release stands at the centre of Palestinian demands. The leaders within prison also contribute to the decision-making of the organisations outside, an example of which can be seen in the 'Prisoners' Document', written by the main leaders in prison, calling for unity of the different Palestinian sections and a move towards agreement

Table 1: Interviewees according to the organisation they lead and their role in prison.

	Not related to any organisation	Islamic Jihad	Fatah	Hamas	Total
Leaders		1	5	4	10
Spokesmen	1 (spokesman of all security prisoners)		6	1	8

with Israel (discussed in further detail later in this book). Furthermore, the researcher considered that during their long incarceration, these prisoners must experience psychological processes, which might have significant impacts and should therefore be investigated properly in order to allow deeper understanding of prisoners' outcomes. As will be detailed, these prisoners do indeed go through a unique process, which has considerable influence on their mindset and behaviour, as well as their conduct within the organisations.[6]

Table 1 describes the distribution of the interviewees according to the organisation they are affiliated with, their role in prison, and whether they are elected leaders or spokesmen.

Research Procedures and Ethical Measures

As previously mentioned, the research was conducted in collaboration with the IPS and its intelligence department, which was interested in acquiring significant new information in order to improve its understanding and handling of this particular group of prisoners. However, the research came about as the result of the researcher approaching the IPS's research department. Understanding the need for primary research to take the field forward, and in light of the lack of genuine originality in much of the existing literature, coupled with the researcher's own interest in the subject as a criminologist and a Middle-East expert, she proposed to the IPS that she conduct the research as an independent researcher along the lines set out earlier. The IPS approved the project and the researcher was granted access to the prisons, the security prisoners, and all information and files relevant

[6] For information regarding the unique process these prisoners are going through in prison, see Chapter 5.

to the study. This was made possible after passing a range of formal procedures and the approval of the IPS research department,[7] as well as ethical approval to carry out the research from Bar-Ilan University, Israel, where the researcher spent the first two years of the research supervised by Professor Sarah Ben-David.[8]

The traditional method for analysing the significance of the responses in the various interviews is by systematic construction of conclusions from the transcriptions. This technique involves creating categories based on the material presented, and counting the frequency of utterances that fall within each category. The assumption is that the accumulation of content under one of the categories is the most effective indicator of meaning.[9] This method is found to be suitable for research where there is insufficient prior information available for more structured investigation, and where there is a phenomenon that needs to be explored. Such a method is thus naturally relevant to this study investigating a unique phenomenon with barely any relevant information available.[10] The interviews were conducted in prisons throughout Israel, and the average duration of each interview was six hours. The interviews were conducted in Hebrew and data were recorded verbatim, in writing, by the researcher.

Before every interview, the researcher prepared by reading the interviewee's IPS files, and additional information about them was gathered from newspapers, the Internet, and other prison personnel. This necessary procedure assured the credibility of the research by allowing the comparison of the data that were gathered from the interviews with other sources of information.

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[7] See Appendix 2: IPS Research Approval.

[8] See Appendix 1: Ethical Approval Document — Bar-Ilan University.

[9] Padgett, D. K. (1998). *Qualitative Methods in Social Work Research: Challenges and Rewards*. Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 76–79; Perakyla, A. (2005). Analysing talk and text. In: Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research.* 3rd edition. Sage Publications, pp. 869–886.

[10] For more information, see Creswell, J. W. (1998). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Traditions*. Sage Publications, pp. 17–18.

Ethical challenges related to prisoners' interviews

The ethical challenges in conducting research involving prisoner interviews have been well studied in recent years due to a growing awareness of the ethical issues involved in these types of studies. Until the late 1960s, there was little or no supervision of studies conducted in prisons and hence there were repeated examples of misconduct and abuse of prisoners as a result of their participation in these studies.[11] Prisoners are a vulnerable group, mainly due to their status in society and the lack of freedom and privacy, and also as a result of vague boundaries between their lack of freedom and justified human rights.[12] In the early 1970s in the US, public awareness influenced the government to finally establish the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research (NCPHSBBR). The code of Federal Regulations for the protection of human subjects[13] provides explicit regulations governing human research, focusing on informed prisoner consent and strict supervision over how research is conducted and justified.[14] Moreover, in order to include prisoners in any study today, numerous ethical aspects must be taken into consideration: the possible risks involved in the study and the justifications for taking these risks, as well as the need to minimize their impact. The benefits of participating in the study must significantly outweigh the risks posed to participants. Furthermore, the prisoners must be fully aware of any information related to the study and their consent must be genuine, having no influence on their personal status or well-being in prison.[15] To some extent, the recent

[11] Gostin, L. O. *et al*. (eds.), (2007). *Ethical Considerations for Research Involving Prisoners*. National Academies Press, p. 1; Byrne, M. W. (2005). Conducting Research as a Visiting Scientist in a Women's Prison. *Journal of Professional Nursing: Official Journal of the American Association of Colleges of Nursing*, 21(4), 223–230.

[12] *Ibid*.

[13] Title 45, Part 46 (45 CFR 46).

[14] Gostin, L. O. *et al*. (eds.), (2007). *Ethical Considerations for Research Involving Prisoners*. National Academies Press, p. 2; Byrne, M. W. (2005). Conducting Research as a Visiting Scientist in a Women's Prison. *Journal of Professional Nursing: Official Journal of the American Association of Colleges of Nursing*, 21(4), 225–226.

[15] Arboleda-Flórez, J. (1991). Ethical Issues Regarding Research on Prisoners. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 35(1), 1–5.

interest, considerable literature and regulations on ethical approval related to research in prisons led to an overprotective attitude towards prisoners as participants in research and hence made it extremely difficult, and sometimes not even worthwhile, for researchers to undergo the process needed for conducting research in prisons, and thus the number of studies conducted in this environment fell.[16] Established ethical principles used in qualitative studies[17] were adhered to in this research; accordingly, the purpose and procedure of the research was communicated to the interviewees, as well as the significant potential benefits of the study, such as improving the communication and understanding of their needs, as well as the minimal risks to their incarceration. More specifically, the researcher explained to each interviewee that the study aimed to garner a better understanding of the social and psychological aspects of their lives, which might allow a better understanding of their mindset and behaviour as part of a unique group of security leaders in prisons. No interviews were carried out without the interviewee's full willingness to participate. In cases of refusal to participate, the interview was cancelled. As was mentioned previously, only two participants refused to be interviewed and they did not take part in the research.

The researcher also clarified to the interviewees that she did not work for the prison authorities or any other security or intelligence institute, that she was a student working on her thesis, and therefore was not part of the dynamic between the prisoners and the authorities, and did not have any obligations to the IPS (apart from the publication of the initial analysis of the study in its in-house journal). Furthermore, the prisoners acknowledged that they were free to discuss and answer any issue or question they viewed as suitable, and were free to decline to speak on any subject that they found uncomfortable or inappropriate for discussion. They were

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[16]Moser, D. J. *et al.* (2004). Coercion and Informed Consent in Research Involving Prisoners. *Comprehensive Psychiatry*, 45(1), 1–9; Patenaude, A. L. (2004). No Promises, But I'm Willing to Listen and Tell What I Hear: Conducting Qualitative Research among Prison Inmates and Staff. *The Prison Journal*, 84(4), 69–70.

[17]For information regarding ethical considerations in qualitative research, see Fontan, A. and Frey, J. H. (2005). The interview — from neutral stance to political involvement. In: Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 3rd edition. Sage Publications, pp. 695–727.

promised anonymity during the research process and upon the publication of the results. Their names and participation were not to be exposed and the data analysis from this study would be used for explaining the general phenomenon of leadership in prison rather than specific personal profiles. Only the researcher is in possession of the interview contents and the personal information that was shared with her.

Prior to the interviews and after the researcher explained in detail the methods and procedures involved in the study, the interviewees signed a document formulated by the IPS research department and deemed appropriate for this type of study. The document details the study's purpose and procedures, as explained to the participants by the researcher, and stipulates the anonymity promised to them while emphasizing that participation is purely voluntary.[18] Interviewees were not handcuffed during the interview process, and the interviews were conducted privately. No security personnel, prison staff, or any other prisoners were present during the interviews in order to avoid jeopardising the interviewees' confidentiality and ability to speak freely. An emergency button was located in the room for the safety of the researcher, but never during any of the interviews did the researcher feel threatened or endangered, and she never had cause to utilise this button. As mentioned previously,[19] other ethical measures relating to the study were addressed by the ethical approval committee at Bar-Ilan university, which assessed the interview structure and contents in order to avoid any possible risk to the interviewees, and to increase the quality of the results for all concerned.

[18] See Appendix 3: A Copy of This Document — Prisoner's Letter of Consent.

[19] See Appendix 1: Bar-Ilan Ethical Approval.

Chapter 1

Sociological Influence Factors

Introduction

All interpersonal behaviour that involves mutual processes and coordinated interaction by larger social units, such as groups and even whole societies, is only possible because our behaviour is guided by pervasive, shared forms of social influence. The remarkable capacity of human beings to cooperate and collaborate with each other and to establish ever-more complex forms of social organisations provides ultimate evidence of our highly developed ability to influence others and our potential to be influenced in turn.[1]

This chapter will focus on the basic social aspects that can influence behaviour, such as social economic status, marital and family status, social surrounding characteristics and its relation to terrorism and religion within the terrorist leaders' lives, as well as on the general social profile that emerges from the analysis of that information.

According to Turk, sociology's substantial contribution to terrorism research is primarily that it highlights terrorism as a social phenomenon. Yet social research and publications in the field of terrorism are quite limited; most publications and studies related to terrorism are presented from a political, strategic, international relations, or historical point of view. Therefore, it is important to elaborate on the social aspects related

[1] Forgas, J. P. and Williams, K. D. (2001). *Social Influence: Direct and Indirect Processes.* New York: Psychology Press, pp. 3–4.

to the leaders of the terrorist groups with the purpose of addressing a significant gap in the literature.[2] Furthermore, terrorism is found to be a very complex phenomenon that cannot be explained by only one parameter[3]; hence, in order to understand the broader social-psychological profile of the leaders, there is an acute need to investigate the social aspects of the leaders' lives. These social elements are accountable for most developments of, as well as the opportunities available to the terrorist leaders.[4]

The social categories elaborated in this chapter are:

1. Socioeconomic status (SES);
2. Adolescence;
3. Marital and family status;
4. Relations with the family;
5. Social environment related to terrorism;
6. Perceptions related to the terrorist organisation.

Socioeconomic Status

Consistent with the findings of other studies mentioned in the introduction to this book,[5] the majority of the terrorist leaders involved in this research (10 out of 18) were found to be from middle-class families, while some of

[2]Turk, A. T. (2004). Sociology of Terrorism. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30, 271–286; Vertigans, S. (2009). *Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes and Consequences*. New York: Routledge; El-Said, H. and Barrett, R. (2011). Radicalisation and extremism that lead to terrorism. In: Jane Harrigan and Hamed El-Said (eds.), *Globalisation, Democratisation and Radicalisation in the Arab World*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 199–235; Harrigan, J. & El-Said, H. (2010, pp. 241–242). *Globalisation, Democratisation and Radicalisation in the Arab World*. Palgrave Macmillan.

[3]Walter, C. (2004, p. 479). *Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty?* Springer; Post, J. (2006, p. 17). 'The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism', in Louise Richardson (ed.), *The Roots of Terrorism*. CRC Press, pp. 17–28; Schmid (2011, p. 56).

[4]Ranstorp, M. (2007, p. 5). *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction*. Taylor & Francis.

[5]See Literature Review chapter in this book, pp. 30–50.

them even came from quite wealthy families who travelled abroad occasionally, wanted for nothing financially, and held steady jobs. Evidence of this can be found in the words of Interviewee 12, who described his home circumstances thus:

> I was born in Lebanon to a wealthy family, we are seven siblings. My dad was a professional chef who worked all around the world, not just in Lebanon, and used to come home once in a while apart from the summer when he was home all the time. My mom is a housewife and my brothers are working, one of them just finished his master's degree and one of my sisters lives in Venezuela.

This interviewee serves as the main spokesman of the security prisoners in Israeli prisons; he does not affiliate himself with any organisation and has been in the Israeli prison since he was a minor as he joined a terrorist organisation early and committed terrorist acts from a young age. Given that his statement reveals a very affluent life it seems that, in this case, this factor has no relationship to financial deprivation.

Others described having functional families who owned successful companies, such as Interviewee 9, an Islamic Jihad member, and Interviewee 15, a Fatah affiliate, and others mentioned family members who worked in academia, such as Interviewees 2 and 10 (Hamas members), and Interviewees 8 and 18 (Fatah members). Some even declared obtaining high positions within the terrorist organisations, which met all of their financial needs. The latter group consisted of Interviewees 3 and 13, who are Fatah leaders, and Interviewee 11, who is a Hamas member. The variety of organisations featured in this category reveals that it is a general phenomenon that is not specific to a certain type of organisation.

Yet a significant minority of the interviewees considered, 44%, do not share the same fortune as the above and described a very low socioeconomic situation and severely undeveloped and dysfunctional social surroundings. An example is Interviewee 4, a Fatah leader, who states:

> The situation at home was very hard, dad barely worked, I studied until the age of 16 and then I quit school and went to work because my dad was sick. I worked in a garage at night and in a factory during the day.

> My brother was a 'shahid' (martyr) killed by the IDF, another brother is a prisoner here with me and another does not deal with politics, he is also sick at home and needs to go every month to Jordan for treatments.

According to these interviewees, their poor circumstances were mostly related to the political situation, which forced them to live in harsh conditions, such as refugee camps, where they lacked basic necessities. Only a few of them took responsibility for their dysfunctional social surroundings and the unbearable situation at home, as Interviewee 17, a Fatah leader, describes:

> We never had good things in my family, never travelled together or had fun, only beatings, my dad used drugs and alcohol and used to beat us all the time. I could not stay there anymore. I used to live in the streets; this is the reason why I preferred to live in prison.

This interviewee is a minor that serves as a leader of the youth section in prison. His violent actions were a result of his poor circumstances at home, which he openly described. However, according to the general findings of this category in relation to the socioeconomic status of the interviewees, economic deprivation was not the main motivation for becoming involved in terrorism; the majority of interviewees had a fortunate background and affluent homes. The next category will elaborate more on this background, focusing the interviewees' adolescence.

Adolescence

The testaments of the interviewees in relation to the way they perceived themselves during their adolescence is divided exactly in half. Nine of the interviewees described themselves as quite mischievous adolescents who disregarded authority, were violent and rude towards their teachers and family members and behaved inappropriately in general. However, most of this group, 77%, testified to having achieved very good grades and to being relatively successful at school. The second half of the group claimed that they were well-behaved adolescents, who cared about their studies

and conduct at school and at home, respected adults, and were thought highly of in return. Interviewee 4, a Fatah leader, explains:

> I was quite a mischievous youngster; I used to ride my bicycle on a hillside and destroyed everything along the way, animals, cats, and dogs. We were a group of teenagers and I told everyone what to do. We had our area and we protected it, so that no one would damage it or harm anyone there. It is not like in your (i.e., the researcher's) area where people do not know each other. I was an excellent student, always went to school and achieved very good grades. We have like a mafia in our area, so if someone needed my help, I would have beaten others in order to help him and this happened many times… but I never got in to trouble or was arrested by the police, I was a good person and never beat anyone for no reason.

The majority of the leaders do not have a criminal background from childhood, and the few who were charged with criminal acts as adolescents committed relatively minor offences relating to property. However, none of these offenders testified to their criminal backgrounds themselves or even admitted to such activities when confronted about them by the researcher. The information relating to their criminal backgrounds was gathered from their files and criminal records. This suggests the interviewees hold a negative attitude towards delinquency and wish to present a rather decent and honourable image of themselves as leaders, as well as of their organisations.

Furthermore, the vast majority of the interviewees, 15 out of the 18, describe themselves as "leaders from birth", individuals who took on leadership roles from a very young age in varying capacities — whether they were responsible for others in the family, at school, or in the neighbourhood, as Interviewee 2, a Hamas leader, describes:

> I was not like everyone during adolescence, I had a different path, and I felt like I have something different from the others… I was born with the characteristics of a leader, but you have to develop it. Anyone who has it since childhood cannot hide it. It always followed me in life, in all periods, at school, on the street. It is inside you and without even noticing it you find yourself committed to things even if they are not relevant

> to you. If someone needs help, you feel like you have to help him. It comes naturally to me and I have just enhanced it.

This elaborates on the early backgrounds of the interviewees and how they perceived themselves during childhood. However, no specific pattern can be extracted from analysis of this data due to relatively equal perceptions among interviewees of the two types of youngsters: mischievous and provocative versus well behaved and responsible. However, the majority of them, whether they testify to having been destructive or upstanding as children, claim to have had leadership qualities and responsibilities during childhood, which have continued into adulthood.

Marital Status and Family Size

Although most of the interviewees in the present research came from affluent socioeconomic backgrounds, the vast majority of them fit the criteria propounded by Caldwell.[6] All are Muslims and most came from very large families with an average of nine children per family. Only two of the interviewees' families include fewer than five children.

Only a small majority of the interviewees in the present research, 11 out of the 18 participants, are single, never married and have no children. Most were involved in terrorist activities since their youth or were arrested during that time. Those who did marry and have children did so despite the difficulties involved and the chances of being arrested or dying. As Interviewee 9, an Islamic Jihad member, describes:

> I got married seven months prior to my second arrest; I met the girl by myself, she was 17 and her family didn't want us to get married, but eventually they agreed. I told her on our first date that I was a member of the Islamic Jihad and therefore wanted by Israel and might die due to that. I also told her that we won't be able to have a big party but only a secret one. It was hard for her, but eventually she agreed.

[6] Caldwell (1986, pp. 175–177).

The interviewees' family profiles are consistent with general cultural norms in terms of family size; most of the interviewees' families are quite large with more than nine people to a family. However, the marital statuses of the interviewees are generally not in keeping with the accepted values of these societies, due to the fact that the majority are not married. Even though it is a small majority, it might be explained by the difficult circumstances these interviewees face when following the terrorist path.

Relations with the Family

Most of the interviewees' families in the present research match the description of traditional Muslim families and, correspondingly, the vast majority of them testify to having very good and close relationships with their families. There is a strong sense of commitment towards the family as a whole and of individual sacrifice, whether financial or personal, for the benefit of the family. Interviewee 3, a Fatah leader, for example, described how he worked day and night and eventually was able to build a house for his family and another for his brother, but he was caught and incarcerated before he managed to build one for himself. Additionally, Interviewee 1, also a Fatah leader, had 12 brothers and sisters and had to leave school at the age of 12 to work at three different jobs in order to support the family financially.

However, even though most of the families approved of and greatly supported their activities in the different organisations, where families opposed terrorist action, as was the case in four instances, the interviewees disobeyed and continued. This reflects the importance they allocated to this path, even beyond the most sacred thing in their culture, the family, for which they have learned to give up their own individuality. As Interviewee 8, a Fatah leader, describes:

> My father was a teacher and wanted us to study and become educated, but things have changed since the *intifada* and we had lots of arguments, he did not support the armed and violent struggle, he thought that there are other ways to handle the occupation and did not want me

> to join the organisation, he even offered to pay for me to study abroad, but I felt that it is not enough and joined the Fatah in order to deepen my fight in the occupation.

Furthermore, it seems that most of them, nearly 84%, expressed their respect for their fathers as leading figures in their families, explaining the need for total obedience to their word. Second in priority, according to the hierarchical structure for the majority of the interviewees, is the big brother, if applicable, who has to be treated with respect and honour, and with compliance. Interestingly, even those who were not the older sons in their families felt the need to take responsibility, to be in charge of the family members, and to make the decisions regarding the conduct of the family. As Interviewee 2, a Hamas leader, explains, he was the middle child in a family of 12 children, but he still had a major influence on his father whom he describes as the leading figure of the family, as well as the representative of the family to outsiders. This was the only interviewee able to discuss matters of the family with his father and to influence him whenever necessary. This is probably due to the fact that all the interviewees are defined as active leaders who have the charisma and attitude to push boundaries and to be influential in every aspect of their lives.

The sisters in the family are expected to be taken care of, to be supervised, and to have minimum opportunity for their own decision-making. The interviewees, as brothers, felt very protective of their sisters and monitored their steps. For example, Interviewee 6, a Fatah leader, emphasised this by explaining that he was over-protective of his sisters due to his fear that they would be used by the Israeli intelligence as collaborators; therefore, he took a great deal of control over their lives and limited their freedom. However, the others were less extreme while still very involved in family decisions regarding the education of the girls in the household, dealing with questions of whether they would go to university or stay at home to help their mothers, to focus on their marriages, etc. Interestingly, most of the interviewees, even the very religious ones, believe that a woman should be educated. The reasons are varied, and examples include allowing them to teach their children, and having a profession that would help other women, such as becoming

a doctor or a nurse, and thus helping other women to protect their modesty by avoiding being treated by men.

The majority of the interviewees spoke favourably of their mothers, describing them as the closest and most loved figure in the family, the person with whom they could share their secrets and who would always have a warm shoulder for them when needed. This is attested by Interviewee 17, a Fatah leader:

> I love my mom, she is everything to me, and whenever I could have done something bad, I would think of her and avoid it. When I'll be out of prison, I do not want to get married, I just want to stay home with my mom.

This finding suggests that generally, in relation to the concept of family, most interviewees meet the cultural standards of having close ties with their families, admiring their fathers as the head and most important figure in the family and appreciating their mothers. Furthermore, they take great responsibility for their siblings, even those who are not the eldest, and are particularly overprotective of their sisters. The only discrepancy related to the traditional family profile, as described throughout this category, is the interviewees' disobedience when faced with familial objections to their involvement with terrorist organisations and activities.

Social Environment Related to Terrorism

Only two of the interviewees in the present research declared that those in their social surroundings had no relation to terrorism. Both of them are Fatah members from Jerusalem and, according to them, terrorist organisations are not very active in that area. Furthermore, their explanations for committing acts of terror are totally different. Interviewee 17, a Fatah leader in the youth section, claims that he did not join a terrorist organisation, that it was not in his interest, and that he committed a violent act in order to be in prison and avoid the poor conditions and treatment he received at home, including being abused by his violent father, poverty and other hardships. From his point of view, he did it only as an escape from a horrible life and not due to extreme ideology.

The situation for Interviewee 18, a Fatah leader in the women's section of prison, was entirely different. She came from a very affluent family; both her parents were lecturers at university and none of her close family or friends were advocates of any terrorist organisations. According to her account, she was fascinated by the conflict and the organisation's way of handling it, and became determined to contribute in spite of her family's objections:

> None of my family is involved in any terrorist organisation, it is only me. Since I was very young, around seven or eight years old, I was fascinated by it, I saw what is happening on television and read about it in the newspapers and that was the thing that has interested me the most, and even though my family completely objected, I kept on being involved in it.

All the other interviewees stated that those in their social surroundings were highly politicised and thus the organisation's activities pervaded many aspects of life, whether in school or in the neighbourhood. As Interviewee 13, a Fatah leader, detailed:

> My father was a member in the Fatah 40 years ago; all my brothers are in the organisation as well. I have two cousins who are shahids (martyrs) and some other cousins of mine are in prisons. The whole social environment is involved in the organisation. It was like that since I was young and learned about the organisation at school. I felt like I need to join and be an active member, I had to help the country to deal with the conflict and the Israelis.

Four out of the 18 interviewees claimed their families were not actively involved in the organisations although they supported the ideology they represent. Therefore, it seems that their initiative to join these activities came mostly from friends, neighbours, teachers, or other acquaintances, as Interviewee 16, a Hamas member, explains:

> I joined the organisation at the age of 16 due to my social environment, which is very politically involved. It is a refugee camp, so everyone lives it and you cannot avoid it. Fatah was considered to be quite central and

> I was interested by it, though none of my family is an active member, nonetheless, they all support the ideology it represents.

However, it is important to note that although most of the interviewees' social circles were involved actively in the organisations or supported them from a distance, many of the interviewees say that their close families did not want them to participate or to be incarcerated and could not accept that they had committed such acts. Interviewee 8, a Fatah leader, explains:

> When a person sees his friends die in front of him, in front of his own eyes, his whole life changes. I looked for weapons and joined the squad. I did not think of anything, not my mom or dad or that our house might be ruined. Now I look at my parents' eyes and I think of what I have done to them, my dad wanted me to be a teacher, I feel ashamed, cannot talk about it with him during visits, he wanted his son to be somebody and not in prison.

A distinct, clear pattern has emerged from the findings of this category, indicating that the interviewees' social surroundings have major impacts on their participation in terrorist activities and organisations. The most impactful aspect was societies' general advocacy of terrorist activities throughout the individuals' childhoods and all the way to adulthood, whether by their closest family or by other members of society, such as teachers, youth movements, or neighbours and friends. The following section will focus on the interviewees' perceptions of these terrorist organisations and activities.

Perceptions of the Terrorist Organisations

Joining the organisation

As was detailed in the introduction to this book, the main three terrorist organisations with members incarcerated in Israeli prisons are Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, and these three constitute the affiliation of the interviewees who participated in this study. Furthermore, as was also detailed previously, these organisations are quite different

in their conduct and attitudes towards the conflict, though they all advocate a violent confrontation with the Israeli occupation in order to achieve the same goals, whether through religious beliefs or a secular ideology. The final section in this chapter explores the social aspects of the interviewee's lives in relation to the terrorist organisations. It analyses the stage in their lives when they became involved in the organisation and its activities and their motivations for doing so, and addresses how they perceive the organisations and their codes and conduct, as well as their abilities to continue the work and the essential communication with the main leadership and activists outside of prison.

Analysis of the data in the current study reveals that only four interviewees claimed only to have joined their organisation at the point of incarceration, since they had to choose an organisation to affiliate with when they entered prison. All of them are Fatah members but each offers a unique explanation. Interviewee 1 describes his actions, which were not carried out in alliance with any organisation, as childish and having severe, unintended outcomes. Interviewee 4 claims that he became involved in terrorism due to particular circumstances: he was asked to assist in a terror attack and he agreed at first but regretted it later and was arrested for his alleged participation. Interviewee 15 was arrested for minor offences and was convicted for a very short period, but in prison his behaviour escalated; he killed a suspected collaborator and was sentenced to life. The last interviewee in this category is a minor who committed a violent act in order to be imprisoned and escape miserable and difficult circumstances at home.

Nonetheless, the vast majority of the interviewees, 14 out of 18, joined the three terrorist organisations before they were incarcerated and were arrested for committing terrorist acts in the name of these organisations. Apart from two Fatah members who started their involvement as adults — one joined the organisation at university in his early twenties and one joined in his mid-twenties — all the other interviewees in this group were involved in their organisations since childhood. Among this group were all the Hamas and the one Islamic Jihad member, as well as the other eight Fatah leaders, and the age range at the point of joining

was between 11 and 17. As is demonstrated by the words of Interviewee 13, a Fatah leader:

> I was a minor when I joined the organisation, still at school, and together with my friends I learned all about the organisation and we got involved in its activities. I did it because I felt that I have to do it. Personally, I felt that I have to help my country and my people dealing with the struggle with Israel and all that.

This individual is a Fatah leader who is very dominant in the organisation and was involved from a very young age. However, he was also involved in criminal activities throughout his youth and was arrested for these rather than terrorist activities. Correspondingly, the findings of this study suggest that most interviewees were involved in their organisations from a fairly young age, mostly due to an intense social process, which strongly advocates for involvement in terrorist activities.

Perceptions of the organisations' codes and conduct

The interviewees describe their perceptions of the organisations they were affiliated with in different terms; however, some common features arise among the statements of all the interviewees, regardless of whether they are affiliated with Fatah, a secular organisation, or either of the religious organisations, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as will be detailed further.

Shared perceptions among all interviewees

One of the main aspects all the interviewees share in relation to their respective organisations is the primary goal of fighting the occupation and redeeming the Palestinian people from Israeli control. Furthermore, they view fighting against soldiers and settlers as an appropriate way of achieving this goal but do not support killing civilians. However, with regards to suicide bombing and other terrorist activities that kill and injure civilians, perceptions varied between affiliates of secular and religious organisations. The Fatah members explained that the organisation was forced into

such activities and drawn into conflict due to circumstances. As Interviewee 3, a Fatah leader, described:

> We do not believe in suicide bombers, the Fatah was dragged into it because of the circumstances and the difficult struggle, but it is not our style. We fight against the occupation, we believe in self-sacrifice, but not in suicide, it is not heroism as far as I see it and I have said it before out loud.

On the other hand, the Hamas affiliates perceived suicide bombings as a religious compromise, which is not advocated normally but is strongly supported by certain Islamic scripts in extreme cases, of which the struggle against Israel is definitely considered one. As Interviewee 2, a Hamas leader, explained:

> I divide the suicide bombing activities into two — against the military and against civilians. If the soldiers fight against whom they are supposed to fight, then it is an honourable army, but when they hurt civilians, then all boundaries are broken. Islam says that it is not allowed to hurt women, elderly, and children, but we are in a war and that is why it is happening. Religiously it is forbidden, but it is also said in the Quran 'tooth for a tooth and eye for an eye', if you are dealing with someone who is not considerate, you should not be considerate as well. Hamas is based on the beautiful things in the Quran of not killing and that is the reason I affiliate with it. People do not blow themselves up because they are in a good place.

This statement, uttered by a very dominant Hamas leader, illustrates the issue of incompatibility shared by most of the religious terrorist organisations' affiliates. These individuals interpret the words of the Quran in a radical way in order to justify their goals; however, this interpretation is not endorsed more broadly by moderate Muslims around the world.[7]

Another common view shared by the interviewees is their perception of their organisations as legitimate political movements, and not as terrorist organisations. As Interviewee 7, a Fatah leader, asserts:

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[7]For more information regarding the origins of radical Islam, see Sageman (2004). *The Origins of the Jihad*, Chapter 1, pp. 1–25; See also Esmail, A. (2007). Towards a Psychoanthropological View of Religious Violence. *International Review of Psychiatry*, 19(3), 243–251.

> Some of my family are active members in the organisation and some are just students, but we are not terrorists, the whole of Europe does not think we are terrorists, they understand that we fight for what is ours, what we deserve to have; we do not kill for no reason. I invite you to go to my family, sit and talk with them and you will see what a good family it is, that we love people and we do not look at who they are, every Jew that enters our area as part of a tourist trip, we have no problem with, but to kill people and destroy our land, that is not acceptable to us.

Another such discrepancy may be found in a statement by another Fatah leader, who was charged with kidnapping and killing two Israelis who were dining in a restaurant in one of the Palestinian towns in his area. He explains this incident as revenge and an outburst of anger for the killing of a senior Fatah member by the Israeli army, yet it reveals inconsistency with the way he perceives Fatah's views and actions.

The final perception shared by the interviewees is related to the leadership of the organisations. Among affiliates of both Fatah and Hamas, there are complaints about the general leadership of the organisations who, according to them, were supposed to do everything in their power to take care of their followers but instead have deserted them in prison and do not do enough to save them from incarceration by the Israelis. This can be seen in the words of Interviewee 8, a Fatah leader:

> I am not sorry for what I have done, but I feel that our leadership has forgotten us. My friends had died and we were counting on our leadership to save us, but they have played with us instead. I used to receive instructions from Tunis (where the main leadership of Fatah was based), now they are bringing people from outside to replace the leadership in the organisation and I am sitting in prison, this is not acceptable, but it does not mean that I regret what I did because I do not.

Different perceptions among the organisations

The main differences in perceptions between affiliates of the secular organisation, Fatah, and the two religious ones, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, relate to the ideologies of the organisations. While the Fatah leaders expressed the need for a practical solution and understanding

between the two states and the two peoples, members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad focused more on the importance of religious ideology and fighting the occupation at all costs. Neither of the religious organisations seems to articulate any practical solutions to the conflict and further found it necessary to criticise Fatah on the basis of corruption and bad leadership, which, they claim, the religious organisations do not suffer from. As Interviewee 5, a Hamas leader, expressed:

> The goals of Hamas are first to convert the whole Palestinian society to religious Islam and to show them that the members of the Fatah are corrupted, that they take millions for themselves at the expense of the Palestinian people, and then to get rid of the occupation. All this must be conveyed by dialogue and not via force.

The most prominent common perception among these religious leaders is that others need to accept Islam and become religious in a peaceful way. They all truly believe that the sovereignty of Islam is good for everyone and, as they attempted to convince the researcher of this study, it would be a positive outcome for Israel as well. These views were expressed by the interviewees around the year 2006 — the same year that Hamas won the elections. Less than a year after, in 2007, Hamas took control of Gaza. Almost four years later, in a report from 2010, Sayigh argued that Hamas seems to have adapted well to the situation and constructed a rather stable and well-administered system. However, in 2020, Gaza is still heavily under siege, making it uninhabitable, and the political isolation is starting to take its toll on Hamas, forcing them to search for ways to reconciliate with the PA, as well as reach a settlement with Israel.[8] Nonetheless, it also aspires to 'Islamize' the entire population and to deepen its religious control over numerous social institutions, such as mosques, committees, youth and religious movements. According to Sayigh, Hamas also supports other radical branches of the organisation, which promote religious laws and

[8] Dalloul, M. A. (December 13, 2019). *Where is Hamas Today, 32 after It Was Founded*, MEMO. Available at: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191213-where-is-hamas-today-32-years-after-it-was-founded/.

behaviours that are being demanded from society.[9] This raises the question of how secure the leaders feel regarding their places in the organisations outside of prison, and whether they feel they contribute to the situation outside through their activities in prison.

Communication with the organisation outside prison

Despite most interviewees' desire to continue their leadership role upon their release from prison, their contribution to the general work within the organisations, and the strong support they receive from them outside of prison, actual contact with the organisations is quite difficult from within prison. Most of them described the technical difficulties of communicating with the organisations outside as having a negative effect on their continued activism from within prison. Throughout the years, the Israeli Prison System (IPS) has discovered various methods used by terrorist operations for the exchange of information and plans out of prison via lawyers, families, and other prisoners who have been released or transferred to other facilities. Accordingly, immense measures have been taken to address and combat these attempts.[10] Though, like other imprisoned terrorists around the world,[11] the prisoners are doing all they can to continue operating from inside prison, though connection is quite limited, preventing a certain amount of activism and a clear line of communication from within prison to the outside.

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[9] Sayigh (2010, pp. 4–5); for more information regarding Hamas suzerainty in Gaza: Milton-Edwards, B. (2008). The Ascendance of Political Islam: Hamas and Consolidation in the Gaza Strip. *Third World Quarterly*, 29(8), 1585–1599; Jensen, M. I. (2006), 'Re-Islamising' Palestinian Society 'From Below': Hamas and Higher Education in Gaza'. *Holy Land Studies: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, 56(1), 57–74; Al Houroub, K. (May 20, 2013). Hamas Islamisation of Gaza, *Al Monitor*. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/05/hamas-palestine-islamize-gaza-society.html.

[10] Virtser, A. (2005) *Security Prisoners Incarcerated in the Israeli Prison System*. In Hebrew, p. 8. Available at: https://www.news1.co.il/uploadFiles/736522853374482.pdf.

[11] Cilluffo *et al*. (2007, pp. 114–115); Warnes, R. & Hannah, G. (2008). Meeting the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners: The Experiences of the United Kingdom and Spain, *Policing*, 2(4), 402–411.

Furthermore, the interviewees are aware of their honourable status among the Palestinian people, but due to their limitations they do not feel very influential from within prisons. Hence, they tend to plan their actions carefully for when they will be released. As Interviewee 10, a Hamas leader, explains:

> There are few ways to work in the movement outside; there is the violent way and the political way in which you spread the ideology in the society, and that is what I am going to do, prison does not intimidate me, I sacrificed myself and my family and besides I am disappointed by our society that they do not fight, I feel alone in the battle and I am staying and fighting because the society at least has extensive respect and appreciation for those who sacrifice themselves and that gives me the strength to keep on fighting. I have no influence on the outside. It is different from the way it is presented in the media, that the Hamas has four influential divisions and we are one of them, but it is so difficult to communicate with the outside and hence it is hard to make any impact, apart from situations where we need something specific, then we send a lawyer to deal with it and ask regarding the information we need to know.

Nonetheless, the general public perception of security prisoners — especially the leaders within prison — is that they are a source of major influence and contributors to the organisations and the conflict; hence, they are seen as a group that unites Palestinian society.[12] The 'Prisoners' Document' that is mentioned in more detail in Chapter 5 of this book,[13] established in 2006 by the main leadership in prison in order to assist with the internal conflict in Palestinian society, and found to be adequate by all sides, is a good example of an initiative implemented by this group. However, no other significant initiatives have been undertaken since then.

According to this analysis of communication with respective organisations from within prison, there seems to be some contradiction between the external image of the security prisoners' leadership and their own perceptions regarding their influential role in the conflict. This

[12]Marcus, I. & Zilberdik, N. J. (2011). *Abbas Glorifies Terrorist Prisoners*. Available at: http://www.palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=157&doc_id=5794.

[13]Mideastweb (2006). *Full Text of the Palestinian Prisoner's National Conciliation Document*. Available at: http://www.mideastweb.org/prisoners_letter.htm.

ambiguity might be explained as being part of their pragmatism, which is discussed in Chapter 5 of this book.

Conclusions

This chapter touched upon some of the main social aspects related to the interviewees' lives and their contribution to their decision-making processes, especially in relation to their involvement in the terrorist organisations and activities. The main findings regarding the social profile of the terrorist groups' leaders explored in this chapter are as follows: it appears that, as in other studies that relate to social issues and terrorism, most of the leaders come from affluent families and had no financial deprivation. They also come from families that are normal in size for traditional Muslim families, with an average of nine children to a family, with close relationships between the members to the extent of self-sacrifice for the greater good of the family. As for the interviewees' marital statuses, it seems that a small majority are single as they were arrested at an early age and therefore were unable to marry. As for their childhood, most of the interviewees were found to be involved in political activity from a young age and even took on some leadership roles in their respective organisations.

Furthermore, most of them do not have a criminal background and were not involved in juvenile delinquency. Their social environment was found to be significantly supportive of political acts, as well as of the organisations' ideologies and activities. Another influential aspect in the interviewees' lives are the organisations themselves, which most of them perceived as legitimate political movements that aim to fight the occupation and end the Palestinian struggle with Israel. However, they also expressed a shared sense of disappointment with their leadership outside prison for not solving their issue of incarceration. Furthermore, the members of the secular versus the religious organisations voiced different opinions regarding the ideology of the group; members of Fatah seem to present more practical solutions, while Hamas affiliates focused on the importance of religion, disregarding other options. The final important aspect is the interviewees' perceived abilities to influence the organisations' decision-making processes outside prison. The interviewees suggested that this was minimal and quite inconsistent with their image outside amidst the Palestinian society, where they are believed to pull strings from captivity.

The findings suggest that none of the factors described — socioeconomic status, marital and family situation, or even the strong bond these interviewees have with their close families — have a significant influence on their decision to join violent movements. However, other aspects such as their experiences during their adolescence, their social surroundings, their perceptions of and involvements in the terrorist organisations and activities, as well as the ideology and conduct of the organisations themselves all had significant influence on the interviewees' choice of path.

Each leader suggested that they believed their leadership quality to have been innate and apparent throughout childhood. In a society struggling with constant conflict, the interviewees found themselves strongly involved in political activities through various organisations that are firmly rooted in Palestinian society. The way each leader chose which organisation to affiliate with relates to the other aspects dealt with in this chapter, including social surroundings, family, neighbourhood, school, or even youth movements, which all influence the individual to become involved in a particular organisation. Furthermore, the intense advocacy towards this type of activism, as well as the massive support the individual receives due to his involvement in an organisation, encourage him to engage entirely in this type of activity to the extent of sacrificing everything for it.

Furthermore, due to his involvement from a very young age, the organisation's ideology and conduct are major catalysts that shape a person's entire formation, where the ideology and the righteous cause are engraved in his psyche and he is willing to give up everything to serve it. Such leaders do not see themselves as terrorists, but as people who fight for a noble cause and for what is theirs. Nonetheless, there seem to be some contradictions in their perceptions of their actions towards achieving these goals. While both secular and religious actors condemn killing civilians, they justify it by subjective interpretation of the Quran or by delegating responsibility to a higher power and saying they were drawn into it. And, in spite of their total commitment to the organisations and their causes, they still express feelings of disappointment towards a leadership that does not do enough to save them.

Chapter 2

Personality Profile

Introduction

This chapter will explore the personality profiles of the leaders and will focus on whether they possess a criminal personality or not. Numerous personality traits were brought up during the interviews when each interviewee was asked to describe his or her own personality. The analysis of the findings revealed six themes where each theme represents a personality feature; some even include subcategories that expand the core theme itself. Hence, the personality characteristics are divided into the following six themes:

(1) **Manipulativeness:** Is the interviewee a schemer who uses devious means to attain his goals? Does he regard himself as being particularly persuasive and as someone who always gets his own way?
(2) **Responsibility:** Does the interviewee regard himself as a generally responsible individual or perhaps an impulsive one? Will he invest excessive efforts in order to achieve his goals? Has he endangered those in his environment through the use of drugs and alcohol or irresponsible use of firearms? Is he an adventurous person who lives on the edge?
(3) **Behavioural inhibitions:** Does the interviewee have the ability to manage anger or to cope with difficult situations that test his patience, and the ability to use rational common sense to deal with such situations? Is he capable of adapting to stressful situations? How do those in his social environment perceive him in this regard?

(4) **Ability to feel remorse:** Does the interviewee express regret or remorse over certain events or situations in his past where he could have, and should have, behaved otherwise? Is he able to admit that he made mistakes generally, as well as specifically with regard to the harmful deeds he may have committed? And how does he cope with past mistakes of this kind?
(5) **Self-evaluation:** How does the interviewee perceive and assess himself generally? Does he have high, average or low self-esteem? All interviewees related their own typical personality traits and how they would describe themselves. Some spoke about the personal character traits that constitute their personality, while others related to personal character traits in the context of their immediate environment.
(6) **Other social characteristics:** Were there any influential factors in the interviewee's life that led him or her to choose a certain path, or is he or she free of influence from any near or distant external factors? Are these interviewees characterised as being rebellious? Are they creative? Are they pessimistic and suspicious people? How do they perceive their interpersonal communication abilities? Do they describe themselves as reclusive?

The concept of personality serves as the heart of this chapter and therefore it begins with an initial review of the literature regarding the definition and development in the study of personality. Furthermore, the 'big five' theory, which is a general classification method for the various personality traits, will be detailed, as well as personality typologies and profiles. These will all contribute to a survey of the types of criminal and terrorist personalities that will be compared for the sake of exploring the possible linkage between the interviewees and the antisocial personality. This will be done via the use of Hare's checklist,[1] which is used to reveal a psychopathic personality disorder.

This research will investigate some of the characteristics that relate to antisocial personality, and an analysis will also be made relating to the

[1] Hare, R. D. (1991). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised* (*PCL-R*). Toronto, Ontario: Multi-Health Systems.

extent of their correspondence with the participating leaders of the terrorist groups. The findings will be presented in a qualitative manner, as well as by revealing the results of Hare's checklist.[2] The three features — manipulativeness, responsibility and deficient behavioural inhibitions — will be analysed here first.

Manipulativeness

The concept of manipulativeness applies to people who typically use lies and deceit in order to achieve their aims, and who manipulate situations in their favour. A manipulator will distort facts and reality and will use all kinds of manoeuvres, including charm, to persuade the interlocutor to give him what he wants.[3] The following analysis of the interviewees' statements focuses on their use of manoeuvres, as well as on their abilities to persuade in order to attain what they want. The findings are detailed as follows:

(1) **Use of manoeuvres:** Half of the interviewees claimed they would use manoeuvres and manipulation to attain their goals, while the others claimed they would only ever use honest means and that they considered all such schemes as unacceptable. Interviewee 9 stated the following:

> It depends on who I am dealing with. If it is an enemy, I will use ruses or any other means to save myself, except for non-religious or forbidden means like photographing him in bad situations (compromising situations), and the like. But if I need to know if someone is bad, I will do anything to get the information. Even if I need to use tricks, I will make every effort to find out about his blunders.

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[2] *Ibid*.

[3] Brown, J. M. (1997). Manipulativeness and dialogue. *Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing*, 4(2), 137–144; for more on this concept: Ackerman, F. (1995). The concept of manipulativeness. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 9, 335–340; Baron, M. (2003). Manipulativeness. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 77(2), 37–54.

Interviewee 6 expressed a contradictory view: "I do not use ruses, not everything is worth any price. I never lie to attain something; I am always sincere and say what I think, even if others do not like it."

Interviewee 9 is an Islamic Jihad member, while Interviewee 6 is a Fatah member. Islamic Jihad is an established radical religious organisation while Fatah is considered a more secular, less extreme and more pragmatic organisation. This factor might explain the difference in attitude regarding the use of any means necessary to fight the enemy.

(2) **Persuasiveness:** Most of the interviewees, around 77%, claimed they are highly persuasive, that they can easily convince others that they are right and cause them to act accordingly. This was best expressed by Interviewee 1, a Fatah leader:

> I would catch drug dealers, car thieves and people who sold their lands to Jews, and I was very good at it because I always managed to persuade people to give me what I wanted … I can persuade anyone to do what I ask him, even to kill someone. I am good at persuading people … It reached a point where I could persuade anyone to do what I wanted, even if it meant killing or hitting another. There is no such thing as 'can't' — every effort must be made to go all the way.

This statement, as well as the general attitude of the interviewees regarding their ability to affect others' decisions, can be explained by the fact that they are all leaders and, as such, almost by definition, they are likely to have the abilities and the skills to influence others.

On the contrary, a few interviewees expressed reservations about their ability to persuade others, citing factors such as the other person's personality, the situation, etc. Interviewee 9 provides one such example:

> I have the ability to explain and to put things in order in my mind and to express them logically. I can carry on a dialogue for 20 hours, depending on the other person. If the other person wants it and is open to being persuaded, I can persuade him. There are things I am not persuasive

> about. I cannot convince you that what I did was right. If someone does not want to be persuaded but only wants to make problems, I cannot persuade him otherwise. In general, I have no problem persuading others … I think that the purpose of dialogue is not to persuade. The main purpose is to learn what the other person thinks and to tell him what I think, and then to persuade.

(3) **The ability to attain anything:** Many of the interviewees claimed they have the ability to get anything they want, if they want it badly enough: "They call me 'a whale', which means that I am a big fish that takes what it wants. I could get anything I wanted, even by telephone" (Interviewee 1, a Fatah leader).

On the contrary, others claimed they cannot get everything they want, no matter how much they want it, as demonstrated by the words of Interviewee 7, a Fatah leader:

> I am not always able to get everything I want. I can persuade others and am good at it. If necessary, I would make a plan, but so far I have not had to do this. I would use any accepted means to get what I want … I cannot solve everything, even if I invest effort.

Many of the interviewees self-reported that they would use devious methods and manipulation to achieve their goals, while others reported that, in the end, they always get what they want. The majority of interviewees regarded themselves as having strong persuasive abilities; nevertheless, the findings in this study do not indicate a strong inclination towards manipulative personality or deviousness among the interviewees.

However, only a few of the interviewees reported attributing high importance to truth and honesty, both with oneself and others. Interviewee 3, a Fatah leader, explained the following:

> It is important for me to tell the truth at any price. One cannot run from the truth. I believe in always telling the truth, even if it sometimes messes up my life, when I should have kept quiet. But I believe that the day will come when I will gain from it.

Responsibility

The origin of the word 'responsibility' comes from the Latin word 'respondeo', meaning 'I answer', which implies that the subject is answerable or accountable for an action.[4] Hence, responsibility is a social phenomenon and one that normally transcends individuality as it involves obligation to others, with consequences dependent on a person's actions (or inaction).[5] In addition, some factors can affect a person's sense of responsibility, such as the use of drugs and alcohol, as well as mental or psychological disabilities.[6]

The subsequent analysis of the interviewees' statements will focus on various aspects of responsibility; these include such factors as their personal responsibility, the lengths they would go to in order to fulfil their responsibilities, as well as the extent to which they value others above themselves. Aspects of irresponsibility were also raised, such as impulsivity, adventurousness and risk-taking, as well as the use of drugs and alcohol, which might negatively affect decision-making and conduct. Firearm use is another aspect that is relevant to the present study in terms of whether it is considered a legitimate means of achieving goals, and whether the risk involved in handling firearms is fully appreciated. All these aspects will be detailed as follows:

(1) **Personal responsibility:** Most of the interviewees stated that they are personally very responsible for their actions and for everything that happened in prison, as can be seen from the words of Interviewee 6:

> I am a very responsible person and it is a part of my standard of living. My people know that I am responsible and even though sometimes I can do all kinds of nonsense, at the moment of truth I will be there and will make the right decisions.

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[4] Lucas, J. R. (1993). *Responsibility*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 5.

[5] Kaler, J. (2002). Responsibility, accountability and governance. *Business Ethics: A European Review*, 11(4), 327–334.

[6] Staddon, J. (1999). On responsibility in science and law. In: Ellen Frankel Paul and Fred D Miller (eds.), *Responsibility*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 146–174; Auhagen, A. E. and Bierhoff, H. W. (2001). *Responsibility: The Many Faces of a Social Phenomenon*. Routledge, p. 1.

This interviewee is a very senior Fatah leader. Despite his relative youth at the time of the interview, and notwithstanding his liberal opinions, which are sometimes seen as unacceptable even by a secular organisation such as Fatah, he is known in prison for being responsible in his decisions and deeds, and he is repeatedly elected and re-elected as a leader.

(2) **Actions or inaction towards fulfilling responsibilities:** Some interviewees described themselves as willing to invest all effort into attaining their goals, or getting what they want. For example, Interviewee 10 stated the following:

> When I set a goal, I am stubborn about attaining it. Success is from God. If I need to solve something, I put all else aside and invest all my efforts in solving it to the very end. I am always determined when I need to solve something or attain a goal. If I do not succeed, at least I can say that I did all I could. For example, our attempted escape — I worked very hard on it. I dug the tunnel for three months and we worked hard, stubbornly and with determination. We started out with screws, but we did not despair.

Interviewee 10 is a Hamas leader who is known as being very dominant in the organisation and, even though he is very religious and therefore believes that everything happens through 'the Hand of God', as can be seen from his words, he still expresses determination towards attaining his goals.

(3) **Impulsiveness:** Only a few interviewees, four out of the eighteen, conveyed that they were very impulsive by nature compared to others who said they were not impulsive at all, and that they had to examine and think about all their answers and actions. For example, Interviewee 6 said, "I am an impulsive person who operates in different directions. One can say that I am hyperactive … I am impulsive but not a fool: it is calculated spontaneity." On the contrary, Interviewee 3 said, "I am not an impulsive person at all. I plan everything and I plan every serious step meticulously. I have never failed in anything that I planned well."

Some interviewees who reported extreme activity levels also claimed that they find it hard to be in one place for too long and need to participate in several different activities simultaneously. For example, Interviewee 7 said the following:

> When I left school, I worked in many jobs; I worked as a painter, in construction, in greenhouses, but I could not stay in one job for too long. I did not have enough patience to stay in the same job, I moved from one job to another. Once I even sold ice cream.

This interviewee is a Fatah leader who, according to his background check, holds criminal records for petty crimes such as stealing cars, which he denied. He finds it very hard to adjust to imprisonment. These data are consistent with his claimed difficulties in holding a steady job and being in one place for long, despite being a very dominant Fatah leader and a good example of one who is non-conformist.

(4) **Use of drugs and alcohol:** Some interviewees claimed that they had never seen drugs or alcohol: "No, never. I have never even seen it. It is forbidden. Since the first grade we are told that people who drink alcohol go to hell" (Interviewee 16). The vast majority of interviewees stated that they had never used drugs or alcohol, and that even though they had access to drugs and alcohol, they had never been tempted. Interviewee 11 stated the following:

> I worked in Tel Aviv for a while and it was accessible, but I never tried drugs and went nowhere near alcohol. I held the bottle and smelled the stuff, but I threw it out — I could not even taste it.

These two leaders are Hamas members, which, as a religious organisation, has basic rules prohibiting the use of alcohol and drugs. However, most of the other interviewees, who are affiliates of Fatah, which is a secular organisation, also argue for the abstention from such substances, in keeping with traditional Islam, which they all affiliate with, whether they practice it or not. This point reveals the importance of Islam to both religious and secular terrorists of Muslim origin.

A minority of the interviewees said they had used drugs and alcohol but clarified that it had been in small doses for short periods and without endangering anyone. It was also apparent that the reasons behind their use were very different. Interviewee 15, a Fatah leader, claimed he did it for fun:

> We used to smoke hashish and drink alcohol. It was forbidden in the family, but we did it anyway. (*You are the first leader I've spoken to that told me they used hashish. The rest were shocked by the very mention of drug use. Could it be that this is because you are an Israeli Arab and most of them are Palestinian Arabs?*) I know them, they are lying. I know that I am harming myself by telling you this, but it is the truth. I smoked for a short while, but a small amount and not for long, and I did not harm anyone. I did not steal anything or commit burglary because I was not short of money. I have good friends who were also like this. I told you that I worked when I had to and had fun whenever I could.

On the contrary, Interviewee 17, also a Fatah leader, used drugs and alcohol as an escape from difficult life circumstances:

> I tried marijuana maybe three or four times, but not all the time. (*Why did you do it*?) Because I wanted to laugh, I saw my friends laughing and I also wanted to laugh. (*Did it help*?) Yes. But I knew it was not good and I also thought about my mother who used to speak to me all the time and tell me it was not good. (*What about alcohol*? *Did you drink alcohol*?) No, I do not want to drink alcohol, also in this case, only because I think of my mother.

Apart from these two interviewees who testify to using both drugs and alcohol few times in their lives, and Interviewee 1 who admits to drinking alcohol occasionally, the rest deny having any relationship with these substances. Nevertheless, these three are all members of Fatah and thus represent a minority of the 12 Fatah members who participated in this research. None of the six religious organisations' affiliates interviewed in this study claimed to use drugs or alcohol, and this may demonstrate the tendency of religious organisations to be more morally motivated and to have a stricter policy regarding any such discrepancies.[7]

[7] *Ibid*.

(5) **Irresponsible use of firearms:** The interviewees may be divided into two groups. The first is made up of those who claim to have had no physical contact with or use of firearms: "I have never touched a weapon and I still do not know how to use one …" (Interviewee 15, a Fatah leader). The second is made up of those who used weapons regularly. Within this latter group, all claimed to use firearms responsibly.

Interviewee 16, a Hamas leader from the youth section, was the only one to admit to irresponsible use of a firearm, which might be linked to his being a minor. As such, he is more likely to behave irresponsibly, as can be clearly seen from his stories:

> Once I was cleaning my gun and put the cartridge aside. But there was a bullet in the gun and it fired by mistake. The bullet hit the ceiling. My head was very close to the barrel. I got a fright and threw the weapon down. The family ran into my room, alarmed. They thought I wanted to commit suicide, but I could not explain because I was in shock. I also made a Molotov cocktail once. Someone was smoking next to me and set my pants alight. I quickly lay down in the sand and put out the fire. Another time I burnt my hand (He s*hows the researcher the burns on his hand*). Once, for laughs, I told a friend that I would shoot his bag. It annoyed me that he did not believe me. I took out my pistol and shot his bag. He was frightened, and after that he did not want to walk home from school with me.

However, the large majority of interviewees claimed that they practiced responsible use of firearms and that nobody was ever mistakenly injured by them. The following are the words of Interviewee 12, the leading spokesman of security prisoners not affiliated with any one organisation:

> I would try not to take firearms home, but if I *did* bring any home, I would lock it in a cupboard and keep the key. I did not give the key to anyone, so that my younger brothers would not get hold of it.

A similar claim was made by Interviewee 9, an Islamic Jihad leader:

> With regard to firearms, I would do all the necessary checks, even several times, before taking out my weapon or bringing it home. I had a

> firearm at home, too, because I was a wanted person and I needed a firearm … everything I did, and my life itself, is for the benefit of those in my social environment. I gave my life to them, so I would not do anything to harm them. I am very careful.

(6) **Valuing others over self:** Some interviewees, seven out of 18, stated that they always considered the public good before they thought of themselves, that all their deeds were intentional and in accordance with the situation in their social environment. The following exchange with Interviewee 9 illustrates this well:

> On a personal level, I never thought about myself without thinking of everyone. I never thought that I should lead a normal life; because of the situation (meaning the occupation and his involvement in it) … I do not want you to think that I feel sorry for myself for being in prison and serving my years. I am referring to the people and their interests. There was a time when we should have stopped to think about our failure and where victory lay. (*What about you*?) I do not think about myself. It was a given that I would either die or end up in prison. I am not surprised. (*Have you ignored yourself completely*?) Sometimes I think that. Nevertheless, I am still a human being with feelings and emotions. But when the general issue arises, personal matters are marginalised.

This statement expresses the dedication and total self-sacrifice of an Islamic Jihad leader; it also reveals one of the main characteristics of this radical organisation and its devoted members.

(7) **Adventurousness:** Many studies related to the psychology of terrorists argue that terrorism attracts bored and violent individuals looking for excitement and adventure.[8] However, only a few of the interviewees in this study demonstrated the need for adventure and excitement, which is probably linked with Crenshaw's[9] acknowledgement that terrorist organisations are doing their best to avoid recruiting this kind

[8]Cottee, S. and Hayward, K. (2011). Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34(12), 963–986; Kaplan, A. (1978). The Psychodynamics of Terrorism. *Terrorism*, 1(3–4), 237–254.

[9]Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399.

of individual, who they see as a potential risk. Interviewee 10, a Hamas leader, expresses the following:

> Going out to work and coming home every day for so many years — how can you live like this? One should also go on trips, not just work. We have a problem in society, where people do not attain progress. I cannot imagine getting married, going to work and then coming home; one needs adventure. Unfortunately, all my adventurous activities were related to resistance to the occupation. It 'cooked' (read as 'established') the opinions in my head and allowed me to develop in the organisation.

This leader is very dominant in the organisation and holds a record for attempting to escape from prison, although was eventually caught, which might be linked to his need for adventure.

An examination of these characteristics suggest that, in general, most interviewees self-report being very responsible towards themselves, their families and in relation to everything that happens in the prison section to which they belong. The interviewees were asked about their potential to endanger their environment and to behave irresponsibly through the use of drugs or weapons. The majority self-reported that they had never used drugs or alcohol and thus had never endangered their social environment. Some even claimed that they had never even seen drugs or alcohol and that they had never had any connection to them. A small number of interviewees admitted to trying drugs on one or several occasions, mainly for fun or as a form of escape. These cases also did not involve addiction or repeated use, and all involved members of Fatah, a secular organisation, and so religious ideology might have some impact on this factor, as was mentioned before.[10]

Just one interviewee admitted to the irresponsible use of firearms, which endangered his social environment. This interviewee is a minor, which might be a relevant factor here. However, most interviewees claimed a high level of responsibility with regard to the use of firearms, including taking all the necessary precautions to avoid endangering others. It should be noted that some interviewees reported never having used firearms, and in fact not even knowing how to use them.

[10]For more information on Fatah, see the introduction to this book.

Concerning the need for stimulation with regard to impulsiveness or adventurousness, only a few of the interviewees regarded themselves as having a tendency towards high activity levels by nature. Indicators of this tendency include such factors as having difficulty in holding down a permanent job and being engaged in many things simultaneously. Some interviewees claimed to be impulsive by nature, while others said they were not at all impulsive and that they needed to examine every aspect thoroughly before taking any action.

The findings in the present study indicate that the interviewees were characterised as having high levels of responsibility towards both themselves and their social environment, and they do not indulge in behaviour that may endanger others. Furthermore, some interviewees displayed self-sacrifice in favour of the general good and the good of others. This characteristic testifies to a high level of responsibility towards their close social environment and their families. Furthermore, some interviewees noted that since they were nominated by others to engage in leadership tasks requiring them to be serious and responsible, they invest maximum effort and the best of their abilities to ensure a successful outcome.

Behavioural Inhibitions

People normally suppress their urges to act in a way that might be unacceptable in order to fit in with society or to avoid social sanctions. Such behaviours can be emotional, passive or active, but most societies have restrictions against unacceptable behaviour, and the consequences can be negative.[11] The following analysis of the data examines the interviewees' behavioural inhibitions including their abilities to cope with anger or failure, how they adapted to different circumstances and how those in their social circles perceived them.

(1) **Coping with anger:** Only a few of the interviewees self-reported that they are not easily angered and that they are restrained and able to

[11] Polivy, J. (1998). The Effects of Behavioural Inhibition: Integrating Internal Cues, Cognition, Behaviour, and Affect. *Psychological Inquiry*, 9(3), 181–204.

control their reactions when angry. For example, Interviewee 13 stated the following:

> (*Do you get angry easily?*) No, not at all; however, lies make me angry or if somebody raises their voice or says something bad. (*What do you do when you get angry?*) When I get angry at someone, I do not speak to him at that moment. I first allow myself to calm down and then I go to him and end it … and if I cannot do much about it, I write or calm myself down, I do not like to shout, I do not curse. (*Have you ever lost control?*) No, especially not here in prison and I am not one of those people who break things when they get angry.

In contrast, many of the interviewees reported that they tend to get angry and lose control when faced with difficult situations, as Interviewee 18, a Fatah leader explains:

> (*Do you get angry easily?*) Yes, yes, (smiles). Everybody knows that I anger easily. (*Give me an example of something that makes you angry.*) Many things, like when someone does not know his work and does not do it properly, shouting irritates me. It angers me if someone destroys something that I make, or if someone does not understand when I explain something. I get angry when someone humiliates others. (*What do you do when you get angry?*) I do not know. I get angry, I shout. My body language shows that I am angry. Afterwards I calm down and start thinking. (*In other words, when you are angry you don't think*?) Yes, that is right.

Still others reported that sometimes they become angry, but that they mostly control their reactions and cope with the situation. One such example is Interviewee 5:

> I do not anger easily, but there are some things that anger me, like when an inmate harms a warden or a cellmate for no reason. When this happens, I get angry and shout at him, reprimand him, but without using hands. There is also a penal code that we follow. It also makes me angry when decisions are made that are not according to our rules. This makes me really angry because it is important that everything is done properly, according to procedure.

In various studies, anger is found to be a strong and substantial motive for individuals or groups to commit horrendous acts of violence, as well as a motivating factor to join violent groups. Angry people who find it hard to cope with their anger tend to be very violent and radical in their actions, as well as their reactions.[12] Maile and his colleagues stressed in their report on 'aggression in terrorism', "Aggression, whether expressed by the leaders or the members of a terrorist group, is a central component of terrorism."[13] However, few of the interviewees in this study were found to be angry people in general or individuals who anger easily and cannot control their reactions to stressful events. The majority of the interviewees argued that they tend to relax and think things through before reacting in these kinds of situations. Some of them even mentioned the influence of prison as a catalyst for forcing them to behave in a certain way since they face greater constraints and need to conduct themselves carefully. The next aspect that this chapter considers might be linked to this aspect of behavioural restoration and will add to its understanding.

(2) **Coping with failure and adaptability:** The majority of the interviewees self-reported that they are able to cope well and effectively with their mistakes, that they learn lessons and that they rectify things accordingly. For example, Interviewee 2, a senior Hamas leader, stated the following:

> Many things happen in life and here there is nobody who does not look back, otherwise you cannot go forwards. Both with regards to family and society, there are things I regret not handling properly. For example, when I allowed my sister to marry a man whom I thought was no good for her … every question has an answer and things that I can change

[12] Abdullah, S. (2002). The soul of a terrorist: Reflections on our war with the 'other'. In: Chris E. Stout (ed.), *The Psychology of Terrorism: A Public Understanding*. Greenwood Publishing Group, pp. 129–142.

[13] Maile, J., Walters, T. K., Ramirez, J. M., and Antonius, D. (2010). Aggression in terrorism. In: Antonius, D., Brown, A. D., Walters, T. K., Ramirez, J. M., & Sinclair, S. J. (eds.), *Interdisciplinary Analyses of Terrorism and Political Aggression*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 22–48.

> should be changed accordingly. I learn lessons and see what the right way is. It is like steering a boat, if it goes off course, you need to change direction.

Self-reporting by a minority of interviewees indicated that they are not always capable of coping with problems in the proper manner and that sometimes they do not know how to rectify their mistakes. Interviewee 7, a Fatah leader, stated the following:

> (*How did you feel after the murder of the children?*) The word difficult says it all. It was difficult for me. I looked at my own children and thought that if someone else had done this to them, it would be unacceptable. (*Did it make you do something*?) What could I do? If I made a bad decision, I would not repeat it. Next time I will do what is right and acceptable. I am smart. If I behave badly towards another inmate, I sit and think about it and do not do it again. (*Are you capable of apologising?*) Of course, I apologise. I apologised for the killings of the children, but I do not apologise for the soldier in Tulkarem (a Palestinian city in the west area of Samaria). (*Are you aware of the implications of your deeds*?) I do not think about everything. I thought about some deeds and did not think about others; it depends on the circumstances. I thought about everything, but sometimes people make mistakes and think that they made mistakes, that they did something that was not appropriate. I have nothing to confess, we do not confess, what is there to confess?

This interviewee is very dominant in the organisation; however, according to his records and statements, he has severe difficulties in coping with life in prison and its consequences and finds it hard to adapt to difficult and problematic situations, as he further explained:

> I never thought I would end up in prison. I preferred to die. To this day I cannot believe that I am in prison. I look around the prison in which you die every minute and every hour, while outside you die only once. It is extremely difficult.

Nevertheless, most interviewees suggested that they possess strong abilities to cope with difficult issues, whether caused by them or in

general; further, they perceive themselves as being able to adapt well to any circumstances, as can be seen clearly by the words of Interviewee 12:

> I am realistic; I do not like to break into pieces. According to my personality, I want to reach the sky, but the reality is different and I put things into perspective. This is what holds me together in prison. (*Do you not have feelings*?) (*Laughs*) … Why do you think that I do not have feelings? Am I a robot? What feelings are you talking about? (*Frustration, anger, envy, perhaps, sadness…*) It is not a lack of emotions, it is coping. I have already been here for 26 years. I need to be aware of my social environment, to be realistic, to know what I want.

The concept of adaptability was presented in some studies[14] as one of the main cause for joining terrorist groups. As Post detailed: "The decision to join often follows failed efforts at adaptation socially, educationally, and at work."[15] However, most of the interviewees in this study were found to have adapted well to their life in prison and the difficult circumstances involved.

(3) **Social environmental perceptions:** Many of the interviewees stated that those in their social environment do not perceive them as being angry and unable to control their reactions in stressful situations, while others stated the contrary, as can be seen in the words of Interviewee 16, a Hamas leader: "Others think I am bad-tempered because they see me laugh sometimes, but if someone makes me angry I cannot see straight." On the contrary, Interviewee 6 stated the following:

> Those who know me well, and very few do, know that there are things that irritate me, but in general they call me 'British'. By that they mean that I am very calm … Nobody says I am bad; I was never violent,

[14] Schweitzer, Y. and Goldstein Faber, S. (2005). *Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism*. Memorandum No. 78, Tel Aviv: Jaffa Centre for Strategic Studies, p. 31.

[15] Post, J. M. (1984). Notes on a psychodynamic theory of terrorist behaviour. *Terrorism*, 7(2), 241–256.

> except in an incident with my sisters, but I have solved that. I have never had quarrels or arguments in public, and even here in prison I never raise a hand on anyone. One has to detach from his humanity to be able to commit murder, and that is what I did.

In an examination of the interviewees' ability to cope with anger, many of the interviewees stated that they are angry by nature, that they find it hard to cope with anger and that they lose control in certain situations. Only a few stated that they were not easily angered, were restrained and were able to control their responses. The rest of the interviewees claimed that generally they were not easily angered and were able to control their reactions, but that sometimes, in extreme cases, they were not able to control their reactions and lost control. With regard to how they are perceived by those within their social environment, a few of the interviewees stated that they are perceived as bad-tempered, while others claimed the opposite.

Furthermore, only a few interviewees were found to be unable to cope with mistakes and unable to learn lessons when necessary, as well as to adapt both to being in prison and to difficult situations in general. Most of the interviewees claimed high adaptive and coping abilities, apart from one interviewee who mentioned great difficulty in adapting to imprisonment and to his current situation. It may be that these findings derive from the fact that the interviewees are leaders who, by their very nature, are more decisive and required to keep their temper. In other words, they have to be calm in order to avoid making the wrong decisions, as was detailed previously in relation to the aspect of responsibility. Furthermore, with regards to behavioural inhibitions, it seems that there is no significant difference in behaviour depending on belonging to one organisation or another, and the interviewees are fairly divided accordingly.

The Capacity for Remorse

In his comparison between terrorists and people with antisocial personality disorder, Martens explores the lack of remorse or guilt expressed in relation to their violent acts. Other studies examining the connection

between terrorism and personality disorders argue that the personalities of terrorists are characterised by a lack of the ability to experience remorse.[16]

(1) **Remorse in general:** Most interviewees claimed that they feel remorse for certain events and deeds in their past and, if it were possible, they would have behaved otherwise. It is evident that only a small number of interviewees regret committing deeds that harmed others. For example, Interviewee 14, a Fatah leader, stated the following:

> I did things that I regret. I beat my wife twice in my life and I am very sorry about that. I thought about it while sitting in prison and I wanted to talk to her about it, but now I think it is too late. I have many family pictures, and every night I look at them and ask them — when will I go home? I am also sorry that I left my mother because she is the person closest to me.

This is inconsistent with most of the interviewees who regretted deeds that caused harm to themselves. For example, a Hamas leader, Interviewee 11 stated:

> It hurts me that I stopped studying; I eat myself up about it. Life is going in another direction. For example, when I am released, I would not know anything about computers or Internet. (*Is there anything else besides studies that you are sorry about?*) I did not have any definite political ideas, I did not have a political position to guide me about what is good and what is bad, about how to do things in the best way, or not to do anything at all.

A minority of the interviewees argued that there is nothing they regret. For example, Interviewee 13, a Fatah leader, responded to the question,

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[16]Martens, W. H. J. (2004). The Terrorist with Antisocial Personality Disorder. *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice*, 4(1), 45–56; Taylor, M. (1988). *The Terrorist*. Brassey's Defence Publishers, p. 85; and Post, J. M. Sprinzak, E. and Denny, L. (2003). The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 15(1), 171–184.

"*Were there things you regretted along the way?*": "No." "*Nothing?*" "No." Interviewee 16, a Hamas leader, offered more detail:

> (*Were there things you regretted in life*?) No, never. I am not sorry about anything I ever did. Even in court I did not show remorse for what I did, because then I would lose faith. But here in prison, if I make a mistake with another inmate, I will apologise to him in front of 140 inmates.

(2) **Remorse for acts of terror:** In the present study, it was found that in the context of terror acts, most of the interviewees do not feel any remorse for their deeds; instead, they believe in the justice of their cause and in perpetrating these acts of terror. Only a minority of the interviewees expressed remorse for their deeds and claimed that today, in similar circumstances, they would do it differently. Hence, the often-repeated narrative stands in that most of the interviewees expressed no remorse for acts of terror they had committed, and refused to express any remorse about them, as clearly exemplified by Interviewee 5, a Hamas leader:

> I am not sorry for anything I did. I believe it contributed to our victory today and to throwing off the occupation. I did it out of belief, not out of mental illness. I knew in advance that I might be arrested, or die, but I took that into account.

Moreover, Interviewee 6, a Fatah leader, argued the following:

> If I am ever in a situation of feeling remorse, I will die. The murder was not carried out for nothing. There was a reason for it, and if I say I am sorry, it will hurt the victim's family. If I could turn the clock back, I would do the same thing again under the same conditions.

A small minority of the interviewees expressed remorse for their deeds and claimed that today they would do otherwise. Interviewee 1, a Fatah leader, expressed the following:

> Today I would do it completely differently. I would not enter into an armed struggle. I would write to the press, join organisations, or leave it

> all alone, depending on the situation. I am not the only one among my people who needs to pay. It also depends on age; I have done my bit. The weapons and the method should be changed.

With regard to remorse in general, most of the interviewees expressed remorse for things they did in their past that were unconnected to terrorism. Only a few of the interviewees said they had no remorse for anything they had done in the past, thereby indicating that their personalities are characterised by the lack of ability to feel remorse. Most interviewees were in fact found to have the ability to learn from their mistakes and to cope with them effectively. Accordingly, the findings of this study thus show that these terrorists have the ability to feel remorse for a variety of past deeds and are even able to learn from their mistakes and to cope with them in a proper and effective manner. Furthermore, no substantial correlation has been noted between the type of organisation interviewees affiliate with and whether they regret their terrorist actions. This finding is deduced from the fact that three out of the four who showed remorse for their terrorist acts are Fatah members and one is a member of Hamas; considering the ratio is 11 Fatah participants to five Hamas interviewees, it seems quite balanced between the organisations.

Self-evaluation

Further to the study conducted by Martens,[17] which found a self-esteem deficiency in terrorists and people with antisocial personality disorder, Shaw[18] also argues that terrorists come from at-risk populations, and therefore their self-esteem suffers from prior damage. Furthermore, Kaplan adds that terrorism is actually a reaction to low self-esteem, since terrorists fight for a cause and expect to gain self-respect from it.[19]

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[17] Martens, W. H. J. (2004). The Terrorist with Antisocial Personality Disorder. *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice*, 4(1), 45–56.

[18] Shaw, E. D. (1986). Political Terrorists: Dangers of Diagnosis and an Alternative to the Psychopathology Model. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 8(3), 359–368.

[19] Kaplan, A. (1978). The Psychodynamics of Terrorism. *Terrorism*, 1(3–4), 237–254; see also Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes*

Self-esteem will be measured in this study by the interviewees' own perceptions of themselves, as well as through relevant information held in their files and the researcher's observations.

Many of the interviewees in this study were found to have high self-esteem, perceived themselves as having a positive personality and believed in themselves and in their capabilities. For example, Interviewee 3, a Fatah leader, stated the following:

> I can and I do believe in who I am, am convinced by what I have, and am always doing things to improve myself. I constantly learn, read, listen to the radio, am interested in politics, build myself and prepare myself in all aspects. I feel like a leader who needs to be followed … I believe I will succeed. I believe in myself and in my ability, and I have proof for it.

Interviewee 6, a Fatah leader, expressed similar attitudes:

> I am gentle, sensitive and considerate; others regarded me as a good friend and good to be with, and they thought that I created a good atmosphere … even though I surprised myself by doing what I did; I did not even have nightmares about it later. I am romantic, sensitive, so why do I not have any nightmares? I love myself, am satisfied with myself and live in harmony with myself. I feel good about what and who I am and I am happy about it. When I compare myself to others, I am pleased… I am a very loving, calm, level-headed and smart person — I regard myself as an intelligent person. Do not accuse me of boasting, it is because you asked me. I accept people for what they are, even if I do not like the way they are. I love them too if they are not stupid or liars. I am very open, even though in prison I am closed. I do not know why. It is hard for me to open up to people here and it is very different to be how I was on the outside. There I was open to people and here I had to change things in order to be successful and to cope.

Half of the interviewees evaluated themselves as average with modest perceptions of their capabilities in general. Moreover, they are also well aware of their successes and good qualities and traits. For example,

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a Terrorist and Why? Federal Research Division Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., p. 25. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf.

Interviewee 5, a Hamas leader, said of himself: "I am obstinate. I can say about myself that when I invest effort in anything, I invest a lot of effort and always find a solution. I do the best I can, but sometimes I do not succeed. That is life." While a few of the interviewees referred to personal traits (as was seen from the previous example from Interviewee 5), others referred to those in their social environment, as described by Interviewee 4, a Fatah leader: "I'm a normal guy; I love the quiet life and love it when everyone around me lives a quiet life. I love looking out for my family and knowing that everyone is okay."

Only one interviewee, Interviewee 9, was found to have low self-esteem, and in fact regarded himself as a total failure. He attributes his feeling to both himself and to his social environment, as follows:

> I am good at reading; I love being righteous and not lying. To me that is the most important thing … it is hard for me to speak about myself. What can I tell you? (*Tell me what you think of yourself*?) I feel there is something bad in me. I feel like a failure, that up to now I have not done anything significant and have not succeeded to become what I want to be. I am a failure from a family point of view because I did not give them what I needed to give them. I have not made any progress socially. (*But you took this into account, didn't you*?) Yes, but I still did not want this to happen. Take Peres (meaning Shimon Peres, an Israeli politician who is currently the president of Israel) for example. He did a thousand times more for his people than I did for mine. I did not become the person I want to be. If I described myself, the result would be a failure.

This interviewee is a member of Islamic Jihad, which, as was detailed before, is a very strict and radical organisation. He was sentenced to life and is considered to be quite dominant in prison, yet his statement offers a contrasting depiction of his personality.

Fluency, Cooperation and Charm — The Author Input

Certain aspects of communication — fluent speech, cooperation with the researcher and willingness to provide information — were assessed by the researcher at the end of every interview, and the analysis of these data disclosed that most of the interviewees were found to be fluent and

cooperative; they talked freely of themselves and revealed comprehensive information regarding their personal and social lives. They also demonstrated a significant ability to conduct a lively, intelligent and deep conversation while projecting charm and charisma. Consequently, most of the interviewees were characterised as having average to high self-esteem and they believed in themselves and their capabilities. Additionally, the majority of the interviewees who self-reported high self-esteem attributed it to personality traits associated with their personal characters, compared to most of the interviewees with average self-esteem who attributed it to personality traits associated with their social environment.

Other Social Aspects of Personality

Post discusses the sense of belonging to a group — that is, when an individual joins a group in order to belong — as being particularly significant. Group dynamic has a major influence on a person's behaviour and conduct, and group membership can exert massive pressure on an individual to conform. Post specified that in the case of nationalist groups, there is pressure to sustain communication and connections with others from outside the group.[20] Shaw adds that ideology is not the main cause for enlisting in a terrorist organisation and that it is just a tool used to hide the need for a sense of belonging. These assumptions typically describe the characters of organisation members who cooperate easily with ideological messages and who are easily given to manipulative influences.[21]

Additionally, Miller argues that terrorists are mostly found to be very sociable, with good communicative skills and devotion to the cause and the group.[22] However, Jenkins claims that most terrorists are troubled and

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[20] Post, J. M. (1990). Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces. In: Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 31–36.

[21] Shaw (1986, p. 366).

[22] Miller, L. (2006a). The Terrorist Mind. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 50(2), 121–138; Miller, L. (2006b). The Terrorist Mind: II. Typologies, Psychopathologies, and Practical Guidelines for Investigation. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 50(3), 255–268.

depressed individuals who feel uncomfortable within society.[23] Moreover, Post adds that the paranoid aspect of a personality drawn to terrorism stems from a sensitive and distrustful personality; thus, he is describing a person who is suspicious of everyone and their intentions and who uses terrorism to justify his or her aggressive reactions.[24] Furthermore, a study conducted by Billig[25] found that terrorists oppose hierarchy and reject authority and are therefore unable to identify with a father figure who they regard as too controlling. They therefore turn to terrorism as a means of self-compensation. Other studies characterise terrorists as individuals on a constant search for excitement. In these studies, it was found that terror may be associated with adventurousness and the search for exciting experiences, as the planning and implementation of acts of terror are perceived as exciting activities that meet the need for stimulation, including high-level risk.[26]

As was detailed in the first chapter of this book, and repeatedly by the interviewees' statements throughout the study, community is very important to them; hence, they are very devoted to their respective groups and to the cause, as well as to their society in general. As was detailed previously, and probably as a consequence of their role as leaders, interviewees appear to be communicative, fluent and cooperative. This will be elaborated on through analyses of other social patterns of personality that were revealed during the interviews and were found to have social

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[23] Jenkins, B. M. (1982). *Terrorism and Beyond: An International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict*, p. 1. Available from: http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2714.html (accessed 18 June 2012).

[24] Post, J. M. (1984). Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behaviour. *Terrorism*. 7(2), 241–256.

[25] Billig, O. (1985). The Lawyer Terrorist and His Comrades. *Political Psychology*, 6(1), 29–46.

[26] Hacker, F. J. (1983). Dialectic interrelationships of personal and political factors in terrorism. In: Lawrence Zelic Freedman and Yonah Alexander (eds.), *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Scholarly Resources, pp. 19–31; Crenshaw, M. (1987). Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 10(4), 13–31; Post, J. M. (1990). Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces. In: Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 31–36; Cottee, S. and Hayward, K. (2011). Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34(12), 963–986.

characteristics. Such characteristics include the tendency to value the opinions of others, the ability to be influenced by others, communication skills and the lack of reclusiveness, pessimism, rebelliousness, as well as being suspicious towards others in general. These characteristics will be detailed further, as follows:

(1) **Tendency to be influenced by others:** The interviewees responded to the following question regarding their tendency to be influenced by other: *Were there any influential factors in your life that led you to choose a certain path, or were you free of influence from any near or distant external factors?* Almost half of the interviewees stated that there were no influential factors in their lives, that they were independent and free of any kind of influential factor, as Interviewee 9 explains:

> I was not influenced by anyone in particular. I am the oldest in the family and the first to join the Islamic Jihad organisation. Nobody in my social environment influenced me to choose this path, only books and newspapers. That is what gave me direction. I am an independent thinker and life made me think; not a specific person, but life in general was my influence.

Interviewee 15, a Fatah leader, reports a similar attitude:

> It was natural for me to rely only on myself my entire life. It is a good and a bad thing, because I rely on myself and have a lot of self-confidence, and that is good. But it also gets you into trouble. If there had been someone like that (an influential agent), then perhaps I would have done things differently.

The rest of the interviewees stated that they had influential factors in their lives, while a small minority of them reported being influenced by external influences — a historical or political figure. Interviewee 2, a Hamas leader, stated the following:

> In our history there is a man called Omar Ibn El-Khattab who was able to say the truth and express his opinion to the Prophet, to stand by what he thought, was always right, reliable; it did not matter who he was talking to, even to the Prophet, the main thing was the truth.

As Interviewee 8, a Fatah leader, explains, "Yasser Arafat was my role model. He had nothing and from that he created the Palestinian nation. He is my role model."

The others said they were influenced by people who were closer to them, such as family members, teachers and friends. Interviewee 10, a Hamas leader, states the following:

> At first there was my father, who encouraged me not to be a coward. These are the values I got from my family. I was also in a religious school and there is no doubt that I was hugely influenced by teachers and friends. Religious schools were not like state-run schools, because the teacher–pupil relationship was good and it was important for teachers to convey the right message. Even those responsible for us in the movement directed us to act. Important people who continued down the path are also influential.

In view of this finding, the interviewees were divided into two categories — those who self-reported that they have never been influenced by anything and those who stated that during their lives they had been influenced by various factors, such as family, their social environment or a historical or political figure.

(2) **Communication skills:** As for their perceptions of their ability to communicate with others, most interviewees claimed to have had good interpersonal relationships at all times, while others expressed difficulties in communicating with others, especially after entering prison. For example, Interviewee 2, a Hamas leader, said the following:

> I have good relations with people, no matter which organisation they belong to. I have good chemistry with people and the ability to talk to them about almost anything, regardless of age or anything else.

On the contrary, Interviewee 11 provides another picture altogether:

> It is hard to maintain relations with friends in this situation. There are some who are interested, but mostly one tends to forget they even have friends. Some ask me to write to them, and I write to those I am not

> angry with. (*Are your friends also from Hamas?*) In the camp I had friends from all the organisations.

With regards to their abilities to communicate with others, a minority claimed they had problems with this issue, and this was only in relation to friends outside prison and due to prison conditions, which limit communication with them. The rest of the interviewees did not identify at all as having difficulty in communicating with others, while some of the interviewees even boasted about their excellent communication skills and claimed they were able to communicate with anyone and everyone.

(3) **Suspicion:** Only one interviewee, Interviewee 18, demonstrated great suspicion about the motive behind and goals of the study at hand. This is demonstrated by her questions:

> What do you get out of this interview? (*It is research for my thesis*). Did you choose the topic yourself? (*Yes, I am very interested in the field.*) What did they say about you outside when they heard what you are doing? You are not scared to come here? (*I cannot say very much about my research outside because it is confidential, but I was not scared to come here. I think you are smart enough and it is not in your interest to harm me here.*) What have I got to lose? I am serving a life sentence anyway. So in fact it would be in my interest. (*Let's just say that I believe in people*.) (*The interviewee smiles*.) (*I also think that things work differently in prison, you do things differently, you said so yourself*.) What do you think when you speak to us? (*I do not think about what you did, I put that aside and relate to you and your personality. That is what interests me at the moment, and there is a lot to see there, in your personality*.) (*The interviewee smiles.*) OK, I wish you luck.

Interviewee 18 is a female leader and a member of Fatah. The dynamic of this interview was slightly different from the others; it might be due to the fact that the researcher is also a female, or else because the interviewee is a suspicious person by nature.

(4) **Reclusiveness:** Only a few participants stated reclusiveness as one of their personality traits; namely, that they do not share their personal

feelings and thoughts with others and that they act alone in many areas. For example, Interviewee 12 explains the following:

> I have never told anyone anything personal. It is also a problem for intelligence services that there is no one close to me (laughs), but that is how it is. I am used to it. I am not prepared to reveal anything personal to anyone. If I have a problem, I think it through alone, or sleep on it and it passes. (*What about your family?*) I have never involved them either, so as not to worry my mother. This way, she does not have to worry about me all the time.

This interviewee is a veteran prisoner and the participant who had been in prison for the longest period of time. He is also the only non-Palestinian participating in this research — he is Lebanese by nationality. He entered prison as a minor and has spent almost 30 years in Israeli prisons already. He is known as a dominant and charismatic leader; he is reserved but he also knows how to share with others when needed.

(5) **Rebelliousness:** Only a small number of interviewees self-reported being rebellious and non-conformist by nature. Interviewee 6 stated the following:

> I always did what I wanted, and it harmed me socially because I did not like anything. I rebelled against my social environment, and was angry about the crowded conditions my family lived in. I asked my mother why she had eight children. There was one room in our home and everyone slept in the same room. It made me very angry. I also did not like the closed off, traditional environment. I was always open to anything and everything. I loved the cinema and knew all the stars, like Marilyn Monroe and others. I bought magazines and grew further away from religion and even from the mosque … People in the organisation objected to my behaviour in activities outside the organisation, but I did not care at all. I was not prepared to share my private life with anyone. I did not have to report to anyone, and I continued in my usual way. This did not cause a rift, and they saw me as someone they could rely on, despite my rebelliousness, which made them very angry.

This interviewee is a Fatah leader, relatively young and open-minded, who presents a different, more liberal attitude in comparison with the other

interviewees who were more conservative. He was found to be very charismatic as a leader and was promoted to be the main spokesman in prison despite his unique attitude, probably due to his other leadership and personal qualities.

(6) **Pessimism:** Feelings of pessimism and a bleak view of the world were demonstrated by only a small minority of the interviewees. This is reflected in the words of Interviewee 7, a Fatah leader:

> We have no trips, or a beach. I want these things and it makes me angry, because you tell yourself, am I not a human being? The entire world looks black. (*Is that how you see the world*?) So far yes. (*Don't you also see good things in the world*?) Sometimes, but not always, usually I do not. (*Give me an example of something good.*) When I was in the Palestinian police and there was security, people felt safe and they could walk around. It was better. Today life is bad, very difficult. Many people will resort to using firearms.

This interviewee is a Fatah member who is imprisoned for life. He is known as a very dominant person in the organisation in his area, but finds it hard to adjust to imprisonment.

(7) **Artistic skills:** An interesting factor that might not be a personality characteristic in the strictest sense, but which can be related to certain aspects of personality, is whether the interviewees possess artistic skills. This may be indicative of creativity in general and problem-solving in particular, as well as original thinking and social relations.[27] It was found that only one interviewee demonstrated remarkable artistic and creative abilities, Interviewee 11, a Hamas leader who is sentenced to more than three life terms. During the interview, he sent someone to bring some of his artwork to show the researcher. The inmate returned with a velvet cloth with a very professionally embroidered picture that revealed great talent. It was hard to believe that this was handmade. The inmate also brought an album with numerous

[27] James, K. and Asmus, C. (2001). Personality, Cognitive Skills, and Creativity in Different Life Domains. *Creativity Research Journal*, 13(2), 149–159.

photographs of other artworks and texts that would require much thought and artistic ability to create. There were also pictures of his home in Gaza and various family pictures, as he explains:

> I focus on love and emotions. It is important to me and I pour it on paper to show the people outside [the prison] and to those here who are interested in what I write … I put the way I feel into my work (*Do you release your anger in your work?*) No. My feeling is good, so I create a lot of flowers. When I feel good, I express it in the fabric. When I feel bad, I do not work. It gives me a lot of time on my own. When I do not have patience, I put it aside.

According to the factors investigated, only a few of the interviewees could be characterised as adventure-seeking individuals who sought excitement. For these few, it could be that the act of terror they perpetrated may have been, among other things, the result of this characteristic. This does not apply at all to most of the interviewees. The same may be said of the characteristic of pessimism; only some view the world as a dark, bleak place and harbour negative thoughts about the future. Furthermore, a minority of interviewees view themselves as being rebellious and as being unable to accept authority, as well as being reclusive with no desire to share their lives with others.

Most of the interviewees were cooperative beyond expectation; they were found to have good communication skills and expressed no suspicion about the researcher's questions or motives. One of the interviewees was even found to have remarkable artistic talent, unique among this group in prison.

As was mentioned before, personality was also analysed by another tool, Hare's psychopathic checklist, which examined the possible existence of psychopathic personality. The relevant information was gathered during the interviews and was analysed along with other resources, such as the interviewees' personal files, media resources, and information from prison employees.

The items are scored by a three-point ordinal scale based on its match to the individual behaviour and personality. A score of 2 indicates the item applies to the individual, a score of 1 indicates the item applies to a certain extent, and a score of 0 indicates the item does not apply at all. The sum

Table 1: Results of the psychopathic personality checklist (Hare's Psychopathy Checklist, 1991).

Not related to any organisation	Hamas	Fatah	Islamic Jihad	Score according to PCL:SV
1	1	1	1	0
	3	1		1
		1		2
	1	4		3
		1		4
		1		5
		1		6
		1		13

of all the item scores, which can be a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 24, demonstrates the percentile ranks of the individual in relation to the different groups, such as a non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, or a delinquent but non-psychiatric one. This can be interpreted via a table of the total and factor scores for each group.[28] Table 1 details the result of the analysis according to Hare's checklist, and is followed by detailed explanation of these results.

Four interviewees obtained a **score of 0** in the questionnaire, of whom two were leaders in Hamas and Islamic Jihad, one was a Fatah spokesperson and one was the main spokesperson not affiliated with any organisation. Relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, this score of 0 places the respondents in the 17th percentile, which is the lowest possible level. Relative to the delinquent but non-psychiatric population, this score places them in the 0 percentile, which is considered the lowest.

Four interviewees obtained a **score of 1** in the questionnaire, including three Hamas leaders and one Fatah leader. Relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, this score of 1 places the respondents in the 34th percentile, which is below half and relatively low.

[28] See Appendix 2: Table of Percentile Ranks for PCL-SV Total and Factor Scores.

Relative to the delinquent but non-psychiatric population, this score places them in the 0 percentile, which is considered the lowest.

One interviewee, a Fatah leader, obtained a **score of 2** in the questionnaire. Relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, this score places the respondent in the 53rd percentile, which is just over half. Relative to the delinquent but non-psychiatric population, this score places him in the 0 percentile, which is considered the lowest.

Five interviewees obtained a **score of 3** in the questionnaire. Three respondents were Fatah spokespeople, one a Fatah leader and one a Hamas spokesperson. Relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, this score places the respondents in the 62nd percentile, which is relatively high. Relative to the delinquent but non-psychiatric population, this score places them in the 0.7th percentile, which is considered very low.

One interviewee, a Fatah leader, obtained a **score of 4** in the questionnaire. Relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, this score places the respondent in the 75th percentile, which is relatively high. Relative to the delinquent but non-psychiatric population, this score places him in the 3.4th percentile, which is considered very low.

One interviewee, a Fatah spokesman, obtained a **score of 5** in the questionnaire. Relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, this score places the respondent in the 81st percentile, which is very high. Relative to the delinquent but non-psychiatric population, this score places him in the 4.7th percentile, which is considered very low.

One interviewee, a Fatah spokesman, obtained a **score of 6** in the questionnaire. Relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, this score places the respondent in the 86th percentile, which is high. Relative to the delinquent but non-psychiatric population, this score places him in the 6.7th percentile, which is considered very low.

One interviewee, a Fatah leader, obtained a **score of 13** in the questionnaire. Relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, this score places the respondent in the 98th percentile, which is the highest. Relative to the delinquent but non-psychiatric population, this score places him in the 35.6th percentile, which is considered relatively low and doesn't pass the halfway mark.

In an analysis of the findings using Hare's checklist,[29] eight of the leaders scored 0 or 1, which, relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, puts them in the lowest percentile with regard to criminal personality. One leader obtained a score of 2 that places him slightly above the 50th percentile. Nine leaders obtained scores that placed them above the 62nd percentile with regard to criminal personality, and relative to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, this is high. With regard to delinquent but not psychiatric personality, none of the interviewees passed the 35th percentile bar, and this is considered very low.

From the above, it may be concluded that with regard to the non-delinquent and non-psychiatric population, eight of the interviewees out of 18 do not go above the 50% bar, and it cannot be said that they have delinquent personalities. Ten interviewees pass the 50% bar, and it can be said that their personalities show signs of various levels of delinquency. With regard to delinquent but not psychiatric population, none of the interviewees passed the halfway mark, and it cannot be said that they have above-average signs of criminal personality.

Moreover, it is clear that most of the leaders who obtained scores that show signs of delinquency belong to Fatah, a secular organisation, while leaders in Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both religious organisations, did not pass the score that indicates delinquency. We can therefore conclude that religion can be a factor that influences the formation of criminal personality traits.

Conclusions

As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, personality impacts upon diverse aspects of the conduct and behaviour of an individual, and it differentiates him or her from others. Furthermore, personality also informs an individual's social abilities and interactions in different events throughout his or her life, as well as the personal motives, values and philosophy of life. Hence, the personality characteristics of the group of

[29] Hare, R. D. (1991). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)*. Toronto, Ontario: Multi-Health Systems.

terrorist leaders who were interviewed in this research are some of the most important pieces of evidence in terms of understanding the mind-set and ways of thinking of some of the most unknown and misunderstood individuals within human society. Consideration of these qualities may allow a better understanding of the conduct and behaviour of these terrorist organisations.

In addition, the constant debates in literature regarding the links between criminality and terrorism and whether terrorists are criminals or an extreme type of activist have been going on for years without much substantial resolution. In one of the first typologies, Hacker[30] differentiated terrorists from criminals by defining them as 'crusaders'. However, since then, and especially for legal reasons, this question has been dealt with by varied authorities such as counterterrorism insurgencies, law enforcement and government officials.[31] Thus, it seems necessary to shed some light on that continuing discussion by exploring the personality characteristics of this group of terrorist leaders and, further, to apply Hare's checklist in order to identify any criminal indicators, if possible.

The findings of this study indeed substantiate that it is difficult to establish a personality profile, even a criminal personality, among terrorist leaders in prisons since they do not generally have criminal personalities. However, some aspects of personality have been explored — this study found that the interviewees are very responsible for their actions and their surroundings and invest a great deal of themselves in order to promote their aspirations and their goals, and in order to provide for the organisation members for whom they are responsible.

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[30]Hacker, F. J. (1976). *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time*, 1st edition. W W Norton & Co Inc.

[31]Demleitner, N. (2003). How Many Terrorists Are There? The Escalation in So-called Terrorism Prosecutions. *Federal Sentencing Reporter*, 16(1), 38–42; Franck, T. M. (2004). Criminals, Combatants, or What? An Examination of the Role of Law in Responding to the Threat of Terror. *The American Journal of International Law*, 98(4), 686–688; Post, J. M. (2005a). The socio-cultural underpinnings of terrorist psychology — When hatred is bred in the bone. In: Tore, Bjørgo (ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*. Psychology Press, p. 54.

This study did not find the interviewees to have manipulative personality nor to be rebellious or suspicious; also, no traits were found among them related to the search for stimulation or excitement-seeking. Most of the interviewees have medium to high self-esteem and good communication skills. This study partially supported the different previous studies that described terrorists' lack of ability to show remorse, and the findings show that they do not regret their destructive, terrorist actions. However, significantly, this is not a characteristic of their personality since they can express regret for other things in their lives. Furthermore, most of them are not isolationists and do not have poor behavioural control.

An analysis of the findings based on Hare's checklist[32] reinforces the findings of the study concerning the criminal personality among terrorist organisation leaders in prison, as they do not point to any clear characteristics of delinquent or psychopathic personality.

[32]Hare, R. D. (1991). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)*. Toronto, Ontario: Multi-Health Systems.

Chapter 3

Mindset

Introduction

This chapter will detail the leaders' general points of view and their perceptions of different topics relating to the conflict and their involvement in it. Most of these aspects were raised by the interviewees themselves during the long discussions held with the author, while other topics thought to be relevant to the conversation were raised by the author. More specific topics covered include rationalisations for carrying out terrorist acts, their perceptions of the attacks, as well as the victims of these attacks in particular and Israeli society in general.

The information detailed in this chapter is based on the implementation of a variety of neutralisation and rationalisation techniques that have been identified in relation to criminals, as well as other techniques that are found to be specifically used by terrorists. The techniques that will be detailed in this chapter and that are typically used by criminals are the following five neutralisation techniques proposed by Sykes and Matza:

1. Denial of responsibility;
2. Denial of injury;
3. Denial of the victim;
4. Condemnation of the condemners;
5. The appeal to higher loyalties.[1]

[1] Sykes and Matza (1957, pp. 666–669).

Five additional techniques, which also relate mostly to criminals, will also be detailed here:

1. The metaphor of the ledger;
2. The defence of necessity[2];
3. The denial of the necessity of the law;
4. The claim that everybody else is doing it;
5. The claim of entitlement.[3]

Other techniques analysed in relation to this group of interviewees were rationalisation techniques that were found to be used specifically by terrorists, who seek vindication by suggesting their violent acts were one of the following:

1. A response to disrespect or insult;
2. An act of revenge or retribution for injustice caused by others;
3. A need to defend oneself;
4. Devaluation of responsibility by arguing that bad things happen and collateral damage occurs in any war.[4]

The final four techniques also found to be used by terrorists are:

1. Viewing themselves as the saviours of their people;
2. Devaluing their role and transferring responsibility to the leader or the group;
3. Disregarding the victims' pain or undervaluing it;
4. Dehumanising the victims or making them irrelevant.[5]

The interviewees expressed their motives and hence their rationalisations for their involvement in violent activities, and a detailed analysis of this data follows.

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[2] Hirschi, T. (1969, p. 208). *Causes of Delinquency*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
[3] Klockars, C. B. (1974). *The Professional Fence.* New York: Free Press, p. 151.
[4] Canter, D. (2006). The Samson Syndrome: Is There a Kamikaze Psychology? *Twenty-First Century Society*, 1(2), 107–127.
[5] Bandura (1990, pp. 173–182).

The findings of the present work strongly support the theories related to the use of rationalisation/neutralisation techniques by terrorists; however, the theories require some modification due to the characteristics of this particular group of leaders, which differ from other members of their organisations. Accordingly, the techniques that were most used by the majority of the interviewees were: the defence of necessity, the claim of entitlement, feeling like a saviour, condemnation of the condemners, and denial of the law. Other techniques that were used by quite a few of the interviewees were: revenge, response to acts of disrespect, and the plea of collateral damage. However, there was almost no use of the denial of responsibility, the denial of injury, self-defence, or the denial or obliviousness of the victim, nor the claim that everybody else was doing it. The absence of these techniques serves as evidence of the participants' unique position as leaders, as will be detailed further.

Techniques Used by the Majority of the Interviewees

Defence of necessity

The majority of the interviewees suggested that their terrorist acts were absolutely necessary in order to achieve their vital goals of ending the occupation and helping progress the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The interviewees expressed strong belief in these causes and, consequently, absolute certainty of the righteousness of their acts. This is exemplified by the words of Interviewee 10:

> The resistance influences the other side to change, if it is not comfortable, then you want a change, therefore we need to assure that they would not feel comfortable and they will leave our land… I had to act, I cannot see myself sit aside and do nothing, it had to be done.

This interviewee is a Hamas leader who is in prison for life for committing murder, as well as other acts of terrorism, and he is known for his persistent struggle against the prison authorities and for never showing any regret for his actions.

Interviewee 9 explained the essential nature of these acts differently:

> Never in my life had I thought of committing violent acts, never. I thought that I would go to study in the university, I always found myself surrounded by books, not guns. It is weird the way things turned out indeed, but I will say it again and again — it is my duty, I had to do it.

This interviewee is a member of the Islamic Jihad and has been sentenced to life for leading numerous terrorist attacks that resulted in the deaths and injury of many Israelis. He never regretted his actions, nor showed any remorse, and always argued that he did it in order to end the occupation and had the right to do so in order to defend himself and his people. This leads on to the next rationalisation technique — the claim of entitlement.

Claim of entitlement

By committing the actual act of terrorism and further to the interviewees' expression of the necessity of their actions, it was quite obvious in their discourse that they all felt entitled to do it, that it was their right as Palestinians/Arabs/deprived people to do something that would lead to the much needed and desired change. As Interviewee 3 clarified:

> There is no justice, occupation is an unjust thing and everything that comes out of it is unjust… I did what I did out of belief and ideology and I stand behind my actions. I chose it; I led myself to do it and nobody else led me, because I believe that I had the right to do it… I am not religious at all, but my Palestinisation (a term he used for the notion of being Palestinian) is secret, then God and I strongly believe that as Palestinians we had to act.

Interviewee 8 noted:

> When I first joined the organisation and became an activist, we were only a few, we had no weapons so we went out on the street and started throwing stones, but it was against our culture that they kill us and we do nothing, as Arabs and Palestinians we had the right to act against it, we had to do more.

Both leaders are from Fatah and are known to be quite dominant in the organisation and for their extreme views relating to the conflict. They expressed a common perception shared by the vast majority of the interviewees regarding the necessity of their acts, as well as their obvious right to do them.

Feeling like a saviour

Further to their strong beliefs in their actions and their absolute right to do them, it is very obvious from their attitudes and general statements that they feel that everything they have done was in order to help their people and nation; hence, they see themselves as saviours and idols within their communities. What is more, the immense support and admiration they receive assures them of their status as heroes and saviours of their society. As Interviewee 7 emphasised:

> I should not be punished at all for what I have done; I should be awarded with higher ranks and prizes for my deeds… I am here for nothing; I am not a criminal and I did not kill for money or steal from anyone. I did it for the Palestinian people and a future state.

This interviewee is a Fatah leader, sentenced to life in prison for leading extreme terrorist acts that killed and injured many Israelis. However, this is his second imprisonment; his first was for criminal acts that he denied and which are not consistent with his statements. Yet, like the majority of the interviewees, he feels that he is a constructive figure who got involved in terrorism for the sake of his nation.

As Interviewee 9 said, "Everything I have done in my life, I have done for my people, I have given up my life for them and for my nation and I will do anything I can in order to protect them".

The condemnation of the condemners

Perceptions of Israeli society and the occupation

All the interviewees see the occupation as the source of all evil. To them, the occupation consists of Israeli society, the Israeli government, as well

as the Israel–Palestinian conflict as a whole. Furthermore, while they generally do not deny anything they have done and express full responsibility for their actions, they still blame those actions on the occupation and strongly believe that if it were not for the occupation, they would not have needed to undertake these violent acts, as they would not have been in this situation. As Interviewee 6 explained:

> I blame the occupation for the entire situation, the man I murdered symbolised the occupation for me, I killed the occupation that is in him and not him as a person, I have nothing against him personally… I told the head intelligence officer here in prison that your mentality must change; it is a militant society and this way of thinking and mentality must change. The Israeli society has to understand that the occupation is an ugly thing.

Additionally, Interviewee 13 noted:

> I blame the occupation for everything that is happening, if it were not for the occupation, I would have never gotten to the point of needing to do what I did, if there was no occupation why would I?

These two interviewees are both Fatah leaders, sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and other terrorist acts. Neither regrets their actions and both believe them to have been essential to ending the occupation, which they see as the most malicious aspect of their lives and their society in general.

Denial of the law

Perception of Israeli law

Most of the interviewees, nearly 89%, expressed their complete denial of Israeli law, arguing that as Palestinians they should not have stood before an Israeli court at all. They perceive the Israeli justice system to be unjust and motivated by politics rather than justice, as current events during their trials, such as terrorist bombings in Israeli territory, had a severe influence on their conviction and sentence. In addition, most of them perceived their lawyers to be incapable of helping them in their cases due to the fact that

their sentences were predictable. Some of them expressed gratitude for their lawyers' efforts, while others claimed that their lawyers were very good but made little difference to their sentences. Others blamed the Israeli authorities for appointing dysfunctional lawyers to their cases or preventing them from getting good lawyers in order to damage their chances of getting more favourable verdicts.

This is emphasised by the statements of some of the interviewees such as Interviewee 3, a Fatah leader, who argued:

> I do not believe in the Israeli law, I am not Israeli and should not be judged by Israelis. My acts were all for my country, nation, and law. There should be a differentiation between a security prisoner and criminal who acts against his society. You are not my society.

Additionally, Interviewee 11, a Hamas leader, claimed:

> If someone should have judged me, it should not have been an Israeli court, no one should have judged me, the Israeli court should have judged themselves, they took our houses and yet judging us? This is not justice … my lawyer could not have changed anything, I put him there only to arrange my visits with the family so they could come to court, I have to have a lawyer according to the law, but he was not even present at the trial, he could not come and I did not want to postpone it, just told them to read the verdict and that is it, it did not matter if he was there or not.

Interviewee 14, a Fatah leader, added:

> My trial was not right at all, I see on television other prisoners who are released from prison and I think that it is not fair. If there is a terrorist bombing on the day of your trial, you get many more years in prison, is that fair? … my lawyer was not good at all, he did not even say anything during the trial, even though he said he would.

These three statements are expressions of the interviewees' disregard for Israeli law and their resentment at having to stand trial at all. Their comments reveal that they perceive terrorists' trials as being predictably and totally unjust and unethical.

Denial or obliviousness of the victim

Perception of the victim

The majority of the interviewees use the technique of denying the victim, though in quite different ways. While most of them dismissed the existence of their victims, claiming that they did not spend much time thinking about them due to the fact that they were too engaged in demanding activities relating to the conflict, others denied the victims were innocent and argued that they were occupiers and soldiers and hence were legitimate targets. The few interviewees who did acknowledge their victims and identified with their pain rationalised their actions by highlighting the essentiality of their acts and the critical nature of their goals. As Interviewee 6, a Fatah leader, clearly explained:

> I love human beings and from that perspective I think of the victim's family. I feel their pain and identified with it in all my hurt. But I still ask you all to understand me and insist that there was a reason that I turned from a romantic person with dreams to conquer the world into a murderer, it is not easy; I had to do it. I do not know if they will understand, but I do not care, I identify with them.

Another interesting quote came from Interviewee 9, an Islamic Jihad leader, who said:

> I am just a human, I am not happy for what I have done and not happy with being in prison. When I see someone dead, I am not happy, even if it is a Jew because I am human, but overall as a human I also cannot live in an occupation, it is to live like an animal. My only problem is with the occupation and not with the Jews … there are two lines, which you find similar, but I think they are different. The first line is me as a human, inside me I am angry and sad for everything that I have done, even for the soldiers I killed with my bare hands, but on the other side, as a person who lives under an occupation, I am telling you that every soldier must die… There was a 19-year-old girl that was sitting in front of me who asked me why I killed her sister. I told her that she looks very nice and that I did not kill her sister because she is her sister but because she is a symbol of the occupation, I have no problem with her personally.

This leader is in prison for life for leading multiple deadly terrorist operations and, as can be understood by his words, he does not regret any of his actions. Nonetheless, these statements show the constant need of the interviewees to justify themselves and their actions and to be presented as moral human beings who share the victims' pain, while essentially perceiving them as symbols of the occupation, rather than actual victims.

On the other hand, Interviewee 10, a Hamas leader, expressed it differently:

> They are not victims, they are soldiers that came to our territories to kill, and hence they are not victims. I had no contact with the people that were injured when my unit attacked them. I do think that by doing this I influenced their families to think that the occupation must end, that they have losses.

An example of another sort of dismissal of the victims can be seen in a statement by Interviewee 12, who is sentenced for life for killing a number of Israelis:

> I do not know them personally and have no idea how I influenced them or their families. Collectively, I added a small layer which, along with such layers others add, is changing the mindset and thinking of the Israelis.

These two interviewees express two types of total denial of the victims. Interviewee 9 does not perceive them as victims at all but combatants who are a legitimate target, while Interviewee 12 prefers not to acknowledge them at all.

Techniques Used by the Interviewees

Revenge

Many of the interviewees shared a need for revenge due to different events that happened in their lives, whether a personal event or something general that happened on a national level, such as the occupation. Although it seems that most of the triggers for revenge were personal rather than

general, national ones, the latter are the ones that further encouraged them to commit their violent acts. McCauley and Moskalenko describe revenge on a personal level, as one of the main motives for self-sacrificing terrorists. They give several examples: the Chechen Black Widows, who seek revenge against the Russians for the rapes they suffered and the deaths of their men; the Tamil Tigers' suicide brigades called "Black Tigers", and the Palestinian suicide terrorists who seek revenge for their traumatic experiences caused by the Sinhalese and the Israeli army.[6]

The latter is exemplified by the words of Interviewee 11, a Hamas leader, who argued:

> Everything that happened to me (in relation to terrorism) happened after my brother was killed … a person that I loved and looked up to, he was very successful in all aspects and had many friends all over the country, even more than my dad. I joined Az'adin Al-Qasam (the military wing of Hamas) and wanted revenge to vent my anger and the grief I felt for him and for my mum when I saw her in pain, mourning her first born.

Additionally, Interviewee 8, a Fatah leader, said:

> I had to decide what I should do. I could have gone to America to study; my dad was even willing to pay for it, but after my friend Jamal died, I decided to stay and continue with the armed struggle. Until then I was just throwing stones, but after he died, I realised that it was not enough to fight like that against the occupation. My friend was just throwing stones with me, he was not dangerous to the soldiers, but they just wanted to kill, so I wanted revenge and that led me to the things I have done. I never considered myself as someone who holds a weapon, but when you see your friends dying in front of you, your whole life changes.

Both interviewees expressed their need for revenge, which drove them to join the terrorist organisations and commit violent acts; however, this need

[6]McCauley, C. and Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation: Pathways toward Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20(3), 415–433; See also Merari, A. (2010, pp. 125–127). *Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism*. Oxford University Press.

for revenge does not seem to be prevalent among interviewees with nearly 67% of them trying to justify their actions using several of the techniques described earlier: expressions of necessity, claims of entitlement, and condemning of the condemners.

Response to disrespect

Violence as a response to disrespect is closely related to the need for revenge. Though the interviewees generally felt disrespected and as though their needs and demands were disregarded, some of the interviewees, 3 out of the 18, described specific experiences of disrespect as being the main triggers that pushed them towards committing violent acts. The following statement from Interviewee 5, a Hamas leader, is a good example:

> I joined the armed struggle because of various things that happened. I went through an immense humiliation when an intelligence officer took my ID and forced me to run around the street if I wanted to have it back. I refused to do it and he came to my house and caused a lot of damage besides beating me. There have been other acts that have been done in order to humiliate Palestinian society such as Druse soldiers who entered our villages and harassed Arab girls; they just wanted to humiliate us and to instigate us to act.

However, among these three interviewees, there was almost no use of techniques to deny personal involvement in or responsibility for these acts.

Denial of responsibility

Most interviewees readily declared their involvement in terrorist acts and their necessity to the Palestinian cause, taking full responsibility for committing them. However, a small percentage of the interviewees denied any responsibility for the terrorist acts they had been accused of or for the severe outcomes that had been presented in their court cases. Two of the participants who deny their actions completely, Interviewees

4 and 14, argued that it was false evidence and that there was a conspiracy against them. Additionally, while five of the interviewees support the violent struggle and their organisations' activities, they claim that there is not much truth in their files and the allegations against them. Specifically, Interviewee 1 argued that he was one of a group of children who committed the act in question, and the death of the victim could have been caused by any member of the group. Interviewee 2 claimed that he was indeed in charge of judging the victims, who were collaborators, but had no part in their execution. Interviewee 12 admitted to leading an attack but not to killing the victims, and Interviewee 18 admitted kidnapping the victims but not killing them, as was argued by the Israeli court.

Additionally, Interviewee 14, a Fatah leader who was not willing to admit anything, argued:

> Everything that is written in my files is untrue. Whoever wrote it works with the Israeli intelligence and writes what he wants in order to hurt me. The only thing I admit to is that my brothers asked me to drive suicide bombers and I refused, all the rest is a lie.

One participant who admits to part of the allegation with no condemnation of the actions is Interviewee 2, who is a Hamas leader convicted of the killing of a number of collaborators:

> Within the Hamas organisation, there is a branch that is in charge of handling collaborators or people that do not behave in a proper way. My role was to make sure that the interrogation was done according to Islamic law, that they talk out of their free will, and that they are saying the truth. I had nothing to do with the executing of the verdicts, the others did it, it was not my job … I knew these people and believe in what they received (their punishment), nobody was doing to their people what they did to us.

In addition, there were a few interviewees who also felt the need to blame others for their imprisonment and for betraying their trust and exposing

them to the Israeli intelligence or police. Interviewee 16 was one such individual:

> I blame someone else for what happened to me. We were a group of people from different organisations and we all promised each other not to give away information on one another. But there was one of these guys who went to prison and told them (the Israeli intelligence) about me too, so they came and took me.

This interviewee is a Hamas leader in the youth section of the prison. However, interestingly, the majority of the interviewees who made such claims of betrayals belonged to the Fatah organisation. These findings might be linked to the differences between Hamas and Fatah discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the antisocial aspects found to a greater extent among Fatah interviewees compared to the Hamas ones. Consequently, Fatah members were found to display more symptoms of antisocial behaviour and hence are more likely to betray others and even their colleagues or friends, while Hamas members were found to be more moral and less prone to committing such acts.

Another relevant finding that relates to the sense of responsibility the interviewees expressed regarding their involvement in the violent acts could be linked to Bandura's second rationalisation technique of the *devaluation of their role and transferring of responsibility to the leader or the group.*[7] As was detailed before, the sense of collectivism, community, and mutual social responsibility have been observed to be significant among this group of interviewees, and only a few of them were found to belittle their responsibility for the acts due to them being a part of a group or in a position where they had to obey a higher authority. These findings, again, must be linked to the characteristics of this group of leaders who think of themselves as authority figures and hence assume responsibility for the actions of their respective groups. One of the rare examples of refusing to take responsibility can be highlighted by the words of Interviewee 14, a Fatah leader, who argued:

[7] Bandura (1990, pp. 173–182).

> I am here for more than five years and it is not because I am a criminal. I am an officer in the Palestinian police, I have a manager, it is like a soldier in the army, he cannot say no to his officer. I said in my trial that I am sorry if I did something wrong, but I was just obeying orders; if you have a problem with it, you should talk to my manager.

This leader has been sentenced to numerous years for leading a number of terrorist operations — both failed and successful. It is his fourth imprisonment, though he expressed regret for his actions in front of the court and asserts that he would not commit such acts again.

Denial of injury

During the interviews, there was nearly no denial of the damage done or injuries caused by the interviewees' terrorist acts. This can probably be explained by their almost absolute belief in the necessity of their acts and their consequences, as was discussed previously. Nevertheless, some of the interviewees argue that they are in a state of war and, therefore, there are no rules or restrictions. In that sense, it seems that they do ignore the difficult consequences of their actions. Examples of such statements can be found in the words of Interviewee 18, a female Fatah leader who is in prison for life due to the murder of an Israeli teenager:

> I know that I am in prison because of what I have done and I accept it, but the way we see it is quite different from the way you see it. You see me as a criminal, but we see ourselves as fighters, that this is a war and in a war there are no rules and everything is allowed.

Additionally, Interviewee 7, a Fatah leader, adds:

> Look, we do not want blood and we do not kill because of that, we want a state; we did not kill Jews just because we love it. But this is a war and when it starts, it all bursts out, people are dying from both sides, there are no rules, I did not think any more and we started to operate with any means possible.

Things happen

Collateral damage

There was nearly no suggestion that the interviewees regarded the results of their actions as something that can happen naturally or as one of life's normal occurrences. This is probably due to their strong belief in the evil and injustice of the "occupation", which reinforces the righteousness of their conduct and extreme but crucial behaviour. However, the notion of collateral damage can be related to an attitude expressed by some of the interviewees in their statements: they acknowledge the fact that the results of their actions are occurrences that necessarily happen as part of any war, that people die on both sides and bad things happen to everyone. As Interviewee 13, a Fatah leader, explained:

> I used to think about the conflict and what I am doing and know what it is going to cause, how can I say it, it is not for people … before the *intifada*, I used to go into Israel, talking to Jews but not killing them, but it happened with the conflict. The aim was to help my country and to be free, in the conflict they kill us and we kill them, but they are not going to prison. If I was a criminal, then that is right, but I did not kill because I love to kill people, it is just what happens along the way in these situations.

Interviewee 2, a Hamas leader, added:

> The religion of Islam says that you are not allowed to hurt women, children, and adults, but we are in a state of war, we were drawn into it, especially Hamas, which is a religious organisation, and in a war that is what happens.

Self-defence

Although the interviewees expressed, to a great extent, the necessity of their actions in order to defend themselves, their social surroundings and nation, their arguments were mostly related to the aspect of national defence[8]; they all felt they were doing it for the greater good and not for

[8]As was elaborated previously in the chapter in relation to the rationalisation techniques which were widely used by the interviewees.

their own interests and needs. One interviewee, however, added to this argument the aspect of self-defence, claiming that he did what he did in order to defend himself — he felt that his life was in danger and he had to act accordingly; otherwise, he would be dead:

> My trial was unjust, what I did was out of self-defence. I was a stationary target to soldiers that killed people. I had an uncle that was shot dead inside the university, and my cousin was harassed by an Israeli intelligence guy, who wanted him to work for him as a collaborator, he pushed him really hard even though he refused. This guy asked questions about me too and I knew he would come for me as well. He wanted to kill me, so I had to defend myself.

These were the words of Interviewee 6, a Fatah leader who was sentenced to life imprisonment, mainly for murder. It is important to add that in some of the interviewees' personal files, there was some mention, among other matters, of self-defence as their justification for committing the acts of terror; however, only Interviewee 6 argued this directly in his interview with the researcher — the others did not.

Conclusions

This chapter investigated how the interviewees rationalise their terrorist acts. While various criminal and terrorist rationalisation techniques were identified in the interviewees' statements and other resources, such as their personal files, some adjustment to the definitions and descriptions of the techniques was required in order to be applicable to this group of terrorist leaders. Six techniques have been found to be used by the majority of the interviewees, five of which are neutralisation techniques identified originally by Sykes and Matza through the analysis of criminal behaviour and mindset. These techniques are: the defence of necessity; the claim of entitlement; the condemning of the condemners; denial of the law, and the denial of the victim. The only technique which was originally identified via research into terrorist conduct and widely used among the interviewees was Bandura's technique in which individuals view themselves as the saviours of their people.

Some of the interviewees also used Canter's rationalisation techniques, also identified as being specifically used by terrorists. These are: the search for revenge; the reaction to disrespect; the attitude of 'things happened', and the claim of self-defence. The one other rarely used technique identified is Sykes and Matza's technique of denial of responsibility. Techniques that were not found to be relevant to this research are the metaphor of the ledger and the claim that everyone else is doing it, which are both related to criminal attitude and were not found to be used by the terrorist leaders interviewed in this research.

It seems that most of the techniques used by the interviewees were originally identified in previous studies as being used by criminals rather than terrorists, which highlights the fact that the participants form a unique group with a variety of different characteristics. Of the 10 criminal techniques identified, the interviewees were found to use those that are rational and yet express strong self-confidence, such as the defence of necessity, the claim of entitlement, the condemning of the condemners, denial of the law, and denial of the victim. The same can also be said of the only terrorist-based technique used widely among the interviewees — viewing oneself as the saviour of one's people. Consequently, other techniques, such as the search for revenge, the reaction to disrespect, the attitude of "things happen", and the claim of self-defence, which, despite having been originally identified as techniques used specifically by terrorists, were probably not identified in terrorist leaders, who would prefer not to use such rhetoric. It is more likely that such techniques would be used by regular members of terrorist groups who are more likely to delegate responsibility and minimise their own. The same can be said of the other criminal techniques — the metaphor of the ledger and the claim that everyone else is doing it, which were not used at all by the leaders.

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Chapter 4

Leadership Profile

Introduction

As was detailed in the introduction of this book, terrorist leaders in Israeli prisons play a significant role with regards to the prisoners, the organisations, and their communities outside the prison, as well as with the prison authorities, with whom they act as mediators. Nonetheless, there is a lack of valid information and research regarding their conduct and characteristics as leaders, or any data that describes how they perceive themselves as leaders and the role of leadership itself. The following chapter will elaborate on the interviewees' perceptions of leadership and their opinions regarding how they fit this role, as well as how, according to the analysis of these findings and the literature review on leadership, these leaders are defined, and whether they are 'charismatic' leaders or not.

Leadership of Terrorist Organisations in Israeli Prisons

This study has so far discovered significant differences between the characteristics of religious versus secular leadership. In light of these differences, the study confirms certain aspects of existing research into the characteristics of charismatic leaders. The study also describes some of the interviewees' main perceptions of members of their respective

organisations, their organisations' objectives, as well as their personal perceptions of leadership. Significantly, the findings challenge the existing literature regarding terrorists' general conduct and decision-making processes, suggesting that these factors are largely influenced by the religious lines they are descended from. This conclusion was reached via an exploration of leadership conduct, which contributes to an understanding of the different ways leaders choose to function in their capacities as leaders of religious versus secular organisations.

There was a high degree of variation among the leaders interviewed in terms of the type of terrorist organisation they lead, the rank they hold, and their experiences in the field. However, all had been incarcerated for committing terrorist acts and all were playing an important role in their organisations by providing leadership inside the prisons. The following findings will elaborate on their shared perceptions regarding aspects of this leadership. The subsequent analysis will seek to explain the commonalities and differences both within this group and between these and other types of leaders. It reveals additional insights into their mindsets and constitutes yet another angle of the social-psychological profile investigated in this book.

The Interviewees' Self-perception as Leaders

Leadership as an inherent quality

The vast majority of the interviewees, 83%, described themselves as "leaders from birth". From an early age they had been in charge of various aspects of their lives: at home, within their family; at school and, later on, in the organisation. This is exemplified by the words of Interviewee 1:

> I can say that I am a leader from birth, even in my childhood I was always in charge of the other kids. If there is something that I am not in charge of, I do not like to be involved in it, it was the same thing at school and outside when I played with friends, I was always in charge of everything. I am the spokesman of the prisoners in prison; otherwise I would not feel comfortable and won't stay still. It had always come naturally to me and not out of any process I went through.

This leader is a Fatah member who is considered to be a very charismatic, intelligent, and open-minded leader, highly experienced and wise.

However, most of the leaders stated that it is not enough to possess inherent leadership qualities; it is also essential to work hard and gain managerial experience, as well as experience in facing difficult situations. According to their statements, there is a certain process a leader has to go through in order to prove him or herself as a valuable and successful leader, as described by Interviewee 5:

> Reality proves that I am a leader. Since birth I was a leader, at school and everywhere I went, as well as later at work and also in university, I was in charge of everything. I always make sure I develop myself and my capabilities, though in prison my resources are limited, by books and through the media I enrich myself, I learn a lot and I develop my capabilities. Leadership is the experience and the process I went through in life that taught me everything I know, because even if you are born with the qualities of a leader, without learning and experiencing you cannot succeed as a leader.

Interviewee 5 is a Hamas leader who is very dominant in the organisation and holds radical views; however, he is considered to be a very cooperative leader within prison.

The only three interviewees who did not see themselves as leaders from birth were all Fatah members, one of whom was a minor when the interview was conducted, acting as a leader in the juvenile detention section of the prison. These three interviewees expressed little desire to be leaders and they claimed to have had no leadership qualities as children. Instead, they described leadership as an acquired skill that they developed due to certain needs later on in their lives, as Interviewee 8 stated:

> I am not a leader from birth. I was never a leader in high school and nobody saw me as a leader. In 1999, when the veteran prisoners were released and we were left in prison, we realised that now we have to be responsible for the new inmates in prison. I cannot say that I am a leader, but it happened suddenly, I had no intentions. It was a sudden process. As a child I never wanted to be a leader, I was always close to the leader, but never agreed to lead, and here it was suddenly compulsory.

This Fatah leader had been elected to the main committee of Fatah in spite of his reluctant attitude towards being a leader. Nonetheless, most interviewees expressed strong affiliation with leadership and perceived it as an inherent quality, which they naturally possessed, although they were also aware of the importance of hard work and experience.

Struggles in becoming a leader

During the interviews, the participants described their experiences of becoming leaders; whether they had to fight for it and compete with others or whether it came easily to them. They also discussed their perceptions of leadership; whether it was an important part of their lives or whether they felt an obligation to lead and contribute to their society in its hour of need when they might otherwise have preferred to do something else with their lives.

Only a minority of the interviewees in this research stated that they had to fight to become leaders and had to invest a lot of effort to prove themselves to be the right individuals for the position. Four of this minority of interviewees were from Fatah while only one was a Hamas leader, who explained:

> In order to be a leader, you have to struggle with people otherwise you cannot be a leader, it is in our nature. Everyone prefers to control others and if you want to be in control, it does not come easily, sometimes you gather enemies and opponents and sometimes they can make you lose your place as a leader. You also need to confront others by expressing your own opinions; you have to be brave, to speak out loud, even though it is not acceptable.

This leader was known as being a very dominant leader within the Hamas organisation, and one who loudly speaks his mind and influences others. A similar approach can also be seen in the words of Interviewee 3, a Fatah leader:

> I was born with the qualities of a leader, but I developed them. I have to make a lot of effort even if it is inherent in me, I need to invest in it and work very hard to fight against the extremists in the organisation, mostly

> democratically, but sometimes you have to be blunt. It is a constant struggle and there is a persistent need to keep the balance and to manoeuvre between the different sides; whoever has the ability to do so succeeds in his role as a strong leader.

Interviewee 3 was known to be a very influential and radical leader, but became less dominant after being transferred to another prison where there was a relatively large group of leaders who were more dominant and influential, essentially making him a smaller fish in a bigger pond.

Most of the interviewees, 13 out of the 18, detailed no struggles or extensive efforts to become leaders. They all described it as being a natural process and claimed a good leader is selected for certain natural qualities, such as humbleness and authenticity. As Interviewee 2, a Hamas leader, explained:

> There are elections in the prison regularly; I never put my name as one of the nominees and never fought with anyone in order to be elected or promote myself and I always get elected to the higher rank. I never fought in order to be a leader, if I need to be there, then I will be there. That is leadership, and the basic responsibility of a leader is that others will genuinely elect him.

The majority of this group, 9 out of 13, even expressed total acceptance of a situation in which a better candidate is chosen in their place, as Interviewee 15 detailed:

> I will fight over leadership only if I think that the others are not good or damaging the organisation, otherwise I am not interested, if there is someone better than me who can serve the organisation and the people well, then I do not mind him being there. I do not have the inclination for leadership just so I can be a leader, in most of the elections I am elected to the main committee, if I feel that my colleagues are weak, I will stay so the organisation would not be damaged. But if I am not elected and I see that there are problems, I will assist them anyway, my only interest is that things should work out well rather than the leadership itself.

These statements demonstrate the leaders' reservations regarding the need to struggle in order to become a leader, as well as any extensive efforts

expended in order to maintain this position. They perceive a leader as someone who does not promote himself yet is popular due to his actions. The majority even expressed full acceptance of being replaced by others better suited to leadership than themselves.

Basic principles of leadership

The interviewees were asked about how they perceived the main principles of their leadership role. Their answers were varied and detailed, and several themes emerged. One of the main themes mentioned by most interviewees was the perception of proper leadership conduct and the different aspects this involved, including justice, mutual respect, the valuing of others over oneself, equality, problem-solving methods, and keeping the balance within the organisation. The second theme related to the expectations they had of themselves as leaders, i.e. the qualities they believed a leader must have, such as reliability, openness, responsibility, moderation, and the ability to set a good example. A third theme emerged as some of the interviewees detailed the importance of various types of rules a leader should follow, including religious rules, the rules of the organisation, and other policies deemed acceptable by the leader.

Theme one — Significant aspects of leadership conduct

The majority of the interviewees, 12 out of 18, referred to how a leader should lead and what kind of models he should follow. Many of the interviewees mentioned mutual respect and the balance within the organisation as among the most important things a leader must maintain, while another significant aspect mentioned by the interviewees was the ability to solve problems immediately and with minimal damage, which shows a more practical side of leadership; as Interviewee 3, a Fatah leader, explained:

> My principles are that I never dismiss any implications, though I am not objective, but I know that when I focus on something and make the decisions about it, I take everything into consideration. I choose between the alternatives I have and minimise damages, I do not like everyone, but I have to decide for them as well so I must maintain some mutual

> respect. I build my decisions on these aspects of seeing the bigger picture and keeping the balance within the members in the organisation.

Interviewee number 4, a Fatah leader, also argued:

> Being a leader is a hassle, no one is perfect and not all prisoners are the same; they do not behave the same in different places such as in the block or outside and they think differently from one another, but despite all that everyone says that my block is the best block in prison, because I solve problems immediately. If there is any problem, it gets solved on the spot, while I take care that everyone will live in peace and that is the most important thing.

These two Fatah leaders displayed a very practical side of leadership in prison, maintaining their value among the inmates by efficiently dealing with issues, keeping an open mind and paying attention to details.

Other aspects that were mentioned by a few of the interviewees were justice and equality; both concepts were referred to by the interviewees in terms of being non-discriminatory towards the members of the organisations and treating them with fairness and decency, as emphasised by Interviewee 13, a Fatah leader:

> I love justice and being fair; a leader who patronises his members and differentiates between them is not a good leader, for me they are all the same … if someone makes a mistake for the first time, I do not dismiss him, I tell him to learn from his mistake and not do it again, and there are many that do learn the lesson.

Interviewee 15, who is also a Fatah leader, stated:

> I believe in being fair and not differentiating between people, even though there are differences between people — they all drink water, so I cannot give someone a drink and not the other.

Only two interviewees mentioned the consideration of others' needs before their own as being an important principle of being a leader; one of

these interviewees belonged to the Islamic Jihad, while the other was a Fatah member. They both perceived this as a very hard aspect of leadership. Interviewee 9 stated:

> My sense of responsibility forces me to invest my time for the benefit of the organisation and its members and not my own … I am 29 and have been in this business for 15 years. Do you know what it does to me? Sometimes I feel like I have no emotions anymore, it is hard; being a leader wears you out, you have to give up everything for the others and sometimes you become apathetic and it is not normal.

Interviewee 7 stated:

> It is a hard thing to be a leader and it is a big responsibility, you have to do things not for yourself and even do a lot better for everyone; whoever is the leader must sit aside with no food and allow others to eat.

This theme reveals the practical, as well as the moral aspects the leaders perceived as being central to good leadership, touching upon efficiency, justice, and altruism.

Theme two — The leader's self-expectations

Most of the interviewees, 13 out of the 18, also expressed other principles of leadership that related more to the leaders themselves and the qualities they perceive as significant for any leader. Many of the interviewees stated that responsibility and reliability in a leader were major features of leadership, that a leader must stand behind his decisions and never shy away from his obligations. He should also be trustworthy and known for keeping his word. As Interviewee 2 stated:

> I believe that a leader is judged by his ability to make hard decisions, I see it as my personal responsibility and I think that the most important thing about leadership is not to run away from responsibility.

Interviewee 2 is a Hamas leader, very dominant and senior in the organisation, and known for his ability to make hard decisions when needed.

Interviewee 1, a Fatah leader who is known for being sincere, refers to reliability as his most important leadership characteristic, stating:

> My most important principle is to be reliable and not to lie ever. If I find something to be hard to say, or if I have a problem with saying it, then I will find ways to say it indirectly, but I will never lie.

Several interviewees stated that their leadership principles are openness and moderation. "Openness" refers to being open-minded towards other ideas and other members in the organisation, while "moderation" refers to being reasonable, calm and in control, as exemplified by the words of Interviewee 8:

> My basic principle is to be clear with people, to be open. If I see an irresponsible person, I have no problem telling him to go to his cell and not to interfere. I have nothing to hide and I say what I think, whoever thinks otherwise must say what is on his mind as well. And if there are other good ideas, I have no problem accepting them.

Interviewee 8 is a Fatah leader who was perceived by the prison authorities as an overly dominant manipulator, but this was not the impression the researcher had when interviewing him; she felt he was quite open and sincere, perhaps even more so than other interviewees.

Another leader, Interviewee 14, identified with the concept of moderation, as can be seen from his words:

> A leader is a politician and as such I have to manoeuvre between things, to keep the balance, so they do not become violent, and so everything goes smoothly and calmly.

Interviewee 14 is also a Fatah leader who is perceived in prison as a moderate leader who has a history of forcing more extreme prisoners to behave more moderately.

According to this theme, the interviewees perceived a good leader as responsible, reliable, open-minded, and sensible, which correlates with their perceptions of the first theme explored, good leadership, which they associate with being righteous and efficient.

Theme three — Rules the leaders must work by

The last theme that emerged from the data was the interviewees' perceptions of codes of ethics relevant to their roles as leaders. Less than half of the interviewees, seven in all, found it important to have clear guidelines such as religious rules, rules originating from the organisations' conventions or democratic principles. For obvious reasons, out of the six interviewees who belonged to religious organisations — Hamas and Islamic Jihad — five declared religion to be the main principle guiding their leadership. Of them, four were Hamas members and one was a member of the Islamic Jihad. As Interviewee 10 clearly explained:

> My principles are linked to Islam; I take the rules of Islam and try my best to implement them as much as I can in order to convince the people that these rules are for the greater good. (*Don't you have your own principles as a leader?*) No. It has to go with Islam because it is all that matters. But I do have some criticism and if something is wrong, I am willing to take full responsibility for it.

Interviewee 11 similarly declared:

> My principles are linked to religion; I cannot take anything from the outside and change the direction in which religion leads us. (*Don't you have principles of your own as a leader?*) Even if I had my own principles, if religion says otherwise, I must follow it. There are many things that we come across which do not fit with religion, they deviate from our education and culture and they are prohibited.

Both quotes are from Hamas leaders who are perceived as very dominant leaders and quite extreme in their views and religious devotion, evidenced by their general conduct.

Three interviewees stated that democratic principles serve as their ethical guidelines for leadership; two were from Fatah and one was from Hamas. The Hamas leader linked democracy with religion and found the two to be compatible:

> I look at Hamas and I want to see democracy, openness. The time for one leader to lead the organisation has passed. I believe in democracy. I see

> the Israeli democracy and I appreciate it. The Israeli society is getting stronger due to democracy and the day it will stop being such, it will collapse. Nevertheless, my basic principles are the rules of the religion and I adjust it to democracy all the time and find the balance of what is wrong and what is right.

This are the words of Interviewee 10, who was known as very dominant in the organisation and for his radical and strict religious and general views. The two Fatah leaders expressed varying views: Interviewee 8 explained how he learned to appreciate democracy and its benefits in prison, since outside, within the squad he served, they had everything decided for them. Interviewee 1 found it important to adhere to the organisation's strict rules in order to maintain discipline and order in prison.

The examples detailed above and the analysis of this aspect of the leaders' basic principles of leadership reveal a significant pattern: out of the 12 interviewees who expressed their basic principles as relating more to the conduct and behaviour of a leader, 10 were affiliated with Fatah, one with Hamas and one from Islamic Jihad. The pattern changed a little with regards to the second theme, as more leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, four out of 13, claimed their leadership values to be more about the personal qualities a leader must have. The dramatic change in the pattern came in the third theme; out of the eight interviewees who referred to the basic rules a leader must follow as being the main principle of leadership, four were Hamas leaders (out of the five Hamas members interviewed in this research) and one was from Islamic Jihad, which highlights the dominant role religion has within these organisations.

Organisation purposes versus the members in the organisation

During the interviews, the participants were asked what they found more important to the conduct and endurance of the organisation: the members themselves who were active in maintaining it, or the organisation's aims, the main purpose of its existence. The findings point to the fact that half of the interviewees found the organisation's aims and purposes more important than the members of the organisation, explaining that people

sacrifice themselves to allow the organisation to achieve its aims and therefore these are more significant. Another explanation was that the aims of an organisation also function as collective guidelines, which cannot be modified for personal needs or inconveniences, as Interviewee 9, an Islamic Jihad member, explained:

> The organisation's purposes are more important, I am here due to these targets and not because of the people. If it is my personal purpose, I might be able to give up on it, but if it is a collective one, of the entire society, I cannot give up on it even for my mother's sake.

Interviewee 10, a Hamas leader, offered another example:

> The organisation's purposes are more important, people sacrifice themselves in order to achieve these targets and that is the amazing thing about it. A leader must set an example and therefore he must sacrifice himself first … I believe the purpose is most important and if my sacrifices will cause its fulfilment, then I will do it.

The group of individuals sharing this opinion was composed of fairly equal numbers of religious and secular affiliates, with four Hamas interviewees versus four Fatah and one Islamic Jihad member.

Six interviewees stressed the importance of people over organisational aims within their respective groups. Five of these interviewees were Fatah members, while only one affiliated with Hamas. This finding might indicate that religion is valued more than the people themselves in Islamic groups and other organisations motivated by religion. This may further explain the devotion and willingness to sacrifice oneself and others exhibited by members of such organisations.[1] As Interviewee 6, a Fatah leader, clearly explained:

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[1] Post, J. M. (2005a). The Socio-Cultural Underpinnings of Terrorist Psychology — When Hatred is Bred in the Bone. In: Tore Bjørgo (ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*. Psychology Press; Post, J. M. (2005b). When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism. *Political Psychology*. 26(4), 615–636; Bakker, E. (2006). *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in which They Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study*. Clingendael:

> The organisation's targets are important for me, they represent me and I represent them. The people in the organisation are important as well, the individual is the most important. Israel as a country is one of the ugliest countries in the world, the war is not for the land but for the people, they are the main thing. The person is more important than the targets because without him it is impossible to implement the targets, and sometimes he pays with his life. The member in the organisation needs to choose if he believes in the organisation's targets, and if he does, he has to commit, there is discipline, and if he does not, he can leave. I do not disqualify him as a person, but he does not fit with the organisation's purposes.

The other three interviewees were divided based on two perspectives; one person declared he did not see either of the two values as important at all. He stated that the only thing he cared about was his family back home who were depending on him, and that was the reason for his involvement in the organisation. The other two believed that the organisations' purposes and their members were both equally important and that they do not have to contradict each other. One of these was a Fatah member and the other was not affiliated with any organisation; he served as the leading spokesman of the security prisoners in all Israeli prisons, and he had the following to say:

> In prison, they go together, the people and the targets, they have to work together as an integral part, it cannot collide because the individual invests in it and sacrifices a lot for these purposes. I am not a social worker, I am a leader of people within a structure, which I believe in, this is the political structure and therefore it has to go together.

The findings of this category suggest that half of the interviewees value their organisations' purposes above the people involved in it. This opinion was held by the majority of Hamas leaders, while most of the Fatah leaders declared the people in the organisation to be more significant. As was mentioned previously, these findings may explain the influence of religion

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Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20061200_cscp_csp_bakker.pdf; Ranstorp, M. (1996). Terrorism in the Name of Religion. *Journal of International Affairs*, 50(1), 41–63.

on perceptions of the value of people in comparison to concepts such as God and divine rules.

Leadership difficulties

In this category, the interviewees expressed the difficulties they experienced in their roles as leaders. Via an analysis of the findings, five different groups were identified, with each group disclosing similar thoughts regarding leadership difficulties. The largest group, which consists of six interviewees, argued that the hardest aspect of being a leader relates to two main aspects: dealing with people in the organisation and leadership as a very demanding and exhausting job. They detailed the need to work with a variety of people with different requirements, and who can sometimes be quite unpleasant and difficult. They also stated that being a leader puts the individual under constant stress, forcing them to invest immense effort in finding prompt solutions to difficult issues and shouldering great responsibility. As Interviewee 15, a Fatah leader, explains:

> It is very hard to lead others, it is a big responsibility, but I do not escape from it and do my best for others, for everyone. I have to take care of everyone and it is really hard to keep up. Sometimes I think to myself why do I need it? It is such a headache and they can manage on their own, but the common interest forces me to think of the greater good.

Additionally, Interviewee 5, a Hamas leader, stated:

> I do not like to be involved in hard decisions that relate to other prisoners, I speak with them and try to convince them, but there are always problems. Prison is like a mad house and there is a lot of pressure that not all prisoners can deal with.

Five out of the six interviewees within this group were Fatah members and only one was from Hamas.

The second group consists of five interviewees who felt that in addition to the hard work a leader undertakes, there are also self-sacrifices which they find hard to embrace, and these sacrifices have a

significant effect on their lives and on the lives of their close relatives; as Interviewee 11, a Hamas leader, argued:

> I do not want to be responsible for everything, I want to be free to be myself, maybe I will get there sometime, but it is not now. I want to be who I am and leadership has drawn me into serious things and ties me up very strongly. It is very hard. You are in charge of fifty prisoners and there are many problems and sometimes you cannot solve them all.

This group was quite varied, consisting of people from all organisations; two from Fatah, one from Hamas, one from Islamic Jihad, and one unaffiliated interviewee.

Three of the interviewees, two Fatah and one Hamas member, described the gruelling work as the main difficulty a leader has to face; as Interviewee 16, a Hamas leader in the youth section, states:

> Leadership is a lot of work, a leader has to think a lot and will die eventually from all these thoughts … when I have to make hard decisions, I think carefully, speak with everyone and then decide. This is the youth section, it is not like the adults, I am the only one who makes the decisions here, I am busy all the time, even now when I speak with you I am constantly thinking — did they go to the yard? Did they get food? It is thinking of everything all the time.

Two of the remaining four leaders expressed difficulties in dealing with people and having to sacrifice a lot as leaders; one of them was a Hamas leader and the other one was a Fatah member. One other Hamas leader found dealing with people in the organisation the hardest part of leadership, while only one leader, a Fatah affiliate, did not find any of these three aspects — hard work, self-sacrifice, and dealing with people — as presenting leadership difficulties; in his view, the most difficult thing associated with being a leader was fighting over leadership, and at times losing political battles and descending from the leader position.

According to the findings, it is clear that the majority of interviewees find leadership to be very demanding. However, it seems that Fatah members also expressed difficulties in dealing with people in the organisation, whereas Hamas and Islamic Jihad affiliates argued that the

sacrifices involved in the role of leadership are a source of hardship. These findings contribute to other findings discussed earlier in this chapter; for example, it was found that members of religious organisations expressed a greater need to sacrifice themselves and others for the greater cause; apparently, that sacrifice is not that easy for them after all.

Decision-making processes

The purpose of this category was to explore the interviewees' decision-making processes; whether they declared themselves to be individuals who share this process and make decisions by consulting with others, or whether they make decisions independently without conferring with others in the organisation. According to the analysis of the findings, half of the interviewees stated that, although they normally listen to what the others have to say, they always decide independently. As Interviewee 4, a Fatah leader, explained tersely, "[A] good leader asks his members for their opinion, but if I do not like what they think, I decide whatever I think is right."

The vast majority of this group, seven out of nine, were Fatah leaders, one was a Hamas leader and one was the unaffiliated prisoner. The Hamas leader, Interviewee 16, belonged to the youth section, where, he explained, unlike the adult section, there is no leadership committee, and therefore he needs to make all decisions by himself. Interviewee 12, who does not affiliate with any organisation and also serves as the main spokesman of the security prisoners, mediating between the organisations, explained:

> I listen to what they have to say and if it is serious, then I accept it, but I make all the decisions alone! (*What if they do not like it?*) I tell them that only the final results will judge my actions. (*But that is not very democratic! He laughs and answers…*) I do not interfere at all with their internal lives, within their organisations they decide whatever they want and I do not mind. I am a foreign minister and make my decisions only via the prison authorities, where you need skills and experience. I would like to explain to you how it works. The moment I let others interfere with the decision-making process vis-à-vis the prison authorities, personal interests are involved, every organisation has its own needs and interests and I have to bridge them all, it is really difficult and hence

> I have to work that way. I am in that position because I do not belong to any organisation and have no interest in the matter, it is a precedent. My decisions are based on experience, constant involvement with the authorities, and also a bit of wisdom, not that I am very smart, but anyway.

Only four of the interviewees, two of them Fatah members and two from Hamas, stated that they always make their decisions with others and not alone, whether these are members of the leadership committee or other senior members in the organisation; as can be seen from the words of Interviewee 2, a very senior Hamas leader:

> Difficult decisions should always be solved by a committee and not alone. When there are a few people who make the decisions, it is better, I would not take this responsibility on myself alone, so there would be no mistake and more support on the matter at hand. The opinions of the organisation members are also very important and not only the leadership, because they are the basis of the organisation and they have to agree with it as well.

As Interviewee 7, a Fatah leader, also stated:

> If I have to deal with difficult decisions I go to senior leaders, or even less senior ones, but I know they can help and we will decide together, we will do the right thing. It is better to consult with everyone, though my word is strong, it is important for me to consult with everyone.

The other five interviewees argued that they would use both methods of decision-making, deciding by themselves and discussing with others, depending on the need or the situation. As in the last category, four of them were divided equally between Hamas and Fatah, while the fifth individual was an Islamic Jihad leader. One of these Fatah leaders, Interviewee 6, stated:

> If I need to make some difficult decisions, I first think of the solution and try to figure out if it is a good one or not, then I consult with others, or if I can I solve it by myself, depending on the situation. I normally make decisions very fast; I do not like to delay it for long.

Interviewee 10 was one of the two Hamas leaders in this group. He argued:

> You cannot always consult with everyone, sometimes you have to decide by yourself and act upon it, I take full responsibility for such situations, and if I am wrong, I will pay the price for it. But there are other situations where you can work together with others, and sometimes in these circumstances, we do not agree on the matter — each one of us is trying to make an effort to convince the other that his opinion is the right one — and if my opinion does not get accepted, I will have to respect that because after all democracy determines the outcome.

The data suggests a tendency among Fatah leaders to favour an independent decision-making process, while the members of Hamas and even the Islamic Jihad affiliates were likely to prefer making decisions with others; or at least, when they are faced with difficult decisions, they see it as important to share the burden and responsibility with others. However, these findings contradict other sources who argue that religious groups tend to have more tyrannical leadership, where the leader assumes religious and organisational superiority, and is the only one to make decisions in the organisation. Hence, these findings present significant new information on the conduct of secular and religious leaders in prison, which differs from the behaviour of leaders outside of prison, and might shed some light on the prison environment that may instigate these behavioural changes.

Leadership within prison

During the interviews, the participants discussed whether they thought it was harder to be a leader within prison or outside of it. Their answers were unambiguous; there was no middle ground or uncertainty on the matter. The majority, 10 out of 18 interviewees, thought it was much harder to lead inside prison where there is no privacy, everyone knows everything, and the leader's ability to function is very limited. Interviewee 5, a Hamas leader, explained:

> It is a lot easier to lead outside. The prison is very complicated, it is like walking in a mine field. Every prisoner thinks differently and you have to know what is going on in his head.

Interviewee 18, a Fatah leader, argued:

> It is different to lead outside than inside the prison, where it is a different war, it is all about how to get things. Outside, they have weapons and they negotiate. I cannot walk around here with a gun and kill the block commander if there is something I do not like. Here, it is different; we have to use common sense.

Eight of the interviewees thought it was a lot more difficult to be a leader outside of prison where the society is bigger and more diverse, and the competition is much harsher. Interviewee 15, a Fatah leader, describes it thus:

> It is very different, it is a competition; it is not easy for anyone who is released from here and has to compete with the leadership outside. He has to be well known to the organisation and the people in it, and he has to have something unique that he has done to be known by, so he will be recognised and he will have to go all the way with his decisions. He cannot make mistakes.

Interviewee 10, a Hamas leader, touched upon another point:

> Outside of prison, it is much harder because the society is bigger and the struggles are harsher; you need to be more determined in your actions and you must influence a wider and a more diverse society.

The pattern that emerges from these two views is clear: seven out of the eight interviewees who argued that leadership outside of prison was harder were Fatah members and only one was affiliated with Hamas. On the other hand, the other four leaders of Hamas along with the other four Fatah members, the Islamic Jihad member and the single unaffiliated interviewee, all argued that leadership inside prison was much more difficult than outside of prison. This might be explained by the fact that Fatah is the biggest and oldest organisation in prison, and hence its members may have felt more comfortable and influential within prison than those of the other organisations.

Leadership outside prison

The last aspect of leadership that was covered by the interviewees was whether they would be interested in taking leadership positions outside

the prison as well, if and when the opportunity arose. Most of the interviewees, 11 out of 18, declared that they would be keen to continue their roles as leaders outside prison upon their release, if possible, due to their desire to continue influencing the conflict and making changes that would improve the difficult situations their society faced. As Interviewee 7, a Fatah leader, explained, "I think I am a person who is worth following, I can lead outside and I am planning on accomplishing it outside, that is for sure". Interviewee 3, also a Fatah leader, said:

> I would like to take part in the leadership outside prison, it is the most influential part in the movement which can balance the situation and deal with the occupation as well as with other actors in the area, both internally and externally, along with influencing the world's public opinion.

Five of the interviewees expressed no interest in being leaders upon their release, viewing it as an unnecessary stress since so many individuals outside prison are willing to fill such a position. Furthermore, they felt that they had given enough and would like to have time to invest in themselves and their families. Interviewee 4, a Fatah leader, was one such individual. He argued:

> I do not want to be a leader outside, there are enough leaders there and many organisations, they do not need me for this. My family is more important to me and I would like to take care of them.

Similarly, Interviewee 15, another Fatah leader, claimed:

> I do not want to be a leader outside, it is a headache; I will probably be old when I am released. I have no lack of money and there is probably no need for me to be a leader because there are enough leaders outside.

Among the five interviewees who declared no desire to be leaders outside prison, four were Fatah and one was the Hamas leader in the youth section. The other youth leader who was a Fatah member was also in this group and they both expressed a need to have their lives back, to go to the beach, or just to be home with their parents. Only two leaders argued that

they have no plans regarding what they would like to do upon their release; they said they had not thought it through and that they would decide when the time came. One of these leaders was a Hamas member and the other had no affiliation with any organisation. The remaining interviewees included seven Fatah members, three Hamas members, and the Islamic Jihad member, all of whom were keen on continuing to be leaders upon their release. This indicates a tendency of the religious organisations to be more enthusiastic about continuing their leadership role and activism in general in comparison with the Fatah leaders, who actually expressed a willingness to disengage from this kind of activity. This finding again suggests that affiliates of religious organisations demonstrate deeper devotion and commitment than those of secular ones.

Charisma: Yes or No?

A key question addressed by this research, and one which will be discussed in the following section, is the question of charisma — whether the interviewees who play the role of leaders within terror organisations fit the description that appears in the literature: do they show charisma and strong personality characteristics, or do they tend to be a more transactional type of leader, functioning more like a manager, using professional means to develop his leadership and to move followers? The findings related to this question are not based on the interviewees' self-perceptions, but rather on the analysis of other findings in this book, as well as the literature reviewed above. Javidan and Waldman's study, detailed previously,[2] found four main aspects common to all charismatic leaders: self-confidence, eloquence, high energy and determination, desire for change and risk-taking. In the current research, the interviewees were found to possess most of the features described by Javidan and Waldman in relation to charismatic leaders:

1. **Self-confidence:** Apart from one, all the interviewees were found to have medium to high self-esteem and confidence.

[2] Javidan, M. and Waldman, D. A. (2003). Exploring Charismatic Leadership in the Public Sector: Measurement and Consequences. *Public Administration Review*. 63(2), 229–242.

2. **Eloquence:** Most of the interviewees were found to be very loquacious and highly articulate.
3. **High energy and determination:** This can be established from two aspects. The first relates to their personality characteristics of persuasiveness and ability to attain their desires. These were detailed in Chapter 2, in which most of the interviewees claimed they have the ability to persuade people, and many of them declared that eventually they could attain anything they wanted. The other aspect related to their leadership role as detailed in this chapter. Most of the interviewees described their desire to continue their leadership roles outside prison due to their determination to influence and bring about change.
4. **Desire for change and risk-taking:** The interviewees' desire to contribute to change has been detailed above. Risk-taking is the only trait that was not found among these interviewees, since only a very small minority of them were found to be adventurers and risk-takers.

Furthermore, the interviewees were found to meet the characteristics of transformational/revolutionary leaders through their extensive adoption of leadership principles regarding self-expectations of openness, reliability, and self-responsibility, as well as their wish to promote justice, equality, and change. However, they also appeared to have much in common with transactional leaders, since they highlighted the need for prompt solutions to problems and their constant attempts to maintain balance and efficiency in their organisations.

These findings suggest that, as Bass and later Hoffman argued,[3] it is likely that leaders will adopt both approaches to improve efficiency in the organisation. The interviewees in this research might be such leaders; though most of them were found to be very charismatic and compelling, they have to adjust to a unique environment in prison in order to enhance efficiency and promote themselves, as well as their organisations and their goals.

[3]Bass, B. M. (1985) *Leadership and Performance beyond Expectations*, Illustrated Edition. New York: The Free Press, p. 24 and Hoffman, B. (2004). *Redefining Counterterrorism — The Terrorist Leader as CEO*. RAND Corporation, pp. 14–15.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the role of leadership, an element that the interviewees in this study are heavily engaged in, focusing mostly on their perceptions of themselves as leaders, as well as on how they perceive leadership in general. Notably, most of the findings suggest a distinct difference between the religious organisations, i.e. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, versus Fatah, the secular organisation. Though the numbers of Hamas and Islamic Jihad interviewees versus Fatah are not equal, i.e. 6 versus 12, a distinct pattern can be acknowledged.

The leaders affiliated with Hamas and the only Islamic Jihad member were found to base their main leadership principles on religion; hence, they expressed no flexibility in anything that contradicts religious demands, with everything else being subjugated to them. All these leaders found this perfectly possible and essential. This aspect might be linked to another finding — the vast majority of the leaders affiliated with the religious groups see the organisations' aims as more important than the members, who serve the cause and therefore are expected to sacrifice themselves for it, if needed. Another finding is that the interviewees associated with religious organisations seem to share their decisions with others, deciding on different matters as part of the organisation's wider leadership, and not on their own. However, the majority of Fatah leaders expressed different views and preferred to work alone, making decisions by themselves without consulting others. Furthermore, they stated that since there can be no organisation without followers, and since they are the main reason for its existence and the developers of its goals and targets, they are more important.

Furthermore, the leaders affiliated with religious organisations also expressed more expectations regarding themselves as leaders, such as responsibility and reliability, while the Fatah affiliates tended to express principles that were associated more with the role of leadership and its conduct such as equality, justice, and the ability to solve difficult issues. As for leadership inside versus outside prison, religious leaders tended to find it more difficult to lead inside prison rather than outside, in contrast to Fatah leaders who argued the opposite. However, the majority of both types of leaders were keen on continuing their leadership roles upon their

release. No distinct patterns were found with regards to leadership difficulties; all organisations, relatively consistently, were found to regard it as demanding and hard work, which involved having to deal with difficult individuals and extensive self-sacrifice. Finally, an analysis of the interviews and relevant literature suggests that these leaders are extremely charismatic, while also possessing transactional qualities.

These findings reveal religious leadership in prison to be hierarchical yet very cooperative. It suggests that Hamas's leadership is very strict yet organised, and perceived as being uncorrupted, quite consistent with their image outside prison. However, Fatah leaders were found to be less organised and tended to make decisions mainly alone, without consultation with others. This was consistent with this organisation's image outside of prison as being corrupt and messy.[4]

[4]For information regarding these differences between the organisations, see Ayoob, M. (2004). Political Islam: Image and Reality. *World Policy Journal*, 21(3), 1–14; Gunning, J. (2004). Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation. *International Affairs*, 80(2), 233–255; Zweiri, M. (2006). The Hamas Victory: Shifting Sands or Major Earthquake? *Third World Quarterly*, 27(4), 675–687.

Chapter 5

Imprisonment

Introduction

This chapter will deal with the influence of prison on the leaders' lives, attitudes, and future behaviour, as well as on the process they go through while they are incarcerated. In particular, it will focus on whether imprisonment makes them more radical in their beliefs and conduct or whether they are actually de-radicalised during their time spent in prison, eventually leading them to abandon their extreme behaviour.

As detailed in the introduction to this book, criminology theories describe the process that a prisoner goes through while in prison as a very traumatic and painful one, with the prisoner losing his freedom, along with his identity and personal safety. This chapter will discuss the different processes that the participants have gone through while in prison, focusing in particular on the marked absence of signs of "pains of imprisonment" such as desperation, loss of vitality, or loss of self. Instead, these prisoners show a remarkable adjustment to prison in the very first stages of their incarceration, being active in daily life, taking on leadership roles, and using their time effectively through education and self-development.

Consequently, as will be elucidated in this chapter through the analysis of the interviews, as well as other resources such as the personal files of the interviewees and prison personnel statements, this process leads these prisoners to feel empowered rather than hopeless and despairing. Furthermore,

it seems that the source of this unique mechanism of behaviour and attitude relies on the Palestinian/Arab cultural perception of prisoners in Israeli jails as honourable and admirable, being at the frontline of the struggle, and as the metaphor for the Palestinian situation. For the prisoners themselves, this position of status provides them with opportunities for self-development and improvement in the conditions for their families.[1]

Finally, this chapter will also elaborate on whether this process of empowerment and self-development, along with other factors related to incarceration, lead to the prisoners' radicalisation or de-radicalisation. Different examples of de-radicalisation processes occurring around the world will be examined in order to find similarities and differences related to the Israeli case. While the analysis of the information reveals a unique process of de-radicalisation for most of these prisoners, this depends on factors such as the length of time in prison, the attainment of education, and involvement in leadership roles during incarceration.

Pains of Imprisonment?

Planning for the future

> When I entered prison, I asked a veteran prisoner, who had already been in prison for 25 years, how he sees the future, and he said there is no prisoner who does not plan his future and think of it every day. If a prisoner is convinced in what he has done and what he is still doing, then he will always look forward, knowing that justice has to be done and that is what is holding him together and gives him strength… When I look at myself and my future, sometimes I am worried, but mostly I see a light at the end of the tunnel.

These are the words of Interviewee 2, a senior Hamas leader who was charged with murder and terrorist acts and sentenced to life

[1] For information regarding the attitude towards prisoners in Palestinian society: Bornstein, A. (2001). Ethnography and the Politics of Prisoners in Palestine-Israel. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 30(5), 546–574; Nashif, E. (2008). *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community*. Taylor & Francis, p. 96; as well as Marcus, I. and Zilberdik, N. J. (January 19, 2014). *Terrorists Murderers Are "heroes", Abbas Said Four Times in Speech*. Available at: https://palwatch.org/page/5794.

imprisonment. Like the majority of the terrorist leaders interviewed, Interviewee 2 gives a sense of anticipating his imminent release and planning his future carefully, and expresses strong optimism towards it. In contrast to criminal prisoners, these prisoners entered prison with a sense of righteousness and belief in their acts, expecting immediate, honourable release.[2] Interestingly, Interviewee 2 was indeed released shortly after this study was conducted as part of the Gilad Shalit deal mentioned in the literature review, lending some support to the prisoners' hopeful perspective that, even though they are convicted for life, they will be free in the near future.

One more example of such an outlook can be found in the words of Interviewee 5, another Hamas leader sentenced to life. He declares:

> I am not interested in looking back, only to the future. I want to plan my future carefully. I am working on it with my wife and believe there is a great chance that I will be released.

This prisoner has also been released following the Gilad Shalit deal.[3]

Support from the outside

Another aspect that contributes greatly to these prisoners' adjustment to imprisonment is the support and care they receive from sources outside of prison; as an intelligence officer in the IPS (he will be referred to here as "H") details:

> The security prisoners definitely go through a different process than criminal prisoners when they enter prisons for the first time, and there are a few reasons for that. First, most of these prisoners have relatives in prison or relatives that were prisoners before. Secondly, these prisoners know that they have strong support and appreciation from their communities outside. Thirdly, they have no financial stress because their family is being taken care of financially by the Palestinian authority,

[2] See also Qouta, S. *et al*. (1997). Prison Experiences and Coping Styles among Palestinian Men. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 3, 19–36; Shaked, R. (2008). The Security Prisoners in Israeli Prisons. *Roim Shabas*, pp. 26–29 (in Hebrew).
[3] *Ibid*.

> which also deposits money to cover their needs in prison. Fourthly, inside prison, the veteran prisoners take them under their shelter, guiding them through their first time in prison so they feel confident and reassured. They also teach them everything they need to know in prison and further other studies as well such as their final exams in high school. The last factor that affects this process of adjustment is the codes and order of the organisation, which the prisoner has to accept, act by, and memorise. This gives him a stable and organised structure that also affirms his sense of confidence and reassurance.[4]

The majority of interviewees in this research were well aware of the support and respect that they receive from outside of prison. Most of them declared their families to be very close and supportive, whether they are married and have children or are single and rely on their parents and siblings to be there for them. However, the majority of them prefer to ignore the pain that their acts can cause their families, and to instead place emphasis on their wider society, which does indeed venerate them for their actions, as can be seen from the words of Interviewee 13:

> We are 10 people in the family, eight siblings and my parents. The relations in the family were always very good and we are very close, but I have one brother who died in prison, he was also my best friend, I still cannot believe he is dead. Another brother of mine is here in prison with me and the rest are at home, studying or working. My dad wanted me to do other things, even though he was a Fatah member himself, but 40 years ago. He tells me to be careful, to take care… They love me a

[4]H, Intelligence Officer (August 2009). A conversation held by the author with an intelligence officer who is in charge of one of the biggest sections of security prisoners in the Israeli prisons. He asked to stay anonymous due to his intensive work with these prisoners and therefore he will be referred to here as 'H'; for more information: Rosenfeld, M. (2011). The centrality of the prisoners' movement to the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation: A historical perspective. In: Abeer Baker and Anat Matar (eds.), *Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel*. Pluto Press, pp. 3–24; Post, J. M. Sprinzak, E and Denny, L. (2003). The Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 15(1), 171–184; Nashif, E. (2008). *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community*. Taylor & Francis, pp. 32–37.

> lot, it was very hard for them when I went to prison, but my mum is happy that at least she can see me and talk to me.

This interviewee is a Fatah member who was convicted of murders and different terrorist acts, for which he was sentenced to life in prison. Throughout his interview he described the care and love he shares with his family, but asserted that whenever he has needed to choose between them and his organisational activities, as far as he was concerned there was no question about the right thing to do.

This is quite a consistent pattern among most interviewees. Another such example is Interviewee 15, a Fatah member who was sentenced to life for murder and further terrorist acts:

> We are eight siblings in the family, I'm the youngest one. The situation in the family was very good, they gave me everything I wanted and the relationships in the family were very good. We lived together in the same place and no-one was related to the organisation. It was spontaneous for me to join the organisation and to get involved, it is attractive, there is an occupation, bad things are being done to us, you see the blood on TV and you want to do something … My family did not know about it, but they had felt it and tried to warn me. It is difficult for them to see what is happening to our people, but they still do not want me to get hurt or die … When I was arrested, it was very hard, my mum was following me to the car crying, she could not believe I was being arrested. During the first visit, she asked me why have I done that? And that I had everything I wanted. I told her that I just had to do it.

Correspondingly, as "H" detailed previously, "G",[5] a senior intelligence officer, adds:

> While in prison, these prisoners are being exposed to a greater extent to the support of the organisations during their incarceration in prison and

[5] G, Senior Intelligence Officer (November 2009). A conversation held by the author, with an intelligence officer who is in charge of one of the biggest areas of prisons in Israel where a large number of security prisoners, mostly very extreme, are held. He asked to stay anonymous due to his intensive work with these prisoners and therefore he will be referred to here as 'G'.

> furthermore they learn to acknowledge the confidence and certainty of their future as well, knowing they will be taken care of upon their release. Additionally, they also experience strongly the admiration and appreciation from their wider society as well as the whole Arab community. They have just been honoured with a new, highly respectful status within their communities and this high position is definitely a place of empowerment.

Al-Qaeda is also known for its great support of its incarcerated members in prisons; furthermore, the network strategy of the organisation allows the prisoners some reassurance regarding their opportunities upon their release.[6] In an interview on the fourth anniversary of 9/11, Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of Al-Qaeda's main leaders, stated:

> I take this opportunity to address our prisoners. We have not forgotten you. We are still committed to the debt of your salvation… We will continue to attack the US until we shatter your shackles.[7]

Interviewee 18, who is sentenced to life in prison for murder and membership to a terrorist group, accurately explains:

> I have no specific plans for when I will be released, I have not thought about it yet, I do not know if I will be released any time soon, but whenever I will be released, I know that whatever I will ask for, I will receive. I have a reputation outside and whatever I will want, I will get, just like any other leader here in prison.

This interviewee was also released as part of the Gilad Shalit deal; however, at the time of writing, there are still no details regarding her activities since then.

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[6]For information regarding Al-Qaeda network strategy: Mishal, S. and Rosenthal, M. (2005). Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28(4), 275–293.

[7]Dunleavy, P. (February 8, 2017). *U.S. Ill Prepared for Convicted Jihadis Ending Their Prison Sentences*, IPT News. Available at: https://www.investigativeproject.org/5778/us-ill-prepared-for-convicted-jihadis-ending.

Another external factor that influences the prisoners' adjustment to imprisonment relates to Palestinian/Arab culture, in which large and influential families are well appreciated in their communities and gain significant respect and honour. Gabay,[8] a former head of intelligence in the IPS, asserts that coming from a well-known and respected family plays a significant role and considerably improves the ability of a prisoner to quickly adjust to their new conditions. This is largely due to the fact that other prisoners are keen to form a connection with them in any way possible and so help them in their adjustment. Furthermore, the intelligence department in prison is very aware of the importance of family reputations, and hence has to be careful while situating the prisoners, since there might be rivalry between different families and regions or, conversely, close connections between them that may cause a security risk.

Indeed, as a result of this research, it was noted that a large portion of the security prisoner leaders come from families that are quite well-known in their areas. Most of the interviewees reported being treated with respect and given substantial help from fellow prisoners on their arrival to prison, which assisted greatly in their adjustment process. As Interviewee 7 details:

> I come from a well-known, strong, and 'clean' family; 'clean' means that all my family love the country and we never had any collaborators (meaning with Israel) in the family and our girls do not speak to guys … we are well known for being clean, here and outside, and therefore everyone respects our family.

This interviewee is a Fatah leader, and is well known in his community for his family relations and activities in the organisation. He is sentenced to life for leading various terrorist acts, killing more than a dozen Israelis, and is known to be very dominant in the organisation.

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[8] Itsik Gabay (November 2011), a phone call conversation conducted by the author with Major General Gabay right after the release of Gilad Shalit in November. Gabay was the head of Intelligence of the IPS between the years 1999–2004 and later become the north district IPS head officer.

Support from fellow prisoners and organisations inside prison

As for the internal support inside prison, Lt. General Adato,[9] a former commissioner of the IPS, explains:

> For a security prisoner, entering prison is a further continuation of his life on the outside, where he has the same conduct and organisational structure as in prison, while additionally in prison they have the ability to develop themselves from different aspects — personally and professionally as well. They enter into a very strong group that gives them structure and support, teaches them everything they need to know about their incarceration, the organisation, as well as other forms of knowledge they are interested in gaining, whether academic or vocational.

Some participants in this study had not even finished high school before their incarceration, but have done so during their time in prison, while others have acquired higher academic degrees. Moreover, some prisoners even testify to not knowing anything about the organisations, the history of the conflict or the important processes related to it prior to their arrest, and only in prison have they learnt the meaning of their actions. As Interviewee 1 explains:

> I did the (terrorist) act out of childish behaviour — I was not related to any organisation before my incarceration, and it was only when I entered prison that I joined Fatah and learned everything. My family was very surprised because no one in my family is an active member of any organisation. After I joined the Fatah and learned about it, I taught my family as well. In prison, I learned that you can never say no to studies. I learned a lot in prison, mostly from books and further from discussions and meetings we have with fellow prisoners.

[9]Adato, O. (2011). *Security Prisoners,* GCTF conference, Paris; A former commissioner of the IPS, between the years 2000 and 2003 and the first International Vice President of the International Correction & Prison Association (ICPA). The author had a conversation with Lt. General Adato at an international conference and launching of the global forum for counter radicalisation held in Paris.

This prisoner was sentenced to more than 10 years in prison for committing terrorist acts; however, this is his third incarceration, having spent more than 20 years in prison so far in total.

Education

In her research, Rosenfeld acknowledges that "it is rare to meet a former prisoner from Dheisheh (a Palestinian refugee camp located just south of Bethlehem in the West Bank) who is not proud of his 'prison studies'". Furthermore, she details that most of the prisoners interviewed in her research testify that whenever it was possible, they would have spent between eight and 14 hours every day studying, whether theoretical literature such as history and politics, fiction, or other areas of interest.[10] Nashif's book, which deals mainly with the building of the Palestinian prisoners' community through prisoners' writings, also emphasises the importance of education in this community and, according to Nashif's research, the effect of this experience frequently manifests in the writings of the prisoners.[11] As examples of such writings, Nashif mentions Abid al Satar Qasim who, along with some of his students (most of them former prisoners), published a historical study on the Palestinian political prisoners,[12] as well as Hasan Abdallah, who was in and out of prisons for years and wrote two books and other varied sources on the issue of political captivity.[13] Another example is Abu al Haj who founded the centre for the political captive movement but whose main activity was

[10]Rosenfeld, M. (2004). *Confronting the Occupation*: *Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp*. Stanford University Press.

[11]Nashif, E. (2008). *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community*. Taylor & Francis, p. 72.

[12]*Ibid*. The reference for this material is: Qasim, A. (and his students) (1986). *Introduction to the Political Imprisonment Experience in the Zionist Prisons*. Beirut: Al Umah House Press (in Arabic).

[13]*Ibid.* (p. 73). The references for these materials are: Abdallah, H. (1994). *The Literary Production of Political Imprisonment: A Historical Analytical Study*. Jerusalem: Al Zahra Research Centre; Abdallah, H. (1996). *A Journalism that Challenged the Chain*. Ramallah: Al Mashriq Research Centre.

compiling a collection of the life stories of political captives.[14] Shaked[15] detailed other examples such as Karim Yunis, an Arab Israeli who murdered an Israeli soldier and while in prison wrote his book named *The Ideological Conflict and The Settlement*, in which he advocated the recognition of the state of Israel and the fight for the solution of two countries for two peoples.

All these examples of activism in relation to education and writing emphasise the importance of these aspects to the development of the prisoners. They therefore support the findings of this research by suggesting that prisoners make significant personal progress while incarcerated, which influences their attitudes, as well as their outcomes regarding radicalisation or de-radicalisation.

Moreover, apart from support in acquiring knowledge related to the organisations, the history and development of the conflict, as well as conduct and behaviour in prison (detailed in the last section), the security prisoners also gain a more general education, whether by completing high school or higher academic degrees. As Adato[16] further details:

> The time they spend in prison allows them to study different kinds of academic and other studies they are interested in. Though the prison management limits the acceptable topics they can explore to subjects which cannot be considered a security threat, such as physics, chemistry and the like, they are quite keen to study topics related to Israeli and Jewish society as a means of knowing the enemy better; its weaknesses and ways to take advantage of it. The pragmatic leaders in particular are eager to enrich their knowledge by studying and developing themselves in order to further expand their understanding of the enemy and to improve their conduct and leadership abilities in prison and later on in the outside.

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[14] *Ibid*. The reference for this material is: Abu al Haj, F. (1992). *The Knights of the* Intifada *Talking from Behind the Bars*. Jerusalem: Jamyat al Dirast al Arabieh.

[15] Shaked, R. (2008). The Security Prisoners in Israeli Prisons. *Roim Shabas*, pp. 26–29 (in Hebrew).

[16] Adato, O. (2011). *Security Prisoners*, GCTF conference, Paris.

Indeed, according to data held by the IPS,[17] a security prisoner is entitled to independently study any subject he wishes in accordance with the security limitations. Most of the prisoners study for the final high school Palestinian exams called the *Tawjiya*, and many of them take up higher studies via the Open University and attain degrees. However, the ability of these prisoners to obtain an education is quite controversial within Israeli society, since many are of the opinion that they should not gain any benefits from their incarceration as a punishment for their appalling acts. Recently, following the aforementioned Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal, there was fervent public demand to change the law to prohibit this "privilege" given to prisoners convicted of terrorist activities.[18] This was emphasised by Interviewee 3, who said:

> After all the difficulties, I finished here in prison my degree in political science and international relations. I knew my family wanted to see me educated, so when I received the diploma, I gave it to my mum, two weeks ago. It is an immense achievement for my family and a big step for me. I am planning on continuing to do a Master's and a Doctorate specialising in the media and diplomacy. I will have the title doctor in front of my name; I can make a difference and do important things.

This interviewee is a Fatah leader; this is his first incarceration and he was sentenced to years in prison on charges of committing various severe terrorist acts. He entered prison before finishing high school but studied while in prison in order to achieve his first degree and is determined to pursue further higher education.

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[17]Virtser, A. (2005). *Security Prisoners Incarcerated in the Israeli Prison System* (in Hebrew). Available at: https://www.news1.co.il/uploadFiles/736522853374482.pdf, p. 12; Shaked, R. (2008). The Security Prisoners in Israeli Prisons. *Roim Shabas*, p. 27; Ben-Tsur, D. (2007). Political Conflict Confronted Through Prison Education: A Case Study of Israeli Teachers Working with Palestinian Prisoners. *Journal of Correctional Education*, 58(2), 108–128.

[18]Ataeli, A. and Bander, A. (June 15, 2011). The Families' Victims are Furious — The Security Prisoners' Conditions is Outrages. *Maariv*. Available from: http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/250/510.html (in Hebrew); Bander, A. (May 25, 2010). The Ministers Committee Certify Worsening the Conditions of Hamas Prisoners. *Maariv*. Available at: http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/109/846.html (in Hebrew).

The findings of this section exploring the concept of education in prison corroborate the factors previously discussed: that prisoners imagine a hopeful future and will plan ahead, receiving massive support from their social circles, as well as their organisations and communities in general, gaining support and guidance from their fellow prisoners, and widening their horizons through further education. This is an altogether different and more intense process than that experienced by an "ordinary" criminal prisoner. Though none of them declare incarceration to be easy and enjoyable, the security prisoners interviewed do not show signs of "pain of imprisonment", and the research suggests that entering prison for the first time was relatively easy for them. Most of them have adjusted well to their circumstances and are even using it to develop themselves in the best way they can.

Radicalisation or De-radicalisation in Israeli Prisons

As previously mentioned, the context in which de-radicalisation can occur differs from one place to another. The Israeli case is quite unique in the sense that the government cannot initiate any prisoner rehabilitation or de-radicalisation programmes, unlike the examples detailed previously in the literature review — Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Yemen. This is due to the fact that the majority of security prisoners do not recognise Israel's existence and therefore will never cooperate with such initiatives. This attitude can be verified by a significant document called the 'Prisoners' Document', written in 2006 by the leaders of the main terrorist organisations in Israeli prisons, and which was created with the aim of reconciling Hamas and Fatah on the basis of 18 principles agreed upon by both organisations. Even though there was no acknowledgement of Israel's right to exist, the document was eventually accepted by all parties.[19] Accordingly,

[19]Mideastweb (2006). *Full Text of the Palestinian Prisoner's National Conciliation Document*. Available at: http://www.mideastweb.org/prisoners_letter.htm. For some analysis of the document by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 June, 2006). *Palestinian 'Prisoners' Document': Stepping Away from Peace*. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/Palestinian+Prisoners+Document-+Stepping+away+from+peace+29-Jun-2006.htm.

de-radicalisation initiatives such as those developed in Egypt and Algeria by the organisations themselves are not happening in Israel, as can be elaborated by this statement:

> The security prisoners in Israeli prisons are not going through any process of de-radicalisation and their leaders are doing everything in their power so the inmates will avoid such opportunities which might confuse them and further open their minds towards critical thinking related to their acts and beliefs. They do not agree with any social workers or treatments from the prison authority and the reason is that they are afraid that the prisoner will get involved with the Israeli prison staff and will form some friendly communication that will make him rethink his extreme thoughts and behaviour. Hence, they appoint a spokesman who will be the only one to communicate with the prison authorities for this very same reason, as well as limit the prisoners' daily life activities such as watching television programs that can have the same effect on them. Correspondingly, the studies they are undertaking are only for the reason of knowing the enemy better and in the interest of improving themselves as better soldiers and leaders who will promote the movement's agenda and further activism.[20]

These are the words of Major General Gabay, a former head of intelligence at the IPS, who does not see any evidence of de-radicalisation among these prisoners. In his statement, he addresses the pressure and the strong influence of the communities and leadership outside prison, which demand these prisoners keep on fighting for their cause and idealise them as warriors at the forefront of their battle.

However, this study has found that some of the variables that influence the de-radicalisation processes in other countries also have some effect on the security prisoners in Israeli prisons. Such variables, which will be analysed further, are: the acquirement of education; the acquirement of leadership roles and hence communication with other individuals and groups within prison, and the length of time spent in prison.

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[20]Itsik Gabay (November 2011). A phone call conversation conducted by the researcher with Major General Gabay right after the release of Gilad Shalit in November. Gabay was the head of Intelligence of the IPS between the years 1999–2004 and later became the north district IPS head officer.

Acquiring education

As detailed previously, gaining education in prison is a very high priority for security prisoners in Israeli prisons and has a major effect on the process they go through and on their adjustment to imprisonment. However, gaining education, especially higher education, while in prison also has a significant influence on the process of de-radicalisation or, as Adato[21] terms it, 'pragmatism'. The prisoners deliberately choose topics that relate to Israeli society, history, and culture for strategic reasons but, by learning these topics, they inadvertently open their minds to a better understanding of Israeli society, which allows them to become more pragmatic towards the conflict and how it is conducted.

In terms of the educational status of the 18 interviewees in this research, only two did not finish high school, while two others are still minors and thus could not yet finish high school. Of the other 14 interviewees, seven did finish high school, three of them while in prison, but did not continue on to higher education, although three of them were keen on doing so in prison but were refused by the IPS. Seven other interviewees have gained degrees, most at undergraduate level but two have gained a master's degree, and four of these seven acquired their degrees while serving their time in prison.

Higher education, according to Barnett,[22] allows students to engage with different views and phenomena and give their own explanation and reasoning for occurrences. Moreover, the journey involved in developing these rationalisations has practical implications, such as providing legitimacy to thoughts and actions and thus a sense of security; new, more enlightened observations allow a transformation in perception and conduct in daily life, and also provide opportunities for new thoughts and actions. Furthermore, education encourages people to be more aware and concerned for their environment; for example, studies show that more

[21] Adato, O. (2011). *Security Prisoners*.

[22] Barnett (1990). *The Idea of Higher Education*. Society for Research into Higher Education, pp. 110–119.

educated people vote than uneducated people, and such social involvement can relate to terrorists as well.[23]

Studies related to education in prison argue that the recidivism rate for criminal prisoners who participated in educational programmes while in prison is significantly lower than the rate for their fellow inmates who did not use the opportunity to gain education during their incarceration.[24] In the case of terrorist prisoners, there is not much research or data regarding how many prisoners undertake educational programmes, and the numbers are probably quite different in each country. In the UK, for example, during the years that IRA members were incarcerated, it has been found that until the year 2000, only five percent of these prisoners studied for higher education via the Open University, and most of them relied on these degrees to help them find a job upon their release.[25] In his study regarding education of IRA prisoners in Northern Ireland, Irwin argued that it:

> … has been credited with transforming young angry men, ruthless in their conviction that military action was the only way forward, into astute political thinkers, responsible for the leadership and strategy of some of Northern Ireland's leading political parties and political organisations.[26]

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[23] Useem, B. and Clayton, O. (2009). Research on US radicalization in prisons. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 8(3), 561–592; See also Krueger, A. B. (2008). *What Makes a Homegrown Terrorist? Human Capital and Participation in Domestic Islamic Terrorist Groups in the U.S.A.* Working Papers 1094, Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section, no. 533. Available at: https://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp012f75r8023/1/533.pdf.

[24] Steurer, S. J. *et al*. (2001). *Three State Recidivism Study*. Available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ERIC-ED465886/pdf/ERIC-ED465886.pdf; Gaes, G. G. (2008). *The Impact of Prison Education Programs on Post-Release Outcomes*. New York City: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, p. 32.

[25] McHardy, A. (2000). *Terrorist Study Cells*. Available at: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/terrorist-study-cells/149558.article.

[26] Irwin, T. (2003). Prison Education in Northern Ireland: Learning from our Paramilitary Past. *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, 42(5), 471–484.

Other studies related to education and terrorist prisoners focus mainly on their educational achievements prior to incarceration, and the main finding reveals that the majority of these terrorists are educated people. One example of such a study is Sageman's[27] research involving 132 incarcerated terrorists worldwide, which found that over sixty percent of them had some higher education. Additionally, Krueger and Maleckova's study found that the majority of Hizballah terrorists hold some higher education as well.[28] The findings of these studies imply that higher education might contribute to extreme ideas and activism; however, as can be seen from Irwin's study, as well as the present one, the attainment of an education while in prison might impact upon an individual's life differently due to various other factors, such as the prisoner's distance from the organisation and from the stressful atmosphere outside prison, as well as the daily contact with the "others" — individuals and groups in prison that security prisoners would not otherwise have had contact with outside of prison.

Although the vast majority of the interviewees in this research have at least finished high school, a large portion of them acquired further degrees and diplomas while in prison. Similarly, while there are no studies regarding this issue in Israeli prisons,[29] the data available show that 200 out of nearly 6,000 prisoners are studying for higher degrees in prison via the Open University, while the majority of the other prisoners are studying for their high school diploma. However, in the last few years, as a means to put pressure on the organisations to release the captured soldier, Gilad Shalit, there has been a ban on acquiring any kind of education in prison, except by informal means such as through family visits and watching television.[30]

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[27] Segamen, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

[28] Krueger, A. B. and Maleckova, J. (2003). Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(4), 119–144.

[29] Ben-Tsur, D. (2007). Political Conflict Confronted through Prison Education: A Case Study of Israeli Teachers Working with Palestinian Prisoners. *Journal of Correctional Education*, 58(2), 108–128.

[30] See Kobo Vich, Y. (2012). Israeli high Court — Security prisoners won't be allowed to gain education in prison, *Haaretz Newspaper,* December 26. Available at: https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1893872 (in Hebrew).

Nevertheless, all the interviewees stressed the importance of these studies, whether academic or general, and the massive impact they have on their perceptions and conduct relating to every aspect of their lives, but mainly on their perceptions of the Israeli Palestinian/Arab conflict and their role in it. Moreover, most of them, especially the ones who studied while in prison, testify that these studies opened their minds regarding the conflict and the Israeli society's motives and conduct in particular. To some extent, this has even led to a change in their attitude regarding their methods and past behaviour towards a more pragmatic approach of dialogue and open-mindedness, as Interviewee 5 explained:

> Since I entered prison, I think before I decide, I count to 10 and only then act — it was not like that before I entered prison. In prison, we learn a lot from the Jews and also from the Open University — it changed me — I learnt a lot about Israeli society and its history. In prison, we live in a democracy, we always consult with each other. Outside, I was not familiar with the concept of democracy and could not relate it to Islam. After I entered prison and started my studies, I understood that it does not collide — I can say whatever I think and even fight for my opinion, but also understand when my opinion is not accepted. For example, if we have problems with the management and we want to settle them, we will check with the other organisations and we will vote, and according to its result we will decide on the actions that we might take.

This interviewee is a senior Hamas leader who has been convicted of murder and other violent acts and has been sentenced to life. He is currently studying for his first degree at the Open University in prison.

Taking leadership roles — communication with the "others"

Prisons can be places that allow communication between groups and individuals who normally would not have the opportunity or will to interact with each other. As was mentioned previously by Ashour,[31] in relation to the Algerian and Egyptian experiences of de-radicalisation, such

[31]Ashour, O. (2008). De-Radicalization of Jihad? The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on Al-Qaeda, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 2(5), pp. 11–14.

communication can open individuals' minds to issues that they had previously not been aware of. In the Israeli prisons, the security prisoners are prevented by their leaders from individually approaching the guards and the prison authority, and hence only by taking on leadership roles is this possible; therefore, it has become one of the influential elements of the de-radicalisation process. Indeed, the leaders in Israeli prisons have constant communication with the prison authorities regarding matters concerning the prisoners' needs, as well as political and social decisions. Therefore, they all declare that their perceptions have changed since becoming leaders and that they have learned to get to know the Israelis with whom they have to work, which was not previously an option.

This is expressed by a statement from Interviewee 12:

> When I entered prison for the first time, I could not understand how the prisoners were communicating and cooperating with the guards — I could not understand it at all — but now I understand that it is different here, that this is a different battlefield and there are different rules and different conduct. Whoever enters prison goes through a positive change and becomes more moderate. Leaders that are released from prison are more pragmatic because they know that there is also another side, that not everything is black and white. In prison, a leader deals constantly with compromises and many times he has to put himself in the place of the other side to be able to solve the matter. For example, prisoners want to be in the yard even when it rains so they ask for a shed, but it is a security problem for the IPS to allow it because the shed can cover the prisoners and the guards would not be able to see them, so I suggested that they construct a transparent shed and that way everyone is happy.

This prisoner is the veteran interviewee in this research; he was sentenced to life for the murder of Israeli civilians and at the time of the interview he had already been in prison for almost 30 years.

Length of time spent in prison

This study has found that the length of time spent in prison is another significant factor that impacts on the psychological process

experienced by prisoners. Adato[32] explains that since Hamas has not been active for as long as Fatah (Hamas only arrived on the scene in the last two decades), any assumptions relating to its affiliates' conduct in prison are premature. Since many more Fatah leaders have spent more time in prison, it is possible to assert that they have gone through a process of learning and concluded that violence is not efficient and will not help them to achieve their goals.[33] Furthermore, Adato adds that:

> The main difference between security prisoners and criminal ones is that unlike criminals, these prisoners, as a result of their terrorist activities, had been considered as 'wanted' by the Israeli security forces and so had been under a constant threat to their lives as well as massive pressure from the organisations, their families, and their social surroundings. In prison, they have no such pressure, most of their needs are taken care of and they have time to invest in their own development.[34]

Similarly, in his research on the disengagement process of individuals and groups within extremist organisations in Northern Ireland, Ferguson highlights the importance of prisons in counter-terrorism strategies, as well as for both radicalisation and disengagement from such violent activities. According to the members and former members of such organisations interviewed in Ferguson's research, prison provides a space to improve strategic and ideological understanding, as well as to develop new, non-violent methods of achieving political goals. Furthermore, these prisoners emphasise that these insights could not be developed if they were in the battlefield outside of prison; only in prison can they debate these issues and have a proper discussion on the matter, resulting in more logical and pragmatic solutions.[35]

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[32] Adato, O. (2011). *Security Prisoners*.

[33] *Ibid*.

[34] *Ibid*.

[35] Ferguson, N. (2010). Disengaging from terrorism, in Andrew Silke (ed.), *The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism*. Taylor & Francis, pp. 111–122; for more information, see: Garfinkel, R. (2007). *Personal Transformations: Moving from Violence to Peace*,

At the point of being interviewed, most of the participants of this research had already served more than 10 years in prison, and the vast majority of them were sentenced to, at least, a life sentence in prison. An analysis of the interviews, records, and documents, such as their personal files supplied to the author by the IPS, as well as prison staff reports, suggests that these prisoners go through a unique process. Upon entering prison and for the first few years, they are radical in their views, hostile and angry towards the prison, Israeli authorities and society in general, and hence they do everything they can to enhance their knowledge and practices related to the organisations, their extremist agendas and conduct, to the extent that they become quite well-educated. After this initial period, and upon reaching the peak of their knowledge and proficiency, they feel confident enough to expand their studies to encompass more general knowledge, to open their minds to options that they had little exposure to before. In addition, the routine in prison is comfortable and relaxed so they are able to think more clearly and rationally, and they become much more pragmatic towards the conflict.

This is a slow process, which is most likely to occur alongside the fulfilment of other elements such as gaining higher education and taking on leadership roles. It can take at least eight to 10 years, with the first hostile phase lasting about four to five years and the "open-minded" phase of pragmatic thinking taking four to five years. However, for many of the leaders in prison, it might take even longer, depending on whether the other elements detailed previously are fully implemented, or whether the organisations to which they belong are more radical in their agenda or more religious; members might therefore be more limited in their views and abilities to compromise. As Interviewee 15 expressed:

> I was not politically attuned; I did not have a solid political stance that would guide me to what is right or wrong and how to do things or not to do them at all. That has all changed since I entered prison, where I had time to think and find my political way. Outside its different, the leaders are playing a game which is different from what we want, there is a

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United State Institute of Peace, Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA472142&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

> rivalry between people at the organisation and among the organisations and the people in general and it does not help our cause. Everyone believes in a different way and there is no cooperation. In prison, it is different; there is an understanding between the people and the organisations as well, we do have different opinions, but we debate and discuss the options and then decide together. I was 21 when I entered prison, I was young and hot blooded and did things without thinking them through. That was the hardest lesson I have learned here, today I am a changed person, I am more confident and have the strength to act accordingly.

This interviewee was sentenced to life in prison for murder and other terrorist acts. He had a history of holding radical views and extremist behaviour during his first 12 years in prison, but this pattern has changed since then and in the three years prior to the interview, the records describe a more moderate prisoner and a pragmatic leader. The longer process of deradicalisation may be linked to the fact that he only started his involvement in higher education later in his incarceration, and he had not completed it at the time of the interview. Furthermore, as a leader he refused to cooperate with the prison authorities and only began to do so in the last three years of his confinement.

Another important aspect relating to the length of time the leaders spend in prison is their perception of the sacrifice they made. As previously detailed, the vast majority of them have been imprisoned for more than 10 years; they therefore feel as though they have sacrificed enough and have earned the privilege to start thinking about themselves, allowing others to continue what they have started. Only 8 out of the 18 interviewees state that they will continue their involvement in the struggle, though most of them differentiate between the military wings of the organisations and the political wings. They suggest that by joining the political wing, rather than the military wing, and by participating in the decision-making processes, they can completely change their involvement in the fight, to the extent that they are no longer violent. In spite of the fact that they remain members of the same organisation, the prisoners choose a different path, recognising that whatever the leadership board decides, the operational wing executes.

As Interviewee 9 explains:

> I would not leave my political involvement, but the way will change, the means will change. I believe I did what I had to do, since in the beginning it was not something I specialised in, I am not qualified for it, but I did it because I had to. Now I need to do what I am right for, what I am good at, I did enough. When I will be released, I see myself raising my family, finishing my doctoral degree and having a distinguished position in the organisation, but only on the political side.

This is an Islamic Jihad leader who was sentenced to life. This is his second incarceration; the first was for four years for involvement in a bombing that had only caused injuries. During four years prior to his subsequent incarceration, he led several terrorist operations that killed 21 Israeli civilians. In total, he has been in prison for more than eight years and since his last incarceration he has been known to be cooperative and pragmatic in his decisions.

Conclusions

Two significant aspects of the leaders' incarceration were analysed in this chapter: the process these prisoners go through while in prison and its influence on their radicalisation or de-radicalisation.

The findings suggest that these prisoners' adjustment to incarceration is relatively easy and that they suffer from fewer symptoms of 'pain of imprisonment' in comparison to other criminal prisoners. This can be verified by their conduct in prison, their determination to plan their near future despite their long-term sentences and their persistent self-development via the attainment of higher education and wider knowledge and skills. Furthermore, they are well aware of the strong support they receive from their families and social circles outside of prison, as well as their fellow prisoners who guide them through the first days of their sentences and address their basic needs. This support from both sources influences their self-esteem and allows them to perceive their incarceration as an essential part of reaching their ideological and personal goals.

The results relating to the radicalisation or de-radicalisation of the leaders in Israeli prisons are not definite, nor are they similar to any

de-radicalisation processes utilised in other countries. It can be argued that due to the length of time spent in prison, gaining education and general knowledge, and taking on leadership roles, these prisoners all go through unique self-development processes during their incarceration. However, it is difficult to state whether this is an actual de-radicalisation process due to the fact that most of them still believe in their organisations' agendas and some of them even declare they would be happy to go back to work for the organisations upon their release, although not in a military capacity. For this reason, there is a need to consider the other aspects detailed earlier, such as the strong support shown by the organisations and communities for the struggle to release their people and land from the occupation and associated deprivation. This support does not allow the imprisoned leaders to abandon the agenda, and so instead they try to adjust their experience in prison in order to maintain their identities as fighters, while becoming more pragmatic towards solutions and open-minded to dialogue and communication.

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Chapter 6

Analysis of the Social-Psychological Profile

The phenomenon of terrorist leadership in Israeli prisons is unique in terms of scope and conduct, rendering comparison with the same phenomenon in other locations fairly fruitless. Crucially, this topic is significantly under-studied and is not well understood by academics and decision-makers alike; therefore, it was most difficult to find a solid literature base and evidence from previous studies to reinforce the findings and assertions this study has made.

The research was conducted via an analysis of the social-psychological profile of the interviewed leaders based on five main elements:

1. Social influence factors;
2. Personality profile;
3. Mindset;
4. Leadership role;
5. Imprisonment.

The main findings regarding each aspect are as follows:

1. **Social influence factors:** The social development of the leaders is informed by their social surroundings, which includes elements such as family, friends, educational institutions, youth movements, and the terrorist organisations themselves. Social surroundings were found to

be most influential in drawing individuals into joining terrorist organisations, and into being deeply involved in violent political activity. The interviewees' social surroundings — by offering support and advocating involvement — in addition to the organisations themselves, through their motivating ideology and their activism, were more influential catalysts of involvement in terrorist activities, compared with socioeconomic status and family size, which were not found to be among the main causes for involvement in terrorist activities.

2. **Personality profile:** The interviewees are very responsible for their actions and their surroundings and were not found to be manipulative, suspicious, or excitement-seeking, nor did they exhibit poor behavioural control. Most of the interviewees possessed medium to high self-esteem and had good communication skills. As for their ability to show remorse, the findings demonstrate that they did not regret their terrorist actions. However, this is not a characteristic of their personality, as they could express regret for other elements in their lives. An analysis of the findings based on Hare's scale[1] does not point out any clear characteristics of delinquent or antisocial personality.
3. **Mindset:** The interviewees used mostly rationalisation techniques commonly employed by criminals rather than the ones commonly used by terrorists. Out of the 10 techniques usually used by criminals, the interviewees in this study were found to use the techniques that included elements of rationality yet allowed for the expression of strong self-confidence and the shouldering of responsibility. These techniques include defence of necessity, claim of entitlement, condemnation of the condemners, denial of the law, and the denial of the victim. This was also true regarding the one technique adopted by the interviewees in this study that, according to the literature, is commonly used by terrorists — visualising themselves as the saviours of their people. Other rationalisation techniques reviewed in the literature and adopted by terrorists and criminals alike were not commonly used by the interviewees in this study. These techniques, which

[1] Hare, R. D. (1991). *The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)*. Toronto, Ontario: Multi-Health Systems.

involve a greater degree of denial of responsibility and a lack of self-esteem, were probably more likely to be used by the lower status members of the organisations, rather than the leaders.

4. **Leadership role:** The leaders of the religious organisations based their main leadership principles mostly on religion, demanding total compliance to it while also citing responsibility and reliability as their most important leadership characteristics. The majority of them found the organisations' targets and goals to be more important than the members themselves, who were expected to sacrifice themselves for the righteous cause, if needed. They found it more difficult to lead inside prison rather than outside of it. By contrast, Fatah leaders claimed their main leadership principles to be equality, justice, and the ability to solve difficult issues. They perceived the followers as the organisation's main reason for existence, and hence, they perceived them as more important than the organisation's goals. They found leadership outside prison a more difficult task than leading inside prison. According to the findings of this research, there are three common aspects of leadership, which leaders from both types of organisations share. Firstly, both types desire to continue their leadership role upon their release. Secondly, both perceive leadership as demanding and as hard work, which entails dealing with difficult individuals and necessitates extensive sacrifice. Thirdly, most of them were found to be extremely charismatic individuals who also possess sufficient transactional leadership qualities.
5. **Imprisonment:** The interviewees' adjustment to imprisonment was found to be relatively easy for most. They suffer less from 'pain of imprisonment' symptoms, mostly due to the strong support they receive from their family and from their social surroundings outside of prison, as well as from their fellow prisoners who guide them through their first days in prison and help them with their needs. The results relating to their radicalisation or de-radicalisation within Israeli prisons are neither definite, nor are they similar to any other de-radicalisation processes. It seems that they have not abandoned the ideology and the belief in the righteousness of the cause, but rather they are more pragmatic towards finding solutions and have become more open-minded to dialogue and communication.

The General Social-Psychological Profile

The analysis of the wider social-psychological profile of the leaders, based on the five aspects discussed above, suggests that the most influential aspect of the five is the *social influences* element. Accordingly, the social process these individuals go through is highly significant. This corresponds with the literature on the importance of different social influences on a person's life, as well as the literature regarding the relationship between involvement in terrorism on the one hand, and social aspects in general on the other. This multi-dimensional social process is initiated at birth and its main consequences are political involvement, and especially the joining of terror organisations. By the time these individuals reach maturity, the social process is embedded in them and has an immense effect on the other aspects of the profile, including their personalities, their mindsets, their leadership roles, and imprisonment.

Imprisonment is the second element of the five and was also found to have a major influence on all the other elements that constitute the profile. Though imprisonment occurs in a later stage of the interviewees' lives, it has a significant effect on their personal and professional development. It can also be defined as a *secondary social process*. However, as was detailed in Chapter 5, this influential process is conditioned by the fulfilment of the other elements coming into play in prison, such as the length of time spent in prison, the attainment of education, and the adoption of leadership roles. During their imprisonment, the interviewees go through a unique process, which improves their general understanding of the conflict, as well as their communication skills, and makes them more pragmatic in their conduct and activism. Accordingly, both the primary social process, as well as the secondary social process, i.e. imprisonment, affect each of the three elements gradually, as will be detailed further.

Personality: According to an analysis of the interviewees' statements, as detailed in the first and second chapters, their initial social process established their main personality characteristics, which include high self-esteem, a strong sense of responsibility, and substantial determination. Their domestic circumstances, as well as the reality of the conflict and its

consequences on their social surroundings, encouraged them to exercise and develop their leadership qualities from a very young age. This happened as they attempted to take control and influence their circumstances. This initiative also amplifies their self-esteem and determination, as well as their sense of responsibility towards their families and social environment. Furthermore, they expressed being very strong-minded and inflexible in their behaviour towards their families, their friends and their colleagues in the organisations, as well as in their attitudes towards the struggle in general.

During their time in prison, these characteristics developed even further. Their leadership role, which in most cases becomes more formal in prison due to the fact that the leadership elections are structured and organised, expands their sense of responsibility towards their fellow prisoners, along with elements of Palestinian society, which include the inmates' families and relatives, who lean on them morally and financially. This secondary social process also contributes to the development of their conduct and behaviour in the sense that they are more open-minded and more able to adjust to difficult situations, as well as more able to acknowledge mistakes and more sensitive in their decision-making processes.

Mindset: The interviewees detailed their thoughts and points of view regarding the conflict and hence their rationalisations for carrying out the terror activities. Six main rationalisation techniques were found: defence of necessity; claim of entitlement; condemnation of the condemners; denial of the law and the victim, and visualising themselves as the saviours of their people. An analysis of this data, combined with the two social processes mentioned above, reveals that the initial social process has an immense influence on their mindset and the subsequent use of these rationalisations. While during the secondary social process, which takes place throughout imprisonment, four out of the six techniques mentioned above are reframed, and the other two are not. The four reframed techniques are: defence of necessity; claim of entitlement; condemnation of the condemners, and visualising themselves as saviours. The interviewees explained that during their incarceration they had improved their understanding of the conflict and of Israeli society in general. Even though they did not regret their previous acts and still claimed their

contributions to the struggle are important, they declared they would act in a different way if they had the chance to do so in the future, as they had realised that the method needed to change. Although they still despised the occupation, they were aware of the fact that there were Israelis with names and faces on the other side, and this fact changed the way they perceived the struggle and how it should be conducted. As for the fourth technique, visualising themselves as the saviours of their people, it seems that imprisonment only enhances this perception due to the fact that they are bestowed with the distinguished status of "political prisoners". As such, they are viewed by definition as prisoners who sacrificed everything for their people and hence are admired by their entire society. The two techniques that are not reframed during imprisonment are the rejection of Israeli law and denial of the victim. This probably happens due to the personal, as well as national sensitivity of these two issues.

Leadership role: As was mentioned previously, the initial social process greatly influences the emergence of leadership qualities within the interviewees from a very young age. It seems that due to the social environment's traditional characteristics, their leadership type is more autocratic, and is based mostly on charisma, as well as on being single-minded and inflexible. However, compared with their roles outside of prison, leadership plays a well-structured role in prison. Although some functioned as leaders in the organisations outside of prison as well, others were not formal leaders. Rather, they held minor leading roles or else they were not leaders at all prior to their imprisonment. Furthermore, the prison's demanding environment compelled them to adjust their conduct and behaviour and hence they operated in a more cooperative way with others, including sharing their decision-making process. This was found to be more strongly expressed within the religious organisations, compared with the secular ones. Most political activities of the organisations within prison are conducted in a democratic fashion. This, they all admitted, was a big change from their experiences in the organisations outside prison. The interviewees explained that as leaders in prison, they had to be more sensitive and understanding towards other inmates, as well as more practical and "hands on" in their approach in order to make any changes or to achieve any progress. It appears from this analysis that the two most

influential elements of the profile are the social environment aspect and imprisonment. The initial social process is influential, long, and intensive; it is deeply rooted and has a significant impact on their conduct and behaviour. The imprisonment, as the secondary social process, starts at a later stage of the interviewees' lives, after the initial social process is already well established. However, only fulfilment of the three main conditions during imprisonment proved to promote change and these were the length of time spent in prison, the gaining of education, and the adoption of leadership roles. Without the fulfilment of these three conditions, it is most likely that the initial social process will continue its effect, pushing the individual towards more radical involvement in the conflict, with less pragmatism and a limited ability to communicate. Accordingly, the influence of these two main elements on each other is also conditioned by the three factors mentioned above. Only the fulfilment of all three would allow imprisonment to change the course of the initial social process. This process is expressed in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Social-psychological profile of terrorist leaders in Israeli prison.

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Chapter 7

Assessing the Risk

The author of this book has been conducting terrorist risk assessments since 2017 in two forms: direct risk assessments and indirect ones. The direct risk assessments are mainly carried out on prisoners in Israel when there is a need for an evaluation of the prisoner's circumstances in terms of the risk he or she poses, as well as recommendations for relevant rehabilitation programs, if applicable. These types of risk assessments are needed due to different circumstances relating to the terrorist/security prisoner, such as forthcoming release or change of status while in prison, etc.

Direct risk assessments are, mostly, being requested by the legal authorities and are presented in court in order to assist in decision-making processes related to the prisoner case. The prisoner and his close circle are fully aware of the process and must agree to cooperate with it by providing all information available. This allows for comprehensive information to be used by the assessor, including the prisoner's prison files indicating his or her progress in prison, legal documents revealing the specific details of crimes, other criminal records, health records, as well as interviews with relevant individuals who can give character references and useful information such as the prisoner himself or herself, the family, and other significant people in their lives.

The assessment is compiled by the assessor using all the information available while relating it to the terrorist and extremist risk assessment

tools available, mainly the VERA −2 and the ERG +22, in order to establish the level of risk posed by the prisoner, whether high, medium, or low. Furthermore, often, in response to a specific demand, the analysis is accompanied by a list of recommendations for rehabilitation programmes and ways to minimise current and future risks. Prior to being sent to the relevant legal bodies, every assessment is supervised by a second assessor in order to provide transparency and balance. Most of these assessments are conducted on Jewish terrorist prisoners in Israeli prisons, rather than Palestinian terrorist prisoners, due to their different circumstances, as will be briefly explained.

The 1967 war between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries, together with the resettlement of Jews in the West Bank, incited the religious Jews who gathered around the rather conservative religious party Mafdal (the united religious national party) and became radicalised in their religious and political attitudes and beliefs. This process of radicalisation increased after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war in 1974, which prompted major terror attacks against Jews who felt unprotected by their government and hence very disillusioned. This led to a number of them joining different radical groups, initially the 'Jewish Underground', which led to the rise of the Kach movement, a racist right-wing party that was considered to be a terrorist organisation by the Israeli government in 1994. Later on, the establishing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 between the Israelis and the Palestinians was considered by these ultranationalist Jews as a catastrophic event and cause for breaking with the Israeli government. These events, together with others later on, such as the evacuation of Gaza by its Jewish population in 2000, led the people, mainly youngsters, labelled as the 'hilltop youth', to commit terrorist acts. These violent acts, usually vandalism and other hate crimes such as arson and violence, were called 'price tag attacks' and were carried out in retaliation for Palestinian violence or government policies perceived as hostile to the settler movement. Mosques, churches, and even Israeli military bases have been targeted by these nationalist vandals in recent years, and as a consequence, many have been incarcerated in Israeli prisons. However, while 2017 saw 105 indictments filed against the far-right activists, by April 2018 only 23 had been filed, making the numbers of Jewish security prisoners in prisons

very low; as of November 2018, there were 20 Jewish security prisoners, and only 4 of them were imprisoned with life sentences.[1]

Consequently, Jewish prisoners lack the numbers and unity that Palestinian prisoners have and most of them are given short-term sentences. Their characteristics are different as well; they do not have the outside support from an organisation, a group, or even their families, who mostly do not approve of their actions. As was explained by Pedahzur and Perliger,[2] many of them had become involved in such activities due to their inability to integrate into their own society — they were expelled from their schools or failed to enlist in the army — and hence their motivation is predominantly a result of these personal crises, together with the need to express their anger and frustration. Moreover, they are not self-organised while in prison, and their motivation and attitude towards their terrorist acts and involvement is different from Palestinian security prisoners incarcerated in Israeli prisons. As a senior intelligence officer at the IPS described it, "They are not posing any threat to security since they are not working together, there is no organisation and no cooperation between them, they do not know each other and are very different from one another in their attitude as well as their terrorist activities and involvement."[3]

As a result of the above, most Jewish terrorist prisoners receive short-term sentences and, unlike the Palestinian prisoners, they have different perceptions of their terrorist acts, as they were mainly motivated by self-grievances rather than social causes. Moreover, they are all released back into Israeli society. Hence, it is most useful to conduct these assessments in order to evaluate whether they pose a risk to society upon their release, and if so, what can be done in order to minimise that risk.

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[1] R'D. (2016). Hilltop Youth — In Our Flowerbed. *Thoughts*, Research Centre, National Security College, p. 12 (in Hebrew); B, Senior Intelligence Officer (2018). *Security Prisoners*; Magid, J. (2018). Shin Bet: Sharp Rise in Settler Youth 'Price Tag' Attacks Against Palestinians. *Times of Israel*, 22 April.

[2] Pedahzur, A. and Perliger, A. (2011). *Jewish Terrorism in Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press.

[3] B, Senior Intelligence Officer (2018). *Security Prisoners.*

The other type of risk assessment is an indirect terrorist risk assessment, useful when there is significant suspicion of an insider threat within a commercial, governmental, or security company or institution. An insider threat is defined as "a threat caused by authorised personnel"[4] or, as described in more detail by the US Department of Homeland Security:

> A current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to an organisation's network, system, or data and intentionally misused that access to negatively affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organisation's information or information systems. Insider threats, to include sabotage, theft, espionage, fraud, and competitive advantage, are often carried out through abusing access rights, theft of materials, and mishandling physical devices.[5]

The damage from such a threat, mainly as a result of fraud, is known to cost organisations in the United States over 600 billion dollars every year.[6] However, an inside malicious act of terrorism, sabotage of critical infrastructure, or the disruption of sensitive government systems poses a much greater threat to national security and is of immense concern to governments and organisations worldwide.[7]

The ever-changing dynamics of terrorism have given rise to an emergence of new terrorist tactics and technologies that have shifted the focus to aspects such as terrorist lone actors, radicalisation, and cyberterrorism. Consequently, the latest global events related to the civil war in Syria, along with the rise of Daesh, have prompted a wide process of radicalisation of individuals around the world, highlighting the threat coming from

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[4] Rasmussen, G. T. (August 2016). Insider Risk Management Guide. Available at: http://www.gideonrasmussen.com/article-13.html.

[5] US Department of Homeland Security (2 May 2014). Combating the Insider Threat, National Cybersecurity and Communication and Integration Centre. Available at: https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Combating%20the%20Insider%20Threat.pdf.

[6] Rasmussen, G. T. (August 2016). Insider Risk Management Guide. Available at: http://www.gideonrasmussen.com/article-13.html.

[7] Pressman, D. E. and Flockton, J. (2012). Calibrating Risk for Violent Political Extremists and Terrorists: The VERA 2 Structured Assessment. *The British Journal of Forensic Practice*, 14(4), 237–251.

insider personnel in almost every governmental, commercial, or security company or institution. It puts these institutions and companies on high alert and requires them to make significant organisational adjustments in order to be well protected from every aspect related to the threat, starting from the recruitment of the employees, monitoring them while they are employed, and making sure they do not pose any danger to the organisation, even when they leave the company.[8]

Although there is not enough factual data on the insider threat on which to base analyses and conclusions, it is well known that an insider has a significant advantage over an outside attacker, since he or she has free access to crucial, sensitive information on the organisation, its facilities and people, as well as vital knowledge on the organisation's weaknesses and conduct. Nonetheless, most research indicates that most organisations and companies deal with the threat posed by insiders very poorly.[9]

The indirect risk assessment utilises indicators that allow an organisation to spot the potential for an insider threat. However, it raises some ethical complexities due to the fact that an investigation is conducted before a crime has been committed. The person suspected of being a threat does not know he is being investigated and hence there is a need to address the relevant privacy and acquisition of information laws and regulations.[10]

The assessor is approached by commercial or security companies to conduct risk assessments on relevant employees who are suspected of posing a terrorist threat. The suspicion is raised mostly due to relevant information from varied governmental intelligence institutions, or through the suspect's close circle of family, friends, or colleagues who become aware of some suspicious or irregular behaviour and decide to alert the organisation of their concerns. As mentioned previously, since the assessor

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[8] BaMaung, D., McIlhatton, D., MacDonald, M. and Beattie, R. (2018). The Enemy Within? The Connection between Insider Threat and Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 41(2), 133–150.

[9] *Ibid*.; Colwill, C. (2009). Human Factors in Information Security: The Insider Threat — Who Can You Trust These Days? *Information Security Technical Report*, 14, 186–196.

[10] Pressman, D. E. and Flockton, J. (2012). Calibrating Risk for Violent Political Extremists and Terrorists: The VERA 2 Structured Assessment. *The British Journal of Forensic Practice*, 14(4), 237–251.

receives the suspect's information from the organisation without the suspect's knowledge or consent, they have to follow the relevant acquirement of information laws and regulations in the specific country. There are variations in the law across different countries; however, in most Western countries, the information must be obtained legally and used impartially.[11]

In such indirect assessments, due to ethical and legal limitations, the information available might be scarce. The assessor receives all the data available on the person being assessed, including possible details about his background, professional and personal experiences, any information that was published in the news or other media platforms, as well as social media and any digital footprints. Social media platforms are substantial tools that reveal much about a person's mindset and thoughts, as well as conduct and behaviour.

Acquiring this information has to be done according to the legal limitations of the country, which differ extensively from one place to another; nevertheless, laws have to be dynamic and adaptable to the demands of the moment. For example, the privacy of an employee must be protected by laws prohibiting the employer from requesting the employee's social media usernames and passwords; however, it is mostly acknowledged that information that has been published publicly is in the public domain and hence can be considered by employers, but must not be used to discriminate against the employee in any way.[12] Any legally-obtained, as well as publicly-available, information is used by the assessor to conduct a social-psychological profile of the person being assessed in order to understand the process of radicalisation he may have been going through, his motivations, and specific characteristics. Further, the social-psychological profile allows for better application of the risk assessment tool, whether the VERA –2, the ERG +22, or both, which will determine the level of risk

[11] Uniform Law Commission (2016). Uniform Employee and Students Online Privacy Protection Act. Available at: https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/final-act-with-comments-32?CommunityKey=0e44f6fc-9e17-41e8-835d-0461e8ea548b&tab=librarydocuments; CIPD. (2018). Pre-Employment Checks: Guidance for Organisations. Available at: https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/fundamentals/emp-law/recruitment/pre-employment-checks-guide.

[12] *Ibid*.

this person poses. If relevant, the assessor will also offer ways to mitigate this risk and deal with it appropriately.

The analysis of most of these assessments, conducted by the author, found a strong link with immigration, since most of the suspects were immigrants who arrived in the country at a young age, or were born to an immigrant family. Furthermore, they all suffer from some social, personal, or mental grievances, which lead them to start a process of radicalisation, whether online or through an acquaintance, and many of them have a criminal record. The level of risk posed by most of these assessed individuals was determined to be 'medium'; nonetheless, the organisations did not have the capability or tolerance to deal with such a threat.

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Conclusion — From Profiling to Assessing the Risk

Importance of the Social-Psychological Profiling and Practice Implications

This work opens a window into the mindset and conduct of terrorist leaders in Israeli prisons. The data gathered from the long interviews cover a wide range of information regarding the leaders' lives and perceptions. In addition, they reveal a picture of social relationships within the broader Palestinian community and throw light on the complex yet mutually enriching relationship between Palestinian leadership within prison and their social surroundings and cadres outside the prison walls. The rich and unique data and the revelatory findings emphasise the need to use social-psychological profiling as a method of investigation and information gathering, as it allows for a better understanding of both individual and group phenomena. This method is unique in that it allows the acquisition of first-hand information in a field suffering from a considerable absence of such valuable data, and where the means to study this topic have hitherto mostly relied on information derived from secondary sources only.

As was mentioned in the methodology section, this study, which involved conducting interviews with a particular group of individuals, entailed significant personal, ethical, and technical challenges that the

author had to overcome. She took every precautionary measure possible to address these issues, including the implementation of various controls, such as ensuring that the interviewees participated of their own free will and promising them anonymity throughout the research. These controls aimed at maintaining independence and transparency in order to safeguard the interviewees, the prison authorities, and the outcomes of the research.

Moreover, the social psychology approach emphasises the importance of social aspects to the development of human mindset and behaviour. Some critics of such an approach claim that it suffers from a lack of a scientific grounding and objectivity. The author herself was born and raised in an Israeli environment and could not claim to be totally neutral and objective towards such sensitive matters. However, she confronted these obstacles by scrupulously ensuring complete transparency throughout the research and in the writing up of the entire study; additionally, throughout the process, she developed and maintained a professional and respectful relationship with her interviewees. Indeed, the inclination of most of the interviewees to be so candid and forthcoming about their attitudes and past experiences could be interpreted both as proof of their willingness to cooperate with the project, and as a litmus test for the success of the project itself and the methodology it employed.

Furthermore, social-psychological profiling was found to be the most suitable method for this work, as it focuses on individuals who are characterised as having strong social identities, motives, and mindsets, and who attained their main aspirations from their social surroundings, as well as social experiences, figures, and institutions, throughout their lives. It is acknowledged that the profiling method also suffers from criticism regarding its ethical challenges and due to its alleged lack of efficiency, especially in relation to terrorism. However, this technique allowed the author to analyse the information gathered during the interviews in terms of angles and categories. In doing so, the researcher identified the similarities and differences between the varied interviewees and groups they affiliated with. Hence, the method employed revealed a range of nuances that other methods might not have discerned. Furthermore, by so doing, it more accurately reflected the variety that exists within a range of people who might otherwise be homogenously characterised under the rubric of 'violent terrorist'.

Looking to the future, and as one major ancillary by-product of the exercise, these findings are particularly relevant for security decision-makers in Israel. This is due to the fact that there is a severe lack of communication between Israel and the Palestinian leadership. It might be useful to prioritise and promote — when possible — communication with leaders who spent time in Israeli prisons and who acquired leadership roles within the Palestinian society upon their release. This might allow for an improvement in decision-making processes and negotiation in future contact between Israel and Palestine, especially as many former terrorists in other situations have gone on to become diplomats and politicians. It is possible that changes in attitude while in prison, as witnessed in this research, could increase the level of cooperation, unlikely as this might currently seem. In addition, though there are currently no de-radicalisation programmes in Israeli prisons, the findings suggest that the leaders are experiencing a unique process while in prison, which results in the adoption of a more pragmatic and communicative attitude. Compared with other leaders of these organisations outside prison, this attitude is distinct and unique.

With regard to the analysis of conclusions, and based on the established profile, this work reveals the unique structure of two different social processes taking place, both of which greatly influence the three main aspects in the interviewees' lives: their social environment, their mindset, and their leadership role, albeit in quite diverse ways. These findings suggest a different perception of imprisonment from that of most studies relating to incarceration, which view it as a harmful process for an individual. According to the findings of *this* study, the security prisoners incarcerated in Israeli prisons experience prison as a place for development and empowerment. The findings suggest that they suffer from fewer symptoms of 'pain of imprisonment' compared to criminal prisoners; and they show improvements in their status and activism. As for radicalisation or de-radicalisation processes occurring during their incarceration, most prior studies find prisons to be hubs for radicalisation and extremism. This research partly concurs, finding that, indeed in the short term, prison does tend to radicalise individuals. However, in the long term, providing certain conditions are met, such as the attainment of further education and the fulfilment of leadership roles, it found that Israeli prisons can also be

places of contemplation that foster more moderate, pragmatic perspectives in its inmates.

From the Social-Psychological Profile to Assessing the Risk

This book has explored two stimulating dimensions. First, it presented a series of case studies based on original research into the mindset of terrorist leaders imprisoned in Israeli prisons, establishing the social-psychological profile of this unique group. Second, it provides an overview of changing methods adapted to global transformations. That is, it explores the process that the field of social psychology of terrorism is going through.

The author began her career as a young criminologist who, over time, developed a great passion for understanding the mindset and conduct of terrorists so as to better communicate and manage the threat they pose. The social-psychological profiling method served as the best tool for that pursuit as it allows for a closer look into terrorists' ways of thinking and operating. The research has two theoretical foundations: criminology and profiling. Both shaped the research, allowing the construction of a terrorist profile based on five main elements: sociology, personality, mindset, leadership, and imprisonment.

However, the latest developments and changes in the realm of terrorism, occurring simultaneously with the emergence of new, landscape-altering entities on the scene, led to the advancement of constructed risk assessment tools based on the social-psychological profile, but which additionally give a more focused response to the query of who poses a risk and who does not, and how to manage that risk.

Daesh has changed terrorism as it was known before, both in terms of scale and conduct. The extensive use of social media by the terrorists exposed significant information about their mindset and behaviour, which previously was not accessible. Furthermore, it has encouraged large-scale radicalisation among people from all over the world who are inspired by Daesh ideology and ideas. This process introduced a new terrorist threat — the insider threat, posed by radicalised people living in

Western countries or those who returned to their Western countries having been radicalised abroad. These 'returnees' and 'home grown' radicalised individuals in turn raise the question of whether they have been — or, indeed, can be — de-radicalised; namely, do they pose a threat or not? The case of the 'ISIS bride', Shamima Begum[1], in the UK is but one of several cases — and each is defined by its own complex set of unique characteristics.

This situation has led to the need for practical risk assessment tools, as was detailed in Chapter 7, which can help determine whether someone poses a risk or not, and what is required in order to minimise that risk.

These developments show how threat management is continuing to adapt. The social-psychological profiling method is considered to be a very deep and informative tool and, as such, is the main determinant in understanding the mindset and conduct of a specific group, in this case, terrorists. Nonetheless, in light of the global political and social changes stated above, this now serves as a means towards another end. Namely, social-psychological profiling can be combined with the separate risk assessment tool to provide a relatively objective and comprehensive evaluation of a specific case.

Furthermore, this method can be relevant to so many fields, ranging from the original paradigm of calculating the general risk of a terrorist attack taking place or recidivism in specific terrorists, to areas as diverse as sports performance management, job interviewing, and understanding the psyches of individual politicians.

[1] *BBC* (15 April 2019). Shamima Begum: IS bride set to be granted legal aid. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-47934721.

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Limitations

As mentioned previously in the methodology chapter, the assumption of qualitative research is that completely objective research is impossible, because any phenomena observed by humans must pass through their personal 'filter', and is therefore affected by the researcher's individual and cultural knowledge. Therefore, there are many valid perceptions of reality that are constructed by both groups and individuals. Interviews, such as the ones conducted in this study, are a form of intervention and have an effect on the participants. This effect creates a limitation, since it is possible that the words of the participants during the interview were influenced by the interaction created between them and the interviewer. Qualitative research methods involve the formation of a personal relationship between the researcher and the participants as the latter share emotional and complex life stories. It may be that the participants' personal exposure to the interviewer has an impact on the course of the interview and its content.[1] Furthermore, in qualitative research, validity and consistency are tested according to the degree of trustworthiness of the study. This can usually be established through validation of the interviews; by presenting the findings to the participants and asking them to confirm and ratify them. However, this could not be done in this study, due to the technical difficulties of carrying out a second round of meetings with the

[1] Maxwell, J. A. (2004). Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach. Sage Publications, Inc., p. 106; Padgett, D. K. (1998). *Qualitative Methods in Social Work Research: Challenges and Rewards*. Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 18–24.

participants; therefore, the only validation that can be achieved is by 'observer triangulation', as the supervisor of the study reads the data and validates the research.[2]

As previously mentioned, an important aspect of qualitative research that poses some challenges, as well as opportunities, is the role of the researcher, which has a significant impact on the study and must be acknowledged, especially in a sensitive study such as this one. Unlike quantitative research, in a qualitative study the researcher is an instrument, an essential part that conducts the research and analyses the information; thus, the researcher's own qualities will determine the characteristics of the study and impact upon its results. Factors such as sex, race, ethnicity, religion, and other personal aspects such as intelligence or ambitions, influence the researcher's attitudes and decision-making process, and shape the study in a particular way. Critics of the qualitative method cite this fact in order to assert that this method lacks credibility;[3] however, others argue that as long as it is acknowledged and dealt with, it can enrich the research and lead to some fascinating outcomes.[4]

The researcher of this study, i.e. the author of this book, is an Israeli, Jewish female who was born and raised in Israel. She is a criminologist who spent most of her adult life working closely with people who were imprisoned criminals or hospitalised due to mental illness. This research may be seen as a continuation of her work using the criminological therapeutic attitude, which approaches people as very complex individuals with both good and bad sides, and asserts that the effort expended in exploring both sides may be rewarded with fascinating, revealing, and enriching results.[5]

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[2]Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. (1985). *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 301–327.

[3]Fink, A. S. (2000). The Role of the Researcher in the Qualitative Research Process. A Potential Barrier to Archiving Qualitative Data. *Qualitative Social Research*, 1(3); Henwood, K. L. and Pidgeon, N. F. (1992). Qualitative research and psychological theorizing. *British Journal of Psychology*, 83(1), 97–111.

[4]Padgett, D. K. (1998). The Researcher as Instrument. In: *Qualitative Methods in Social Work Research: Challenges and Rewards*. Sage Publications, Inc., Chapter 2, pp. 18–24.

[5]On criminological attitude, see Vitello, C. J. (2003). Stalking Laws, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Peacemaking Criminology: A Radical Law-Psychology Inquiry. *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice*, 3(2), 1–37.

Another important challenge posed by this type of research is the relationship between the researcher and the correctional institutions concerned, a relationship that could be seen as raising potential conflicts of interest.[6] The delicate relationship between the researcher and the IPS was maintained by an open attitude from both sides as to the needs and boundaries of the study. Nevertheless, the researcher undertook the study as an outside researcher and not as a prison official, which allowed further objectivity towards the institutional perceptions of the prisoners. Details regarding the interviewees were not disclosed by the researcher, with the exception of a general report on aspects of the phenomenon of terrorist leadership in Israeli prisons, which was presented to the IPS authorities.

The researcher was permitted to conduct the interviews privately, with no guard or prison official in the room, in order to allow privacy, enabling the discussions to be conducted freely and genuinely. Only the researcher held the transcription of the detailed conversations with the interviewees, and no specific or private information was transferred to the IPS or any outside agency. The researcher assured the IPS that the findings of the research would be discussed as a general phenomenon and not as profiles of specific leaders. The IPS was not involved in the written work and could not edit or remove information at any stage of the research. Furthermore, no boundaries were set by the IPS regarding how the research was conducted, what kind of questions were asked, or what information was obtained — the researcher had sole rights in deciding the procedures of the study, within the ethical framework established by the ethical approval process of the IPS and Bar-Ilan University. The IPS, for its part, insisted on the security measures taken during the interviews, such as an emergency button in the room, intercom, and random checks by guards. It also insisted that if any information concerning security threats was obtained during the interviews, the researcher would report it immediately to the IPS intelligence department. Additionally, the IPS could only respond to security or personal threats made by the interviewees against the researcher if she decided to report them. Furthermore, it required every

[6] Patenaude, A. L. (2004). No Promises, But I'm Willing to Listen and Tell What I Hear: Conducting Qualitative Research among Prison Inmates and Staff. *The Prison Journal*, 84(4), 69–91.

interviewee to sign a consent form explaining to him his rights and the research procedures.[7] The IPS also asked for the first article reporting this research to be published initially in the IPS journal, *Window to Prison — Theory and Practice*, which the researcher did after completing her field work in the prisons.[8]

As was mentioned in the methodology chapter, this study raises numerous ethical issues, mainly due to the use of prisoners as participants. Hence, established ethical principles used in qualitative studies[9] were adhered to in this research: the purpose and procedure of the research was communicated to the interviewees, as well as the significant potential benefits of the study. No interviews were carried out without the interviewee's full willingness to participate. In cases of refusal to participate, the interview was cancelled. Furthermore, the prisoners acknowledged that they were free to discuss and answer any issue or question they viewed as suitable and were free to decline to speak on any subject that they found uncomfortable or inappropriate for discussion. They were promised anonymity during the research process and upon the publication of the results; the interviews were conducted privately, no security personnel, prison staff, or any other prisoners were present during the interviews in order to avoid jeopardising the interviewees' confidentiality and ability to speak freely. As mentioned previously,[10] other ethical measures relating to the study were reviewed by the ethical approval committee located at the Bar-Ilan university, which focused on the structure and contents of the interviews to avoid any possible risk for the interviewees, as well as to ensure the quality of the results for all concerned.

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[7] See Appendix 3: Consent form the prisoners had to sign prior to the interview (translated into English).

[8] Yehoshua, S. (2009). Personality Profile of Terrorist Leaders in Prison. *Window to Prison — Theory and Practice*. IPS: Press Office, pp. 12, 104–116 (in Hebrew).

[9] For information regarding ethical considerations in qualitative research, see Fontan, A. and Frey, J. H. (2005). The Interview — from neutral stance to political involvement. In: Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 3rd Edition. Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 695–727.

[10] See Appendix 1 — Bar-Ilan ethical approval.

Appendix 1

Ethical Approval Document — Bar-Ilan University

Bar-Ilan University
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן

Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of Criminology

הפקולטה למדעי החברה
המחלקה לקרימינולוגיה

Tuesday, October 16, 2012

To whom it may concern,

As Ms. Sagit Yehoshua's supervisor during her PhD studies, and as the head of the Department of Criminology at Bar-Ilan University, Israel, at the time, I am writing to confirm that Ms. Yehoshua had indeed applied and received the approval of the department's ethics committee for her research.

Ms. Yehoshua's study demanded the collaboration of the Israeli Prison Service (IPS) as it involved the participation of security prisoners as interviewees. To receive the IPS's formal approval, Ms. Yehoshua submitted an official application to the IPS on 20 July 2005. An internal IPS committee, comprising Brigadier General (Ret) Betty Lahat, IPS head of intelligence, Lt. Colonel Gavriel Yehuda, IPS head of counter-terrorism division, and Lt. Colonel Dr. Yehoshua Weiss, IPS head of research division, formally authorized the research and approved its methodology.

Following this, Ms. Yehoshua's research proposal was approved both by the Criminology Department and by the department's ethical approval committee, on 16 January 2006. The committee members, Prof. Gerald Cromer and Dr. Uri Timor, approved Ms. Yehoshua's proposed line of questions. These were mostly open questions regarding the interviewees' lives and general perceptions. Another external tool which was approved was the application of Hare psychopathology check list — PCL-SV.

Tel: 03 5318221/241 :טל • Fax: 03 7384038 :פקס • criminology.dept@mail.biu.ac.il • www.criminology.biu.ac.il
Bar-Ilan University (RA), Ramat Gan 52900, Israel • **www.biu.ac.il** • אוניברסיטת בר-אילן (ע"ר), רמת גן 52900, ישראל

Bar-Ilan University
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן

Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of Criminology

הפקולטה למדעי החברה
המחלקה לקרימינולוגיה

The committee also discussed other aspects of the research, such as the security measures that should be taken by the IPS to ensure Ms. Yehoshua's safety. These included establishing a communication mechanism such as a security button, an intercom, or an alarm button between the interview's venues and the prison's HQ.

The interviewees' safety and their interests were considered as well. Under the conditions detailed in the Research Approval (Appendix 2), it was decided to approve the research: participation in the research will be exclusively voluntary, anonymity will be guaranteed, and information shared with the researcher will not be made available to the IPS authorities. The committee also approved the wording of the letter of consent proposed by Ms. Yehoshua. This letter was to be signed by Ms. Yehoshua and each interviewee before the commencement of each interview and after the establishment of all the relevant facts.

I hereby guarantee that every measure was taken both by Ms. Yehoshua and by the department's ethical approval committee to ensure that this research would meet the highest ethical research standards.



Prof. Sarah Ben David,
Department of Criminology,
Bar-Ilan University

Tel: 03 5318221/241 :טל • Fax: 03 7384038 :פקס • criminology.dept@mail.biu.ac.il • www.criminology.biu.ac.il
Bar-Ilan University (RA), Ramat Gan 52900, Israel • **www.biu.ac.il** • אוניברסיטת בר-אילן (ע"ר), רמת גן 52900, ישראל

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Appendix 2

IPS Research Approval

Israel Prison Service

July 20, 2005

To Ms. Sagit Yehoshua

Research approval

We are happy to inform you that the Israeli Prison Service (IPS) Commander approves the carrying out of your research regarding the leadership of security prisoners, conditional to the compliance of the following conditions:

- The approval of a relevant academic institution.
- Publication in any library or other means of publication will be allowed only with preliminary approval.
- Interviews will be conducted with the approval of the intelligence department.
- Each prisoner interviewed must sign a confidentiality statement prior to the interview.

We wish you the best of luck in your research!

Yifat Vahaba

pp. Dr. Yehoshua Wiess

Appendix 3

Prisoner Consent Form

Israel Prison Service

IPS- Research department

Prisoner Declaration to Participate in Research Project

I, signed below _____

Full name and prisoner number

1. Declare and approve my participation out of my own free and good will, in a research regarding the subject of: ***The characteristics of security prisoners' leaders*** conducted by the researcher: *Ms. Sagit Yehoshua*
2. I declare that I am willing to be interviewed and to answer verbally or in writing the questions which the researcher will present to me.
3. I am aware that the research is anonymous.
4. I declare that I will not have any future claims against the IPS or the researcher with regards to my participation in this research or for anything relating to it.

_____ _____

Date Prisoner Signature

Appendix 4

Email Confirmation for Registration as Signatory to the Code of Conduct for Serendipitous Research at KCL

14 October 2011 10:23 Patterson, James [james.2.patterson@kcl.ac.uk] on behalf of kcl - sshl [sshl@kcl.ac.uk]

Dear Sagit,
Thank you for your e-mail.

I am pleased to confirm that you are registered as a signatory to the Code of Conduct for Serendipitous Research.

Yours sincerely,

James Patterson
Senior Research Ethics Officer
Research Ethics Office
King's College London
5.11 Franklin-Wilkins Building
(Waterloo Bridge Wing)
Stamford Street
LONDON SE1 9NH

Telephone: 020-7848-4077
E-mail: james.2.patterson@kcl.ac.uk

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Appendix 5

Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance from 1948

פקודת מניעת טרור

רבדים בחקיקה

עונשין ומשפט פלילי – עבירות – עבירות ביטחוניות

בטחון – טרור – מניעת טרור

תוכן עניינים

סעיף 1	פירושים	Go	10
סעיף 2	פעילות בארגון טרוריסטי	Go	10
סעיף 3	חברות בארגון טרוריסטי	Go	10
סעיף 4	תמיכה בארגון טרוריסטי	Go	10
סעיף 5	החרמת רכוש	Go	11
סעיף 6	סגירת מקומות פעולה וכו של ארגון טרוריסטי	Go	11
סעיף 7	הוכחה על קיום ארגון טרוריסטי	Go	11
סעיף 8	הכרזת הממשלה על ארגון כארגון טרוריסטי	Go	11
סעיף 9	הוכחה על חברות בארגון טרוריסטי	Go	11
סעיף 10	הוכחה על ידי פרסום של ארגון טרוריסטי	Go	11
סעיף 11	פסק דין — ראיה לכאורה	Go	11
סעיף 22	ביטול	Go	12
סעיף 23	ביצוע ותקנות	Go	12
סעיף 24	תחולה	Go	12
סעיף 25	שם	Go	12

פקודת מניעת טרור*

מס' 33 לש' תש"ח-1948

מועצת המדינה הזמנית מחוקקת בזה לאמור:

פירושים

1. "ארגון טרוריסטי" פירושו חבר אנשים המשתמש בפעולותיו במעשי אלימות העלולים לגרום למותו של אדם או לחבלתו, או באיומים במעשי אלימות כאלה;

"חבר בארגון טרוריסטי" פירושו אדם הנמנה עליו, וכולל אדם המשתתף בפעולותיו, המפרסם דברי תעמולה לטובת ארגון טרוריסטי, פעולותיו או מטרותיו, או אוסף כספים או חפצים לטובת ארגון טרוריסטי או פעולותיו.

פעילות בארגון טרוריסטי

2. אדם הממלא תפקיד בהנהלה או בהדרכה של ארגון טרוריסטי, או משתתף בדיוניו או בקבלת החלטותיו של ארגון טרוריסטי, או משמש חבר בבית דין של ארגון טרוריסטי, או נואם תעמולה באסיפה פומבית או ברדיו מטעם ארגון טרוריסטי, ייאשם בעבירה, ובצאתו חייב בדין, יהא צפוי לעונש מאסר עד עשרים שנה.

חברות בארגון טרוריסטי

3. אדם שהוא חבר בארגון טרוריסטי, ייאשם בעבירה, ובצאתו חייב בדין, יהא צפוי לעונש מאסר עד חמש שנים.

תמיכה בארגון טרוריסטי

4. אדם –

(תיקון מס' 4) תשס"ב-2002

(א) (בוטל);

(ב) המפרסם, בכתב או בעל פה, דברי שבח, אהדה או קריאה לעזרה או תמיכה בארגון טרוריסטי; או

(ג) המחזיק לטובת ארגון טרוריסטי בחומר תעמולה; או

(ד) הנותן כסף או שווה כסף לטובת ארגון טרוריסטי; או

(ה) המעמיד לרשות מישהו מקום כדי שמקום זה ישמש לארגון טרוריסטי או לחבריו, בקביעות או בהזדמנות מסויימת, מקום של פעולה, פגישה, תעמולה או מחסן; או

(ו) המעמיד לרשות מישהו חפץ כדי שחפץ זה ישמש לארגון טרוריסטי או לחבר בארגון טרוריסטי בביצוע פעולה מטעם הארגון הטרוריסטי;

(תיקון מס' 1) תש"ם-1980

(ז) או העושה מעשה שיש בו גילוי של הזדהות עם ארגון טרוריסטי או אהדה אליו, בהנפת דגל, בהצגת סמל או סיסמה או בהשמעת המנון או סיסמה, או כל מעשה גלוי דומה המגלה בבירור הזדהות או אהדה כאמור, והכל במקום ציבורי או באופן שאנשים הנמצאים במקום ציבורי יכולים לראות או לשמוע גילוי כזה של הזדהות או אהדה;

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* פורסמה ע"ר מס' 24 מיום 29.9.1948, תוס' א', עמ' 73.

תוקנה ס"ח תש"ם מס' 980 מיום 5.8.1980 עמ' 187 (ה"ח תש"ם מס' 1467 עמ' 296) – תיקון מס' 1.

ס"ח תשמ"ו מס' 1191 מיום 13.8.1986 עמ' 219 (ה"ח תשמ"ה מס' 1742 עמ' 248) – תיקון מס' 2.

ס"ח תשנ"ג מס' 1410 מיום 27.1.1993 עמ' 46 (ה"ח תשנ"ג מס' 2148 עמ' 32) – תיקון מס' 3.

ס"ח תשס"ב מס' 1845 מיום 22.5.2002 עמ' 411 (ה"ח תשס"ב מס' 3082 עמ' 286) – תיקון מס' 4 בסעיף 3 לחוק העונשין (תיקון מס' 66), תשס"ב-2002.

ס"ח תשס"ה מס' 2020 מיום 8.8.2005 עמ' 746 (ה"ח הממשלה תשס"ד מס' 77 עמ' 298) – תיקון מס' 5 [במקור מס' 4] בסעיף 25 לחוק בתי משפט לענינים מינהליים (תיקון מס' 15), תשס"ה-2005.

(ח) (בוטלה);

(תיקון מס' 3) תשנ"ג-1993

(תיקון מס' 3) תשנ"ג-1993

ייאשם בעבירה, ובצאתו חייב בדין, יהא צפוי לעונש מאסר עד שלוש שנים או לקנס עד 1000 לירות או לשני העונשים גם יחד.

החרמת רכוש

5. (א) כל רכוש של ארגון טרוריסטי, גם אם נרכש לפני פרסום פקודה זו בעתון הרשמי, יוחרם לטובת המדינה בפקודת בית משפט מחוזי.

(תיקון מס' 1) תש"ם-1980

(ב) כל רכוש הצפוי להחרמה לפי סעיף זה, יעוקל לפי החלטה בכתב של המפקח הכללי של משטרת ישראל.

(ג) כל רכוש הנמצא במקום המשמש לארגון טרוריסטי או לחבריו, בקביעות או בהזדמנות מסויימת, מקום של פעולה, פגישה, תעמולה או מחסן, וכן כל רכוש הנמצא בחזקתו או ברשותו של חבר בארגון טרוריסטי, ייחשב לרכושו של ארגון טרוריסטי, אלא אם יוכח ההיפך.

סגירת מקומות פעולה וכו' של ארגון טרוריסטי

6. (א) המפקח הכללי של משטרת ישראל, רשאי להחליט בכתב לסגור כל מקום המשמש לארגון טרוריסטי או לחבריו, בקביעות או בהזדמנות מסויימת, מקום של פעולה, פגישה, תעמולה או מחסן; משניתנה החלטה כאמור, רשאי כל מפקח משטרה לבצעה.

(תיקון מס' 1)

(תיקון מס' 5) תשס"ה-2005

(ב) (בוטל).

הוכחה על קיום ארגון טרוריסטי

7. כדי להוכיח, בכל דיון משפטי, שחבר אנשים מסויים הוא ארגון טרוריסטי, יספיק להוכיח כי –

(א) מטעם אותו חבר אנשים או בפקודתו ביצע אחד או יותר מחבריו בכל זמן שהוא לאחר ה' באייר תש"ח (14 במאי 1948) מעשי אלימות העלולים לגרום למותו של אדם או לחבלתו, או איומים במעשי אלימות כאלה; או

(ב) חבר האנשים, או אחד או יותר מחבריו מטעמו או בפקודתו, הכריז שאותו חבר אנשים אחראי למעשי אלימות העלולים לגרום למותו של אדם או לחבלתו, או לאיומים במעשי אלימות כאלה, או שהכריז שחבר האנשים היה מעורב במעשי אלימות או איומים כאלה, בתנאי שמעשי האלימות או האיומים נעשו אחרי ה' באייר תש"ח (14 במאי 1948).

הכרזת הממשלה על ארגון כארגון טרוריסטי

8. אם תכריז הממשלה, בהודעה ברשומות, שחבר אנשים מסויים הנו ארגון טרוריסטי, תשמש ההודעה הוכחה בכל דיון משפטי, כי אותו חבר אנשים הוא ארגון טרוריסטי, אלא אם יוכח ההיפך.

הוכחה על חברות בארגון טרוריסטי

9. (א) אם יוכח שאדם היה בכל זמן שהוא לאחר ה' באייר תש"ח (14 במאי 1948) חבר בארגון טרוריסטי מסויים, ייחשב אותו אדם לחבר באותו ארגון טרוריסטי, אלא אם יוכח שחדל מלהיות חבר בו.

(ב) אדם הנמצא במקום אשר משמש לארגון טרוריסטי או לחבריו מקום של פעולה, פגישה או מחסן, ייחשב לחבר בארגון טרוריסטי, אלא אם יוכח שמסיבות הימצאו באותו מקום אינן מצדיקות מסקנה זו.

הוכחה על ידי פרסום של ארגון טרוריסטי

10. לשם הרשעתו של נאשם לפי פקודה זו, וכן לצרכי החרמתו של רכוש לפי פקודה זו, מותר לקבל כל דבר שנראה מתוכו כי פורסם על ידי ארגון טרוריסטי או מטעמו, בכתב או בעל פה, כראיה לעובדות שהובאו בו.

פסק דין – ראיה לכאורה

(תיקון מס' 1) תש"ם-1980

11. אם נקבע בפסק דין סופי כי חבר אנשים מסויים הנו ארגון טרוריסטי, ייחשב פסק הדין בכל דיון משפטי אחר ראיה לכאורה שאותו חבר אנשים הנו

ארגון טרוריסטי.

(תיקון מס׳ 1) תש"ם-1980

12. עד 21. (בוטלו).

ביטול

22. תקנות-שעת-חרום למניעת טרור, תש"ח-1948, בטלות, אולם ביטולן אינו פוגע בכל הכרזה או הודעה שניתנה או פעולה אחרת שנעשתה על פיהן ואינו מפטר אדם מעונש שהוא התחייב בו על פיהן.

ביצוע ותקנות

23. שר המשפטים ממונה על ביצוע פקודה זו, והוא רשאי להתקין תקנות בכל ענין הנוגע לביצועה.

(תיקון מס׳ 1) תש"ם-1980

תחולה

24. פקודה זו לא תחול אלא בתקופה שקיים במדינה מצב של חירום בתוקף אכרזה לפי סעיף 9 לפקודת סדרי השלטון והמשפט, תש"ח-1948.

(תיקון מס׳ 1) תש"ם-1980

שם

25. פקודה זו תיקרא בשם "פקודת מניעת טרור, תש"ח-1948".

י"ט באלול תש"ח (23 בספטמבר 1948) דוד בן-גוריון ראש הממשלה ושר הבטחון פליכס רוזנבליט שר המשפטים

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Appendix 6

PCL-SV Item Description

Item Descriptions

The PCL:SV items are defined below. These definitions are brief, comprising a number of simple statements ordered roughly in descending order of importance and frequency (prototypicality). However, as discussed earlier, raters should not use the item definitions as a simple checklist. Instead, they should use the entire item description to form an impression (prototype) in their minds, then compare the individual being rated to the prototype. Once raters have assessed someone who matches an item description very well, that individual can serve as an exemplar for the item; it may be helpful to conjure up a mental image of that person while rating the item in question. Also, because PCL:SV items are derived from the twenty-item PCL-R, the user would benefit from familiarisation with the scoring criteria from the PCL-R items.

Item 1: Superficial

This item describes an individual whose interactional style appears superficial (i.e., glib) to others. Usually, the individual tries to make a favourable impression on others by "shamming" emotions, telling stories that portray him/her in a good light, and making unlikely excuses for undesirable behaviours. He/she may use unnecessary — frequently

inappropriate — jargon. Despite its superficiality, the individual's style may be considered engaging. Alternatively, the individual may try to impress others by appearing sullen, hostile, or "macho." Still, the key aspect is that this presentation appears affected and superficial. Both types of individuals are "slippery" in conversation; when challenged with facts that contradict their statements or with inconsistencies in their statements, they simply change their stories.

Item 2: Grandiose

Individuals who score high on this item are often described as grandiose or as braggarts. They have an inflated view of themselves and their abilities. They appear self-assured and opinionated in the interview (a situation where most people are somewhat reticent or deferential). If they are in hospital or prison, they attribute their unfortunate circumstances to external forces (bad luck, the "system") rather than to themselves. Consequently, they are relatively concerned about their present circumstances and worry little about the future. (Note that psychotic delusions are irrelevant to the scoring of this item, unless they are accompanied by the other characteristics listed.)

Item 3: Deceitful

People with this characteristic commonly engage in lying, deception, and other manipulations in order to achieve their own personal goals (money, sex, power, etc.). They lie and deceive with self-assurance and no apparent anxiety. They may admit that they enjoy conning and deceiving others; they may even label themselves "fraud artists."

Item 4: Lacks Remorse

High scores on this item are given to individuals who appear to lack the capacity for guilt. It is normal to feel justified in having hurt someone on at least a few occasions; however, high scorers on this item appear to have no conscience whatsoever. Some of these latter individuals will verbalise

remorse but in an insincere manner; others will display little emotion about their own actions or the impact they had on others and will focus instead on their own suffering. (In scoring this item, it is necessary to take the nature of the individual's harmful behaviours into account. Clearly, a lack of remorse concerning relatively trivial acts may not be pathological.)

Item 5: Lacks Empathy

This item describes individuals who have little affective bonding with others and are unable to appreciate the emotional consequences (positive or negative) of their actions. As a result, they may appear cold and callous, unable to experience strong emotions, and indifferent to the feelings of others. Alternatively, they may express their emotions, but these emotional expressions are shallow and labile. The verbal and nonverbal aspects of their emotion may appear inconsistent.

Item 6: Doesn't Accept Responsibility

People who score high on this item avoid taking personal responsibility for their harmful actions by rationalising their behaviour, greatly minimising the consequences for others, or even denying the actions altogether. Most of their rationalisations involve the projection of blame (or at least partial blame) onto the victim or onto circumstances. Minimisations usually involve denying that the victim suffered any serious or direct physical, emotional, or financial consequences. Denial usually involves claiming innocence, that is, that the victim lied or the individual was framed; alternatively, he/she may claim amnesia due to substance use or to physical or mental illness.

Item 7: Impulsive

This item describes people who act without considering the consequences of their actions. They act on the spur of the moment, often as the result of a desire for risk and excitement. They may be easily bored and have a

short attention span. Consequently, they lead a lifestyle characterised by instability in school, relationships, employment, and place of residence.

Item 8: Poor Behavioural Controls

This item describes people who are easily angered or frustrated; this may be exacerbated by the use of alcohol or drugs. They are frequently verbally abusive (e.g., they swear, insult, or make threats) and physically abusive (e.g., they break or throw things; push, slap, or punch others). The abuse may appear to be sudden and unprovoked. These angry outbursts are often short-lived.

Item 9: Lacks Goals

High scores on this item are given to those who do not have realistic long-term plans and commitments. Such people tend to live their lives "day-to-day," not thinking of the future. They may have relied excessively on family, friends, and social assistance for financial support. They often have poor academic and employment records. When asked about their goals for the future, they may describe far-fetched plans or schemes.

Item 10: Irresponsible

This item describes people who exhibit behaviour that frequently causes hardship to others or puts others at risk. They tend to be unreliable as a spouse or parent; they lack commitment to relationships, fail to care adequately for their children, and so forth. Also, their job performance is inadequate; they are frequently late or absent without good reason, etc. Finally, they are untrustworthy with money; they have been in trouble for such things as defaulting on loans, not paying bills, or not paying child support.

Item 11: Adolescent Antisocial Behaviour

People who score high on this item had serious conduct problems as an adolescent. These problems were not limited to only one setting (i.e., occurred at home, at school, and in the community) and were not

simply the result of childhood abuse or neglect (e.g., running away to avoid beatings, stealing food when it wasn't available at home). Such people frequently were in trouble with the law as a youth or minor, and their antisocial activities were varied, frequent, and persistent.

Item 12: Adult Antisocial Behaviour

This item describes people who frequently violate formal, explicit rules and regulations. They have had legal problems as an adult, including charges or convictions for criminal offenses. Their antisocial activities are varied, frequent, and persistent.

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Appendix 7

Table of Percentile Ranks for PCL-SV Total and Factor Scores

Percentile Ranks — Example B

The HARE PCL:SV

S.D. Hart, D.N. Cox, & R.D. Hare

Percentile Ranks for PCL:SV Total and Factor Scores

Forensic/Non Psychiatric (N = 149)

Total	Percentile	Part 1	Part 2
24	100.0		
23	99.3		
22	98.0		
21	96.0		
20	89.9		
19	81.9		
18	75.8		
17	69.8		
16	58.4		
15	51.7		
14	38.9		
13	35.6		
12	29.5	100.0	100.0
11	24.8	96.0	91.9
10	20.1	92.6	73.8
9	16.1	84.6	52.3
8	11.4	74.5	40.3
7	8.1	63.1	28.9
6	6.7	49.7	19.5
5	4.7	36.2	14.1
4	3.4	26.2	10.1
3	0.7	17.4	6.7
2	0.0	13.4	3.4
1	0.0	6.7	1.3
0	0.0	1.3	0.7

Forensic/Psychiatric (N = 120)

Total	Percentile	Part 1	Part 2
24	100.0		
23	100.0		
22	100.0		
21	96.7		
20	91.7		
19	83.3		
18	78.3		
17	70.8		
16	62.5		
15	54.2		
14	42.5		
13	31.7		
12	29.2	100.0	100.0
11	20.0	96.3	95.8
10	15.0	93.3	83.3
9	10.8	83.3	65.0
8	5.8	72.5	45.8
7	1.7	60.0	30.8
6	0.8	48.3	22.5
5	0.8	30.0	10.0
4	0.0	17.5	4.2
3	0.0	10.8	0.0
2	0.0	3.3	0.0
1	0.0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Non Criminal/Non Psychiatric Undergrads (N = 100)

Total	Percentile	Part 1	Part 2
24	100.0		
23	100.0		
22	100.0		
21	100.0		
20	100.0		
19	100.0		
18	100.0		
17	100.0		
16	100.0		
15	100.0		
14	99.0		
13	98.0		
12	98.0	100.0	100.0
11	98.0	100.0	100.0
10	97.0	100.0	100.0
9	95.0	100.0	100.0
8	95.0	99.0	98.0
7	90.0	99.0	98.0
6	86.0	99.0	98.0
5	81.0	97.0	96.0
4	75.0	94.0	91.0
3	62.0	89.0	79.0
2	53.0	82.0	70.0
1	34.0	65.0	52.0
0	17.0	41.0	22.0

Civil/Psychiatric (N = 217)

Total	Percentile	Part 1	Part 2
24	100.0		
23	100.0		
22	99.5		
21	96.8		
20	94.9		
19	92.2		
18	90.8		
17	88.0		
16	84.3		
15	77.4		
14	74.7		
13	70.0		
12	66.4	100.0	100.0
11	62.7	99.1	94.9
10	57.1	97.7	88.5
9	51.2	92.6	82.9
8	47.0	88.5	72.8
7	41.5	84.3	63.6
6	34.1	76.3	54.4
5	27.7	71.0	44.2
4	24.0	61.3	35.9
3	16.6	53.5	28.1
2	12.0	44.7	19.4
1	6.5	30.0	11.1
0	4.1	13.8	6.5

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